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ABSTRACT 
"Asian values" is more than the articulation of cultural difference; its propositions 
of "Asian Capitalism" and "Asian Democracy" indicate a project to legitimise 
particular economic and political structures that have come under challenge. 
While capitalism and authoritarianism may have elective affinity, the "end of 
history" thesis argues that contradictions in late-capitalism would threaten 
authoritarianism and propel societies towards liberal democracy. Singapore's 
"Asian Democracy" is significant in its ability to detour at history's end and to re- 
amalgamate authoritarianism with (late)-capitalism. 
"Asian Values, " by emphasising communitarianism and consensus over conflict, 
creates a normative centre that guides media policy, civil society and inter- 
personal interactions. Good Asian citizens value prosperity over Western dreams 
(of non-consensual democracy). They also subordinate personal whims to the 
good of the community - the "silent (Asian) majority. " By allowing ideological 
pluralism without fragmentation, "Asian values" de-legitimises dissent and 
legitimises authoritarianism. 
The Singapore one-party government's hegemony is based less on belief than on 
rhetorical compliance, which is reproduced through a combination of consent, 
consensus and coercion. Coercion (authoritarianism) is tolerated or consented to 
upon a consensus that it is worthwhile to trade freedom for prosperity and that 
there are no viable alternatives. Fuelled by personal desire for prosperity and 
pressurised by social expectations, citizens privatise/subordinate their dissent, 
producing an aura of public support for the government. This appearance of 
ideological unity crucially accords one-party governments the legitimacy to claim 
to represent the nation and deny multi-party representation. 
Despite the importance of economic legitimacy to the Singapore government, an 
economic crisis is not necessarily an ideological/hegemonic crisis because it is 
the hope rather than the reality of prosperity that sustains its hegemony. This 
relative autonomy from econpmic conditions, together with its anti-pluralism 
nature and its claim of cultural legitimacy makes "Asian Values" a superlative 
ideology for the evolution of government authoritarianism into soft/popular 
authoritarianism, thereby enabling Asian Democracy to carve a new trajectory 
and spark off a resurgence of authoritarianism. 
3 
MAP OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 
SUUTHEAS t ASIA 
Chengdu Wuhan r ''e: " 
HAflSZhd 
tý 'rt, Choniglni i.. 
A" 
"I 
sons Ninchl 
"! 
yi,. ý ". 
it. " "% 
(j=: 11 ji Li Changsha "'l. 
ýi?;, 
ICU 
Fuzhou INDIA " 
, 
"f wo-htlue lindala . ý"'l: 
ý', "Nannln ý' " 
Hong It9n4 }A. R 
4.1 
A1ýV 
A' tý "" 
Franö* an äÄlß 
p'"" (, Sit[ "'. y" 
iý 
", 
f '1 alphon tl, i, t 
a 
4t t 
Ch am i" F. 4r 
nb 
e Holman 
Ra go n ! y( 
basset "4 Hý r{ 
Hut PA NC05 
loutmct t' "'" , Na hon 
ý" Da Nang , ý" 
Jt "^"' ;. Ratchastmaý I. V "" 
: 1A: i 
Tav tI 
6. w, 24d " 
ngkok Fý . 
South 
KA t'4 SO IAvha 
A° 
VOS 
an Chbu "x" 
rR , ý"" 
` Ph"° EHIL 
An, G, rsn I Ho Ch tlnh 
Sfi -"c "s 
try 
hanghal flrt a JArAM 
i ü 
ýCl : v 
.Sv 
6 
iw 
Obýw+ ' y ISLAMn 
Nähaý a 
a' a Taipei anE 4ý f w+a Ho. t, .I " { ISLA MS 
___ 
ý' Trcpi. N Cantor 
.................. .... Taiwan 
" 
Ok Iu1 
aq f 
" . 1- 
4VAn1 
711 
"" MASMAN 65A NO! 
Philippine 
Sea 
1poITa 
" w: r, ýr -Lon ,. wises. l 
" T"4 YfA 
" 
SpA T1Y """ Ne/ra "" RD. TAT 5 Of 
wuos+/ 
Y ýýISýArDS. s, du lea 
fig'''ýýýan de Oro 
.4 "a 
, Vie` e nd4nä KK 
0`MSIA % rof piuket Songkhla .o "2a 
bong. v r' 
Koror 
ava 
George To Sandar, äer, ota 
Inabal "y"' 
Banda Meg* 
j IPA, * Begawan. 
rf ý.., " PAI All 
'P YSIA UWE !, t'f :. "N or th " 
eda 
Celebes 
" 
It. K% ual Lumpur 
IN77"Uv. r. " lA': %Pacific 
iý SA ttcýI ", r0CZ 11 hla" flwtulut """d GZr r,, ýMn (Bo.,, ne 
ee .. d 
/u4wNwr\J ý -ýU't°AlOitt ýý ýps! ý%" M,, tuaa 
ý'ýM 
E. , 
" 
tlana ýN 
,ýr . 
Samarlnda" 
ý. +e' >tlu 
ý' ka 
,b 
ºde"fl6win 
ý'f: 
'Sumatrau 
ýT' 
." 
`V, '. ýý, ., " ý" Q 
Soronjý 
. -Cs 
O 9i 
. fý 
r" ;ý) fas K 
aE 
ULAUAS 
,'W 
t' 
6n armasi0 ."... , 
ý`'ý 
"ýayapu 
ry^Patemb j /ý ' ý"' endart 
I 
TV ' wiriäý,. 
It 
g 
" 
Tan 
uR 
ranj Javagta Uýungpand 
/w 
N 'Gi+lnea 
" arm' IND0N E° %. IA »a, ýa stx ,ý ,r f. tuw. taý' gran wies tLm, xý AAU o 
B yn "'. "'law ur bay , lm b1 -_""x 
, Valuta Merau 
Utnpaür } fwiava " E++ýTirnor sea 
Christmas Wan4 Mit L L4. 
' 
iwo6e 
Kupans r lutr 
rKAU do 
cow 
_ýý 
Tunt " &y c4 f a%camy 
wan" 
1MO+*Aw 
Indian Ocean 
Scale 1: 32,000,000 at 5"N 
Mercator Projedlon 
_0 
$00 Kilometers 
ILIJ11J 
0 300 Ulks 
Ownd. ry r. pm. nurae i as eeeaunly wthwlu0v .AJ 
Na" In VMaum are ahowe without dxrlneal mart. 
100 
-Ne 
Ashmore and Darwin 
Catbv Islands r" 
WSTRALMI 
"'. AUSTRALIA"". x 
" . '- Por Hedland 
GREAT SANDY 
_" Karratna 
Mount W 
DESERT 
602696/ß (Rc2106)4-00 
Source: http: //www. lib. utexas/edu/maps/ 
4 
Singapore: Basic Social and Economic Data 
(Figures are accurate as of 2000 unless otherwise indicated) 
Land area 
Population, population density 
Average annual population growth 
Urban population 
Ethnic groups (% of population) 
Official languages 
Median age 
Life expectancy (1998) 
Infant mortality (1998) 
Doctors 
683.7 sq km 
4.018 million, 5885 persons/sq km 
1.7 
100% 
Chinese (76.8), Malays (13.9), Indians (7.9%), Others (1) 
English, Mandarin, Malay, Tamil 
34 
75 (male), 79 (female) 
4.1 (per 1000 live births) 
14 (per 1000) 
Education 
Primary enrolments 305,992 
Secondary enrolments 176,132 
Pre-University enrolments 99323 
University enrolments 49856 
Adult literacy rate (%) 93 
Labour 
Labour participation rate 
Unemployment rate 
Occupational distribution (% of lat 
Admin & managerial 
Professional & technical 
Clerical, sales & services 
Production &, related 
Economy 
GDP 
Per capita GNP 
Real economic growth rate (%) 
Productivity growth (%) 
Inflation rate (%) 
Official foreign reserves 
Domestic government debt 
68.6% (Male 78%, Female 51 % 
3.5 
)our force) 
11.37 
22.79 
20.23 
38.67 
Communications 
Circulation of daily newspapers (1997) 
I 
Circulation of daily newspapers (1996) 
TV receivers (1997) 
TV licenses issued 
Cable Vision subscribers 
Radio receivers (1996) 
Main telephone lines (1998) 
Internet hosts (1999) 
159 billion (US$94.08 billion) 
42,212 (US$ 24978) 
9.9 
5.6 
1.3 
139,260 million (US$ 82402 million) 
134,370 million (US$ 79508 million) 
1,087,551 (49.1% English, 43.9% Mandarin, 6.2% Malay, 
0.8% Tamil) 
32.4 (per 100) 
29.2 (per 100) 
89% of households 
14% of households 
73.9 (per 100) 
54.29 (per 100) 
259.84 (per 10000) 
Sources: Singapore Department of Statistics (2001) Singapore in figures 2001. Shelton A. 
Gunaratne (2000) "Overview" in Handbook of the media in Asia, edited by S. Gunaratne, New 
Delhi: Sage. Gary Rodan (1997) The political economy of Southeast Asia. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press. 
5 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AV Asian Values 
AWSJ Asian Wall Street Journal 
BS Barisan Socialis 
CC Community Centre 
CMIO Chinese, Malay, Indians, Others 
CPF Central Provident Fund 
DARG Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric Group at Loughborough University 
DPM Deputy Prime Minister 
EOI Export-Oriented Industrialisation 
EEC (former) European Economic Community 
EP Elected President 
FEER Far Eastern Economic Review 
FT Financial Times 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
GRC Group Representative Constituency 
ISA Ideological State Apparatus 
ISI Import-Substitution Industrialisation 
IT Information Technology 
JBJ Jeyaretnam, the "Father of Singapore Opposition" 
LF The Labour Front, dominant party in pre-Independent Singapore 
LKY Lee Kwan-Yew, "Father of Singapore" 
MCP Malayan Communist Party 
MITA Ministry of Information and the Arts 
MP Member of Parliament 
NCMP Non-Constituency Member of Parliament 
NIE Newly Industrialising Economy 
NMP Nominated Member of Parliament 
NTUC National Trade Union Congress 
NYT New York Times 
OB Out-of-Bounds 
PAP The People's Action Party, dominant party in Singapore 
PM Prime Minister 
PRO Public Relations Officers 
RK Religious Knowledge Programme 
RSA Repressive State Apparatus 
SBA Singapore Broadcasting Authority 
SCMP South China Morning Post 
SMC Speak Mandarin Campaign 
ST Straits Times, Singapore's national English daily 
SV Shared Values 
UMNO United Malay National Organisation, dominant party in Malaysia 
WW2 World War Two 
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CHAPTER 1 NOT THE END OF HISTORY: 
ASIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE RE-AMALGAMATION OF 
AUTHORITARIANISM AND LATE-CAPITALISM 
1 A. THE END OF HISTORY AND THE UN-DISMISSABLE COUNTER-EXAMPLE 
OF SINGAPORE 
Grand claims have been made about the superiority and inevitability of liberal 
democracy. Liberal democracy was seen as a superior mode of organising and 
prospering society because it was believed to provide a check against corrupt 
authoritarian governments. Liberal democracy was also seen as a more perfect 
embodiment of equality and freedom than other types of democracies and political 
organisations. 
Liberal democracy has also been seen as inevitable, especially for developed 
economies, since "prosperity brings democracy" (DeBary 1998,150). 1 Fukuyama 
(1992) predicted the end of history and the triumph of liberal democracy over other 
forms in late-capitalism through increasing institutional, and ideological 
convergence globally. Modernisation theories subscribed to a milder form of 
economic determinism by highlighting the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between market economy and liberal democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986) 
or the emergence of a middle-class that would exert pressure on non-liberal states 
(Paul 1992,10). 
With the miraculous economic growth of non-democratic Newly Industrialising 
Economies(NIEs), modernisation theorists were forced to refine or concede their 
'Cf. Robison, Hewison and Rodan (1993) for an excellent review of theories about 
political forms in capitalist societies. Briefly, in the 1 950s/1 960s, modernization 
theories/hopes of post-colonialism ushering in democracy were crushed by a communist 
wave across the third world. This theory was replaced by the (tautological) theory that 
authoritarianism blocks democracy. Meanwhile, American Marxists, referencing Marx and 
Weber's orientalist beliefs about the Asiatic mode of (pre-capitalist) production, argued 
that capitalism could generate authoritarianism and socialism, and not only democracy. 
Indeed, some even observed that perhaps certain authoritarian societies lacked the 
cultural "roots" for democracy. E. g., Barrington-Moore observed that Latin America has 
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theory. One camp (Zou 1991,115; Castells 1988,3-4; Rodan 1993b; Harris 1986) 
argued that authoritarianism/centralisation was necessary for new/young states to 
kick-start their economies. However, they argued that, In time, contradictions 
between late-capitalism and authoritarianism would trigger the 
"evolution/transition" into liberal democracies. A second camp (Pye and Pye 1985; 
Rodan 1993c, 1996a, 2; Dahl 1966,1973), while conceding that liberal democracy 
was not inevitable, continued to rely on it as the standard for classifying states as 
democratic or "pseudo-democratic" and for investigating factors that "complicate[d] 
the forward march of democracy. " 
According to these theories, Singapore, especially, should have become a liberal 
democracy. Having outperformed all other Asian NIEs and being an extremely 
successful and "advanced" (late-capitalist information) society, Singapore's 
success made it a highly visible and un-dismiss-able counterexample. Additionally, 
Singapore was also the staunchest critic of liberal democracy and the initiator of 
an alternative "Asian Democracy" trajectory. 
Singapore has the world's second highest average rate of GDP growth2 (6.3% for 
1970-19953) and is ranked as the world's freest economy along with Hong Kong 
(SCMP 1/12/2000). It has the highest foreign reserves per capita In the world (Paul 
1992,6) and a GNP that surpasses some EEC's (Castells 1988); for almost a 
decade, it held unbroken records as the world's busiest port and best airline. 
Such phenomenal success has been achieved through exposing itself to Western 
influences. Having 
. no agricultural 
industry and a small domestic market, economic 
growth is entirely dependent on international trade and investments (Castells 
1988,3-7). Despite having the world's highest savings rate (Vogel 1989,1049; 
Castells 1988,6), its industrial production is wholly foreign-owned. Foreigners 
democracy because of the presence of strong bourgeoisie (church and hacienda 
feudalism) while Asia lacked civil society and required revolution from above. 2 In year 2000, during the Asian economic crisis, Singapore achieved a 10.1% growth in 
GDP (http: //www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbookn. 3 Cf. http: //wbinOO18. worldbank. org/psd/compete. nsf/ 
7349593d593389e88525648f00641829? OpenView 
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generate three quarters of all manufacturing investments and own more than 30% 
of its GDP (Paul 1992,5-6). Because economic survival is tied to Singapore's 
competitiveness internationally, industrial and political harmony were seen as 
essential for Singapore to remain "one of the safest and most profitable locations 
in the world" (O'Leary and Coplin 1983; Lim and Pang 1991,72). Singapore's 
economy was so aligned with MNC's interests that Singapore has been described 
as "an offshore centre for foreign capital" (Yoshihara 1988,71) and "a stable and 
efficient vehicle for the Western exploitation of Southeast Asia" (Mirza 1986,73). 
Socially, Singapore's standard of living is second only to Japan's in Asia. Its 
income inequality is higher than other NIEs - Rodan (1993b, 54-55) estimates that 
only one quarter of the workforce is middle-class. There is no unemployment and 
a large majority owns homes. Education is generally affordable and health 
standards are high - Singapore has the same infant mortality rate and life 
expectancy as the USA and UK. With English as the first language in school and 
the national working language, Singapore is "soft-shelled" (Pakir 1993,82)- and 
highly vulnerable to Western influences. Living in an urban environment with 
prosperity and high literacy (93% in 2000), and in the world's third best home 
(Forbes magazine 1996), Singaporeans are active media users with a high 
exposure to foreign media. Despite having the smallest population in Asia, it 
constitutes the largest single-country market in Asia for Far Eastern Economic 
Review (FEER) and second largest market for Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ). 
The Singapore government has been described as authoritarian; it "has the forms 
of democracy but the reality is dictatorship" (Friedman in Paul 1992,1). Hitchcock 
(1994,10) considers it noteworthy that Singapore, "in many ways the most 
advanced country in the region after Japan, " is listed in the company of Vietnam, 
China, North Korea and Myanmar as states that do not endorse a Union of Civil 
Liberty. 
What is problematic for Western myths is that the Singapore government is not 
only authoritarian but also hegemonic. "Although clearly authoritarian, Singapore is 
not a dictatorship but a hegemonic state, in the Gramscian sense... it is based not 
13 
simply on coercion, but also on consensus" (Castells 1988,78). Singapore's ability 
to push through tough policies without crippling political costs Is envied by Taiwan 
and Hong Kong (DeBary 1998,3); its unique combination of openness and 
regulation is studied and praised by Chinese Premiers Deng and Jiang 
(ST1 3/7/1992); Blair highlighted Singapore as the best illustration of the parallel 
achievements on economic success and social cohesion (FT10/1/1996). 
Revised modernisation theories argue that late-capitalism requires hegemonic 
governance rather than authoritarianism, assuming that authoritarian governments 
are not hegemonic. While this may be true for some third world governments, the 
Singapore government is extremely stable and hegemonic. Despite Its 
authoritarianism, Singapore has been ranked among the top five countries for 
political stability and its current regime is seen as being "likely to continue 
indefinitely (O'Leary and Coplin 1983,21), i. e., the end of history or 
authoritarianism is nowhere in sight. 
Singapore's significance can be appreciated if we consider how much easier it 
would be to emulate the Western model than to "swim against the tide. " Most 
states accept the hegemony of Western democracy-they either emulate it or 
justify its absence to avoid international sanctions. E. g., Japan and Korea are 
generally seen as representative democracies despite lapses while the Philippines 
tries to be one. Singapore could have easily followed suit. Huntington (1991,108; 
Rodan 1996a, 17) notes that "if he had wanted to, a political leader far less skilled 
than Lee Kwan Yew (henceforth, LKY) could have produced democracy In 
Singapore. " Instead, Singapore denounces the Western model as Irrelevant and 
inferior and initiates an alternative "Asian democracy" trajectory of political 
evolution. 
The difficulty and ambition of the Asian democracy project should not be 
underestimated. "Asian democracy" criticises not only the inferiority of Western 
democracy but also the West's monopoly over representations (West=democratic, 
Rest=un/pseudo-democratic). While many state were content to internalise this 
Western gaze and perform self-Orientaiisation (Cf. Morley and Robins 1995 on 
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Japan's self "techno-orientalism"), Singapore refuses it and insists on 
defining/representing itself and its Others. Through "Asian Values" (henceforth 
AV), the West is occidentalised (Ang and Stratton 1997,2). Democracy is argued 
to "lead to contention and political instability" while "an authoritarian but benign 
government could be a better vehicle to achieve development" (Ambassador Koh 
in Hitchcock 1994,2). 
Singapore's "Asian Democracy" discourse is remarkable because it provides 
cultural legitimacy' and an aura of regional solidarity against the West. While 
many states could have resisted the Western model in private, "Asian Democracy' 
rallies Asian solidarity against the West. Asian states can now legitimise their 
"deviance" as a cultural/regional trait. 
The "Asian democracy" discourse has been extremely successful. It gained 
worldwide attention and forced the US to concede its monopoly over 
representation and to re-frame its foreign policy away from universal human rights. 
to a more relativistic (and economically based) framework of "good governance, " a 
term promoted by Tommy Koh, Singapore Ambassador to the UN (Robison 1996, 
319). Secondly, a "third way, " an amalgam of social conservatism and neo- 
liberalism, has emerged. Markets are not seen as the cause of the breakdown of 
traditional values; markets and conservative values can co-exist (Giddens 1994a, 
27-41). Reagan and Thatcher coaxed workers to emulate Asian conservatism 
(Times of London 1/12/1997; NYT 23/11/1997), agreeing that "too much 
democracy impedes economic growth... conservative values should guide social 
life ... strong states are required to. contain threats to law and order" (Robison 
1996,321). 
As an argument that emerged during "the Pacific Century'- a period of Western 
economic recessions and Asian renaissance - the sustainability of "Asian 
Democracy" depends on the relative economic performance of Asia and the West 
rather than its ideological content. Not surprisingly, the Asian economic crisis 
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(July1997) ushered in a period of self-questioning and "Reformasi; " citizens 
questioned if AV was equivalent to "KKN" (Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism) in 
disguise. While many Asian states had to concede that AV was vulnerable to 
nepotism (Time 16/03/1998), Singapore, being less affected, could legitimately 
continue to champion AV without embarrassment. 
If the legitimacy of AV is dependent on economic performance, how then are we to 
understand its meaning - as a cultural trait or as a political artefact? 
1 B. THE MYTH OF CIVILISATIONAL CLASH: BEYOND A CULTURALIST 
UNDERSTANDING OF ASIAN DEMOCRACY 
There is an apparent difference between Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis and 
Huntington's "clash of civilisations" thesis. While Fukuyama predicts international 
cultural and political convergence (towards liberal democracy), Huntington (1993) 
observes increasing cultural and political divergence or clashes between nation- 
states from different civilisation groups. 
Their difference is in the degree of optimism in cultural determinism and in the 
ability of the Western forms to influence the Rest. Huntington observes that, "a 
West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the 
desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. " He 
fears for the weakening of the Western civilisation, as evident in its moral decline 
(suicide, single parenthood, individualism)5, in the face of the corresponding 
strengthening of non-Western civilisations as they increasingly try to "return to 
[their] roots. "6 While Huntington is pessimistic about the triumph and international 
influence of Western cultural-political forms, Fukuyama argues that whether 
4 Such "regional" culturalist arguments have been used to justify Japan's WWII invasion to 
create a pan-Asia empire in the name of regional solidarity (Hitchcock 1994,3). 
Note Huntington's selective definition of Western culture as Christianity rather than as 
liberalism, of which these Indicators of "moral decline" could then be conversely 
interpreted as the presence of healthy liberalism. 
6 Huntington cites further the "Asianisation" of Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the 
"Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western Ideas of socialism and nationalism and 
hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and a debate over Westernisation versus 
Russianisation in Yeltsin's country. 
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civilisations like it or not, social-economic contradictions in late-capitalism will 
trigger off pressures towards liberal democracy. 
Despite these differences, both share the epistemological premise that there are 
essential cultural/civilisation differences between the West and the Rest and that 
Western cultural influences, which are clearly distinguishable from non-Western 
cultures, are either resisted or adapted to by the Rest. Fukuyama, despite 
believing that economic forces will triumph over cultural forces, acknowledged that 
non-Western cultures do try to resist their Western destiny, citing "Asian 
Democracy" as a case in point. S 
The problems with their approach is that they ignore that culture can be actively 
constructed by states; i. e., that cultures are not organic, authentic entities that 
propels social change while remaining themselves unchanged. Additionally, their 
insistence on distinct (dichotomous) and essential cultures contradicts with their 
difficulties in articulating just what "Western" and "Asian" civilisations mean. For 
instance, AV has emerged as the West's attempts to explain the economic 
miracles of the Asian Tiger economies and was selectively traced (to provide the 
greatest distinction from Western values) to Confucianism - the Asian (Protestant) 
work ethic. It has also been confused with (Asian states' ideologies of) 
comMunitarianism. 7 Huntington and Fukuyama are not alone in conflating 
Confucianism with communitarianism, most economists and political scientists 
(Leary 1990; Chua 1995; Vogel 1989) do not distinguish between them. 
That "Asian-ness" arose to explain economic performance suggests that AV is a 
postulate (hypothesised category) rather an entity that its advocates are interested 
in for its own sake. Indeed, DeBary (1998,2) argues that the consciousness of a 
shared Asian identity emerged only in modernity. Additionally, what is frequently 
identified as "Asian-ness" is often simply state ideologies rather than popular 
everyday practices or mass civilisation (Cf. Leavis 1930 on "mass civilisation and 
7 Later, I will argue that it is because there is a significant difference between 
Confucianism (competitiveness) and communitarianism that they are used to supplement 
each other. 
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minority culture"). Armentrout (AWSJ 08/11/1995) observes that in Asia, civil 
servants have "the mistaken notion that they embody the cultures they are 
charged with representing at world gatherings. " Should analysts take on Raymond 
Williams' understanding of culture as ordinary and take a close look at everyday 
popular practices, they would be stumped, as Pertierra (1999,280) and Mauzy 
(1997,216) were, by Asia's heterogeneity. 8 Leary (1990,13-15) notes that every 
region except Asia had been able to establish some cultural commonality upon 
which to found a regional system of human rights. Even Huntington, a descrier of 
clashing civilisations, concedes that he could not find a common Asian 
culture/civilisation, only irreducible differences. 
Besides being extremely heterogeneous, Asia's "characteristics" are also not 
unique. Contrary to Chua (1995), DeBary (1998,11-12) argues that 
communitarianism is not exclusive to Asia but also underlined 19th Century 
Western liberalism and 20th Century socialism. Malaysian PM Mahathir (1 995a) 
and Ward (1995,33) argue that AV is a reinvention of inherited colonial values, 
particularly "the patriarchal and middle-class humbug puritanism of late Victorian 
and Edwardian times. " 
A debate of whether Asia has democratic roots has also emerged in attempts to 
distinguish between "Asian-ness" and ' Western-ness " Because of the 
pervasiveness of a mindset of cultural determinism among its debaters, the issue 
of whether Asia has democratic roots quickly becomes an issue of whether Asia 
societies should/can develop into democracies, inspiring many fantastic re- 
inventions of Asia's past. 9 Leaving aside the question of how democracy should be 
8 Surveys offer mixed signals: Hitchcock (1994) concluded that Asians valued social order 
and harmony while Americans valued freedom and rights while FEER(12/9/1996,46) 
finds more differences within Asia than between Asia and the West. 9 More extreme re-Inventions include interpreting Confucius as a dissident so as to argue 
for "the great Confucian tradition of dissent" (AWSJ 08/11/1995). While arguing that 
Confucian was genuinely communitarian, DeBary (1998,147/12-13) concedes that the 
best examples he could find of Chinese "civil society" were "rather homespun and 
humdrum. " 
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defined, 10 many eagerly re-discover missed trajectories to argue that Asia has 
democratic roots (Cf. volume edited by Schmiegelow 1997) - whether liberal- 
democratic (Zou 1991) or communitarian-democratic (DeBary 1998). To prove 
Asia's democratic potential, many present a Whig and linear - even if dotted - 
version of history (Moody 1999,339), assuming that roots are something "already 
there, " waiting to be discovered. 
Among governments, the People's Action Party (the PAP, Singapore's dominant 
party) appears to be the only Asian government to argue that liberal democracy is 
un-Asian. For Malaysia's ex-DPM Anwar (SbMP 10/03/1995,23), "to say that 
freedom is Western and un-Asian is to offend our own traditions [and] ... 
forefathers who ... struggle[d] against tyranny and injustice. " Dissident President 
Kim (South Korea) is the only Asian politician who has rejected cultural 
determinism with his statement that "culture is not destiny. " For Kim, the lack of 
democratic roots should not be used as an excuse to not let them take root in 
Asian societies. 
Without denying that there may be cultural differences, Kim reminds us at the 
same time to look beyond cuituralist explanations to see how we could (re-) 
construct culture and to see how culture may be socially engineered to encourage 
certain political developments. " Indeed, to think otherwise would trap us within a 
black box - e. g., should "Asia" be found to lack democratic roots, does it mean 
that Asia can/should never become democratic? Such cultural determinism 
legitimises authoritarianism tautologically because, as categories of explanations, 
culture may be reified/naturalised as ahistorical, thereby generating tautological 
theses (e. g., authoritarian cultures produce authoritarianism). Especially in 
studying a "socially-engineered" campaign country like Singapore, one cannot help 
10 Except for the presence of political contestation (Mauzy 1997,219), several other 
indicators of democracy, including the existence of popular consensus and the election of 
delegates (Diamond 1996,100; Schumpter 1947), are present In many Asian countries. 
" Kim's position has the distinct advantage of pacifying those for whom cultural 
differences are too real to be dismissed as a mere construct. Rather than deny them, the 
task would be to examine how successful the government's socially engineering is and 
how preferred values are painstakingly maintained. 19 
but be strongly reminded that culture has a political history and is itself in need of 
explanation. 
Often, the issue is less a matter of whether societies have democratic roots than 
whether their governments desire them - if a society truly lacks such roots, its 
government would hardly need to defend its society against democracy. Clearly 
among "Asian democracies, " democratic tendencies must have been real enough 
to warrant preventive measures (e. g., initiating the discourse of "Asian 
Democracy"). In Singapore, it was upon the realisation that the West was within 
and inevitable that the PAP realised it needdd to take urgent and drastic measures 
- LKY resigned without delay - to reverse the quick drift towards the end of history 
by steering the nation towards Asian democracy. 
1 C. ASIAN VALUES AS A SUPERIOR RESPONSE TO CONTRADICTIONS IN 
LATE-CAPITALISM 
I. Ideologies of early-capitalism: variants of liberalism in Asia and 
the West 
As a system based on exploitation, capitalism requires the constant legitimisation 
of inequality and masking of exploitation in order to maintain social order through 
the consent of happy workers. It is within the context of considering the needs of 
capitalism that I will review the role of liberal ideologies in sustaining capitalism, 
including liberal democracy and Asian Values, which I will argue constitute a 
variant of (economic) liberalism. 
In Asia and in the West, the emergence of capitalist systems was bound up with 
tremendous coercion (Cf. E. P. Thompson 1963, Tremewan 1994). The process of 
creating a working-class or a reserve army of labour requires that citizens be 
forcefully deprived of their means of production (especially land), become "bare 
individuals" stripped of status, position, relationship or place "to be later inserted 
into combinations of capitalist relations of production" (Poulantzas 1968,126)'and 
imbued with an ethic of competitiveness: not only must subjects have an insatiable 
desire to accumulate ("to not be complacent"), they must also feel the need to 
attain monopolistic control over the market. 
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As an ideology that validated such values, liberalism was an ideology that "most 
intimately connected with the birth and evolution of the modern capitalist world" 
(Eccleshall 1984). Liberal discourses of freedom and equality proved useful in 
legitimising the proletarianisation of citizens by displacing/framing the issue as one 
of giving them the freedom from ascribed social positions to select new options 
and invited them to the exciting project of self-determination. By claiming that 
liberal subjects would be given the freedom to compete and pursue their self- 
interest, discourses of meritocratic liberalism also legitimised social inequality. Hall 
(1986,39) noted that liberalism has 
consistently favoured an 'open' meritocratic society, where the energetic 
individual can rise to respectability and success, whatever his humble 
origins... Liberalism maintains a contractual and competitive rather than an 
ascriptive idea of social order. It favours free-thinking, rationalist and 
sceptical modes of thought, regarding religion as a matter of private 
conscience, not a matter for the state to legislate. 
The basic liberal belief that individuals were "naturally' driven by the search for 
security, power and self-interest, which was embraced by Western and Asia 
societies alike in their early-capitalism stage, precipitated two logical modes of 
political organisation - the maximal and the minimal state. 
In the West, it was the latter that became dominant and identified as classical 
liberalism (e. g., Locke). To ensure that the state interfered as little as possible with 
individuals' rights and freedom, state power was weakened, e. g., through 
separation, of power (executive-judiciary-legislative, Hamilton in Morris 1969,13) 
and raising civil society over the state so that citizens could check on the state. 
Because what was prioritised was individuals' pursuit of their self-interest with 
minimal state interference, government authority was legitimated only by citizen's 
deliberate consent. Situated within the context of sustaining capitalism, this meant 
that economic elite must now govern indirectly through the state and gain consent,. 
to lead rather than to dominate (Gramsci 1971), i. e., its domination has now to be 
legitimised ideologically. 
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Minimal states were unacceptable to Asian societies because, historically in the 
West, liberalism emerged in opposition to all arbitrary power (church, monarchy 
and nobility) and ascribed social order. This was something post-colonial Asia was 
unprepared to do, especially since post-colonial discourses were often based on 
the overthrowing of Western authority for the reinstatement of a traditional order. 
Because the term "liberalism" was so strongly identified with the West, many Asian 
states resorted to dissociate their liberalism from colonialism and Western 
liberalism by dubbing it "modernisation. " 
The liberalism that became dominant in Asia was the Hobbes variant, where 
competitive societies were believed to require strong governments to impose 
constraints on individuals to prevent them from waging a "war of all against all. " 
While fully embracing economic liberalism, Asian governments argued that 
politically illiberalism was required for sustaining economic liberalism -a 
Hobbesian argument echoed by first-generation PAP leaders - and that it was 
culturally natural - an argument made by the second-generation PAP leaders. 
This helps us understand what Asian states mean when they say'modernise 
without westernising, ' and why Hong Kong and Singapore, the freest economies in 
the world, rank low on political freedom: with Asian liberalism, embracing 
economic liberalism did not mean the rejection but the. return to traditional orders. 
How was the PAP able to argue that political illiberalism was necessary and 
natural? This was achieved through the construction of the myth that, as a small 
country without natural resources and as a multiracial nation filled with potentially 
racially chauvinist citizens, Singapore needed a strong government to protect it 
from its citizens. 
Whereas governments are seen as unnatural conventions and social contracts in 
the West, economic liberalism and political illiberalism (strong governments) are 
rendered natural and "organic" (Robison 1996,310-311) through Confucianism. 
Observing that the economies of the four Asian Tigers are all Confucian societies, 
scholars have hailed Confucianism as an Asian (Protestant) Work Ethic. Weber's 
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(1956) Calvinists have no way of being assured of the status of their (predestined) 
salvation, thus material achievements became the only signifier of how close/far 
they are to their ideal state. Like Calvinists but much more "inner-worldly" 
(Hitchcock 1994,25), Confucian subjects work incessantly for material goals and 
not beyond it because material achievements are considered the very expression 
of their moral/spiritual state. Where material accomplishment becomes conflated 
with morality, and where it is moral to "work for the sake of working, " what is 
produced is a cultural ethic that easily "electively affiniate" itself with the spirit of 
capitalism. 
Political illiberalism also finds "electively affinity" with the Confucian social order, 
which consists of a web of five sets of hierarchical relationships - 
sovereign/subject, parent/child, husband/wife, older/younger sibling and 
friend/friend. t2 While the Western liberal subject is defined by his individuality, 13 
the Confucian subject maintains his place in the Confucian order by not losing his 
"face, " through conforming to the (imagined) expectations of a moral community, 
regardless of what he believes. 
That citizens practice a type of rhetorical compliance to maintain face explains two 
puzzles about Chinese political psychology. Firstly, Pye and Pye (1985,60) note 
the Chinese's high tolerance for cognitive dissonance and "lack of psychic 
anxieties" (contrast this to Weber's Calvinists) and puzzle over their ability to "live 
with all kinds of ambiguities and contradictions. " Secondly, many interviewees 
puzzled over the difference between "face" and "ego, " since both appears self- 
centred. The solution to these puzzles lies in the different types of governmentality 
or self-government practised by the liberal subject and by the Confucian/illiberal 
subject. Foucault (1979) argues that liberal subjects self-govern after internalising 
public morality as personal ethics. I would suggest that illiberal subjects'are 
12 "Horizontal" friendship Is made hierarchical through prefixing sibling terms denoting 
elder/younger. 
13 Professor Beng-Huat Chua shared this anecdote: An old Singaporean Chinese woman 
was asked if she had sufficient privacy in a public flat she shared with her family. After 
several attempts to explain the concept of privacy (until recently, there is no such term in 
23 
governed by social expectations (face). To successfully navigate everyday life, it is 
vital that Confucian subjects have a high tolerance of ideological inconsistency and 
that they do not develop a consistent ethical self. 
Although the Confucian order is largely constituted by ascribed hierarchies, these 
hierarchies may also be represented as achieved status. Government authority is 
especially legitimised by a rigorous selection process of competitive formal exams 
and by a continuous process of streaming from a young age. Because it is 
believed that scholastic excellence is acquired through moral self-discipline, it 
follows that a technocratic government is also morally superior. Pye and Pye 
(1985,66-76) noted that modern Chinese politics consists of a serious of outbursts 
at the failings of leadership followed by a search for another perfect "leader without 
weakness. " Because a good/perfect leader is seen as the solution to all problems, 
Chinese intellectuals devote energy to social change. Checks on authority are not 
tolerated; mandated to rule, leaders are justifiably "entitled to be hypersensitive to 
any hint of criticism. " 
This combination of moral and technocratic legitimacy creates in Confucian 
subjects a deep unquestioning dependency/trust in government. The expert-sage 
government is not expected to consult lay-citizens or to "represent" the views of 
the morally inferior populace. Instead, its task is to embody society's ideal and 
enlighten the masses with through exemplary leadership. 14 
It is inaccurate to describe Confucian leaders as authoritarian; this reflects a mis- 
recognition of the organic culturallemotional dynamics underlying Confucian 
authority. The distinction between authoritarianism and paternalism is precisely the 
question of whether coercion has been successfully legitimated; and to the extent 
that citizens accept that leaders are morally and technically superior, 
Confucianism must be said to have successfully rendered political illiberalism 
organic and natural. 
Mandarin), she was finally asked where she goes to be alone. She replied, "Why would I 
want to be alone? " 
14 Cf. Weber's (1 966a) distinction between ethical and exemplary prophecy. 
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II. Ideologies for late-capitalism: Western ideological compromises 
Although liberty and equality have always been articulated together in liberal 
discourse, the tension between them constitutes a recurring contradiction of liberal 
discourse. Many liberals noted the non-egalitarian nature of liberalism: democracy 
was feared as "tyranny of the majority" (Hayek 1986,25). Representative 
democracy was often based on beliefs that some were more fit than others to rule 
or to vote--Burke (in Baradat 1988,74-75) argued that a good representative 
should have ability, property and high birth, while Holback (in Arblaster 1987,37) 
believed that voting rights should only be issued to those propertied males who 
were also heads of their household. Concerned that democracy has gone too far 
and threatens to plunder the rich, John Stuart Mill suggested that the educated 
should be given two votes, which illustrates the lack of 'fit' between liberty and 
suggesting that values of equality and democracy (political liberalism) were 
'accidental and remediable' consequences, rather than inevitable features of 
capitalism (economic liberalism) (Hall 1986,60). 
To get to the heart of this tension, Hall (1986,41) suggests that equality must be 
understood as a subordinate ideology to liberty since the liberal state is not bound 
to remedy the inequality that free competition inevitably produces (since many 
must lose for some to win). I. e., liberalism must be understood as an ideology that 
(unapologetically) produces and legitimises elitism. 
This helps us understand why late-capitalism is purported to produce side effects 
and contradictions that, if not resolved with various ideological compromises, could 
threaten the sustainability of capitalism. Economically, the logical and inevitable 
consequence of free competition is the creation of extreme social equality and 
stratification. Unless some form of social welfare is provided to alleviate this 
inequality, it threatens to disrupt co-operative capital-labour relations. 
The severity of such contradictions depends on several factors. Insofar as there is 
economic prosperity or the perception of genuine freedom to compete equally, this 
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contradiction may weaken or be contained. This contradiction intensifies especially 
in late-capitalism when economic inequality widens and when social stratification 
sets in so that the liberal ideology of being free to compete (acquire private 
property, etc. ) no longer holds true. While these contradictions impact Asian and 
Western liberalism alike, it should be noted that they have been allowed to develop 
to different degrees. Where economic liberalism is accompanied by political 
liberalism (the West), discourses of liberal democracy tend to over-legitimise 
citizens' demands for equality and for individual rights to the extent of placing the 
'liberal state at the mercy of its voters. Wher9 economic liberalism is "protected" by 
political illiberalism (Confucian Asia), citizens' right to make demands of the state 
tends to be de-legitimised; and because authority is less dependent on consent, 
the state is less compelled to compromise the logic of capitalism (e. g., to provide 
welfare). 
A popular solution in the West is the "third way" (Giddens 1994a), which typically 
involved the weakening of capitalistic instinct and the affirmation of community 
(socialism/collectivism/communitarianism). In the US and Europe, there are 
different degrees of compromise between the left and the right. In Europe, these 
contradictions are partially resolved through welfarism (Hall 1986,64-65). To a 
lesser extent, even the USA has to compromise its capitalist logic by providing 
social security to its citizens. 
The case of such a "historical compromise" in the US is worth a closer look. As 
possibly the most capitalist of all nations, its response is likely to be one where 
capitalistic logic is the least compromised. It will be in comparison to the American 
case that I will make my argument that Singapore's Asian Values response is a 
superior (least compromising) response. 
As a response to the Great Depression, Roosevelt promised voters a New Deal, 
which consisted of a serious of pro-labour programmes aimed at breaking 
monopolies, regulating business and improving workers' conditions (including the 
Social Security Act in 1935). 
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Scholars have questioned whether the New Deal was truly a compromise of the 
interests of capital. The prolonged debate between Roosevelt (Democrats) and 
Hoover (Republicans) on the benefits of a strong government appears to be a 
false one, because it was based upon the assumption that strong governments 
work against the interests of capital, when, as the case of Asian Capitalism shows, 
economic liberalism can be sustained both by maximal or minimal states. I. e., 
whether the US has a strong or weak government will not help us identify whether 
it was pro- or anti-capital. 
However, in terms of the extent of compromise, Zinn (1980,383-384) noted that 
Roosevelt made concessions only when organised labour was strong - "where 
organised labour was weak, Roosevelt was unprepared to withstand the pressure 
of industrial spokesmen. " This led Zinn to conclude that the New Deal, by 
stabilising the economy and giving enough to prevent a rebellion from turning into 
a revolution, merely re-organised capitalism to sustain it 
Despite the pro-capital nature of the New Deal's long-term goal, I would argue that 
it was a significant compromise because it offered an alternative (leftist) vision - 
as economist Gardiner Means (in Davidson, Lytle and Stoff 1992,383) observed, 
"the New Deal ... was less a clear program than a symbol of the possibilities 
available to a desperate nation. " Indeed, this vision so dominated popular 
imagination that for two decades, citizens and Republicans alike perceived there to 
be no viable alternatives and elections were fought within the parameters of the 
New Deal. 
III. Asian Values and the re-amalgamation of authoritarianism with late- 
capitalism 
The Western trajectory of compromise was unacceptable to many Asian (one- 
party) governments. To understand why many Asian governments are unwilling to 
blunt capitalistic impulses and why they insist on keeping political liberalism at bay, 
we have to understand the logic behind the maintenance of one-party rule in Asia. 
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Firstly, government legitimacy in many Asian one-party democracies is crucially 
based upon economic growth, which is fuelled by capitalistic expansion. To sustain 
economic growth and legitimacy, governments must be able to attract foreign 
investments through being the world's freest economies - i. e., being the most 
business-friendly economies with the least worker protection and the weakest 
labour unions (economies where the logic of capitalism runs purest). As such, 
many Asian one-party governments find the "third wad" or any 
weakening/compromise of the capitalist logic unacceptable. 
Additionally, any subscription to welfarist ideologies could promote political 
liberalism since individuals are deemed to have the rights to make demands on 
the state. Such liberalisation, if unchecked, could over-legitimise Individualism and, 
carried over to the field of politics, set the stage for ideological fragmentation. This 
brings us to another logic of one-party rule: single party governments can only 
legitimately claim to represent a consensual nation since an ideologically 
fragmented nation would require multi-party representation. Le., ideological 
fragmentation must be averted at all costs so that the party is seen as the nation's 
only option. 
In this way, capitalism and authoritarianism are mutually reinforcing: 
authoritarianism protects capitalism by enabling it to be less compromised by 
popular demands for welfarism while capitalistic success "protects" and provides 
economic legitimacy for authoritarian governments. Seeing such ideological 
function of Asian Democracy allows us to add to Poulantzas"periodisation of 
capitalism into distinct stages and phrases" (Hall 1988,152): if liberal (bourgeois) 
democracy offers the "best shell" within which early capitalist relations can develop 
since it offers the most illusions about popular representation (Lenin in Hall 1986, 
15), I would argue that communitarian (Asian) democracy is an ideology par 
excellence for protecting the logic of capitalism from -having to compromise/give it 
to its contradictions in late-capitalism. 
To protect its one-party rule against threats of political liberalisation and welfarism, 
the PAP labels these individualistic tendencies as dangerous "Western" values, 
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the solution of which was the "Asianisation" of society, where communitarianism 
(anti-individualism) is promoted as an alternative to welfarism and plural/liberal 
democracy. 
"Asian capitalism" is considered preferable - where competition and social 
inequality continues to be legitimised by meritocracy and where social welfare is 
privatised and administered through (ethnic) communities, not through the state. 
Within the AV discourse, individuals, families and (ethnic) communities should be 
self-reliant and place nation above self. Ratter than "selfishly" make demands on 
society/state, good Asians should provide for their needy family/community 
members. In China, Taiwan and Singapore, communitarianism has been 
mobilised to legitimise "Parents Maintenance Bills, " where working children are. 
obligated to support their aged, retired parents. In Singapore, "community" is 
stretched beyond family to include ethnic community: a small portion is deducted 
from every employee's monthly salary for donation to his/her ethnic "community 
self-help organisations" (Chua 1995,34). 
Communitarianism is also mobilised against ideological pluralism in support of 
"Asian (one-party) Democracy. " By emphasising consensus over conflict, political 
contestation or "opposition for the sake of opposition" - an unspoken democratic 
value - is represented as anti-harmony and unsuited for an Asian society. 
Comm unitarianism encourages citizens, as good Asians, to privatise and 
subordinate their individualism/difference, to communitarianly put national interests 
(as defined by the PAP) above self. In this way, ideological alternatives are de- 
legitimised and ideological fragmentation averted. 
In this way, communitarianism de-legitimises counter-capitalistic and counter- 
authoritarian values and enables the re-amalgamation of capitalism with 
authoritarianism through representing them as "Asian capitalism" (anti-welfarism) 
and "Asian Democracy" (one-party democracy) respectively. 
There are some implications and residual questions when AV is understood as an 
ideological response to contradictions in late-capitalism, rather than as set of 
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cultural values. Firstly, the fact that governments feel the need to "Astanise" their 
citizens exposes the myth of communitarian Asia (Pye and Pye 1985; DeBary 
1998). "Asian values" were so clearly absent in Singapore society that it had to be 
imported. In 1982,8 foreign Confucian scholars were invited to design a school 
curriculum (Chua 1995,159; Hill and Lian 1995,202) after local (Buddhist) monks' 
proposals were criticised for being "unpractical" and for failing to select "desirable 
national values" (Kuah 1991,32). Perhaps the best evidence of anti-community 
values is the phenomenon of clean home/private toilets and dirty public toilets. In 
the 1990s, the Singapore government was so frustrated by citizens' lack of civic- 
mindedness that it launched a "Keep Public Toilets Clean Campaign. " 
Additionally, the AV project encouraged only certain types of communities- "safe" 
communities that did not attempt to usurp the government's credibility - as the 
only (legitimate) representative of national interest. E. g., racial identification was 
encouraged until racial groups began to contest the government. The project to 
Confucianise citizens was abandoned in the late 1980s when the government 
realised that its campaigns over-legitimated religion as a source of counter- 
ideology (Hill and Lian 1995,205-206; Chua 1995,31-32; Tamney 1996,35). Such 
politics of racial differentiation and homogenisation echoed the British colonial 
strategy of "divide and rule. Rather than encouraging ideological contestation, 
such politics of difference serve to contain dissent by racialising citizens by 
constituting them as ethnic, thus subjective and partial, in multi-racial Singapore. 
Secondly, seeing AV as an ideological response to social contradictions help us 
understand why its substantive meaning is necessarily confusing and 
contradictory. To some extent, the ideological contradiction within AV mirrors the 
impossibility of combining capitalism with community: If you drive the notion of 
enterprise far enough, you undermine any sense of tradition, or organic 
belongingness to society" (Hall in Tamney 1996,184). As an attempt to 
ideologically unite society without compromising capitalism, "Asian Values" must 
simultaneously encourage comm unitarianism (community before self) without 
discouraging competition (self before others). It Is vital to remember that AV was 
invoked to deal with the side effects of late-capitalism-at no point does it 
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discourage or detract from the dominant Ideology of capitalist development or 
encourage citizens to prioritise community over competition. It is precisely 
because communitarianism is opposite to competitiveness that it serves as a 
useful supplement to repair and enable to continued operation of the dominant 
ideology of meritocratic competition, to make capitalism more caring and the 
nation more cohesive. 
Thus, rather than understanding AV as either communitarianism or Confucianism, 
I would argue that AV is more effectively understood as consisting of the dominant 
ideology of Confucian meritocratic competition and a subdominant ideology of 
communitarianism. The dominant ideology of Confucianism fuels capitalist 
development by motivating subjects to compete (as individuals and families) and 
raise themselves over others within the social hierarchy, thereby earning it the 
label of "Asian (Protestant) Work Ethic. " Confucianism's emphasis on competition 
makes it anti-community, not unlike market liberalism, and comes closer to 
Thatcher's idealisation of liberal capitalism: "there is no such thing as society, 
thereare only individual men and women, and there are families" (http: //www. univ- 
tours. fr/capaganglais/PovertyQuotes. htm). 
Confucianism can' be considered communitarian only if the family is the 
community. Besides the absence of civic-mindedness indicated by the anecdotal 
evidence of dirty public toilets, Liang (in DeBary 1998,140-141) also observed that 
China lacked group life and attempted to add a sixth Confucian relationship to 
promote group relations - the only "non-hierarchical" Confucian relation. 
Confucianism guides relationship with immediate, not imagined community. 
Confucian subjects are not exhorted to include unrelated others as part of their 
community - as the PAP's communitarian programmes of Parents Maintenance 
Bill and ethnic self-help illustrate. The understanding of community is one that is 
highly tied to blood and race. I would argue that it is in fact vital that Confucian 
groups are exclusionary; it may be difficult otherwise for subjects to feel 
competitive against each other. Confucian subjects feel no lateral solidarity, which 
Benedict Anderson identifies as a prerequisite for the development of a sense of 
imagined community. Given this considerable difference between Confucianism 
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and communitarianism, we can see that its conflation in the myth of 
communitarian Asia is an ideological effect that is crucially sustained by a refusal 
to acknowledge that Confucian Asia is more accurately pro-family and anti- 
community. 
Thirdly, the persuasiveness of AV is necessarily tied to economics. Not only is . 
communitarianism subordinated to the dominant ideology of competition, it is itself 
an economic argument since the superiority of communitarianism and Asian 
(consensual) Democracy is "proven" by miraculous economic performance (Lodge 
and Vogel 1987; Chua 1995,31; Leary 1990). This has significant implications for 
its effectiveness: of what use is it during an economic crisis, when the government 
most needs it? 
If we recall that liberal states are not obliged to protect its citizens because such 
state intervention would constitute a violation of the sacred value of free 
competition, then the Singapore government must be seen as having been more 
successful than the US in justifying their non-intervention and the non- 
compromise15 of competitiveness as the nation's primary goal. Indeed, in ensuring 
that there is no viable alternative to capitalist accumulation, it could even be said 
the logic of capitalism runs "purer" in Singapore than in the US. 18 
The ingenuity of the AV response lies in its ability de-legitimise ("Western") 
ideological alternatives. This absence of viable alternatives in turn means that no 
"historical compromise" was necessary since there was simply no alternative but to 
tolerate the contradictions (or privatise the contradictions to make capitalism more 
t5 It would be inaccurate to say that there have been no compromises at all. The PAP 
could not have stayed hegemonic for more than four decades without ensuring that 
citizens were properly taken care of (Singapore has been described as "capitalism with 
socialist characteristics" in Tamney 1996,69). However, it would be accurate to say that 
there had not been any ideological compromises - Singapore has never been imagined 
as anything but a free, internationally competitive economy. Any compromises that the 
PAP makes are always one-off and frequently entitled "Off-Budget Measures" to 
emphasise their non-permanence. 
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tolerable). It is this lack of alternatives that ensured that, throughout the PAP's 
one-party rule, it has never been possible to imagine a Singapore without the PAP. 
1 D. HEGEMONY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT ASIAN 
DEMOCRACY 
Once AV is understood as an ideological project to secure consensus on particular 
economic and political structures that have come under global challenge, the 
question of whether Asian Democracy is or is not "truly" a democracy seems 
misplaced. This is because (Asian) Democ, acy cannot be conceived of as a stage 
that is either present or absent or simply as whether authority Is based on either 
coercion or consent, as classical definitions of democracy are prone to do. As an 
ideological project, (Asian) Democracy must be seen as an ongoing project to 
secure consent on coercion. 
Indeed, many have argued that it is a fallacy to think that consent and coercion 
can be separated and that they can exist independent of each other. This is 
because firstly, states and governments are inherently coercive institutions with a 
"monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" (Weber 1946,78-79). Secondly, 
consent or consensus is never simply the acceptance of certain values but also 
the expectation that others conform to this consensus and the agreement to 
exclude/punish those who contravene this consensus. Thirdly, theorists argue that 
what is considered "consent" is often "tacit consent" (Locke), "silent allowance" 
(Hooker) and "habitualised acquiescence" (Hume). These qualified forms of 
consent suggest that "consent" is more accurately a type of internalised 
consensus (Key 1961). Indeed, Lipset (1960,32) goes so far as to argue that the 
sign of a healthy consensual society is political apathy, rather than consent. 
That consent is more accurately "consensus" and that it is also always coercive 
(towards those who lie outside the consensus) makes the definition of democracy 
as government by consent a highly un-rigorous concept. If democracy is to 
'e That Singapore is more capitalistic than the US developed in conversation with Yuezhi 
Zhao (Simon Fraser University). Bill Schwarz (Goldsmiths College) commented that 
Singapore was a "state without a nation, " echoing citizens' nickname for Singapore as 
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continue to meaningfully refer to government by consent, then democracy is better 
understood as a utopia or ideal that all governments aspire to, rather than as a 
stage that some (Western) states have achieved and have to defend against the 
Rest. 
This idea that government by consent is an ideal to be continuously worked 
towards resonates with my understanding of (Asian) Democracy as an ideological 
project to secure consent. l. e., Asian Democracy is better considered within the 
framework of hegemony than democracy. The differences between these two 
frameworks become clearest when we compare democratic with hegemonic 
governments. 
Governments can be democratic without being hegemonic, such as when the 
electorate is split evenly between various ideological alternatives (e. g., US 
presidential elections between Al Gore versus George W. Bush"). Governments 
can be hegemonic without being democratic, as in the case of religious leaders 
who are not popularly elected but who are deemed legitimate nonetheless. Indeed, 
democracy and hegemony may be inversely correlated-the presence of 
ideological pluralism or viable ideological alternatives is considered an indicator of 
democracy but it also indicates the absence of hegemony. I. e., it would seem that 
governments could not be democratic and hegemonic at the same time. 
This brings us to another important difference between the two frameworks: within 
the paradigm of hegemony, democracy is seen as only one among many ways of 
securing government legitimacy. Besides democratic/popular legitimacy, 
governments can also become legitimate on the basis of economics, religion, 
morality, culture and even charisma (e. g., post-colonial revolutionary leaders who 
acquire a mythical legitimacy). Within the framework of hegemony, it becomes 
possible to imagine that governments can be hegemonic without being popular. 
"Singapore Inc. " 
17 The fact that Al Gore won the popular vote but George W. Bush won the democratic 
elections illustrates that a leader can be democratic without being popular, and vice versa. 
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The notion of "hegemony without popularity' is directly relevant to the study of 
Asian Democracy. The Singapore model of Asian Democracy has always eluded 
simple classification as either authoritarian or democratic. Academics sometimes 
call it soft authoritarianism or popular dictatorship, while local journalists resort to 
metaphors of the PAP having "won the people's minds but not their hearts, " which 
signify the conceptual insufficiency of classical political science categories and 
theoretical frameworks. 
In this dissertation, I intend to investigate the basis of PAP legitimacy. What is the 
extent and nature of its hegemony? What strategies does it use to maintain 
legitimate one-party rule and how successful are they - to what extent and through 
what processes is authority legitimated in everyday popular discourse? 
In Chapter One, I illustrate the significance of Singapore's model of Asian 
Democracy in challenging the superiority and inevitability of liberal democracy. I 
argue that instead of seeing AV as a form of cultural nationalism, it should be 
viewed as a hegemonic project with specific ideological functions of sustaining 
capitalism (Asian capitalism) and one-party rule (Asian Democracy). Indeed, 
compared to other (Western) responses to contradictions in late-capitalism, AV 
appears to be a superior strategy because it least compromises the logic of 
capitalism. 
The rest of Part One outlines some epistemological and methodological problems 
and solutions in conceptualising and applying the theory of hegemony. Chapter 
Two highlights the particular views that theories of hegemony hold of power and 
the state and addresses two main criticisms: the possibility of ideological unity in 
face of discursive heterogeneity and whether power is dispersed or traceable to a 
certain institutional centre (whether it has an institutional materiality). 
Chapter Three addresses a wide variety of issues that arise before, during and 
after the six months fieldwork period in Singapore. Guided by the research goal of 
observing the popular legitimisation of authority in everyday life, I explain my 
fieldwork decisions regarding sampling, interviewing and analytical procedure. 
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Part Two discusses the nation-building strategies of the PAP within a theoretical 
and comparative framework provided at the beginning of each of its chapters. 
Chapter Four and Five focus respectively on the ideological projects of the first- 
generation PAP government (under LKY) and the second-generation PAP 
government (under Chok-Tong Goh). Chapter Four outlines the PAP's attempts to 
navigate a period of shifting bases of legitimacy (from colonial to popular to 
economic) through building a pro-party modern state and economy. 
Chapter Five focuses on the second-generation leaders' attempt to secure cultural 
legitimacy through Asian Values, which sought to transform a heterogeneous 
immigrant society into an ideologically cohesive nation that a one-party 
government can legitimately claim to represent. Chapter Five traces the various 
trials and errors in formulating Asian Values, noting that the political project/goal of 
preventing ideological fragmentation was finally perfected/crystallised as 
com m unitarianism. 
After identifying the state's projects and strategies for securing legitimacy, Part 
Three (Chapter Six) focuses on citizens' discourse to explore the extent to which 
state ideologies are central/relevant to everyday popular discourse. Four postures 
towards authority are identified depending on how citizens bridge gaps between 
national and personal versions of reality: (a) refuting dissent, (b) neutralising 
dissent, (c) privatising dissent and (d) subordinating dissent. 
After looking at the state's ideological projects (Part Two) and citizens' posture 
toward authority (Part Three), Part Four evaluates whether the PAP has secured 
hegemony and if so, what is the nature, basis and durability of its hegemony? 
Chapter Seven focuses on the hegemonic process at the level of. the everyday 
popular legitimisation of authority. Despite citizens' rhetorical compliance, the PAP 
must be considered ideologically successful not only because citizens perceive it 
to be Singapore's only option but also because its party ideologies constitutes a 
normative centre that mediates social ("face") expectations and guides inter- 
personal interaction. 
36 
By taking a comparative approach, Chapter Eight considers some challenges 
(hegemonic crises) that one-party governments face and considers how, in the 
PAP's case, Asian Democracy contributes invaluably to the de-legitimisation of 
ideological pluralism, thereby sustaining one-party rule. Through being imitated by 
other Asian nations, AV has sparked off a regional resurgence of culturally 
legitimated authoritarianism, suggesting that one-party statehood remains highly 
tenable, thanks'for the AV discourse in transforming coercive dictatorships into 
ideologically dominant one-party states. 
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CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALISING HEGEMONY 
A DISCURSIVE UNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL MATERIALITY 
2A. THE ORGANIC-IDEOLOGICAL STATE: A CRITIQUE* OF LIBERALISM, 
ECONOMISM AND STRUCTURALISM 
In any consideration of the state, the precise relationship between the ruling and 
the ruled must be established. Different conceptions of power and legitimacy - 
where power is believed to come from (or be based on) and where the sites of 
political contestation are believed to be - would lead us to adopt different 
epistemological and methodological models. 
Within liberalism, (decision-making) power is believed to belong to the people; all 
individuals are believed to be equal and can freely form groups to lobby for their 
interests. In this model, the state is believed to be merely a neutral facilitator. '8 
However, this is likely to be an "idealised" rather than "real" perspective of class 
and power in a democracy. Firstly, liberalism believes that individuals should be 
free to complete regardless of their unequal wealth; it does not believe in equality 
of conditions or equality of opportunities (Hall 1986,41). Secondly, Poulantzas 
(1968; 1972,245) argues that the separation of the economic and political elite 
makes the state appear distant from capitalistic exploitation, thereby giving it an 
aura of legitimacy. In sustaining, developing and reproducing the basic social and 
economic framework of society (e. g., system of private property) to generate 
wealth and' prosperity, the liberal state cannot be recognized as neutral (Hall 1982, 
14). Finally, this is a model built upon a free market ideal and such 
liberalization/privatisation (of the media), which political economists argue, do not 
necessarily make the media more democratic or better representatives of "the 
popular" than state media. As Sparks (2000,47) suggests, they may be equally 
the "enemies of popular expression and popular democracy. " 
18 On the. issue of the objectivity of the liberal media, scholars have argued that "objective 
journalism" is often guided by highly selective "unwritten rules" (Gans 1980,80; Hall 1977, 
343) that affirm social consensus and commonsense (Schudson 1982,98). 
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It is against this liberal conception of state that classical -Marxist perspectives are 
defined. Generally, these perspectives argue that the state Is a "political committee 
of the ruling class" and which allows the ruling elite to "generalise its rule across 
society" (Hall 1982,15). Marxists argue further that "general/popular interest" is an 
illusion and that such "bourgeois democracy' offers the "best shell" within which 
capitalist relations can develop since it offers the most illusions about popular 
representation (Lenin in Hall 1986,15). 
The problem with this view of the state is that the role of the, state Is insufficiently 
theorized. Firstly, those who do theorise about the state (Hall 1980b; Poulantzas 
1978,20) lament the lack of a general theory of the state within Marxism. 
Poulantzas (1972,239) explains this lack by an underlying economism that 
considers superstructural levels of social reality (including the state) as 
epiphenomenona reducible to the economic base, which makes the study of the 
state superfluous. 
Secondly, while agreeing that the state serves elite interests, Hall (1982,15) 
argues that the link between the elite and the state is not simply one of 
"instrumentalism" (the state as a mere tool of a class) or "economism" (the state 
as being wholly determined by economics) but as a relatively autonomous entity. 
Hall's point follows from Poulantzas' (1972,242-243) criticism of Miliband's theory 
of the state as too "subjective. " Miliband considers the state to be constituted 
sociologically by a network of economic elite19 and psychologically by the desire to 
profit; i. e., managers and other white-collar workers (who do not own the means of 
production) are made "honorary members" of the ruling class based upon their 
(assumed) subjective motivations. 
The problem with such subjective descriptions of the state is that its role and 
existence are not seen as independent. Poulantzas (1972,246-247) argues that 
state bureaucrats should not be defined by their individual/group class origins but 
be seen as a "social category" that is united by their objective function - "the 
19 This understanding of the state runs through Curran and Park's (eds. 2000) volume, 
especially the concept of "interpenetration of elite. " 
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actualisation of the role of the state. " He questioned, should bureaucrats not come 
from the ruling class and should they feel little motivation for profit, 20 would 
Miliband revise his theory to say that the state ceases to serve ruling class 
interest? 21 
How then does Poulantzas define the state? Following Althusser and Gramsci, he 
argues that the state is more than the repressive institution that Miliband implies 
with his theory of direct governance by economic elite, whose economic control 
make the need for legitimation unnecessary. Poulantzas (1972,249) observes that 
Miliband appears to be affected by states' crushing of student demonstrations and 
the rise of fascism in the late 1960s, causing him to focus almost exclusively on 
the state's repressive state apparatuses (RSAs). Poulantzas insightfully notes that 
Miliband interprets events in this way because to accept the state's ideological rote 
would have required that he abandon his economistic and subjective view of the 
state. Observing the same events, Poulantzas arrives at the opposite conclusion - 
that the state's reliance on RSAs indicated that the "inner ditch" of civil society and 
consent has collapsed, forcing the state to rely on its "outer ditch" or armour of 
coercion (Gramsci 1971) -a stage which he described as "authoritarian statism" 
(Cf. * Hall 1988,152). That coercion is used on rare occasion is taken to further 
indicate that most of the time, the state replies on non-coercive power. 
Althusser (1971) and Gramsci (1971) agree with classical Marxists that the state 
serves to ensure the reproduction of relations of capitalist production. Both 
believed that the state has a relative autonomy from the base structure because 
reproduction takes place outside the economy. For Althusser (1971), this happens 
within the "legal-political-ideological" super-structures dominated by the state and 
its many state apparatuses - both repressive and ideological (e. g., schools, 
churches, family, cultural institutions). Gramsci (1971,263), arguing that "state 
20 This was actually the case among many young graduate interviewees, who joined the 
civil service because they could not imagine themselves working hard to profit (individuals 
who own) corporations. 
21 In this thesis, the creation of capitalist subjects with the desire to accumulate is a 
specific ideological project of the Singapore government (Cf. the Singapore Dream, 
stakeholders' society in Chapter 4). 
40 
political society + civil society, " similarly extends the state to include all civil 
institutions that served such functions. 
Agreeing with Althusser's and Gramsci's view of the relative autonomous state, 
Poulantzas (1972,246) argues that "the capitalist state best serves the interests of 
the capitalist class only when the members of this class do not participate directly 
in the state apparatus, that is to say when the ruling class is not the politically 
governing class. " I. e., political and economic elites are separated and given 
relative autonomy to produce the illusion of the neutral (liberal democratic) state, 
or pro-capital (in the short or long which can appear to be independently pro-labour 
run). Additionally, as a relatively autonomous entity, the state reorganizes/unifies 
elite interest in the event of an elite dissensus by constraining disagreeing elite 
and de-legitimating credible elite alternatives (Cf. Hguy 1991; Mouffe 1982; Lull 
1991). 
However, even while adopting Althusser's theory, many are critical of its 
weakness. Hall (1986,16) argues that Althusser's theory escapes one type of 
determinism (economism) but falls into another (functionalism) - that "everything 
in society is determined by the functional requirements of the system, and the 
state [does] fulfils these needs. " Althusser assumes that state and ideology will 
always function in ways that perfectly fulfil the requirements of the capitalist 
system; even while recognizing the ideological role of organic communities, he 
does not accord them autonomy and agency. As such, his view of the state 
appears too structural and functional, tacking in any sense of struggle and is 
unable to explain citizens' self-organisation (independent of the state) or 
resistance against the state (Katz 1996). 
The contrast between Althusser and Gramsci can be clearly seen in how, despite 
both believing that state secures its legitimacy through ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs), Gramsci (1971,244) uses the term "active consent" to 
indicate that their cooperation in reproducing/legitimating the state is not automatic 
but has to be won. I. e., subjects and super-structural agencies, being relatively 
autonomous, are seen as having the agency to consent or resist. With Gramscl, 
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the notion of relative autonomy is not limited to the Althusserian reference of the 
state (from ruling elite) but also extended to ISAs (e. g., civil society). 
In this way, the state is not merely an Althusserian super-structure, but a set of 
social relations (not unlike social contracts) that "cements" a particular social order 
through moral, intellectual and cultural consensus. It is consent that "forms" 
society under the social-moral leadership (and not only domination) of a power 
bloc. 
Gramsci's model is thus a very dynamic one where authority is not automatic 
(upon owning means of production or motivation to profit as Miliband claimed) but 
conditional upon consent. Gramsci further observes that social reproduction is not 
only conducted by formal institutions, but more deeply through generalizing elite 
ideologies as commonsense. The authority of the power bloc is therefore 
sustained and legitimised through citizens' everyday practices and their 
reproduction of commonsensical discourses. 
2B. THE STATE AS ABSENT YET CENTRAL: THE ISSUE OF DISCURSIVE AND 
SOCIAL DISUNITY 
Gramsci's theory of hegemony nicely articulates my research interest - to 
examine the basis and nature of the PAP's hegemony by looking at how its one- 
party rule is legitimised in popular everyday discourse. However, before these 
issues can be dealt with, it is necessary to address some epistemological and 
methodological issues that Gramsci's particular conception of state and of the 
nature of power raise. 
As a concept, "hegemony" requires careful verification. Firstly, while it may be 
relatively easy to verify the coercive domination through considering how those 
who own the means of production also has a monopoly over legitimate (state) 
coercion (Weber 1966b), the bourgeoisie can only become a hegemonic class 
through overcoming its "corporatist" nature and by providing intellectual-moral 
leadership to secure the consent of the ruled (Mouffe 1982,220-221). By inserting 
"the masses" crucially into the heart of governance, hegemony breaks the easy 
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equation of control with power or legitimacy, and inserts into it the crucial 
component of mass consent. 
Secondly, Gramsci understands hegemony as a dynamic process rather than a 
static condition since hegemony will always be contested. His own reflections on 
hegemony are based upon his keen concern with usurping the ideological 
dominance of Italian fascism and building a communist hegemony. For Bennett et 
al (1982,16), this facet of hegemony is so important that studies of hegemony 
would be incomplete without considering "hegemonic crises" or "cris(es) of 
authority: " 
the issues posed by the concept of hegemony concern not whether ... 
hegemony can be said to be present or absent in a given situation ... but 
rather the direction in which a complex set of relations between two 
principal classes and a series of intermediate social strata and social 
groups are moving. 
These two features significantly influence the nature of research on hegemony. By 
emphasising the relationship between political legitimacy and everyday citizen 
practices, the verification of hegemony implies certain methods of study. Firstly, 
hegemony establishes popular consent as a central element in any discussion of 
governance and insists upon the verification, not just assumption, of hypodermic 
ideological effects. This concern with the active role of the masses in reproducing 
the capitalist social relations urges studies of hegemony towards some form of 
audience studies. 
Secondly, because hegemony is an ongoing process, there is a need to go beyond 
studying only the political moments (e. g., elections) to also focusing on everyday 
political contestation. Just as Hall (1977,342/347) is interested in studying the 
ideological effects of the media, the study of hegemony is interested in the 
ideological effects of everyday citizen practices. To this end, qualitative methods 
are especially suitable for studying the local, subjective and particular practices 
that naturalise, legitimise and perpetuate the ideological and political status quo. 
43 
The difficulty of verifying hegemony has been acknowledged, especially the 
difficulty of identifying "popular will" without assuming that there is an 
authentically' popular conscience that can be discovered and used as a standard 
against which consensuses can be judged to be truly "national-popular" or not. 
Nowell-Smith (1977,13) questions if "the popular" exists and whether It Is merely 
the people's sense of itself as reflected by the political elite. Even if it is possible to 
generalise about a "popular will, " to what extent is such a popular will merely a 
form of false (inauthentically popular) consciousness - especially in a situation of 
an organic ideological state such as Gramsci's where the state and' 
society/working class are blurred (Hall 1986,17; Hall 1980b, 63)? Additionally, 
Nowell-Smith (1977,12) noted that national-popular culture is defined by its 
absence just as hegemony is an ideal condition, which makes it difficult to 
establish empirical indicators, often requiring highly historical and descriptive 
accounts (Hall 1986,17). 
These critiques of hegemony can be more clearly glimpsed when Gramsci's theory 
of power and the state is contrasted to Foucault's since Foucault seems to take 
Gramsci's idea of an organic state to an extreme. As we move from Althusser to 
Gramsci and to Foucault, there is an increasing embedding of the state onto (civil) 
society and the notion that state and society are mutually constitutive, to the extent 
that their boundaries are no longer clear (Cf. Hall 1980b, 65). In some ways, 
Foucault's theory of dispersed (discursive) power reflects the logical consequence 
of a neo-Gramscian situation when the state becomes too organic or when it 
becomes so "truly national-popular' that the state melts and disappears/disperses 
into civil/organic society, losing its objective reality and if even possible, can be 
traced only to sets of inter-personal (e. g., Miliband) and antra-personal (e. g., 
technologies of the self) relations. 
22 An idea that developed in conversation with Erik Axel (Roskilde University, 
Copenhagen) was that the shift from the state being conceived as overarching and 
external to society to the state as being embedded in society can be likened to a shift from 
a dualistic paradigm (where it is more possible to separate the national and the popular) 
to a dialectical paradigm (where both are mutually constituted). 
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It is at this juncture that Poulantzas' (1978) attempt to bridge Foucault and 
Gramsci (no matter how unsuccessful, Cf. Hall 1980b) can usefully highlight the 
gaps between their models. Like Foucault and Gramsci, Poulantzas saw the state 
as more than consent plus coercion since it Is through the ISAs that citizens' 
practices are disciplined and they are persuaded to consent to coercion. Using the 
term "institutional materiality, " he sought to articulate how material state processes 
are institutionalised through the conflation of knowledge-power. 23 
The impasse between Gramsci. and Foucault is firstly, whether there can be a 
discursive/ideological unity and secondly, the "institutional materiality" of this 
discursive centre. I. e., whether this discursive unity can be further traced to certain 
social formations (or relations of production), especially to (the project, interests, 
intentions or effects of) a social group that holds (economic or other types of) 
power. 
On the first issue, Foucault believed in the chaotic, unsystematisable 
heterogeneity of discursive materialization. From Foucault's point of view, the 
problem with Gramsci's theory is that hegemony requires a sense of ideological 
unity, which Foucault (1979) believes to exist only as an elite construction created 
by the disciplines of population sciences (statistics, demography, etc. ). As such, 
Foucault does "not simply [point] ... to the proliferation of discourses. He 
advanc[es] a theory of their necessary heterogeneity! ' (Hall 1980b, 66) and a 
rejection of the possibility of ideological homogeneity. 
Although Foucault's rejection of this possibility seems to deal a deep blow to the 
study of hegemony, I would argue that this is only so if hegemony Is thought of as 
being based on a positive unity (as identification or match/correspondence 
between elite and popular discourses) - an understanding that Nowell-Smith 
(1977,12) cautions as idealistic and empirically unviable. Indeed Gramsci and Hall 
believe that for an ideology to become hegemonic, it must be necessarily 
transformed and localized, especially as commonsense. Still, the question remains 
23 E. g., how the emergence of the discipline of psychiatry allowed for the categorisation 
and institutionalization of a previously non-existent concept of the "madman. " 
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whether it is possible to find an ultimate discursive/ideological unity despite the 
irreducible heterogeneity. Toward the conclusion of this chapter, I will suggest that 
this is a possible task. Notions of "incorporation, " "subordination" and "rhetorical 
compliance" (a term I use to describe Singaporean's posture towards the state) all 
point to hegemony as being not the elimination of discursive heterogeneity but an 
acknowledgment that while discourses are irreducible heterogeneous, there may 
also be limits to their variations. 
On the second issue of whether the state remains a distinct entity, Poulantzas 
(1978,68) observes that for Foucault, power is "'an abstract machine, ' whose 
action is everywhere and which is assumed prior to its concretisation in any 
particular field. " By Marxist standards, Foucault's conception of the state and 
power constitutes a form of ideologism because the economic base disappears. 
Indeed, Hall (1980b, 67) argues that Foucault simply cannot afford to 
conceptualise non-abstract sources of power (whether economic elites or state) if 
he is to retain this thesis that power "is dispersed [heterogeneously] so that it 
cannot, theoretically, be traced back to any single organizing instances, such as 
the state. It voids the question of the economic because it cannot ... be 
crystallized into any set of global relations" (e. g., class relations). 24 
Poulantzas is uncomfortable with this view of power and insists on the state as a 
_ 
"condensation of relations of [class] forces" (Hall 1980b, 65), i. e., that power its not 
abstract but specifically concentrated along socio-economic lines. This is in line 
with Gramsci's (1971) insistence that hegemony is not exclusively an ideological 
phenomenon and that there can be no hegemony without "the decisive nucleus of 
the economic. " What is so disturbing about Foucault's reluctance to posit non- 
abstract sources/centres of power is best expressed by Hall (1 980b, 66): that the 
state appears to be missing "not by inadvertence but by design" and by Benjamin's 
(1988) description of the state's "unseen presence. " 
24At the same time, Hall (1 980b, 67) observed that Foucault, when he is unable to 
question sources/centres of power, descend abruptly into "vulgar economism 
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That the state (and/or ruling elite) may be strategically absent brings to realization 
just how subtle its hegemonic processes are and makes the project of re- 
discovering these sources of power and the de-mystifying their processes all the 
more urgent. Indeed, if the liberal state is viewed within the historical stages of 
relations of production, then such strategic absence of the state must be 
understood as part of the liberal ideology of separating political and economic 
power to legitimise the ethics (freedom to compete) and consequences (social 
inequality) of capitalism. This is perhaps what Hall (1980b, 67) means when he 
points out Foucault's implicit "anarcho-libertarianism. " While Foucault does provide 
tremendous insights into the subtle processes of discursive power, Marxist 
criticises that he does so within liberal frameworks, oblivious to the possibility that 
these processes - including discursive heterogeneity and the dispersal of power 
through inscription onto the popular- are particular to the needs of liberal 
capitalism. 
Nevertheless, Foucault's theories do contribute to a clearer vision of socialist 
strategy. Certainly, if power is "everywhere, " then states are no longer the 
centres25 of ideological/discursive unity in liberal capitalist societies (despite 
remaining centres of ultimate "coercive" power). The "heart" of capitalist 
reproduction now takes place in new centres - whether this be individuals' desires 
to accumulate (Miliband), a society's shared commonsense (Hall) or as a society's 
moral expectations of individuals ("face"), which I argue to be the case in 
Singapore. Indeed, if these constitute the new centres of social reproduction, then 
the emergence of a counter-hegemonic movement would require struggling at the 
level of personal desires, collective commonsense and public morality. 
Depending on where the heart of social reproduction is believed to be and what is 
seen as problematic about it, theorists offer different strategies. E. g., for Bourdieu 
(in Hamel 1993), what is problematic about everyday practice and commonsense 
25 In the Philippines during the People Power II revolution, power seemed to reside less 
with the state (President Estrada was removed) than with the people. However, even 
among "people power, " there are different centres. People Power II (nickname "cell- 
phone" revolution) was organized by the middle-class and resisted by the rural working 
class who supported Estrada to power during the People Power I revolution. 
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is not that it is mediated by ideology - an inescapable condition - but that it is 
unable to transcend its mundane subjective reality and is thus alienated from an 
objective vision of society. Bourdieu's strategy is then the recovery of a 
sociological imagination to re-establish the objectivity of individuals' subjective 
conditions. For Gramsci (1971,324/421; Hyug 1991,149), the goal Is to transform 
commonsense into a coherent, unified and critical conception of the world and to 
achieve a new "conformism" - but conformism no less (Coluccl 1999,152-153) - 
to this critical commonsense. 
It is upon the affirmation that the state is absent by design and that it undertakes 
ideological projects to shape inter/intra-personal relations (e. g., technologies of the 
social and of the self) that I will try, in the course of this dissertation, to articulate a 
theory, epistemology and method for thinking about how/when hegemony can be 
said to exist in the light of Foucault's criticisms. Before doing so, I will first focus on 
the irreducible and "necessarily heterogeneous" nature of hegemony by looking at 
the subtle ways'that the state inscribes itself onto the popular and the sites that it 
grafts itself onto so as to render itself seemingly absent. 
2C. THE HEGEMONIC PROCESS: ITS SUBTLE AND "NECESSARILY 
HETEROGENEOUS" NATURE 
Many scholars have noted the heterogeneity of elite discourses. Their 
heterogeneity is both a material and ideological condition. Materially/economically 
many note the blurring of class boundaries. Where late-capitalism brought 
"embourgeoisement" (Goldthrope and Lockwood 1969) and "middle-class 
societies" (Fukuyama 1992; Rodan 1993b)ß and where "information societies" 
expand the definition of (ownership of) "means of production" to include computer 
literacy and technical expertise, it has become more difficult to hold on to 
traditional indicators of class. Since the 1950s in Britain, Westgaard (1972) has 
observed the ascendancy of "a myth of classlessness. " The failure of class as an 
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explanatory concept has echoed throughout the decades, gaining more strength 
as social theorists try but fail to demonstrate the significance of class. 26 
If it is difficult to identify the elite as an economic class, it is even more 
complicated to identify the elite's dominant ideology. Firstly, where there is elite 
dissensus - whether due to contradictions or disagreements - Is it still meaningful 
to speak of a dominant ideology? Lull (1991) argues that in China, the elite's 
ideological projects have not been successful because the elite's could not come 
to a consensus (pro/anti-capitalism), and this elite dissensus, when disseminated 
and amplified by the media, led to popular dissensus. 
However, elite dissensus poses a problem for the identification of dominant 
ideologies only if it is assumed that dominant ideologies must be consistent. This 
is not the view in theories of hegemony where the elite must compromise its 
corporatist interests to become hegemonic. Indeed, Hallin (1986) argues that elite 
dissensus are often mirrored by popular dissensus, suggesting as Billig (et al 
1988) does, that elite dissensus and ideological contradictions can also be 
naturalized (as personal dilemmas) and reproduced, rather than problematised in 
popular discourse. For Hyug (1991) and Mouffe (1982), elite ideological 
heterogeneity is not an obstacle but a necessary process in the study of the elite's 
hegemonic strategies because the elite often have to sacrifice their short-term 
interests or. modify (rendering inconsistent) dominant ideologies. Looking at elite 
ideologies from a long-term perspective allows us to see that elite ideology is often 
constituted by hesitations and contradictions. 
In Singapore, state capitalism allows the PAP to exercise extensive control over 
relations of production and over the media. Such conflation of economic and 
political power makes the identification and theorizing of state power relatively 
easy - theories emphasizing economism would suffice. However, the PAP does 
not only legitimise its rule based on economic performance but also through 
26 Morley's (1980) study of the Nationwide audience is perhaps the most famous of these. 
In Singapore, Rodan (1993b) struggles to maintain the relevance of class explanations, 
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economic ideologies. E. g., the Singapore Dream and the creation of a 
"stakeholders' society" represent the PAP's attempt to give their ideologies an 
"institutional materiality" through being grafted onto personal desires and dreams. 
As such, "hegemony" remains relevant because the PAP government does 
undertake ideological projects to inscribe pro-party values as an organic discursive 
centre that, by being relatively autonomous from the state, would render the state 
strategically absent. 
The heterogeneity of PAP discourses is emphasized in Part Two. The discussion 
of the PAP's political history and culturaVideological policy is not placed at the 
opening of the dissertation as "factual" background information but is presented as 
part of the analysis of what constitutes elite or dominant ideologies. Rather than 
offering an "objective" account, only analytically relevant aspects of Singapore 
history is woven in, paying special attention to the trial and errors (the various 
reformulations of "Asian Values") and the contradictions ("side-effects" and "price 
of success") within elite discourses. 
The heterogeneity of popular discourses in Singapore is emphasized in Part 
Three. Accepting that the popular is too multi-faceted and defies generalizations, 
sub-sections in Part Three aims to minimize categorization and explore variations 
in popular discourse. Sub-sections are intentionally without strong links and do not 
aim to provide an overarching, abstracted/general view of the popular, preferring to 
capture the messiness of the field. It is crucial that Part Three convinces readers 
of the irreducible heterogeneity of popular discourse because it is only then that 
the argument for hegemony (as a form of unity in spite of discursive heterogeneity) 
can be convincingly made in Part Four. 
To observe popular discursive heterogeneity and to uncover the subtle processes 
of inscription, we need to have a clear idea of where the site of ideological 
rep roduction/contestation is. E. g., many theorists argued that hegemony is 
negotiated and maintained in unique "sites" such as commonsense and un- 
Insisting upon the liberal potential of the middle-class even while having to explain its 
failure to live up to this potential. 
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reflexive practices rather than in deliberated opinion. What is identified as the "site" 
and "mechanisms" of ideological contestation is often premised upon theories of 
where and how meaning is made or fixed, since the project of interpretation 
depends on finding some fixity in meanings, however temporary. These theories of 
meaning are inevitably based on some assumptions about human nature. 
In the next four sub-sections, I will criticize some theories and assumptions 
concerning the site of meaning so as to pinpoint the precise sites and mechanisms 
of meaning making or ideological reproduction and to point us, in the conclusion, 
towards us a re-conceptualisation of hegemony. 
I. Beyond behaviourism: from structure to agency 
Theories of hegemony accept ideological and structuring effects. (from power elite, 
language, culture, sociology, etc. ) as very real. For Gramsci, the role of organic 
intellectuals is precisely to achieve the ideological effect of a socialist consensus. 
However, these structural effects must be understood within the context of 
individuals' active and heterogeneous reproduction firstly because the fact that 
subjects must be persuaded to give their consent means that they can also 
withhold it. Secondly, as many scholars suggest, ideology becomes naturalized 
and reproduced through subjective experience and micro processes - through 
desires, pleasure and everyday commonsensical practices (Ang 1985; Radway 
1984). 
The issue then is not the denial of the effects of ideological/structural determinism 
but to graft its processes onto the subjective and the biographical. To this end, len 
Ang's (1990,247) clarification that an active audience is not tantamount to a 
powerful one is useful; certainly, theories of hegemony subscribe to the view that 
subjects' agency is limited rather than celebrate complete freedom (Cf. Fiske 
1987a; 1987b on "semiotic democracy"). For the purpose of understanding the 
hegemonic process, theories of determinism are useful to the extent that they take 
into consideration individuals' consent and complicity in the process of social- 
ideological reproduction. A suitable level of determinism is thus one that, while not 
pronouncing certain and even effects, offers insight on the pressures exerted on 
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individuals to conform. It is in this light that I will review some theories of 
determinism. 
Social psychological theories of determination range from assumed (total) 
ideological effect to objective sociological correlations to 
psychoanalytical/biographical determination. Among these, structuralist theories 
are the most totalising. The pronouncement of total (behaviourist27) determination 
is possible only through prioritising langue over parole and deep structures over 
surface representations, i. e., through the disjnissal of heterogeneity and variations. 
Structuralist theories are especially dominant in the discipline of "cultural 
psychology, " where language (Whorf 1956), culture (Pye and Pye 1985) or myth 
(Levi-Strauss 1972) are seen to have all-pervasive, often homogeneous and 
inescapable effects. E. g., Pye and Pye argued that subjects of Confucian societies 
exhibit a high degree of dependency on authority and tautologically assert that 
authoritarian (Confucian) culture creates authoritarianism. What is problematic Is 
that their account is not only their Orientalist uni-dimensional representation of 
Confucian subjects, but also that they see the dependency on authority as an 
inescapable trait for all Confucian subjects, ignoring the many instances of revolts 
against authority in Chinese history. 
Slightly less deterministic are structures (textualism) that prescribe several 
positions, e. g., the three readings ("dominant, " "negotiated" and "oppositional") In 
Hall's (1 980a) Encoding/Decoding model. In these theories, variations are seen as 
a property of structures/texts rather than of individual agency. This distinction 
between multiple positions as opposed to ambiguity is also observed by Hall when 
he says polysemy is not pluralism (in Hagen and Wasko 2000,19-20) and by 
Willemen's (1978,45) criticism that polysemy denies rather than celebrates 
audience agency. The problem with the theory of polysemy is again, that 
variations/heterogeneity is seen to be a textual quality that Is independent of 
subjects' agency. An analyst can pre-determine a number of possible readings 
27 Behaviourism typically refers to animal-like non-capacity for active symbolic 
communication (Percy 1975). Here, I would argue that these models suggest a type of 
"symbolic behaviourism. " 
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without consulting subjects and insist upon their legitimacy even if, upon consulting 
subjects, he finds that none of his subjects occupy certain positions. E. g., Hall's 
"oppositional reading" is an empirically rare position (Cf. Ang 1985) and becomes 
rarer the more hegemonic the ideologies in question are. Its value lies more in its 
logical importance and counter-hegemonic potential than as a description of the 
position of real subjects. 28 
Less deterministic is the view that variations exist within structures due to agents' 
interpretation and practice. Using dramaturgical metaphors, Nelson(1985) and 
Peckham (1965) argue that "roles" and "scripts" are always interpreted and 
performed in the personal style of the actor (e. g., pitch, emotional quality) and 
cannot never be fully pre-determined. Despite such focus on variations, they argue 
that these personal variations exist within a pre-scripted "range. " For them then, an 
ideal social psychological theory - or cultural script - must then be skeletal and 
flexible enough to account for limited variations. 
The notion of a prescribed script and obedient subjects focuses on parole with little 
consideration that it is through parole/performance (e. g., "argument" and 
"commemoration" for Billig, 1992) that "scripts"/langue are (re )written. While 
"script" theorists may postulate multiple but clear positions, for Billig and 
Volosinov, the "script" is not a clear ideology with a range of variations but one that 
is infused with contradictions and ambiguity. For Volosinov (1973,10-13), 
ideologies live through signs, which have no reality outside communication. 
Because communication is `Characterised by non-determinacy ("multiaccentuality, " 
"registers of voice"), the meanings of signs and thus ideologies can never be fixed. 
For Billig (1988), ideological reproduction is often infused with indeterminacy and 
contradictions/arguments. In dramaturgical terms, there is no "script, " only 
"interpretative repertoires" (Potter and Wetherell 1987), rhetorical goals, devices 
and constraints. 
28 As opposed to textual subjects, Cf. Willemen 1978,48 later. 
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In reviewing these theories, my aim is less to reject ideological determinism and 
celebrate "semiotic democracy" than to find a satisfactory explanation of the extent 
and limits of ideological determination. What is unsatisfactory about many theories 
of determination is that the postulation of static "deep/underlying structures" 
necessitates a de-linking with surface variations and particularities and a 
privileging of langue over parole. This over-emphasises abstract structuring effects 
at the expense of a localised account of how structures may or may not be 
(faithfully) reproduced through human agency (Lechte 1994,75). For Willemen 
(1978,48; Osterud 2000,126), there is an unbridgeable gap between "real" 
readers/authors and "inscribed" ones, constructed (in and by the text). For 
Willemen, real readers are subjects in history, living in social formations, rather 
than mere subjects in a single text. Secondly, conceptually, such trivialising of 
surface variations also compromises the explanatory power of the theory. Without 
some understanding of. the process/mechanism of structuration, it would not be 
possible to understand whether theorised/objective correlations are meaningful or 
coincidental29 (e. g., the issue of "control variables"); and if they are meaningful, 
whether it is a case of causality, amplification or dialecticism. 
Foücault's and Marx's theories offer us insights into what constitute a good theory 
of determination because they are "deterministic" in different ways. Marx's theory 
is objective without being totalising while Foucault's theory focuses on subjective 
process but is totalising. Marx's theory can be said to be more deterministic than 
Foucault in that Marx posits objective structural determinations (of the 
superstructure by the base structure) while Foucault focuses on the micro bio- 
processes through which objective'structures become inscribed and subjectively 
real for individuals. On the other hand, Foucault's theory can be said to be more 
deterministic (totalising): Marx actively theorises social change while Foucault 
sees power as being dispersed and its disciplinary effects as inescapable. 
Looking at these two types of determination, it would appear that what makes a 
good theory is the extent to which objective processes and theories of social 
29 E. g., Bourdieu (1992) distinguishes between correlation and explanation 
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change are articulated through subjectivised lenses. Indeed, without attendant 
explanations of micro-processes, the assumption of hypodermic Ideological effects 
problematically implies that ideological success can be achieved merely with the 
implementation of ideological projects. What is missing from such coarse 
correlation between objective structures/projects and their ideological effect can be 
found in Gramsci's distinction between domination and leadership or governance 
by consent - the subject's active cooperation/complicity. Looking at'the particular, 
local and the subjective allows us to identify the mechanisms through which 
objective structures become subjectively "real" in subjects' lives and through which 
power/structure is mystified and naturalised. 
11. Beyond cognitivism: the rhetorical turn to contextualism 
To understand the process of subjectification or internalisation, social 
psychological theories are especially useful. Depending on where meaning is 
believed to be located - in the "script, " in the "head, " in social 
structures/representations, in the "context, " etc. - different approaches incline us 
towards different projects of interpretation. This is because our claim to 
know/represent the "Other" or "masses" is premised on assumptions that there are 
relatively consistent or (context) unvarying "attitudes"/`opinions" without which the 
project of interpretation would be impossible. 
More mechanical social psychological models posit some form of cognitive 
symbolic structures. Believing that the prime task of social science is to study "the 
thinking society' Moscovici (1981; 1984) and Farr (1990) build their theories of 
social representations based on Durkheim's concept of collective representations. 
For them, people are socialised into communities and inherit the accumulated 
received wisdom of their community. These symbolic structures (mechanically) 
govern the actor's creation of their shared realities and, Billig (1991,7) argues, 
remove the autonomy of thinking from the individual. 
While Moscovici and Farr postulate a direct process of transference of social 
representations into individual representations, Van Dijk (1985) and Fairclough 
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(1989) use the concept of "mental structuresi30 to postulate a mediating cognitive 
process that occurs in the individual's mind. The separation of the cognitive 
process into two stages accords actors relative autonomy from the symbolic 
structure. The transference of social structures to mental structures may be 
mechanical but the process of forming an opinion from one's mental structures is 
less prescribed since individuals exercise subjectivity/choice in assembling options 
from their cognitive resources (Garrett and Bell 1998,6-13). 
For these theories, the mind is seen as the centre of meaning making and 
subjects are seen as mental beings. Neale observed that many analytical 
categories place a strong emphasis on cognition and associate ideology with mind 
(Neale 1977,10/11/18; Willemen 1978,45-47). Willemen (1978,58) attributes the 
over-emphasis on cognitivism to psycholinguistic, to Lacanian theories that argue 
that self-awareness emerges through language and to empiricist standards that 
demand that only "text" counts as evidence (Willemen 19878,43-7). 
Such assumptions of cognitivist subjects seem to stem from/affirm a liberal 
paradigm. Foucauldians31 describes Western liberal subjects as subjects who are 
encouraged to become cognitively aware ethical subjects who self-disciplines 
themselves into ideological consistency (e. g., individuals who hold on to principles 
regardless of contextual variations. ) By contrast, the moral subjects that "Asian 
Democracy" attempts to cultivate should have a high tolerance of cognitive 
dissonance (Cf. Pye and Pye 1985). It is vital that the good "Asian" subject does 
not strive for ethical/ideological consistency but tries to live harmoniously with 
others by observing the right contextual codes of conduct (e. g., the 5 hierarchical 
Confucian relations). While liberal subjects are expected to stand by their 
principles even if it inconveniences them, moral (Confucian) subjects take the path 
of least resistance, thereby maintaining the cherished "Asian" value of social 
harmony. [Indeed, should moral subjects attempt to live ethically, they may not be 
able to cope in a moral society where they have to conform to others' expectations 
30 Traditional semantics (linguistics) Is replete with analogies of the human minds to 
library filing systems, with further analogies of memory to acts of retrieving old files and 
cataloguing away current information. 
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or in an "Asian (authoritarian) democracy" where what they want must be 
subordinated to the social consensus - or what imagined "others" want. ] 
Additionally, there is significant empirical evidence against the cognitivist premise 
that there are consistent attitudes inside people's heads - entities that social 
psychology studies and political science polls seek to categorise and quantify. As 
early as 197.0s, Pollock (1976,229) has explained that people reproduce 
stereotypical knowledge when they feel caught by the need to give an opinion 
when they lack one. Recent findings also indicate that "opinions" are extremely 
sensitive to contexts and changing the wording of questions can bring about 
systematic changes in responses (Zaller 1992). Coming from an American 
quantitative tradition, Zaller (1992) argues that there is no such thing as attitudes, 
only "considerations" and that survey responses are a function of the immediately 
accessible or "salient" considerations - which are typically those of the 
media's/elite's. To summarise all this as being the expression of an 'attitude' or as 
a 'predisposition' is to undermine the rhetorical complexity of opinion giving (Billig 
1991,16). Similarly arguing that meaning is not independent of rhetorical goals, 
Osterud (2000,125-126) criticises Hall's encoding-decoding model32 for failing to 
recognise that "use" (contextual meaning) and (textual) meaning is not separated 
and that "use" is not a "secondary phenomenon" but rather a factor that Influences 
how a message is decoded. 
These empirical findings have led theorists to move away from cognitivism to 
contextualism, where meaning is not located inside people's heads waiting to be 
uncovered but is seen to be constructed in (contextualised) discourse, e. g., Knorr- 
Cetina's (1988) methodological situationalism. Nowhere Is this departure more 
clear than in the work of members of the Discourse And Rhetoric Group (DARG) 
at Loughborough University. Rejecting Fairclough's (1989) and Van Dijk's (1982; 
31 Cf. Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996). 
32 According to Hall (1 980a, 130): "Before this message can have an "effect" (however 
defined), satisfy a "need" or be put to a "use, " it must first be appropriated as a meaningful 
discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It is this set of decoded meanings which "have 
an effect, " influence, entertain, instruct or persuade, with very complex perceptual, 
cognitive, emotional, ideological or behavioural consequences. " 
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1985; 1998) "mental structures" and "attitudes" approaches, Potter and Wetherell 
(1987,7) make clear their opposition to various types of discourse determinism 
(cognitivist, linguistic, sociolinguistic) in their book, provocatively entitled 
"Discourse and social structure: beyond attitude and behaviour. " While Van Dijk 
argues that people hold racist attitudes because they internalise the media's 
(collective) representations (and are thus racist or un-racist), Potter and Wetherell 
argue that racism is not a mental/cognitive attribute of actors but arises in/through 
discourse. 
Besides this discursive turn towards social psychology, DARG's approach Is 
further distinguished by a rhetorical turn where ideology/structure is not seen as a 
"script" but as a resource manipulated through rhetorical devices to achieve 
rhetorical goals. E. g., Potter and Wetherell use the notion of "interpretative 
repertoire" to capture this rhetorical nature of the subject. For another DARG 
member Billig (1987), subjects are fundamentally rhetorical or "argumentative" 
beings. Social interactions - and even the act of thinking in private - are seen as 
inherently dialogic (Bahktin 1981); actors are constantly defending, persuading 
and negotiating with (internalised) others. I. e., conversation is not merely "talk" or 
the expression of personal attitudes, but "action" directed at the achievement of 
rhetorical goals (Hagen and Wasko 2000,20). 
DARG members acknowledge structuring effects to different degrees. For Potter 
and Wetherell, ideological frames are resources rather than constraints. Despite 
drawing heavily from Foucault, there is an unwillingness to acknowledge 
structuring effects. This is due less to a naivety about media/ideological effects 
than them being rigorously discursive. Ideology, race and class are seen as effects 
of discourse rather than being pre-discursive; i. e., subjects are not racial and their 
discourses cannot be explained by their race. Instead the issue Is whether and 
how "race" is sustained through discourse. While this comes close to Hall's 
(1996b) notion of race as a floating signifier, their perspective is constructivist 
without being historical and sociological and intensely (micro-)contextual without 
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being embedded in (macro-) contexts. 33 Their perspective lacks a consideration of 
how, over time, meanings and positions can accumulate into sociological 
traits/patterns or "predispositions" (Parkin 1971; 1974; Bourdieu 1984) through 
being inscribed onto the body, commonsense or interpretative communities (Fish 
1980). 
Billig's (1991,3; 1992) elegant argument that thinking is ideological and 
rhetorical/argumentative allows for a more dialectical perspective where subjects 
are both structured by and manipulative of ideology. Meanings are created within 
ideologies and are inherently rhetorical (rhetorically constructed by the individual) 
while the use of rhetoric by the individual in turn reflects the patterns of ideology. 
Thus, while commonsensical thinking replicates ideology, it can also serve as a 
rhetorical resource. In my research, I am interested in whether government 
discourses are replicated faithfully or hijacked for personal rhetorical goals. 
However, it would be insufficient to think of ideologies as either a constraint or 
resource because they can be subverted despite an actor's intention of faithful 
reproduction. I. e., it is insufficient, if even possible, to identify the rhetorical goals 
of the actor because the effects are often more important than the actor's 
rhetorical goals. 34 
111. Beyond ratlonality/intentlonality to effects 
The shortcoming with the above approaches is the incomplete transcendence of 
cognitivism. While arguing that meaning emerges through discourse rather than 
resides in the mind ("mental structure theories), DARG emphasises context 
without giving up on cognitivism totally through focusing narrowly on the mind as 
the key agent in the process of meaning production. Although there is less 
emphasis on the consistency of meaning, the DARG's postulation of a rhetorical, 
33 Another way of phrasing this critique is to suggest that what they are doing is not 
"social" psychology but "interpersonal" psychology. 34 This will become evident in Chapter 7's argument of "rhetorical compliance" and "aura 
of consensus. " This focus of effects is also important to understand "unintended 
consequences" and the function served by the state/media's construction of "moral 
majority. " 
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argumentative subject, especially by Billig, emphasises the logical, goal-oriented 
subject with "rhetorical devices" and "interpretative repertories. " 
This assumption of the rational, goal-oriented subject, which also underlies rational 
choice theories and "Uses and Gratification" theories, is problematic because it 
overlooks firstly the unintended consequences or effects of intentional actions. Hall 
reminds us that hegemony is the unity achieved across different classes 
regardless of their different "motivations" or intentions. This means that hegemony 
may be sustained by apathy (Abercrombie et al 1980) or even by seemingly 
counter-hegemonic forms. E. g., Neale (1977) examines how critical art films can 
have propaganda effects while Hall (1 988b, 176) argues that the hegemony of 
Thatcherism was sustained less by rational/calculated identification with her 
economic policies than by her articulation of their irrational fantasies and anxieties: 
People don't vote for Thatcherism ... because they believe the small print... What Thatcherism ... as an ideology does, is to address fears, the 
anxieties, the lost identities, of a people. It invites us to think about politics 
in images. It is addressed to our collective fantasies. 
Secondly, the emphasis on the rational subject prevents us from appreciating that 
ideology may be more effectively inscribed through pleasure and Irrationality. This 
perception of the subject as strictly pragmatic/rational is a significant weakness in 
Zaller's argument that public opinion is a function of (mental) "considerations" and 
"predispositions. " Despite acknowledging the non-rational influences on 
opinions/meaning-making, he leaves the notion of "predispositions" unexplained, In 
contrast to his careful theorisation of "considerations. " This distinction between the 
different aspects of audience agency - rational/intentional versus 
unconscious/non-deliberate - is also an issue of contention between Curran 
(1996) and Morley (1996). In his critique of "new revisionism" in audience 
research, Curran tries to demonstrate that the notion of active audience also forms 
the basis for studies in the 1940s and 1950s. However, these early studies define 
audience activity strictly in terms of selective use, rather than as meaning 
construction (Hagen and Wasko 2000,15-16). 
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Studies have pointed out that ideological processes are also located at the level of 
the "unthought. " Morley (1992,79-80) argues that In the long-term, the media 
influences interpretative frameworks and categories of thought. Chessbro (1984, 
120) argues that television works to provide general orientation of awareness; 
Corcoran (1984,138) argues that the medium (rather than the message) is the 
ideology, e. g., in its ability to frame conventions and time orientations (Gumpert 
and Cathcart 1982,23). For Brummett (1991,6-7,13-18), the televisual logic is 
dramatic and anecdotal. Many Marxist theories also see media effect as non- 
specific or attitudinal and in terms of the categories or frameworks induced 
through habits of thought and discourse (Blumler and Gurevitch 1985,238- 
239/262-263). For Marxists and other structuralists, "it is above all as structures 
that [ideologies] impose on the ... men, not via their consciousness" (Heck 1980, 
122). 
. 
Similarly, Bourdieu (1992), Gramsci (1971) and Hall (1996a) argue that society is 
inscribed onto subjectivity through practices and commonsense. For Gramsci and 
Hall, commonsense has an element of "irrationality' to it. Gramsci (1971,323/419) 
saw commonsense as a sedimentary collection of previously organic ideologies, 
ranging from folklore, superstitions, received wisdom and popular science. For 
Hall(1977,325), commonsense is non-reflexive: 
It. is precisely its 'spontaneous' quality, its transparency, its 'naturalness, ' its 
refusal to be made to examine the premise on which it is founded, its 
resistance to change or to correction... which makes commonsense, at one 
and the same time, 'spontaneous, ' ideological and unconscious. 
These approaches vitally acknowledge that everyday practices and pleasures of 
popular culture cannot lie outside ideological formations and that the pleasures of 
popular culture must be implicated in the ways in which hegemony is secured and 
maintained (Ang 1985). For Rose (1992), the pleasures and aura of freedom are 
vital for ideological success - the transformation of public morality as personal 
ethics - in liberal societies. Hall (1977,325) also reminds us that hegemony is 
maintained less through ideological consistency than through the inconsistent and 
fragmented commonsense. Together, these theories imply that it is more through 
unthinking habits and pleasure than cognitively mediated forms that ideologies 
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become inscribed and taken-for-granted. It could even be said that Ideologies are 
most successful when ideological contradictions are rendered Invisible (naturalised 
as commonsense), reproduced rather than resolved by citizens. E. g., Billig (1988) 
uses the term "ideological dilemma" to underline that it is not only consistent 
ideologies that are reproduced but that ideological contradictions can also be 
reproduced/naturalised as personal ideological dilemmas. Just as Weber argues 
that the capitalist ethic was an unintended consequences of Calvinist Protestant 
dilemmas, hegemony is not necessarily intentionally reaffirmed by citizens and is 
sustained in spite of (or even through) ambiguous communications, contradictory 
ideological reproduction and even intentions of resistance (Neale 1977). 
This does not constitute a repudiation of the idea that meanings are situated in 
contexts, but a repudiation that they are necessarily mediated by the mind, 
conscious/deliberate thought or intentional action. This realisation - that ideology is 
maintained and negotiated not only through intentionality but also through being 
unthinking - creates epistemological and methodological problems. Is it still 
possible to access meanings, to claim to know our subjects, to re-present or 
capture "the popular? " 
This suggests that analysis is often merely a form of "popular ventriloquism" (Frow 
in Morley 1992,31), where there is an unacknowledged "substitution of the voice 
of a, middle-class intellectual for that of the users of popular culture" and that 
analysts often resort to the fact of "being there" (Geertz 1988) to argue for the 
superiority and "truth" of their particular account. 
While such privileging of the researcher's "first-hand" experience is difficult to 
avoid in my analysis, i will try as far as possible to incorporate primary material to 
allow readers to develop an independent interpretation. Part of this strategy 
includes identifying multiple interpretations of the same phenomenon, whether 
through comparing my analysis with that of other scholars or through identifying 
different levels/layers of meanings. Let me illustrate the latter with the infamous 
example - in local popular songs - that Singaporeans are "famous for 
complaining" (in private). 
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As an utterance in itself, a complaint can be read literally as an expression of 
dissatisfaction. However, reading a complaint inter-textually frequently produces a 
contrary reading - how serious/significant is it, and what is the meaning of a 
complaint or the act of complaining in the speaker's overall discourse? The 
complainer may be a fervent anti-government critic or someone who is generally 
satisfied but critical of some "side-effects, " e. g., a phrase that recurs is "despite 
these, the PAP has done a good job. " Indeed, I would even argue that, far from 
indicating dissent, such complaints indicate a high level of consent since citizens 
choose to accept the government despite their awareness of "side effects" Hence, 
hegemony may be more convincingly indicated not by the absence of 
dissent/complaints but by citizens' complicity in subordinating/privatising dissent 
(cf. Mouffe 1982,219). 35 
The act of complaining takes on a third meaning when viewed contextually or 
extra-textually, such as when the speaker's rhetorical goal and targeted audience 36 
is considered. There were moments during the interviews when I felt that my 
interviewees were communicating with an audience other than myself. Through 
thinking about these "hidden" audiences, originally irrelevant statements become 
the most insightful and Important. 37 In some subcultures (e. g., coffeeshop or 
"artsy"), citizens may criticise the government to appear "alternative/hip. " It is a 
taboo in Singapore society to ask anyone how he or she voted - this is because it 
may be embarrassing (losing face) for a person to confess that he voted for the 
PAP. Finally, the ideologicaVhegemonic effect of this act must also be considered. 
It may be a way of "letting off steam" so that the system would not explode. In this 
35 For Leys (1990), the hegemony of Thatcherism was indicated by how even critics of 
Thatcher could not bring themselves to vote Labour. (I. e., by spoilt votes rather than 
opposition votes). 
3 In an authoritarian society, the researcher (with a recorder in hand) represents a unique 
type of "audience. " This will be dealt with in Chapter 3. 
A good example is HO's defence that she was not "a stupid housewife" In response to 
my seemingly Innocent question of "which newspapers do you read? " (Chapter 6B). It was 
not until I remembered her telling me about her educated snobbish neighbours that I 
understood that it was they, not me, who were her "real" audience. (Also see "moral 
majority" and "the burden of social expectations" in Chapter 6). 
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way, citizens may passively "support" or reproduce the state without discursively 
doing so and despite their intention. 
Finally, even though thicker descriptions can generate more layers of meanings, 
Morley (1992,15) argues that it is not the case of the more context the better, as 
Dahlgren (in Corner 1991,280) implies. Morley rejects Corner's distinction 
between micro ethnographic research and macro research into media power and 
argues that context-bound ("ethnographic") research is valuable only insofar as it 
explains "how media power ... operates in the micro-contexts of consumption. " As 
such, the quality of my interpretation should be judged by the extent to which they 
bridge the micro and the macro. 
IV. Practice, performance, posture: subjecthood and hegemony 
What concepts would allow us to go beyond behaviourism and cognitivism to take 
into account the subjective, particular, and even biographical (Willis 1980; Mills 
1959) mechanisms through which ideology is naturalised and hegemony 
maintained? In this section, I will compare the different conceptualisations of 
subjecthood and argue for "posture" as a superior category for thinking about 
ideological processes. 
The notion of "performance" is developed from Goff man's (1973) theory about 
impression management in front/back-stages. Performing subjects are deemed to 
have a backstage, more authentic self (that is less impressions-managed) and 
often, * have a sense of an abstract, transcendental and reflexive self - one that is 
conscious of and even disturbed by the "problem" of inconsistent selves. This 
contrasts with the goals of the PAP's project to Confucianise subjects, where ideal 
subjects conform to social expectations or public morality (e. g., the 5 hierarchical 
Confucian relationships) rather than personal ethics. 
The notion of "subject position" operates within a similar paradigm of the liberal 
ethical subject/project, where inconsistency in the self is seen as problematic, e. g., 
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as (cognitive) "dissonance. " Usually implied rather than verified, 38 each subject 
position tends to be conceived of as un-encumbered by Internal contradictions39 
and approximating to the purity associated with "langue" rather than "parole" 
categories. Such a pejorative view of inconsistency as a "clash" contrasts starkly 
with Taoist and Buddhist notions of ideal subjecthood, which see opposition as 
inherent and as something to be balanced/harmonised rather than to be resolved, 
as dialectical rather than dualistic. 
Leaving aside "performance" (backstage/frontstage selves) and "subject positions" 
- concepts that imply cognitivist subjects seeking ideological coherence -I want 
to 
suggest "posture" as a concept to talk about ideological reproduction and 
contestation, a concept that is inspired by the anthropological works of James 
Scott (1990,1985). Studying peasant resistance in three Southeast Asian 
societies, he described how powerless peasants who could not overtly articulate 
their resentment (without jeopardizing their subsistence) resorted to embedding 
their dissent in acts of civility (Cf. 1990,139-182), e. g., farting while bowing, or 
wearing fake smiles. Unlike cognitivist (ethical) subjects who may experience 
ideological `doubleness' as troubling, Scott observed that such doubleness had 
become a form of "routine resistance" (1985,255-274) that actually served to 
salvage the self-esteem of these peasants (1990,7). 
"Posture" bears many similarities with other concepts; "habitus" and "practice" are 
especially complimentary. All three concepts focus on embodied subjects in their 
material contexts - what Willemen (1978,48) described as "real subjects" as 
opposed tö "textual subjects. " All three concepts see culture as being re-made on 
an everyday basis, and in a way that is often unthinking, if not unconscious. 
28 "Subject position" seems more popular among textualists than anthropologists, perhaps 
because pure subjects cease to exist when submerged In context. Cf. Criticism of 
textualism earlier. 
39 Hall's earlier distinction between polysemy and pluralism (which I described as 
ambiguous versus multiple readings) is relevant here. Textually motivated subject 
positions may be multiple but seldom ambiguous. 
65 
However, these three terms all emphasize different aspects of this process. 
"Habitus" (Bourdieu 1984) tends to de-emphasize agency by theorizing subjects as 
products of their (sociological) "habitus. " "Practice, " by comparison, focuses on 
subjects as active agents, who constantly re-make their "habitus" but this 
perspective often ignores wider questions about social inequality. Especially in 
anthropological studies, "practice" tends to focus on those practices that agents 
can and do perform (e. g., Hobart 1986), with little consideration of agents' (lack of) 
access to the forms of cultural capital necessary in order to perf orm different 
practices, i. e., of practices that agents do not or cannot perform. De Certeau's 
(1984) distinction between the "strategies" of the powerful and the "tactics" of the 
weak, Bourdieu's (1984) notion of "cultural capital" and Scott's (1985) theorization 
of the "weapons of the weak" are noteworthy. While acknowledging the (semiotic) 
freedom of the subject, they also situate such practices within a wider context of 
power and acknowledge that there are various types of limits - semiotic, socio- 
economic or political - limitations to agents' freedom to carry out symbolic 
practices. 
It is almost impossible to think of "posture" without simultaneously thinking about 
the environment (habitus) and habits (practice) that produce it. Indeed, it is this 
quality of articulating the other two concepts that makes 'posture' a useful way of 
thinking about ideological/cultural reproduction. Articulated in terms of the other 
two concepts, posture can be seen as the accumulated effects of habitualised 
practices (Cf. Lull 1988 on "ritualized practices") and recurring (personal- 
sociological or interpersonal) habitus-es. By focusing on effects, "posture" focuses 
of the process of inscription of social discourses over time. To highlight the effects 
of inscription is to also highlight the way that ideological effects have a certain 
durability. Postures are not subject positions or postmodern Identities displayed in 
show-windows that subjects can simply purchase/consume and occupy, but must 
be cultivated over time through repetitive practices. Yet, while durable, postures 
can also be changed with effort and awareness. 
The concept of "posture" connotes the embodiment of practices and sets up 
expectations of visual description of these embodied practices, which further 
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implies a reliance on ethnographic observations. Yet, while I am directly interested 
in citizens' doubleness and posturing (e. g., reading ethnic newspapers only when 
one is reminded that one is an inadequate Malay/Indian), the fact that resistance in 
an authoritarian society must always be disguised makes It Inappropriate for this 
research to rely primarily on observational modes of ethnography. 
Although local pop songs describe Singaporeans as "famous for complaining, " 
what is so frustrating about studying (strategies of managing) dissent in an 
authoritarian society is that one does not always have direct access to those who 
perform such resistance and that one can never be sure of the meaning of their 
acts. As Scott (1990,139) observed, "at the most basic level, ... techniques [of 
resistance] can be divided into those that disguise the message and those that 
disguise the messenger. " 
Both types of examples abound in Singapore, and I would argue, are not 
amenable to ethnographic research. For those acts of resistance whose meanings 
are clear, the identity of the actor must be anonymous. Performers of such type of 
resistance, such as vandalism and not flushing public toilets40, cannot be easily 
traced unless interviewees "brag" about them during the interview - an unlikely 
situation especially since the interviewer confronts the interviewee as a stranger 
and who may or may not prove trustworthy since these acts are punishable by law. 
If such "actors" are difficult to find, actors of the second type of resistance are 
even more difficult to identify, since it is not always clear if they are in fact 
'resisting', as they must perform their resisting posture while staying within the law 
(Scott 1990,138). As such, these acts are usually "too ambiguous to be actionable 
by authorities" (Scott 1990,139), as they could always be attributed to 
carelessness or coincidence. The meanings of such acts of resistance are often 
so subjective that it is difficult for the researcher to know, without checking their 
meaning with the actor (which is in turn premised upon the assumption that 
40 The government had become so frustrated by this that it launched a "Flush the toilet" 
campaign along with a fine for not flushing, although there are no toilet police appointed. 
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meaning is authorialiy determined, rather than through the process of reading). For 
instance, a friend voluntarily told me that he leaves a middle shirt button 
unbuttoned - something that I would not have noticed - as a refusal to be 
completely "proper. " There are also acts that are more visible, such as the wearing 
of headscarves by Muslim women. However, it is not always clear whether these 
women wear them out of deference for tradition or as a protest about official 
secularism, or a mixture of both. 
Because ethnographic observations are often inadequate for ascertaining the 
meanings of these acts, I followed up on what observations of resistance I could 
identify in the interviews. Besides asking observation-based questionsdl, I also 
asked more generic questions as to how interviewees "let off steam" or react when 
confronted with social expectations. Many of their responses, from joking to 
sourcing for rumors, are listed in Chapter 6CIII and 6D11I. 
The implications of filtering ethnographic observations into the interviews mean 
that the presentation of the interview material appears in a particular format - 
neither as my ethnographic notes nor block-quoted in interviewee's own words, but 
re-told in my own voice. This is because firstly, interviewees' narration of their 
practices tended to be repetitive and hesitant, and since these conversations took 
place in the interviewees' natural settings (e. g., homes), there were often 
interruptions. Given the space constraints in this dissertation, block-quoting my 
interview conversations did not seem practical. Secondly, the meaning of the 
interviewee's practices can only be appreciated when situated within a wider 
semiotic, (sub-)cultural context that is tacitly shared between myself and the 
interviewee. Because I could not ask the interviewee to explicate during the 
interviews without losing rapport, l found it necessary to then 'vocalize' my 
The media also had their own "Toilets of shame" - which regularly featured the nation's 
dirtiest toilets in order to shame them into improving. 
41 E. g., why professional women wear headscarves to work ("is there a special reason 
why you wear headscarf? "), why self-proclaimed Westernised citizens would have a 20kg 
sack of rice ("why do you have so much rice? "), why some students wear colourful dental 
braces ("I bet your friends think it's cool! (not nerdy)), whether the designer clothes that 
working class subjects wear are genuine ("this outfit is lovely, how much did you pay for 
it? /where can I get it? "). 
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understanding of the semiotic context, so that the reader can understand the 
significance of the interviewees' practices. 
In this dissertation, I use the notion of "posture" to highlight the non-cognitive and 
non-behaviourist processes through which ideology is reproduced in everyday life. 
I use different postures to capture how citizens balance their personal values and 
ways of knowing with those of the media's. For instance, how would gaps between 
national and personal reality be bridged (if citizens are even aware of them)- 
through discrediting personal knowledge or doubting the media? Drawing from 
Morley's (1980) application of Hall's model of 3 types of readings (dominant, 
negotiated, oppositional), I expand their criteria to include the 
relevance/awareness of dominant ideology and modify the unit of analysis from 
uni-dimensional reading positions to strategies of coping with different versions of 
reality. To what extent do citizens' version of reality resonate with official 
representations of reality and where there is no match, how are "reality gaps" 
bridged: through de-legitimating their own version or through doubting the media? 
The posture of unconditional acceptance describes the refutation of dissent and 
the reproduction of official discourse. The posture of conditional acceptance 
describes the neutralisation of dissent (whether due to a genuine appreciation of 
the state or through apathy) and/or the reproduction of dominant frames. The 
posture of tolerance describes privatisation without neutralisation of dissent. 
Citizens are not necessarily convinced of the illegitimacy of their opinions but 
conform out of a perceived lack of choice (fear or belief that there is "no viable 
alternatives. ") The posture of challenge describes the refusal to privatise dissent 
and the attempt to work towards the creation of a "viable alternative; " however, in 
this posture, dissent can sometimes be subordinated [Cf. Chapter 6. ] 
My research direction is guided by theories that hegemony is maintained less 
through ideological identification than through the unintended effects of less- 
cognitively mediated practices of privatising and subordinating dissent - through 
deference, conformity, rhetorical compliance - rather than through belief and 
active consent. Through "postures, " I want to explore the subtle link between 
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citizens' everyday discourse and political legitimacy: government legitimacy is not 
necessarily achieved through citizen's belief but rather through their unwitting, 
unintentional reproduction, through inscribing ideology onto everyday practices 
and over time, moulding citizens' very posture. 
2D. HEGEMONY REVISITED: A DISCURSIVE UNITY/CENTRE AND ITS 
INSTITUTIONAL MATERIALITY 
Although hegemony seeks to distinguish government by consent (leadership) from 
government by coercion (domination), Gran1sci and Hall argue that it is not 
indicated by the absence of coercion but by consent to, coercion, e. g., through 
identifying common enemies or to arrive at consensual definition of what 
constitutes' normality and deviance. 
Neither is it unproblematic to conceptualise hegemony as a "match" or resonance 
between elite and popular discourse. Firstly, to think of hegemony as governance 
by "consent" is misleading since hegemony tends to be sustained less through 
conviction and belief than through tacit consensus and apathy. Additionally, as 
Mattleart (1983,27-28) observes, the consumption/reproduction of ideologies 
exercise a transformative effect on them: 
Subdued and even consenting, often [ethnic] Indians converted the liturgies 
[of their Spanish colonisers], the representations or laws which they were 
forced to accept, into something other than what the conqueror hoped to 
obtain through their imposition; they subverted them not by challenging or 
changing them, but by their way of using them for and in the function of 
references that were outside the system they could not escape from. 
To say that ideologies are transformed through consumption Is not tantamount to 
the dismissal of the possibility of hegemony. Rather, hegemony is not to be 
indicated by the absence of ideological variations, but by the presence of 
ideological unity despite local transformations. 
If Leys (1990, "127) is right, that for ideologies to be hegemonic, it is not necessary 
that they are loved, merely that they have no serious rivals, then the presence of 
dissent or "mismatches" would not indicate non-hegemony. If Fiske (1986,293) is 
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right, that "in order to be popular, [an ideology] must reach a wide diversity of 
audience and, to be chosen by them, must be an open text that allows the various 
subcultures to generate meanings from it that meets the needs of subcultural 
identities, " then variations and dissent may even be a necessary condition for the 
pronouncement of hegemony. Most citizens have some complaints against their 
governments and it is too simplistic to dismiss governments as un-hegemonic on 
this basis. Indeed, I argue in Chapter 7 that it may well be the case that complaints 
(privatised dissent) should be read as an indication of, rather than counter- 
evidence against government hegemony. 
Thus, I would suggest that hegemony be understood as a form of limited . 
heterogeneity and especially, following Leys' analysis of Thatcherism, a 
heterogeneity that does not stake "a viable alternative. " Because of a perceived 
lack of ideological/political alternatives, dissent may be Incorporated or 
subordinated to the prevailing (even if reluctant) consensus. This conceptualisation 
of a minimal ideological unity -a "teeth-gritting" (Hall 1978) and reluctant one - 
allows us a way to bridge the seeming impasse that Poulantzas faced between 
Foucault's irreducible discursive heterogeneity and Gramsci's ideological unity. 
The second. impasse that Poulantzas' theory faces is the question of whether it Is 
possible to ground such discursive unity to the material/economic (i. e., the base 
structure of relations of production. ) I would suggest that the key to this impasse is 
to recall Hall's reminder that the state may be absent not inadvertently but by 
design. 
Firstly, if a (minimal) discursive unity can be identified ("there Is no viable 
alternative") within popular discourse, the nature of its content can provide insight 
into whether it coincides with values espoused by elite projects or whether it 
perpetuates authority (regardless of citizens' "intentions"). Indeed, to what extent Is 
this discursive unity a form of commonsense that works to de-legitimise 
alternatives and render them unthinkable or unviable? 
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Secondly, it is important to think about how the site of this discursive unity - 
whether commonsense or in this dissertation, "face, " social expectations and "the 
silent majority"- can precisely be the institution that state ideologies are grafted 
on, allowing the state to be absent while allowing its ideologies to acquire a certain 
"institutional materiality. " 
In my dissertation, I will use the term "moral centre" to refer to this relatively 
autonomous (from the state) organic/civil institution42 where state ideologies are 
inscribed and disseminated. This term is borrowed from Neale's (1977,14) use of 
"centre" to highlight the way that ideological dominance is not maintained only by 
the reproduction of preferred readings but that even seemingly oppositional or 
critical discourses can serve propaganda purposes. 
This conceptualisation of hegemony as a minimal ideological unity based on 
centrality/relevance rather than identification or actual reproduction Is especially 
suitable for Singapore. Like Neale, LKY believes that the project of hegemony 
should not aim to eliminate dissent but maintain the relevance or "centrality" of 
dominant frames and standards of morality in public life. Indeed, LKY goes so far 
as to argue that citizens' (private) identification with values of this moral centre is a 
non-issue; it suffices that they conform to it in public. I. e., it suffices that dominant 
ideologies serve as a moral centre or "middleground" (a term the PAP uses to 
describe its ideological strategy) -a well demarcated area with clearly set norms 
(consensus) of what is il/legitimate, im/moral, Asian/Western - within which 
contestation is confined. 
This is because hegemony Is not about citizens' agreement/disagreement with 
government opinions or values, but citizens' affirmation of their centrality/relevance 
and using them as frames to make sense of the world. I. e., it may be more useful 
42 In chapter 7, I will argue that these civil institutions perform in Asian societies the same 
function that civil societies perform in Western society. This argument Is made in 
response to the observation by many theorists (including Gramsci) of the absence of civil 
societies in Asia. 
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to think of hegemony as the privatisation and subordination 43 of dissent than as 
the absence of dissent. The strategy of subordination of dissent also serves to 
render ideological alternatives unthinkable - less in the sense of being logically 
unimaginable (and thus dissent being completely absent) than of being considered 
"impossible" or "unviable, " despite consideration. 
In Singapore, globally hegemonic ideological alternatives such as Western 
capitalism and democracy are not unimaginable, but made "unthinkable" through 
rendering them unviable for the present or for "the nation. " The "Asian Values" 
argument that economics is more important than democracy postpones the 
relevance of democracy indefinitely. Comm unitarianism, by obliging citizens to 
subordinate their personal (= selfish) wants to what Is good for society, denigrates 
dissenting desires as unviable and allows government values to remain socially 
relevant/central, despite being privately seen as meaningless by many citizens. 
To reiterate, I am interested in how the values of a one-party government are kept 
central and relevant for society and how political legitimacy is reproduced in 
everyday citizen discourse. To this end, I have suggested that hegemony may be 
more accurately and effectively maintained by rhetorical conformity and apathy 
than by (behaviouristic) obedience and convicted (cognitivist) belief. Having 
established the types of processes that would help us understand the process of 
hegemony, let us move on to discuss how to look for them. 
4" This understanding of hegemony as subordination is rather unique since hegemony is 
more frequently thought of as incorporation (Hall 1977,331-333; Brown 1993) This may 
be due to the particular ideologies under study - liberalism seems to have greater "elective affinity" with incorporatist strategies while communitarlanism, with subordination 
strategies. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3 FIELD ISSUES 
FINDING IDEOLOGICAL CONTESTATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
3A. FIELDWORK GOALS 
My research is concerned with the everyday legitimisation of authority through the 
popular reproduction of dominant discourses. Although it takes popular discourses 
as its chief body of data, this data is only meaningful when seen in relation to 
dominant ideologies and more specifically, when considered in terms of the extent 
to which popular discourses affirm or contest authority. 
To identify the "dominant ideology" in Singapore, I had hoped to rely on analyses 
by local scholars. To my disappointment, there were no analyses that I could 
immediately draw upon. Of the handful of scholars who study cultural projects in 
Singapore, most saw them as what the government claimed they were - nation- 
building rather as ideological projects. The only two works (Chua 1995; Hill and 
Lian 1995) that attempted an ideological analysis of culture identified "Asian 
välues/communitarianism" as the dominant ideology for the maintenance of party 
dominance. 
Their analyses were problematic for me because they miss a vital level of analysis 
- economics or "base structure; " after all, these scholars admit that economics 
remains the PAP's most important basis of legitimacy. This implies that the 
relation between culture and politics is mediated by economics. Perhaps, as 
argued, communitarianism serves as a supplementary subdominant ideology (to 
the dominant ideology of competitiveness) that allows for a re-amalgamation of 
capitalism and authoritarianism. 
This identification of a mediating economic level meant that the project to identify 
the government's ideological project required a two-pronged approach - the 
identifying of cultural ideologies and situating them within political-economic 
contexts. 
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To identify cultural ideologies, I drew on media coverage (from local and 
international, especially 1998-1999, when I was In Singapore for fieldwork). Media 
coverage was used In two ways. Firstly, campaign advertisements and related 
campaign press articles were used as a source of information about the various 
cultural campaigns and campaign strategies that the government used In their 
attempt to nation-build (Part 2). 
Besides analysing media coverage of specific campaigns, I was also Interested in 
general media effects on popular discourse., Because I was interested in only 
those media discourses that were actually reproduced in popular discourses - 
which tended to be fragmented and contradictory- it was difficult to trace them to 
daily media coverage, which tends to be event-specific. Instead, throughout my 
discussion of citizens' ways of knowing (and sources of knowledge) in Part 3, I try 
to highlight moments when citizens' discourses seemed to echo media discourses. 
For example, in Chapter 6A, dissent tended to be neutralized by the reproduction 
of the media's comparative frame of the economiccrisis - even though citizens 
understood Singapore's economy to be worsening, they always qualified this 
observation with the cautionary statement that, "at least we're not doing as badly 
as Malaysia and Indonesia! " In Chapter 6B, the dissent of the "have-nots" is 'de- 
fused' by the belief that Singapore is meritocratic and that their children would be 
able to achieve the Singapore Dream -a myth that is kept alive by the media's 
highlighting of cases such as that of the working-class boy who receives 
government scholarships. In Chapter 6C, dissent is privatised through (the 
perception of) the burdens of social expectation, which could be traced to the 
media's constant reminders (through popular cartoons or soap operas, even one 
entitled "5Cs") that the "silent majority" values material success. In Chapter 6D, 
dissent is subordinated because citizens, even if they can imagine viable 
alternatives, perceive there to be no credible political opposition -a group that the 
media represents as clowns. 
Besides identifying cultural ideologies, they also have to be situated in economic 
and political contexts. The lack of a political economy analysis of culture in 
Singapore meant that I had to look through a considerable quantity of economic 
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documents to establish how the cultural and the political were connected with the 
economic. The analysis derived from these materials will be discussed in various 
chapters (especially Chapter 4 and 5 on the political economy of social control and 
Chapters 7 and 8 in the discussion of the PAP's economic legitimacy). 
To collect popular discourse, I spent 6 months (Aug 1998 to Feb 1999) in 
Singapore immersing myself in various forms of popular culture. Besides doing 
ethnography in coffeeshops and other popular "hangouts" (malls and cultural 
events), I conducted in-depth interviews and collected popular literature (from 
bookshops and websites) and citizens' letters to the press. Given the 
"authoritarian" environment, I also collected anonymous popular discourse such as 
jokes and rumours to develop a more rounded sense of the "feelings on the 
ground. " Given that the methods of collecting popular discourse is less 
straightforward than that of collecting elite discourse, I will use this chapter to 
explain my fieldwork and analysis procedures. 
3B. SAMPLE DESIGN 
My understanding of hegemony as ideological unity in spite of pluralism (the 
subordination of dissent) means that my research has no vested Interest In 
demonstrating the homogeneity of popular opinion or the prevalence of a particular 
position. Indeed, the persuasiveness of my analysis of hegemony requires that I 
first convey a sense of the breadth and messiness of the field, before describing 
how these different discourses work towards sustaining or challenging the status 
quo. 
Given. that I prioritise range over average, hesitations and contradictions over 
coherence, qualitative methods are more suitable because they embrace issues of 
interpretation and are context-sensitive (Mason 1997,4). However, they tend to 
lack representativeness. While many qualitative researchers respond by 
weakening their claims (to the extent of dropping all claims to represent the wider 
population), this response compromises the potential significance of qualitative 
research. In studying hegemony, the analysis of commonsense allows for a certain 
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claim to generalizability even from a small sample. There would be no need to 
demonstrate the numerical frequency of commonsensical statements because 
readers44 would intuitively know how prevalent these discourses are. Indeed, 
Durkheim (1965) and Foucault (1965) remind us that representativeness - what Is 
average or normal - is not always the opinion of a numerical majority, but expert 
knowledge that has become a "preferred reading" that each of us expect others to 
"prefer. " 
in downplaying the problem of representativeness, I am not trying to avoid a 
discussion of issues in qualitative sampling. Rather, this Is an issue I want to 
return to, but only after considering sample variables, because the size of a 
qualitative sample also depends on the types of variables we want to sample for. 
I. Sample variables 
In selecting which variables to sample, I am particularly concerned with those 
variables that would allow me to methodologically control for media influence. This 
is not because, in studying how successful the government is in gaining consent to 
its ideology, I accord an automatic importance to the media or its effects. Indeed, 
my dissertation recognizes that consent can be gained in many ways - Chapter 4 
describes attempts to secure popular identification through policies (e. g., housing, 
employment) and not only (economic or cultural) ideologies. 
The 18t-generation PAP government's ideological projects were largely founded 
upon economic policies and economic ideologies. Since the late 1980s, the 2 "a- 
generation government increasingly relied on "Asian Values" and other cultural 
policies to secure legitimacy, and these campaigns were largely - If not solely, as 
Chua (1995) argues, media campaigns. 
The media are important also because Singapore is famed as "Campaign 
Country. " While these campaigns tend to be accompanied by disciplinary policies 
(whether educational, correctional or fiscal- Singapore is also famed as "Fine 
"Especially Singaporeans but hopefully, also readers' familiar with capitalist culture. 
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Country"), the media is usually the key state apparatus to alter citizens' perception. 
Thus, for the "Brush Your Teeth" campaign, while the Ministry of Health taught 
children to brush their teeth, it is MITA who was responsible for changing their 
perception of dental health. Additionally, as coercive policies become less 
acceptable to the citizenry, campaigns became Increasingly a principally media 
event (Chua 1995). 
The media are also important because for a vast majority of citizens, they are their 
only source of information about the nation. js an easily accessible source of 
knowledge, the media can considerably shape citizens' perception of national 
reality. 
While acknowledging the importance of the media, I also do not want to fall Into a 
kind of media determinism. The media must be contextualized and be seen as 
only one of many "ways of knowing, " as a particular type of semiotic 
capital/resource that citizens may draw upon and as a particular government-led 
interpretative frame. ' A central fieldwork goal in my work Is to locate alternative 
sources that citizens may draw upon in their "talk", about the nation, including the 
use of jokes and rumours. Analytically, I am particularly Interested In comparing 
the use of governmental and non-governmental "ways of knowing" (whether 
personal observations or social knowledges drawn from "interpretative 
communities" such as "coffeeshoppers"). 
GENERATION 
It is this interest In non-governmental "ways of knowing" that leads me to select 
generation as the most important sample variable - one that would allow me to 
control for government/media influence. 
This can be achieved through sampling and comparing pre-state citizens (who 
lived a considerable portion of their lives in pre-independent Singapore) with "post- 
state" citizens. For most countries, this opportunity to study pre-state citizens may 
not be available. Because Singapore is a very young nation-state (since 1965), 
78 
this research project has the rare opportunity of accessing this group of citizens, 
which allows for a "control" for government and media influence. 
However, there are also problems with the assumption that pro-state citizens are 
"less ideologically influenced" by the media and the state. An especially plausible 
critique is that this group may be influenced by media exposure in post-state 
Singapore. However, I would argue that (post-independence) media influence Is 
not as strong as readers may expect. When asked about their media habits, many 
senior interviewees (above the age of 60) told me that they had little contact with 
media. As poor immigrants from China and India, these immigrant-citizens were 
mostly illiterate. 45 The government's ban on dialect languages in broadcast media 
also meant that radio and televisual communications were inaccessible to them. 
Indeed, a typical complaint that the older generation had was that "they 
(broadcasters) speak Mandarin too fast. " Many resort to listening to cassette 
music or rent dialect videos (e. g., Cantonese Hong Kong serials). - 
Secondly, I tried to select pre-state citizens who had spent their formative years in 
pre-state Singapore. By "generation" I refer primarily to the generation of political 
authority in which citizens spent their "formative years"46 and secondarily to their 
own ancestry. E. g., "1st generation citizens" are citizens who spent their formative 
years under the 1st-generation PAP leadership. 
45 The extent of illiteracy cannot be underestimated. A pastor confided the older 
generation is nervous about going out alone because they could not read train station 
signs, fill forms or communicate with receptionists at hospitals and other public services. It 
is also common knowledge that dialect-speaking politicians are more popular at election 
rallies. 
46 Childhood, teenage, youth: It Is difficult for me to give a concrete age, but a general 
guideline was to think of formative years as lasting till early 20s, when most post-state 
citizens would have started working. 
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Table 1: Generation as a sample variable 
Generation category Experience of types of government 
Immigrant citizens, Various non-local authorities 
(pre-state citizens) (British colonialism, Japanese Occupation, 
Malayan Federation, interim governments) 
1s -generation citizens, 161-generation PAP government 
(pre-state citizens)47 under PM LKY (1959-1990) 
-generation citizens, 2" -generation PAP government (post-state citizens) under PM chok-Tong Goh (1990-present) 
A more general defence of my choice of sampling variables is that, when 
investigating issues of consciousness, experiment is not a methodological option 
and that pure specimens are hard to come by. Furthermore, Singapore offers a 
rare opportunity to study a relatively "pure" group that is already dying off. 
A post justification for my research decision and choice of sampling variable is the 
startling fieldwork findings: many pre-state citizens exhibited a complete lack of a 
sense of national belonging. KPT, an 82-year old immigrant citizen, asserted that 
governments were transient and that ordinary citizens should simply use whatever 
languages were necessary for survival: Malay during Malaya Federation, English 
during British Colonialism, Japanese during the WW2 Occupation. He had no 
vested interest in a particular language; he only wanted to be "left alone" to raise 
his family. I had always been persuaded that the nation as an imagined community 
was a recent phenomenon (Cf. Andersen 1983 on the role of the printing press) 
but it was not until I interviewed immigrant pre-state citizens that I realized how 
very recent and how very absent it was among the pre-state generation. 
Such sampled interviews lent insight to the relation between capitalism and 
nationalism: the making of a working class (E. P. Thompson 1965) or the 
transformation of individuals into workers require that they be deprived of their 
47 This generation is likely born in pre-state Singapore because 1`t-generation PAP came 
to power before independence and LKY, "the father of Singapore, " led Singapore to 
independence. 
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means of production (especially land) so that they are forced to sell their labour. 
Yet, without a sense of national belonging, a person who has been deprived of his 
means of subsistence could simply migrate and seek "greener pastures, 48i which 
was precisely the motivation that led immigrants to Singapore and a continuing 
problem that the PAP government faces to this day ("brain drain"). As such, the 
formation of a working class also requires that they develop a sense of nationalism 
and a willingness to remain on the very land they are deprived of. 
Using "generation" as a sampling variable brings many advantages. Besides 
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allowing me to control for media/state effect, it also allows me to explore the 
historical stages of nation-state formation and to develop an embodied insight into 
the goals of the PAP's stakeholders' policy and nation-building projects. 
ETHNICITY 
Besides creating a nation based on a "stakeholders' society, " the PAP also 
mobilized ethnic identities to secure consent; this was especially so. for second- 
generation leaders, whose concern was no longer with converting immigrants into 
citizens, but with converting citizens into "Singaporeans. " This shift in nation- 
building goals meant that consent was no longer to be gained through coercive 
projects but through mediating citizens' relations to their (ethnic/Asian) self and 
through defining and appealing to citizens' sense of national being. To better 
understand the second-generation government's project, two concepts are, 
especially useful. In terms of "governmentality, " how successful is the PAP In 
inserting and making relevant its discursive values ("the good Singaporean") to 
private citizens? In terms of "hegemony, " to what extent are government 
discourses reproduced in everyday social and personal practices? 
The "ethnicity" of the Singaporean citizen has changed over the decades of British 
and PAP governance. Before independence, the British strategy of divide and rule 
aimed to homogenize diverse immigrant groups into three main races - Chinese, 
48 Marx describes the "vagabond, " a category that resisted being transformed into the 
reserve army of labour. For a discussion of the relation between land deprivation and the 
making of the working class, see Giddens (1971,27-34, especially p30). 
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Malays, Indians (and Others). The PAP kept this "CMIO" formulation but overlaid it 
with a (multiracial) national formulation. Instead of "CMIO" being subordinated to 
British%European ethnicity, it was now subordinated to a group of British-trained 
local elites who guard a fragile, multiracial nation against its dangerous 
ethnic(ised) citizens. "' 
Had this research been concerned with PAP hegemony before the 1 980s, 
operationalising "ethnicity" as "CMIO" might be useful. This is because rapid 
economic development and government campaigns to homogenize Chinese 
dialect groups (through making Mandarin the mother-tongue for all Chinese) 
produced a relatively prosperous Chinese population and heightened Chinese- 
dominance in Singapore. This conflation of Chinese cultural and economic 
dominance destabilized the multi-racial nation, leading to the re-Invention of 
Singapore as an "Asian nation. " 
When the working class appear to be increasingly united against the PAP, the 
PAP sought to fragment it ethnically. This was the strategy against the 
development of a counter-cultural movement based on the glamorisation and 
legitimation50 of "Singlish, " which the elite saw as a bastardisation of elite English - 
the language of global capitalism. Fragmentation through ethnicization was a way 
of maintaining elite cultural control since cultural power would remain In the hands 
of leaders/elite (of each cultural community), rather than ceded to popular leaders 
of Singlish culture (such as pop singers and actors). 
While a multiracial "CMIO" formulation sought to fragment the counter-culture 
when it seemed too united, the discourse of "Asian Values" aimed to do the 
49 See Chapter 4B on why Britain withdrew support for the Progressive Party and the 
Labour Front and supported the PAP as Singapore's post-independent government. That 
local leaders are "Western-oriented" also explains why the Chinese-educated Is described 
as a politically un-represented majority. 
50 This situation parallels Arnold's (1932) and Leavis' (1930) fear that mass culture In 20ý' 
century Britain would result In a loss of cultural coherence -a condition where despite 
cultural differences between masses and elite, cultural coherence was maintained by 
mass deference and acknowledgement of the superiority of elite culture. 
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reverse: to bind when social consensus seemed too fragmented 51 By the late 
1980s, dramatic improvements in living and education standards meant that the 
PAP government was no longer the only educated, modern elite who could claim 
professionalism. AV thus sought to secure a consensus on a new social ideal - an 
Asian (not multiracial) modernity where the PAP government denounced 
ideological alternatives (raised by professionals or by lay citizens) as "too 
westernised" or "too Eastern" ("Chinese/Malay chauvinist"). In everyday media, the 
"English-educated" and the "Chinese-educated" were constructed and naturalized 
as "real" categories. These categories proviie a latent source of moral panic that 
could be mobilized during political crises and elections because they could be 
easily made to sound extremist. 
Situating my research in the late 1990s and being especially concerned with the 
PAP's Asian Values strategy requires a new understanding of ethnicity beyond the 
"CMIO" model. Besides investigating whether the PAP succeeded in getting 
citizens to identify themselves as belonging to one of the CMIO categories, I am 
also interested in whether the PAP succeeded in getting citizens to "self-Asianise. " 
This understanding of ethnicity deviates considerably from a biological 
understanding of ethnicity as race (which LKY tries to entrench through basing 
social policies on genetic theory) or a cultural understanding of ethnicity as unique 
cultural practices (festivals, etc. ). 
Instead, ethnicity is understood as cross-ethnic politicised groups. 52 "CMIO" 
categories no longer sufficed because they did not capture the two politically 
significant groups that the AV project sought to contain: the "English-educated" 
(ENG) and the "Chinese-educated" (CHE). Neither groups were strictly based on 
51 This shift concretizes two of Hall's (1977, p336-346, citing Poultanzas 1968) 3 notions 
of ideological effects: shifting, fragmenting, binding. 
52 For the British reader, It may help to think of the CHEs as a sort of white working-class 
(who has some Identification with minority working-class). However, because Singapore is 
not anti-colonial - the PAP came to power with British support and PAP's language policy 
(colonial tongue as first language) - means that even the ethnic majority (CHEs) feels 
ethnic and "black. ' 
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ethnicity or language53 and are better understood as particular formations of class, 
gender and race. 
The actual meanings of "ENG" and "CHE" have never been clearly articulated in 
Singapore society, perhaps because they are so strongly infused with class -a 
notion associated with leftist values and deemed politically dangerousTM and 
irrelevant to a "middle-class society" like Singapore. Social order can be better 
maintained if citizens consider themselves "Asians, " rather than "ENG" or "CHE, " 
which displaces dissent and class into consgnsus and organic ethnicity. 
"ENG" refers to a specific category within the professional class or "yuppies" 
(Young Urban Professionals). Used synonomously with 'Western-educated, " 
"ENG" refers specifically to those who are vocal and who espouses "Western" 
values. "ENG" is usually not race or gender specific, though they tend to refer to 
the Chinese, who are the most-educated in Singapore. 
According to a Chinese pastor, the CHEs were a politically un-represented 
majority who had been left behind in the nation's quest for rapid modernization, 
and especially through the state's privileging of English, rather than Mandarin, as 
the working language. Keeping in mind their political alienation and socio- 
economic marginalization, we can now understand the stereotype image of the 
CHE -a dialect speaking, relatively uneducated and disaffected Chinese man who 
frequents the coffeeshop. In Singapore, coffeeshops serve as a type of semi- 
public sphere for the working-class, 56 where views can be articulated without 
63 Thus far, I have not explained why ethnicity should not be operationalised by language. 
Language Is a direct effect of education policies that defines one's "mother-tongue" as 
one's father's race. Pre-state immigrants tend to speak only dialects while post-state 
citizens speak English as their first language and mother tongue (Mandarin, Malay, Tamil) 
as their second language. 
64 The recognition of class faultlines and legitimation of class categories threatens to rally 
the working-class Into a significant counter-hegemonic force. To date, the most popular 
(and thus most persecuted) opposite party Is the left-leaning Workers' Party, rather than 
the liberal Singapore Democratic Party. 
5,5 This corresponds with Hall's (1977) 3`d ideological effect: "displacement" or "shifting. " 56 When questioned about their ties with Malays and Indians, those interviewees who 
described themselves as Chinese-educated said they felt closer to them then to English- 
educated Chinese. This suggests that the coffeeshop may be a trans-ethnic working-class 
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having to conform to expectations of expertness and factuality. Demographically, 
there is usually a coffeeshop for every ten public housing apartment blocks. 
Located on the ground floor and serving inexpensive food and drinks, the 
coffeeshop serves different groups at different times of the day. After lunch and 
dinner, the coffeeshop serves as a space where the CHEs gather to discuss the 
latest news and to exchange rumors. 
The Malays are indigenous, well defined religiously (Islam) and have the lowest 
status. Indians are internally very heterogeneous and constantly resist being 
labelled "Indian. " Eurasians are problematic "Asians", and a group that Is self- 
defined, whereas other "CMIO" categories were constituted with considerable 
governmental interference. Despite being conceptually interesting, given the small 
fieldwork sample, it is necessary to focus on those "ethnicities" that are more 
politically significant. In local media, "ENG, " "CHE, " Malays" and "Indians" have 
been identified as politically significant57 (Appendix 1). In my own sample, I include 
these groups but vary their proportion (see below). 
Il. Sample size and sampling 
PRE-FIELDWORK "IDEAL" SAMPLE 
Sampling is an important issue in qualitative research insofar as researchers are 
concerned with finding patterns - whether averages or ranges. If researchers wish 
to claim some degree of generalizability of their findings, then Issues of range 
(how many sampling categories) and generalizability (how many in each category) 
remain relevant. 
public sphere and that "CHE" should be understood as a trans-ethnic political identity not 
unlike how "black" Is sometimes understood in Britain. 
57 What is considered politically significant depends on the model of democracy we 
privilege. An understanding of power as decision-making power (Lukes 1974) may prefer 
a quantitative view of democracy where only winners count. Random sampling identifies 
the average or median rather than range. A qualitative view of democracy accords more 
primacy to marginalized groups. The types of sample and results (average or range) we 
choose have significant ideological consequences: the insistence that there is an average 
or majority allows a one-party government to legitimately claim to represent the nation. 
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How range and generalizability are negotiated depends on sample size. The 
process of determining a qualitative sample size Is shrouded in mystery. Even in 
fine empirical work (Radway 1984, Ang 1985) or qualitative methods reference 
books (Mason 1996), it is not uncommon for researchers to bypass or dismiss the 
complex issue of qualitative sampling with a simple "30 people were interviewed" 
before quickly proceeding to discuss in elaborate detail the design of interview 
questions and the technique of interviewing. Alternatively, researchers appeal to 
the notion of "saturation point, " when fieldwork can be justifiably ceased because 
incremental fieldwork brings no new insight. A less mysterious and more concrete 
way was one that I was informally given by a few professors: to collect 60 to 80 
hours of recorded interviews. Working on a minimal of 60 hours of recorded 
interviews (each 2 hours), I targeted 30-36 interviews. 
In a small qualitative sample, goals of range and generalizability contradict: the 
more range (sampling categories), the lower the generalizability (the number of 
interviewees in each category). In my research, I preferred to sacrifice 
generalizability because, as chapter 2 argues, the focus on everyday discourse will 
supply my research with a different (discursive) generalizability. I Intend to analyse 
popular, commonsensical discourses that readers will be able to identify as 
"preferred readings" in society, as normative values that members feel compelled 
to negotiate. The implication for sampling is to increase the number of sample' 
categories and decrease the number of interviewees in each category. My ideal 
pre-fieldwork sample was to have 9 permutations of sample categories based on 
three "generation" categories and three "ethnicity" categories: 
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Table 2: Ideal sample 
Ethnicity/ 
Generation 
"English- 
educated" (ENG) 
"Chinese- 
educated" (CHE) 
Malays, 
Indians, 
Eurasians 
Immigrant citizens 4 4 4 
Pre-state citizens 4 4 4 
Post-state citizens 4 4 4 
ACTUAL SAMPLE 
After 6 months of intense fieldwork in Singapore, I completed 32 interviews, each 
lasting at least 2 hours. After the 30"' interview, i felt "saturated" - the past few 
interviews had no brought new insights - but decided to finish another 2 that had 
already been scheduled to complete the sociological categories set out. I did not 
feel the need to complete the original target of 36. 
Upon "entering the field, " I was immediately confronted with a serious problem - 
the sample categories were not something I could easily ascertain before the 
interview. "CHE" and "ENG" were ideological positions-identities that 
interviewees may choose and which the analyst identifies through analysing 
transcripts. In my first interview, an overseas university student seemed 
sociologically and unproblematically "ENG" until I spotted a1 0kg sack of rice. 
When asked about why he had such a big sack of rice for a person who live alone 
and who claims not to cook, he admitted that he was "Chinese after all. "58 
This quickly led me to realize that my sampling categories had to be based on 
variables that were identifiable before analysis. This led me back to a more 
traditional race-based sampling strategy ("CMIO") while backgrounding the goal of 
collecting a balanced proportion of "ENG/CHE", which in turn has strong class and 
gender correlations. 
58 Rice is the main staple for Southern Chinese; most eat it for two meals a day. 
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Table 3: Actual sample (by generation and ethnicity) 
Ethnicity/ Chinese Malay Indian Eurasian Total 
Generation 
Immigrant 3 X 1 X 4 
(indigenous) (indigenous) 
11 
Pre-state 7 3 0 1 
2ENG, 5CHE 1 ENG, 2MLY 1 ENG 
17 
Post-state 10 3' 3 1 
4ENG 6CHE 3ENG 3ENG 1 ENG 
Total 20 6 4 2 32 
"X" refers to historically improbable categories 
This sample deviates considerably from the pre-fieldwork ideal. Besides the 
conceptual problem discussed above, there were also practical obstacles to 
achieving that ideal. 
Because of the length of the interview (2 hours), it was impractical to expect 
strangers to accept an interview. Secondly, I preferred to conduct interviews in the 
subjects' own environment (mostly home), having learnt from the above "10kg 
sack of rice" example that what people say about themselves may not correspond 
to an outsiders' view of them. Thirdly, in an authoritarian society, citizens do not 
easily trust researchers with their views. These issues of trust meant that I could 
not approach strangers and that I had to find my interviewees via introductions or 
"snowballing. " 
However, there are practical and methodological problems with "snowballing. " 
Practically, it was difficult for me to ask interviewees to introduce me to others 
because, firstly, my interviewees were already doing me a considerable "favour" by 
giving me so much of their time, which I tried to reciprocate with gifts of cakes and 
fruits. More importantly I left politically sensitive topics to the last, when the 
interviewee and I have established sufficient trust. As such, the interviewee's 
understanding of my research after the interview might differ from their initial 
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expectation. Thus, although some interviewees enthusiastically recommended 
their friends before the interview, I did not take their offers too seriously. 
Methodologically, "snowballing" is prone to skew a sample since interviewees tend 
to recommend others who are ideologically close to them. 
Since I had little choice but to depend on introductions, I took a few measures to 
minimize the side effects of "snowballing. " Firstly, I asked for recommendations 
from non-interviewees; "recommenders" are not interviewed. This altered way of 
snowballing produces a methodological advantage: by "skipping" the 
recommender, I (hopefully) placed some sociological/ideological distance between 
interviewees and myself. The disadvantage is that, as a stranger to the 
interviewee, I had to put more effort to build rapport. To do this, I usually asked the 
recommender to tell me a little about the interviewees before the interviews. In one 
case, my sister described her church-mate as working-class and "very Christian, " 
which contradicted my observations that he exhibited some upper class traits and 
had some "non-Christian". practices. It was rare for a Singaporean man In his 60s 
to speak excellent English; this would typically signify very high social status in 
colonial Singapore. He also practiced the tradition of arranged marriages for his 
children, selecting his daughters-in-law from India. This difference in perception 
between my recommender and myself made me think harder to reconcile these 
different perceptions and to develop a more multi-dimensional impression of him 
and a more sophisticated understanding of "class. " 
My family and friends drew upon their formal and informal networks in 
recommending interviewees to me. I do not think it is a problem that my 
interviewees are recommended by people close to me because I "skip" the 
recommender. Secondly, before concluding whether the sample is unbalanced, I 
think it is important to consider the way these interviewees were linked to my 
family and friends. 
There are 3 types of "links: " formal links, informal links and exceptions (Appendix 
2). 2 interviewees were special cases. One was approached because she spent 
"all her time writing in the Forum page" (in the national daily). A friend was 
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approached because she was the only graduate I knew who had comfortably 
relinquished the desire to be successful. 
The bulk of my interviewees (22)59 were secured through formal institutional links 
(of family, friends, etc. ), including advertisement (2), a Chinese church network 
(4), an English church (1), offices (6), schools (4), a tuition agency (1), a 
counselling centre (2), and journalistic contacts (2). 
Eight interviewees were directly taken from Among family friends. The reasons for 
choosing them need to be clarified because this group can be perceived to be 
"closer" to me (sociologically or ideologically). My translator recommended two old 
Malays interviewees; it was impossible for me to have contacts with non-English 
speaking minorities. Another two were from my extended family: my aunt was 
selected for her involvement with the government's grassroots organizations; my 
grandfather was selected because he belonged to a rare category - 
English/colonial-educated pre-state citizen. 2 interviewees were my father's 
friends: one was a Peranakan (Malay-Chinese mix) and another was an 
uneducated Chinese businessman who had "made good. " While interviewing this 
Chinese businessman, I "stumbled" upon the last two interviewees -- his father 
and son. I interviewed all 3 generations because they were a picture of the national 
fairy tale - the immigrant grandfather who worked hard and set up a small 
business, the pre-state son (father) who inherited and expanded the business and 
the post-state grandson (son) who went through university, "modernized" and Is 
now a successful civil servant. 
How balanced is my sample? That depends on the standards for judging the 
sample. In terms of ratio among races, my sample (62.5% Chinese, 18.75%, 
Malays, 12.5% Indians, 6.25% Eurasians) corresponds quite closely to the national 
ratio (77% Chinese, 14% Malays, 8% Indians, 1% Others). 0 
59 Brackets indicate number of interviewees. 
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There were 22 men and 10 women. It was difficult to interview women, especially 
pre-state and immigrant women. Older women especially were "shy" about 
speaking "publicly" to a researcher. In one case, I Insisted that I had a Malay 
translator but she insisted that no translators were needed. When I arrived at her 
home, I realized that she did not speak English and had Intended for me to 
interview her English-speaking husband. This difficulty of securing female 
interviewees only serves to strengthen my fieldwork finding: that a (good Asian) 
woman's space is the private sphere of the home rather the "public" sphere that I 
as a researcher presented to them. 
In terms of class, s' the sample is quite evenly distributed. Summarily, there are 14 
"above average, " 7 "average" and 11 "below average" class positions. More 
specifically (Appendix 3): 
2 Upper (university-educated interviewees from rich families) 
8 Upper-Middle (small business proprietors, graduates from above 
average families) 
7 Middle (rich with little education, graduates from poor families) 
3 Lower-Middle (retired and living on average wealth) 
8 Working (low education, blue-collared jobs). 
Although there is a rather even class distribution, there is an asymmetry in the way 
the interviewees are linked to me: "Upper Class" interviewees were a group I was 
acquainted with but not friendly with (e. g., schoolmates but not friends). "Upper- 
Middle Class" interviewees were comfortably linked through informal ties of 
friendship and family. "Middle Class" interviewees were usually approached 
through a particular combination of formal and informal links: they were largely the 
colleagues of friends and family. "Lower-Middle Class" interviewees, because they 
belong to the older (retired) generation, were usually family friends. "Working 
Class" interviewees were either subordinates of friends/family or secured through 
formal institutions, e. g., counselling centres, advertisements. 
60 It is impossible to correspond exactly to the national ratio for a small sample with so 
many categories. To do so, I would have to interview 24.6 Chinese, 4.5 Malays, 2.56 
Indians and 0.32 Eurasians. 
61 The Singapore dream of the 5Cs (car, credit, career, condominium, cash) depends 
upon good education, which allows individuals the opportunity to acquire them. 
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pre-state and immigrant women. Older women especially were "shy" about 
speaking "publicly" to a researcher. In one case, I Insisted that I had a Malay 
translator but she insisted that no translators were needed. When I arrived at her 
home, I realized that she did not speak English and had intended for me to 
interview her English-speaking husband. This difficulty of securing female 
interviewees only serves to strengthen my fieldwork finding: that a (good Asian) 
woman's space is the private sphere of the home rather the "public" sphere that I 
as a researcher presented to them. 
In terms of class, 61 the sample is quite evenly distributed. Summarily, there are 14 
"above average, " 7 "average" and 11 "below average" class positions. More 
specifically (Appendix 3): 
2 Upper (university-educated interviewees from rich families) 
8 Upper-Middle (small business proprietors, graduates from above 
average families) 
7 Middle (rich with little education, graduates from poor families) 
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Although there is a rather even class distribution, there is an asymmetry in the way 
the interviewees are linked to me: "Upper Class" interviewees were a group I was 
acquainted with but not friendly with (e. g., schoolmates but not friends). "Upper- 
Middle Class" interviewees were comfortably linked through informal ties of 
friendship and family. "Middle Class" interviewees were usually approached 
through a particular combination of formal and informal links: they were largely the 
colleagues of friends and family. "Lower-Middle Class" Interviewees, because they 
belong to the older (retired) generation, were usually family friends. "Working 
Class" interviewees were either subordinates of friends/family or secured through 
formal institutions, e. g., counselling centres, advertisements. 
60 It is impossible to correspond exactly to the national ratio for a small sample with so 
many categories. To do so, I would have to interview 24.6 Chinese, 4.5 Malays, 2.56 
Indians and 0.32 Eurasians. 
61 The Singapore dream of the 5Cs (car, credit, career, condominium, cash) depends 
upon good education, which allows Individuals the opportunity to acquire them. 
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This imbalance of links to different classes tells us something further. I can see 
that I am most comfortably linked with "Upper-Middle Class, " and that my friends 
and contacts were limited to the neighbouring classes. E. g., I do not personally 
know a member of the working class. However, despite my particular class 
background, I managed to acquire a sample that is relatively balanced in terms of 
class. 
A final standard of sample balance is whether I have interviewed people who hold 
sufficiently diverse ideological/subject values. During fieldwork, I was deeply 
concerned that there might be insufficient. ideological diversity in the responses I 
could gather. The working-class members that I interviewed were linked to me 
through formalized correctional institutions such as counselling centres and 
churches. As such, I was concerned that they were a very particular group of "re- 
enchanted" working-class (Chapter 6C). All spoke about a problematic past they 
repented62 while two Chinese pastors told me that their churches were dedicated 
to those who needed hope. These "formerly dysfunctional" interviewees tended to 
have a curiously combined air of resignation and hope about them: it was as if 
they had decided to work within the system while accepting that their flawed 
beginnings mean they have no rights to have any expectations of society. 
Because of this suspicion that these working-class interviewees were particularly 
pro-system, I valued Thomas (a "working-class" coffeeshopper) very much and 
tried very hard to get his co-operation. However, our interactions were plagued by 
many (necessary) problems. He felt a strong antagonism towards me, such that 
even a recorder, a note-pad and the act of questioning were seen as icons of our 
difference--my'Western/English-educatedness" as opposed to his lack of 
education. To date, I am not certain that I fully appreciate the CHE's world or if 
have sufficiently captured the ideological diversity of the field. I hope that it suffices 
that I have begun to understand how deep social/ideological antagonisms can be 
and that I have experienced them at first hand through my interactions with 
Thomas. 
62 E. g., gangsterism. Interestingly, many considered "wasting" their time as a significant 
(social, Ideological) crime. 
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3C. THE INTERVIEW DESIGN 
I. Designing the questions 
There were two key challenges to designing interview questions prior to entering 
the field. Firstly, questions had to be subtle and indirect enough for interviewees In 
an authoritarian society to be willing to answer. One solution was to design the 
questions as a game where each party "dares" the other to be more "overt" and to 
"up the stakes" until it reaches a mutually comfortable level of overt"ness 63 This 
means that my questions had to begin innocuously. Instead of asking about 
freedom and democracy in Singapore, I asked, "Which newspapers do you read 
and why? " Many responded, as I expected, by talking about media censorship. 
Instead of asking meritocracy and fairness, I asked, "Which schools do your 
children go to? " or "Are you satisfied with your job? " Many responded by talking 
about the national ranking of educational institutions and degrees, and the class 
and racial discrimination they experienced. 
A second measure also aimed to overcome interviewees' paranoia about 
commenting on anything mildly political in front of a stranger/researcher. Instead 
of asking interviewees what they thought, I first asked them what they thought 
others, especially their friends, thought before asking if they felt the same. This 
type of question is double-edged. Not only did it bypass interviewees' paranoia, it 
also allowed me to identify the "interpretative communities" and subcultures they 
belonged to and to see how much credibility or deference interviewees accord 
public opinion. 
A second challenge was to design questions that were broad enough to be 
comparable and applicable to all interviewees, while specific enough to be 
localizable. This led me to design two different set of interview questions: one that 
is detailed (Appendix 4), and another that is general (Appendix 5). 
63 The alternative solution - that I be politically more incorrect than them so that they 
would feel comfortable trusting me - was discarded because it may be too leading. In one instance, an interview "started" after the official interview ended (and the tape recorder 
stopped) when the interviewee asked me about my views and started telling me about his. 
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These lists were useful only in the beginning and soon proved problematic. They 
allowed me develop my ideas in breadth and depth and helped my translator (see 
later) have a better grasp of the directions I hope to guide the interviews In. The 
questions were refined as I gained more interview experience. Some amendments 
included removing or clarifying categories that did not make sense to certain 
interviewees. E. g., the older generation could not "remember" or did not "know" 
what Singlish and the Singapore Dream were. Others had difficulty understanding 
my distinction between dialect, ethnicity ancj, nation. 
Ultimately, I realized that these problems could not be solved simply through 
refining interview questions; they required a more fundamental, paradigmatic shift 
in my interview strategy. To make questions relevant to interviewees while keeping 
the interview theoretically meaningfully, I realized that my interviews needed to be 
less rigid and to be less guided by standardized questions. Instead of compelling 
interviewees to enter my "comfort zone, " I should follow them to theirs - even if it 
meant completely abandoning my painstakingly designed list of questions. In one 
case, after trying to get LDS to comment on multi-racialism and failing badly, I 
gave up and allowed him to speak about whatever he wanted. He then spoke 
about how he "ran" his family in an "Asian style. " Themes of Asian vs. Western 
values, and paternalism in family structures flowed easily and parallels were made 
to the benevolent government. In some cases involving Malay interviewees, my 
translator was an immense help to me. Because he understood my research 
goals, he was able to steer interviews into Issues that were controversial for the 
Malay community in Singapore (e. g., civil versus Islamic divorce laws). 
With more interviewing experience, I realized that I had been too preoccupied with 
maintaining topical comparability across interviews and that interviews should be 
linked through my conceptual framework rather than through 
standardized/topicalised questions. This is one of the most important lessons I 
learnt in this interview project: thematic/conceptual unity and topical flexibility. In 
approaching the field, it is vital to retain a clear view of these research themes and 
goals at all times; without this conceptual clarity, the overall coherence of the 
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interview project would have to be achieved through sacrificing the flexibility of 
interview questions. At moments when I lost this clarity, I found myself less flexible 
with the interview questions and less able to immediately assimilate what the 
interviewee was, in my distracted attempts to steer the interview. Conversely, 
when I regained this clarity, I found myself having the flexibility to follow 
interviewees into topics they preferred to speak about. 
This led me to clearly articulate the conceptual goal of the interviews, which is to 
explore the extent to which citizens' versions of reality resonate or contrast with 
official representations of national reality. Where there Is a gap, how are "reality 
gaps" bridged: through de-legitimising their own versions or through doubting the 
media? In attempting these coping or bridging strategies, what "ways of knowing" 
or sources of knowledges do citizens draw on - to what extent are non- 
governmental, informal sources of knowledge such as rumours and jokes drawn 
upon to legitimise the illegitimated? If citizens do reproduce government' 
discourses, what is the contextual meaning of these discourses and how do these 
contradict with official meanings? 
A-secondary interest was whether the various coping/bridging strategies and "ways 
of knowing" were sociologically correlated. As such, before each interview, a short 
survey (Appendix 6) requesting information about interviewees' socio-economic 
background was administered. Alterations to this survey were slight: income 
became rephrased as "disposable household income. " From the start, I had 
explained to interviewees that I was not interested in how much they earned 
(which may be sensitive) but in their spending power as a household, including on 
instalments for property, cars and other aspects of the Singapore Dream. 
ll. The context of interviewing 
In the course of fieldwork, I realized that the methodology of interview is biased 
towards certain types of sociality. I have already mentioned how "icons" like a tape 
recorder and note-pad came across as a type of "expert-isation" of social 
interaction, which Thomas violently opposed and accused of being "insincere. " 
Additionally, I also noticed that conventions like turn taking and giving monologue- 
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like replies (rather than having a conversational style) made older uneducated 
housewives very uncomfortable; some felt they were being "impolite. " In one case, 
I had great difficulty transcribing the many uncomfortable pauses -I did not know 
if I should transcribe them as the interviewee's or as mine. If it was not for my 
interest in collecting a range of views and if I had been interested in understanding 
the pre-state generation and housewives, participant observation would have been 
a more effective methodology than interviews. As can be imagined, getting 
responses with these groups was a trying experience, and interviews had to be 
sustained by incessant questions to prod them on. 
I also noticed that in cases where I was more personally related to my 
interviewees or had more rapport with interviewees, they spoke more freely to me, 
to the extent of telling me about their emotional lives and inter-personal conflicts 
with others. I really valued these instances because these narratives, rather than 
opinions, help me to see who their Significant Others were, what sub-cultures they 
belonged to and how my interviewees situated themselves in everyday 
controversies/conflicts. Before giving some examples, i would like to discuss 
systematically my attempts to secure an interview environment that is conducive 
for interviewees to speak freely; it is not always the case that trust is the most 
important factor, occasionally, respect and ignorance worked better. 
One such case is in interviews with older male interviewees. In an interview with a 
three-tier family, these issues were compounded. In this interview, I was the 
youngest female among 3 older Chinese men. Being a Chinese myself meant that 
I was expected to know how to behave in such settings, i. e., that I had the least 
"power" and rights to speak in this interview situation; it would also be rude for me 
to interrupt or ask questions in such a way as to cast doubt on the credibility of the 
interviewees' statement. This was a very difficult situation for me to control and, 
this difficulty was enhanced by two other situations: firstly, I did not understand the 
grandfather's dialect and needed the grandson to translate for me; secondly, the 
father kept trying to cut the grandfather short because he thought "the old man" 
was rattling. 
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There were several possible solutions to these difficulties. One that I rejected off- 
hand was to return and interview the others separately. I had originally arranged to 
interview only the father but the other-two became excited by the idea and wanted 
to be interviewed too. I did not want to interview them separately because they 
would develop pre-conceptions about what I would ask them. Additionally, they 
fitted the national fairy tale of the poor immigrant who made good and handed his 
small business to his sons and grandsons. Another solution I rejected was to 
occupy the subject position of an expert/researcher who had the "right" to control 
the conversation. I knew that any control I gained this way would merely 
compromise the quality of the interview.. 
To control the interview situation, what I did was to take the opposite subject 
position by presenting myself as a "blur girl" so that my challenges to patriarchal 
authority would not be seen as malevolent. While the term "blur" may be used in 
Singapore used to describe people who are socially inept (usually because they 
are unaware of unspoken expectations), it is also common for well-intentioned 
friends to tell each other to "act blur' when they do not want to be invest socially or 
commit to a particular moral-political position. Acting like a "blur girl" who was 
unaware of social expectations and who had little understanding of local wisdom 
(such as "open secrets") helped me navigate many sensitive interview situations. 
From my experience of living and working in Singapore, I knew that people would 
not become defensive when questioned by a "blur" person because they could not 
see the non/mis-communication as their problem (of not being clear, of having too 
many assumptions), but rather my problem. In particularly, I attributed my "blur- 
ness" to having spent too many years in the ivory towers of academia, affirming 
popular perceptions that academics have no understanding of the "real" world. 
This strategy was especially important in an interview with a three-tier family. 
Through speaking hesitantly and sounding confused, I could stop the father from 
cutting the grandfather off and beg for more elaboration from the grandfather. This 
strategy worked very well and the grandfather's transcripts provided tremendous 
insights; he was probably the singular most important interviewee to be cited in my 
analysis (interviewee KPT in Chapter 6A). 
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This "blur girl" strategy seems useful only with senior males. With interviewees of 
similar age, an environment of trust rather than hierarchy seemed to create a more 
conducive interview environment. With VH, my former student, he spoke freely 
about his recent break-up and how he lost his girlfriend to a university student, 
saying, "How could I compete with him? " His willingness to speak about personal 
loss and conflicts gave me an insight into something that is otherwise very well 
hidden - the self-inferiority of the working-class (CHE) male. With Thomas, 
another young working-class (CHE) male, similar relationships problems cropped 
up but Thomas always responded with macho, almost violent, anger - "I wouldn't 
allow my women to see other men, if they do so, I leave theml" - until he became 
drunk, when he would then call or meet me to tell me that "I have nothing, I am a 
good for nothing, of course she doesn't want me. " While my interactions with 
Thomas cannot be described as one of rapport, the fact that "a Western-educated" 
person bothered trying to understand what he called "our plight" somewhat 
endeared me to him. 
The above cases are instances when there was rapport. Rapport with VH had 
been gained years ago, outside the interview context, while "rapport" with Thomas 
was something I had to work extremely hard to secure, but which is all the more 
rewarding because of our considerable social and ideological distance. When I 
first met him, Thomas laughed that I would never be able to understand the CHE 
coffeeshoppers - who unlike the repentant working-class, defined themselves as . 
people who enjoy "wasting" time - because I had only mixed with privileged 
company. When I retorted that my best friend was a Muslim gay man, to impress 
him of - what I now with hindsight recognize as - my "tolerance, " he laughed even 
harder. He said that I hung out with these friends in cafes; I did not frequent the 
coffeeshops. I realized that he was right, my friends and I just would not feel 
comfortable in a coffeeshop. His statement made me realize that sexuality, gender 
and ethnic boundaries are often more easily bridged than that of class, and 
convinced me of the importance of "class" as an analytical category. 
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In another case, TEO explicitly checked my research ethics before allowing the 
interview to start. He cautioned that I must maintain interviewees' anonymity at all 
costs because "it only takes one bad researcher to spoil the market" (to scare 
Singaporeans into distrusting all researchers). 
I raise these examples to convince the reader that I took considerable pains to 
create an interview environment that would allow me to collect the material I 
needed. Of course, interviews could be performed without a significant level of 
rapport; however, it is in those interviews where there is a lot of rapport that the 
interview material is richest. In some cases, interviewees did not require such 
excessive assurances; educated interviewees were usually willing to talk about 
themselves while housewives were generally eager to gossip about their 
neighbours and confide their anxieties about their children's future. Yet, even in 
these "easier" situations, rapport was something that I had to incrementally secure. 
Without building rapport with my informants, I would have only been able to 
analyse their opinions and thoughts, I would not had access to their dilemmas and 
hesitations, I would not have been able to locate "the structures of feelings" that 
they live within. In the case of my fieldwork experience, it is definitely the case that 
the more rapport and trust, the more interviewees revealed the type of social 
conflicts they were involved in and how they positioned themselves in these 
conflicts, allowing me to see, at first-hand, ideological contestations in "live" and 
embodied ways. 
3D. POST-FIELDWORK ISSUES 
Throughout the fieldwork process, the research goal has been to understand how 
citizens legitimise and de-legitimise (by reproducing, negotiating, opposing or 
ignoring) various versions of reality. In particular, I wish to identify their choice 
among many "ways of knowing" and variously creditable sources of knowledge 
(media, rumours). As such, the criteria against which effective translation and 
translation is measured should be the extent to which transcription is sensitive to 
interviewees' (subtle) attempts to convey doubt, hesitations or secondary 
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meanings of words. The analytical process must be sensitive not only to linguistic 
cues but also non-verbal cues. Following Scott's (1990) description of how 
peasants bow and fart at the same time, and following Geertz's (1973) Imperative 
that we distinguish between a wink and a blink, I chose "posture" as my key . 
analytical construct. "Posture" indicates my abiding concern with the importance of 
the non-verbal aspect of communications and in thinking of language and gestures 
as "speech acts" with rhetorical/communicative goals and agenda 64 
F. Transcription and translation 
Given the importance I place on field observations (Cf. the sack of rice example), I 
place a high premium on transcribing immediately after each interview. Even when 
there were many interviews stacked up, I ensured that every Interview was fully 
transcribed within three days. By transcription I do not refer only to the interview 
transcript. Each transcript begins with a description of how contact is made 
(including the recommender's impression of the interviewee) and my observation 
of the objects and people surrounding my interviewee and concludes with 
discussion of methodological problems and solutions. Especially in the case of 
older males, seeing their behaviour with their spouses help me grasp their 
expectations of how I, a young female, should behave. In one case, my fieldnotes 
say: 
His wife is very silent but visible from the corner of one's eye. She stands at 
the doorway between the living room and kitchen, like a servant ready to 
serve. When she needs to get to the other side of the living room, she does 
so without daring to cross our field of vision. 
This and other observations of "silent" wives, helped me concretise the notion of 
what a "good Asian woman" would be. 
"Posture" goes beyond linguistic discourse to seek clues in interviewee's actions 
and surroundings. For instance, a collection of self-help books ("how to improve 
your market value") and other signifiers of the Singaporean preoccupation with 
64 i argued further in Chapter 2 that the meaning of a communication also include its 
effects and not only its intentions. 
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"upgrading" would offer a richer interpretation of an interviewee who seemingly 
denies being concerned with staying competitive or appears anti-system. 
Because I was not engaged in conversation analysis (e. g., Silverman 1998), my 
transcripts did not record details such as length of pauses or loudness of 
utterances. An issue that arose during transcription was to whom pauses should 
be attributed. In most interviews, this was not an issue; pauses seemed to 
"naturally" belong to either the researcher or the interviewee. However, with older 
citizens and housewives - people who may not be so used to being interviews and 
turn taking65- the transcription of pauses were problematic. I was often surprised 
by their short replies; I kept expecting them to elaborate but was always 
disappointed. I often had to repeat to chase them for what I consider "a decent 
answer, " but my repetitive questions only - in hindsight, deservingly - reaped 
repetitive replies. In these cases, I transcribed the pauses as my own - my own 
non-understanding of the interviewees' mentality. 
The question of what details then are meaningful enough to be transcribed is a 
difficult but necessary one. To date, I am not certain if my transcription paid 
sufficient attention to details, since I could only transcribe those nuances that I am 
conscious of. While I did not transcribe all sounds (e. g., coughs), I did however 
pay attention to "hmm" and other communicative sounds, which are especially 
abundant in Singlish, perhaps because it borrows heavily from the tonal Chinese 
dialects. While transcribing my first Singlish interview, I realised that "meaningless" 
sounds do signify. E. g., the use of "meh" transforms a sentence into a question. 
However, the way it is utteredºcan determine whether it has an "innocent, " "blur 
girl" tone or whether it is merely a form of mock innocence "fake blur girl" tone. For 
example, the following statement can generate two meanings and it takes an 
experienced eye - literally, to observe the facial expression - to differentiate 
between this verbal blink and wink. 
6,5 Older people have authority because of their seniority; they are listened to, not 
questioned. Housewives are usually subordinate to their husbands and even their 
children, especially if they are more educated. 
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WCM: There is a difference between Chinese and Singaporean meh? 
= surprise: is there a difference? 
= irony: there is a difference? 
For interviews conducted in Mandarin and Chinese dialects, I had to transcribe 
and translate simultaneously. This is not something difficult for Singaporeans who 
are used to communicating in many languages at the same time. However, there 
were some terms that] was reluctant to translate in simple way. One such 
example was: 
zhong-guo ren: China people hua ren: Chinese people 
[Word exists in Mandarin and Chinese dialects] [Word exists in Mandarin] 
= Chinese nationals 
= Chinese ethnicity = Chinese ethnicity 
The term zhong-guo ren conflates ethnicity and nationality, which is unproblematic 
as long as a Chinese remains in China. For overseas Chinese, this term is 
inconvenient and another term "hua ren" has emerged recently to Chinese 
ethnicity. However, in Singapore, "hua ren" is used only when speaking in 
Mandarin - the language that is learnt is state-imposed. In dialect conversations, 
even though a corresponding term can be coined, none exists (perhaps because 
the state does not try to mould dialect vocabulary as much as it does Mandarin 
vocabulary). The particular transcription/translation problem that this poses is 
whether I should assume that those who use "zhong-guo ren" necessarily imagine 
China as their homeland. To solve this problem of translation, I turn to 
transcription - instead of notating an English meaning, I left the term as spoken 
by the interviewee while putting a most probable English equivalent in parenthesis. 
Hiring a translator was a difficult decision, but I finally decided that the conceptual 
importance of interviewing certain groups overrode any financial and 
methodological difficulties I may incur. Firstly, I recognised that my limited 
language abilities (I speak English, Mandarin, Singlish, Cantonese and can 
understand some Teochew, Hokkien and Hakka) were effects of the nation- 
building process; I had been trained in the languages of modern, not pre-state 
Singapore. As LKY himself recognised, in the process of building a nation, many 
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families were torn apart because children and grandchildren could not speak the 
same language. Indeed, the "Speak Mandarin Campaign" even encouraged 
grandparents and parents to swallow this pain so that their children would have a 
brighter future. To date, the "Speak Mandarin Campaign" fights an ongoing battle 
and the political significance of dialect is acutely recognised. It Is common 
knowledge that politicians can better woo voters in dialect than in Mandarin. 
Additionally, in recent years, many churches have started dialect phone lines to 
reach the "heartlands" -a political term describing the dialect-speaking "silent 
majority. " 
Recognising my own linguistic and historical constructedness, I felt an urgent need 
to contact the illiterate older generation who may be relatively "untouched" by the 
government's nationalising project. Partly out of a romanticisation of this group and 
partly out of a fear of regretting that I would miss such a rare opportunity to study a 
pre-national people slip, and encouraged by anthropological accounts of migrant 
culture in pre-national Singapore, I decided that this group would be my priority. 
[The insights from the interview with KPT alone made this risk a worthwhile one, 
see Chapter 6A. ] It should also be noted that the need for translation Is a historical 
one: a few decades ago, every person in Singapore spoke Malay; a few decades 
later, every person in Singapore would speak English. 
Besides reaching this group, I also felt that it was important, perhaps because of 
my own experience as a minority in London, to break out of a type of academic 
compartmentalisation where researchers study only their own ethnic group. Such 
academic compartmentalisation serves to affirm an imperialist status quo where 
minorities (the Rest) are deemed too "ethnically-biased" (e. g., jealous, angry 
minority) to be a credible expert on non-partisan/ethnic issues -a privilege 
reserved for the unbiased (the West) 66 
Ee E. g., minority journalists can only comment on minority affairs; I should teach about 
"Asian/third world women in developing countries. " Historically and currently, anthropology 
remains a discipline where it is the norm for the West to an expert on the Rest but not vice 
versa. 
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However, using translators and transcripts creates significant financial and 
methodological problems. I decided to use only one translator for 2 Malay 
transcripts because I could not afford more. I selected to interview non-English 
speaking Malays because they are culturally the least assimilated group in 
Singapore. 
I recruited a good friend to be my translator. Before and during my PhD, I often 
discussed my ideas with him and we have become very familiar with each other's 
way of thinking. Upon deciding that I needed his assistance, I Involved him more 
deeply in the details of my work, including all the paths among which my research 
could have developed but did not. This was intended to help him pinpoint the type 
of research that I was and was not doing. The two lists of interview questions were 
partly designed for his benefit. 
Translation is never only about language, especially in a face-to-face interview 
situation. Translators have a vital role in understanding, explaining and performing 
the expected customs to establish rapport with the interviewees. My translator did 
all these admirably: he advised me on gifts, collaborated with me on selecting 
topics that would be more relevant for the Malay community and corrected me 
after each interview. I also showed him 4 sample transcripts and briefed him on 
transcription procedures. 
. 
Because of his familiarity with the field and with my research, I chose to let him 
take a more active role during interviews. Rather than passively translate 
communications between theinterviewee and me, I gave him the license to pursue 
interesting themes. In deciding this, I was also concerned that the "flow" of the 
interview should not be sacrificed by incessant translations and worried that any 
rapport that we gain would be lost and that frustrated interviewees would give only 
short, easy-to-translate replies. 
There is some evidence that my analysis of the translated transcripts were inferior 
to my interpretation of those transcripts that I personally transcribed. My 
supervisor faithfully read the entire first round of analysis, where I profiled each of 
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the 32 interviewees in considerable detail. He highlighted 2 transcripts as being 
different from the others, although he could not explain how it was different. It was 
not until he named them (AZ and ALI) that we discovered that those were the 
analyses of the translated interviews. Evidently, something had been sacrificed 
during the interviewing, transcribing or/and analysing process. 7 
ll. Analysis 
The goal of the analysis is to explore the various ways that the hegemony of 
government discourses are affirmed, negotiated or opposed In embodied everyday 
contexts, paying particular attention to the types of knowledges (media, personal, 
rumours) citizens draw upon to legitimise or de-legitimise various versions of 
reality. Theories of hegemony - especially Gramsci's emphasis on commonsense 
and Hall's elaboration of the concept through "reproduction, " "preferred reading, " 
and "frame" - is useful because it acknowledges the unintentional complicity of 
individuals and because it understands that hegemony is founded more on 
unthinking reproduction68 than active consent. Rephrased in Singaporean political 
terms, hegemony is maintained insofar as government values serve as a 
"middleground" or norm, as the moral gaze of "the silent majority, " as a normative 
centre against which non-conformity has to be justified and as the "grain" or 
preferred reading against which alternatives must be read. Because I am 
interested in seeing ideological contestation "live" and "embedded" In everday 
negotiations, I was particular fascinated with and hoped to collect interviewees' 
experience of contradictions, hesitations and dilemmas and to, at the analytical 
stage, identify how their persopal experience may be understood within wider 
structures of feelings and socio-ideological configurations. 
67 My original translator fell very III after the Interviews and due to time pressures, I had to 
ask another person to transcribe the Interview tapes. This could explain the disparity in the 
quality of my analysis. 
6 E. g., through apathy, "the dull compulsion of the economic, " adaptation, which creates a 
stage of "expansive hegemony. " 
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IDENTIFYING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
I conducted three rounds of analysis. In the first round, I profiled individuals in 
terms of their awareness of nation, their perception of the constituency, nature and 
their stake in this nation, and the "ways of knowing" they drew upon to substantiate 
their accounts. I was very aware of the pitfalls of such analysis and fought the 
inclination to search for an "overall" opinion of each individual or to take the 
cognitivist view of incoherence as pathological. If this danger can be avoided, this 
analytical profiling can actually help the analyst arrive at a more multi-dimensional 
view of each interviewee. 
In the second round, I tried to locate sociological patterns. While this embedded 
actors in their context, it also produced the problem of assuming that individuals 
exhibit consistent-enough traits (e. g., "opinions, " "attitudes") that could be 
correlated with sociological categories. Considerable time was spent trying to 
analyse interview material sociologically without falling into this trap, and I ended 
up distinguishing between two rounds of sociologically analyses: (i) to group 
sociological groups together and identify what they have in common, and (ii) group 
strategies and postures together and then identify sociological patterns. I preferred 
(ii) because it gave me less pressure to engage in sociological gymnastics69 and 
allowed me to better understand and explain, not merely correlate, sociological 
influences in a subjectivised way. 
I found this last round of discursive analysis (discussed above as (ii)) to be highly 
productive and have organized my analysis chapter according to four postures, 
which categorises strategies (of balancing dissent and consent) rather than 
individual's overall opinion. Strangely, giving sociology a secondary prominence 
actually helped me identify "stronger" sociological patterns. This is because certain 
strategies were used only by specific sociological groups, but each sociological 
group could have several types of strategies/postures. E. g., the most sociology- 
specific posture was that of unconditional acceptance. Those who felt this 
ss Such as by allowing an ethnically mixed interviewee to be classified as "Malay" or 
"Chinese" depending on which produced more desirable results. 
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emotional bond to LKY as the "father of Singapore" did not necessarily come from 
the same class, but exhibited the same kind of class experience - they all spoke 
about their blocked class trajectory and their hopes that their children will go 
further. This finding70 would have been lost had I stuck to (i), where classifying 
them by objective indications of class would have meant separating them out into 
different sociological groups. Additionally, because my analysis began with their 
postures and struggles, it allowed me to arrive at a "subjectivised" understanding 
of class as (the perception of family) class trajectory, which I believe is a more 
meaningful than a traditional, objective understanding of class. 
IDENTIFYING SUITABLE CATEGORIES OF EXPLANATION 
In many ways, the process of analysis is a continuation of the Interview process. 
Often, analysts simply quote their interviewees' statements and equate them with 
analysis. These analysts may perceive the interview as a way of interrogating 
interviewees so as to collect answers from their informants' lips (Soysal 1999). 
disagree with this understanding of what analysis is or should be. For me, the 
analytical process is more than a "comprehension" exercise that treats Interview 
material as a resource rather than as a topic (Slater and Tonkiss 2001). The 
analytical process is an opportunity for the analyst to go beyond texts to take Into 
account a variety of sources of knowledge (theory, observation, perception, 
deduction) and to arrive at a contextualized and meaningful appreciation of the 
significance and the wider processes in which the interviewee's world is 
embedded. To this end, "posture" is a superior concept because it bypasses 
tendencies in cognitive and linguistic approaches to establish coherence and goes 
beyond linguistic discourse to seek clues in Interviewee's actions and 
surroundings. For instance, a collection of self-help books ("how to improve your 
market value") and other signifiers of the Singaporean preoccupation with 
70 I cannot take full credit. Conducting fieldwork during the Asian economic crisis, where a 
person's "class" can change overnight, meant that I had to either abandon or arrive at a 
better way of capturing class. Seeing how the PAP government successfully rallied 
citizens made me realize that an "ideological" understanding of class was more Important 
than a "material" one. The PAP's hegemony can be sustained without economic 
performance, but not without the people's dream/hope of material success. 
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"upgrading" would offer a richer interpretation of an interviewee who claims to be 
unconcerned with staying competitive. 
The shift to seeing transcripts as "topics" rather than as "resources, " and the 
emergence of discourse analysis is underlined by a constructivist turn, where the 
unit of analysis is no longer the utterance as a factual statement, but the utterance 
as a speech act (Austin 1975), with no true or fixed meaning in itself but whose 
meaning is derived contextually. In my work, this shift is not merely a theoretical 
ideal, but an issue I was forced to reckon with directly in two fieldwork situations. 
In the first situation, an interview with HO left me mulling over it for days trying to 
understand her many irrelevant answers. My seemingly harmless questions were 
met with defensive replies: 
Me(60-67): Are there sections [in newspapers] that you look out for? 
HO: I read all, whatever happens, I want to know about it, if not I sit at 
home stupidly, not knowing about the world outside. I must know a bit! 
Me(84-93): Do you think the economy will recover? 
HO: Of course we wish 
Me: But do you have the confidence? 
HO: Yes! If the whole world is like that, it's tragic. I cannot be so selfish. 
I could not make sense of HO's replies until I realized that there were "hidden 
audiences" in our conversations -a concept whose theoretical significance will be 
explained in Chapter 7. I could not make sense of HO's replies until I realized that 
there were "hidden audiences" in our conversations. As to who these "hidden 
audiences" were, they became obvious at other points in the Interview when HO 
spoke about how her neighbours looked down on her CHE family for being "old- 
fashioned" and "scolded" her for "stupidly" sending their children to Chinese 
schools (Chapter 6B). 
There were similar situations where certain interviewees (especially those with 
blocked class trajectory) seemed to be haunted by social expectations, usually 
embodied in the voices of impersonal significant others like neighbours, brothers- 
in-law and classmates. 
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If these cases were difficult, the situation with Thomas nearly Incapacitated my 
research-Thomas smugly told me that researchers like me were very stupid, 
because we assumed that our interviewees told the truth. He then told me he 
deliberately lied to me during interviews but refused to tell me all the things he lied 
about. This was an epistemological and analytical nightmare for me -I had not 
realized how "unconstructivistic" my analytical procedure had been so far; I had 
not realized how dependent I was on the goodwill and honesty of my interviewees. 
I realized that thus far, my belief that my approach was constructivist (see chapter 
2, especially "proven" by my willingness to analyse jokes and rumours) was an 
illusion. It took Thomas' trick to slap self"reflexivity into my work; I was forced to 
consider the extent to which my analysis would still hold if all my Interviewees lied 
to me. 
A solution that I was tempted to implement (but did not) was to try to find out 
exactly where he lied. Without his cooperation, it would. have taken a lot of second- 
guessing to achieve this. More importantly, such a solution would require that 
judged his utterances based on some notions of coherence - which I was highly 
unwilling to do, given my professed anti-cognitivism. 
The only other solution was to make a resolute constructivist turn by prioritising the 
meaning of the (speech) act (of lying) over the meaning of the utterance. Without 
thinking about his utterances - especially the statement that he lied - in terms of 
"speech acts" and "hidden audiences, " I would not have been able to put 
constructivism into practice. Without Thomas' case, I would not have realized the 
problems with my previous analytical method and overhauled my research goals 
and methods of analysis. 
Since this realization, thinking about "hidden audience" had proven useful 
whenever I came across passages of transcripts that seem "to come from 
nowhere. " Indeed, I later realized the conceptual importance of this notion71- 
71 A whole dissertation may be needed to explore the full significance of this concept. 
Briefly, this focus on hidden audience again suggests a type of non-abstract 
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"hidden audiences" appears to function as a type of preferred reading that 
interviewees have internalised and which they feel compelled to live up to, failing 
which they feel they need to act defensively. Theoretically, these moments have 
become the most important analytical nuggets in my research - because these 
are precisely the moments when ideological contestations are performed on an 
everyday basis and in embedded and materially "real" contexts (as conflicts with 
neighbours and brothers-in-law). 
How interviewees resolve these dilemmas and conflicts with alternative ideological 
values (represented by significant others who hold these values) vitally reveal what 
my research aims to uncover: the subcultures they belong to (which group 
constitutes their preferred reading) and their structure of feelings. These "live" and 
embedded dramatizations of ideological contestations provide direct insight into 
the presence of a normative/moral centre (internalised social values or "discursive 
unity") and its institutional links or "institutional materiality" (e. g., government 
campaigns), and explain how the state/authority is rendered organic yet 
(strategically) absent in everyday life. 
communitarian governmentality based on the formation of moral subjects (who may 
exhibit different public/private behaviours) rather than ethical subjects with a neo-liberal 
governmentality. If this is correct, it would suggest the need to develop different 
epistemological and analytical tools to understand different ideological systems. To study 
moral societies (as opposed to ethical/liberal societies), it may be especially important to 
develop methods and concepts that are not based upon cognitivist assumptions of 
(public-private) coherence. 
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CHAPTER 4 FROM IMMIGRANTS TO CITIZENS 
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN THE 1ST GENERATION 
The PAP Is the vital nerve centre of the entire nation... 
Without the PAP, there will be no Singapore... " 
(Petir, December 1983). 
4A. STATE, NATION OR NATION-STATE? 
What is the nation-state and what is its relation to the state or nation? The 
conflation of nation with state (e. g., "nationality") has increasingly become a 
taken-for-granted category. The views that the state and nation are 
coterminous and the view of a nation as an "organic" (state) community have 
come to constitute the preferred understanding of nation-state. However, these 
views belong within a particular, culturalist paradigm where (state) cultures or 
communities are used to explain social phenomena, rather than as a 
phenomenon that needs to be explained. This culturalist understanding of 
nation-state is hegemonic in popular and academic discourse. Researches are 
often conducted within the boundaries of the nation-state and draw upon 
national stereotypes as explanations. Among contemporary thinkers, there is a 
longing to reassert national essence and uniqueness, especially in face of rapid 
social changes. E. g., Heidegger's desire for a return to German folk culture 
became controversial when rallied behind Hitler's cause. 
By seeing the nation as "natural, " "essential" or "already there" (e. g., Herder, 
Fichte), culturalist approaches mystifies the process of nation-state formation 
and cannot be applied to communities where state and national boundaries are 
not coterminous. 72 Kurds and Israelites are considered nations without state 
while Singapore has been described. as a state without a nation. Many of my 
'2 Connor (1994,39) supplies some interesting figures to argue that "a prime fact 
about the world is that it is not largely composed of nation-states: " 
-Only 12 states (9.1)% can justifiably be described as nation-states. 
-25 (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for more than 90% of the 
state's total population but also contain an important minority. 
-Another 25 (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for between 75% 
and 89% of the population. 
-In 31 (25%), the largest ethnic elements accounts for 50% to 74% of the population. 
-In 39 (29.5%), the largest nation or potential nation accounts for less than half of the 
population. 
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interviewees considered themselves "Singaporean" because of their passports. 
That Singapore's independence was unwanted means that citizens see 
"Singapore" as a historically contingent political entity rather than as an organic 
polity with an intrinsic ahistorical essence. Citizens also joke about being 
citizens of "Singapore Inc., " indicating that their nationality is based on (social 
and economic) contract, rather than a sense of belonging to an organic 
community. 
While culturalist perspectives conflate the state and nation, materialist 
perspectives tend to dichotomise them such that the nation tends to be seen as 
being constituted by subjective bonds between citizens, as opposed to the 
"objective" entity of the state. 
Materialist approaches offer useful insights into models of development of the 
nation-state by looking at the process of state and nation-formation. Hroch 
(1996,63) identifies three stages of nationalist movements by looking at 
political agents and mobilisation: small groups of intellectuals first elaborate on 
the concept of the nation; a wider network of patriots spread the word through 
concerted agitation; and serious popular mobilisation begins. Breuilly (1989, 
11) distinguishes between the various goals and enemies of nationalism: 
nationalism prior to ("state nationalism") and after ("government nationalism") 
the gaining of state power. He also distinguishes between the internal functions 
(consensus-building) and external functions (coercion towards opposition) of 
government nationalism. Anthony Birch (1989,8-11) distinguishes stages of 
national development institutionally: 
1. Consolidating political control by quelling internal rivals ... 
establishing police and courts to maintain order; 
2. Penetrating administratively ... collecting taxes, implementing laws, appointing bureaucrats and creating register of tax-payers; 
3. Creating educational system to give a sense of national identity, 
common history, inculcate patriotism; and 
4. Developing national pride. 
All these theories can be usefully applied to Singapore. Hroch's trace of the 
growth of nationalism can be directly applied to how a small Westernised elite 
with little popularity strove to gain nationalist legitimacy by building an 
administrative state founded upon a network of loyal civil servants and mass 
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(Chan, Vasil, C. M. Seow). Breuilly's distinctions are especially applicable for 
post-colonial one-party states, where revolutionary parties' monopoly over 
state/government power and legitimacy is often based upon state nationalism. 
Within Breuilly's and Birch's categories, we can discern Althusserian categories 
of repressive versus Ideological state apparatuses (RSA vs. ISA), Gramsci's 
distinction between consent and coercion and Foucault's distinction between 
government through law and morality or though ethics and the self 
(govern mentality). Birch's delineation of stages provides the structure for 
Chapter 4 (stages 1 and 2) and Chapter 5 (stages 3 and 4). 
While materialist theories can be useful, their view that the nation-state evolved 
under certain material conditions is problematic. By subscribing to some form 
of material determination, they privilege particular material forces over other 
(non-) material forces, which limits their usefulness as theories. Materialist 
typologies tend to be prescriptive and reductionist, explaining the nation-state 
as a "sociological necessity in modern society" (Eley and Suny 1996,6) or an 
inevitable consequence of certain material forces. Gellner (1983,5) goes so far 
as to argue that, "in the post-agrarian, industrial age there Is, once again, no 
option; but now the presence, not the absence of the state Is inescapable. " In 
these historical accounts, functions and effects are used as explanations. 
Weber (1946,78-79) argued that the modern nation-state should not be 
defined "in terms of its ends... (but) in terms of the specific means peculiar to 
it. " E. g., Gellner (1974 and 1983) argues that the state performs an 
exosocialisation function by educating and disciplining a workforce, but does 
not explain why the state is needed to perform this function or how this state 
function may be an effect of yet other forces. 
Secondly, Benjamin and Kedourie, drawing upon the experience of post- 
colonial states, provide strong refutation of materialist theories: nation- 
statehood is neither continuous nor inevitable. 
Instead of nation-states being surrounded by conducive (material) conditions of 
emergence or there being "elective affinity" between material conditions and 
state-formation, Benjamin (1988,3-7) argues that for many states, the 
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experience of nation-statehood in modern nation-states is characterised by a 
"discontinuity between nation-statehood and whatever preceded It" rather than 
as a continuous evolutionary process. He argues that the nation-state was 
invented once and "never again to be independently Invented. " This Western 
intervention was then imposed on the rest of the world; statehood is mutually 
conferred through violence and diplomacy, rather than gained through events 
as "Independence. " Primary nation-states emerged In Europe between the 13`n- 
18`h century, "gradually and cumulatively to reinforce each other, until 
eventually, it became obvious to the people involved that a new kind of societal 
framework had enveloped them. " Secondary nation-states, "with very few 
exceptions... come into being quite literally overnight, " usually through 
postcolonial struggles and conscious imitation by local Westernised elite. " The 
achievement of statehood requires the mutual recognition of each other's 
territorial sovereignty and not merely material conditions. States interpellate 
each other into existence into a world-system of nation states. Because 
statehood has to be conferred, claims for sovereignty by the Kurds and 
Taiwanese are empty without the recognition of the UN or other nations. 
Kedourie similarly rejects materialist/evolutionist perspectives that argue that 
nation-states develop locally. To him, nationalism "is a doctrine invented in 
Europe at the beginning of the 19th Century. It pretends to supply a criterion for 
the determination of a unit of population proper to enjoy a government 
exclusively for its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for 
the right of organisation of a society of states" (Kedourie 1990,1; Eley and 
Suny 1996,6). 
Not only may nation-stateh6od be experienced as a discontinuity, the stages of 
state-formation that materialist theorists, highlight may actually be reversed. 
Because the nation-state is invented only once, "primary nation-states" are 
more easily explained by domestic materialist conditions. In "secondary nation 
states" statehood often precedes industrialisation (versus Gellnerl983); the 
"material determinant" (industrialisation) is actually the goal of the determined 
(state). 
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This brings us to a more general critique that constructivism levies on 
materialist and culturalist perspectives on the nation-state. Both camps tend to 
see the nation, in different ways, as "natural" - as essential and unchanging in 
culturalist theories or as evolutionary/continuous and thus historically natural or 
inevitable in materialist theory. Constructivists argue that the nation Is not 
natural but naturalised; it is more imagined than real, It is a selectively 
constructed human artifice and an effect of (deliberate or complicit) human 
effort. 
In thinking of the nation-state as a social construction, It Is important to ask 
"whose version of nation" and "for what purpose? " It is only within more recent 
work on nationalism that constructivist perspectives emerge, conceptualising 
the nation as a rhetorical and ideological entity constructed by the state to 
legitimise its monopoly over coercion. In thinking about "whose version of 
nation" is naturalised, scholars appeal to Raymond Williams' (1965,66) notion 
of the selectivity of tradition. Nowhere is the awareness of alternative 
trajectories sharper than when confronted with post-colonial statehood, where 
governments struggle against the 'Western" model of nation-statehood. 
Jayasuriya (1997) argues for a "reactionary modernisation model" where the 
Asian Values discourse is seen as a reaction against Westernisation; Kohn 
(1994) distinguishes between Western and Eastern forms of nationalism. Ang 
and Stratton (1997) argue that "Asian Values" represents an attempt by non- 
Western governments to use Western strategies (Orientalising/Occidentalising) 
and epistemology (East/West) to ward off Westernisation (liberal/plural 
democracy). 
Weber (1946,78-79) reminds us that the nation-state must be understood not 
only "in terms of its ends ... (but) in terms of the specific means peculiar to it. " 
Weber's definition of the state is by now canonical: it is an institution with a 
"monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. " If a nation is state 
community that shares a common culture, then a nation is surely, first and 
foremost, a community that shares the same system of legitimate coercion. 
This understanding of nation as a coerced state community is a logical 
derivative from Weber's definition and begs the constructivist question of how 
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the nation-state can be coercive and organic at the same time? Why is lt that 
"state" and "nation" tend to be inseparable in our minds? 
The blatant incongruity of the coercive state and the organic nation and their 
seamless conflation into "nation-state" should give us cause for alarm. 
Considerable ideological efforts must be invested to make state communities 
forget its common coercive culture so as to experience themselves as organic 
communities. To this end, it is imperative to consider the role of organic 
intellectuals in helping state communities erase/forget the coercive dimension 
of their communality and in helping the state to build nations based upon state- 
mediated consensus. Constructivists point out this ideological function that 
culturalist and materialist theorists perform when they do not address the Issue 
of the unnatural creation or naturalisation of an organic state community based 
on an erasure of the community's coercive antecedent. For constructivists, the 
act of seeing national culture as natural (essential or inevitable) furthers the 
state's ideological project and legitimises cultural justifications of coercion. 
Singapore's experience questions many taken-for-granted assumptions about 
the nature of nation-statehood. Statehood, or territorial sovereignty, was neither 
a material inevitability nor a goal that was fought for. Independence was 
considered "a foolish and absurd proposition" (Drysdale 1984,249) and came 
as a shock. The degree of disbelief cannot be underestimated: even when 
occupied by the Japanese during WW2, its people did not desire independence 
but sought British colonial protection. Even when freed from colonial rule, 
independence remained unimaginable and leaders tried to avoid it through a 
proposed merger with Malaysia. Modern statehood, which necessitated the 
breaking of traditional bonds and teaching citizen to accept state intervention in 
personal life, was not experienced as a continuous material evolution but as a 
discontinuity. 
Secondly, the PAP retained many colonial institutions while trying to avoid 
evolving into a "Western" model of statehood. Materialist and culturalist 
approaches tend to ignore the ideological projects that state elite mobilises to 
combat trajectories favoured by nature, culture or material conditions (Cf. 
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Fukuyama's 1992 "end of history" thesis). "Asian Values" Is but the PAP's latest 
project to prevent the "natural evolution" towards liberal-plural democracy and 
inaugurate a more hierarchical and monolithic "strong moral centre" model of 
Asian statehood based rhetorically on communitarianism and benevolent 
paternalism. 
As a one-party hegemonic state, 73 Singapore also provides interesting insights 
into the conflation of party with the nation-state. Within a Western framework 
where pluralism is the norm, and where authoritarianism is contrasted with 
democracy and believed to be unpopular, the existence of popular dictatorships 
is an anomaly that begs explanation. This anomaly is made all the more 
bewildering by observations that some governments (including the PAP) have 
shifted from "hard" to "soft authoritarianism. " 
Poulantzas (1978,203) and Hall (1 988b, 153; 1977,337) observed that 
coercion and consent can be uniquely combined to perpetuate a form of 
"authoritarian populism. " While the PAP is not always successful In disguising 
its coercion or making citizens forget the coercive dimensions of their 
community life, it has, nonetheless, secured considerable consensus such that 
observers (Castells 1988,78) consider the PAP government a hegemonic one- 
party-state. This makes Singapore's case theoretically Interesting: how is it 
possible to secure citizen consensus despite, not in absence of, reminders of 
coercion? 
The PAP rejects a "government by the people for the people" model, preferring 
a Confucian model where leaders have a mandate to rule and the duty to make 
unpopular decisions. The PAP's hegemony is not gained through absorbing 
popular values to enlarge party hegemony but through-inscribing its party 
objectives into administrative and social processes and institutions such as 
social expectations and public morality so that state authoritarianism can be 
transformed and softened into societal authoritarianism. 
73 For Sartori (in Chan 1985b, 147), a "dominant party system" is characterised by an 
absolute majority of seats over time while a "hegemonic party system" should be "truly 
one-party centred" but without precluding minor parties. The PAP is both: its monopoly 
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In the rest of Part 2,1 will elaborate on the PAP's attempt to allow Ideological 
pluralism without allowing fragmentation throughout generations of PAP rule 
and the different state apparatuses and ideological strategies used to achieve 
this goal. 
4B. SHIFTING BASES OF LEGITIMACY: THE PAP'S CONSOLIDATION OF 
STATE-POWER 
If it is not totalitarian to arrest a man and detain him when you cannot 
charge him with any offence against the written law... -what Is It? What 
[Marshall] is seeking to do in the name of democracy is to curtail a 
fundamental liberty... freedom from arrest and punishment without 
having violated ... the law. (LKY 
in 1955, cited in Tremewan 1994,21) 
Where there are fierce anti-colonial struggles, successful leaders gains 
mythical legitimacy as fathers of the nation. In Singapore, independence came 
peacefully and late, when post-colonialism was already "passe" (universal) and 
"inevitable" (Vasil 1984,8). This meant that changes in the bases of legitimacy 
(from colonial appointment to popular nationalism) were not attained through a 
process of mass nationalist struggle but through a fine diplomatic balance 
between the shifting bases of legitimacy had to be negotiated skilfully. 
Originally, the PAP was neither the British's nor the people's favourite. Its 
legitimacy was not based upon popularity but affiliation with the strategic 
political elite; its ideological flexibility allowed it to keep up a "sustained 
dissimulation" (T. George 1973,40). This does not mean that the PAP did not 
have ideological preferences, but these preferences were not given vent until it 
had consolidated power and eliminated political opposition. Because it was able 
to align with popular ideological camps, the PAP, while in opposition, was able 
of state power since Independence is unbroken; at its weakest, it conceded only 4 out 
of 81 seats to the opposition. 
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to bait dominant parties into losing credibility without showing its own hand. 4 
As the dominant party, the PAP did not hesitate to use coercion to consolidate 
its power. 
I. Waning British legitimacy and rising popular nationalism 
With the Japanese occupation in Malaya (made up of Malaysia and Singapore) 
during WW2, the British lost their imperial legitimacy. Yet, because Malaya was 
the main dollar-earning colony, the British were not willing to relinquish it 
without a fight. However, its attempt to re-colonise Malaya was met with strong 
international and local opposition. While the British continued to rely on 
colonisation as a method of exploitation, the US had developed an "open door 
policy" technique of exploitation without colonisation (Tremewan 1994,12) and 
was eager to have a share of Malaya's revenues. Locally, the Japanese 
occupation had led to the formation of a popular75 guerrilla army (with British 
support), the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), who was now ready to fight 
British colonisation. 
Because of Malaya's economic importance, the British fought fiercely, crippling 
the MCP and other leftwing organisations. It closed down two Chinese 
newspapers, jailed editors and quelled MCP demonstrations, resulting in 
several deaths (Clutterbuck 1984). Despite declaring a state of emergency 
(which gave the government unlimited power to detain without trial76 and 
impose bans and curfews), and despite their superior numbers (10000 against 
MCP's 3000 men), the British became aware of their unpopularity and begun to 
see the "inevitability" of international decolonisation (Vasil 1984,8). However, 
74PAP's skill at baiting/scapecfoating enemies is well known and popularly joked about: 
LKY, Dr Mahathir (PM of Malaysia) and Claudia Schiffer were, sitting together in a 
train. Suddenly the train went through a tunnel and It went completely dark. Then 
there was a kissing noise and a loud slap. When the train came out of the tunnel, 
Claudia Schiffer and LKY were sitting as if nothing had happened and Dr. M had his 
hand against his face as he had been slapped. 
Dr. M (thinks): "LKY must have kissed Claudia Schiffer and she missed him and 
slapped me instead. " 
Claudia Schiffer (thinks): "Dr. M must have tried to kiss me and actually kissed LKY 
and got slapped. " 
LKY (thinks): "This is great. The next time the train goes through a tunnel I'll make 
another kissing noise and slap that Dr. M bastard again. " 
75 Turnbull (1989,334) estimates 70000 supporters In Singapore. 
76 Tremewan speculates that as many as 1200 were detained. 
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they harboured the hope of controlling Malaya and sought the co-operation of 
the right-wing 'leisured gentry' Progressive Party (PP) (Drysdale 1984,83) to 
maintain a veneer of popular legitimacy. The PP was encouraged to propose 
constitutional changes, which was accepted as the Rendel Constitution, to be 
instituted after the 1955 elections. 
The Rendel Constitution marked the change In the bases of state legitimacy. 
Leaders were no longer appointed by the colonial masters but were to be 
popularly elected. The British were confident that the PP would win and did not 
believe citizens would be nationalistic or interested enough to vote, thereby 
thwarting its final attempt at indirect re-colonisation. 
LKY thought differently and founded the PAP In 1954 with his friends. Aware of 
the shifting bases of legitimacy, the PAP knew that it had to court both the 
British and the masses. Its class position (English-educated) drew the British 
but alienated the masses. Because "any man in Singapore who wants to carry 
the Chinese-speaking people with him cannot afford to be anti-communist" 
(LKY 1955 in Vasil 1984), the PAP allied itself with the left. A PAP with two 
distinct factions was formed, held together by anti-colonialism and mutual 
need. The communists needed PAP's legal front, the PAP needed the 
communists' popularity (Bellows 1970,20; Tremewan 1994,19). This marriage 
of convenience demonstrates PAP's ideological flexibility. LKY's identification 
with the left's cause has always been suspect. Although he earned the 
reputation of being an activist by volunteering his legal services to communists, 
he often begged them to tone down their protests. He also knew that the 
communists did not trust a bourgeoisie like him who could not speak Chinese 
(Tremewan 1994,18-19). 
The results of the 1955 came as a shock for all parties concerned. The mass 
turnout was unexpected. Turnbull (1989,254) attributes this political awakening 
to the verbal duels of Marshall from the Labour Front (LF) and LKY (PAP), 
which "electrified the legislative chambers and brought crowds to its previously 
empty public benches. " Left-wing parties, which had criticised the Rendel 
constitution as neo-colonial, emerged victorious despite fielding only a token 
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force; they had wanted to secure a platform to protest, not to win seats. The LF 
emerged the clear victor while rightwing parties were decimated. The election 
clearly demonstrated that the future belonged to politicians with anti-colonial 
social-democratic tendencies. 
11. From opposition to dominant party 
After the election, the British understood that the Chinese masses regarded 
[the PP] as neo-colonial collaborators (Turnbull 1989,239) and realised they 
needed was "an ally with apparently contradictory attributes: mass support ... 
and a commitment to British interests" (Tremewan 1994,17). 
The PAP needed British and mass support. It knew that its goal of a merger 
with Malaya was less detrimental to British interest than the LF's quest for full 
independence. I. e., in terms of gaining British support, the PAP was ahead of 
the LF. To emerge as leader, the PAP had to be more popular than the LF. The 
PAP tried previously to ally itself with the LF but without success. It should be 
noted that, according to election results, while the LF was more popular than 
the PAP, LKY was more popular than Marshall (Drysdale 1984,99). Had an 
alliance been formed, LKY would have emerged leader of the alliance and 
leader of Singapore. Without an alliance with the LF, PAP was not able to co- 
opt the LF's popular legitimacy and had to find other ways to ensure that PAP 
was more popular than the LF. It did so by engineering the LF's unpopularity. 
LKY's goal was made easier by the problems plaguing the Rendel Constitution. 
The Rendel Constitution was designed to reduce the elected leader to the 
status of a puppet of the British. Chief Minister Marshall (LF) found himself 
having to defend a constitution he did not support while struggling for more 
power from the British to control the many riots and strikes organised with the 
PAP's legal aid (Drysdale 1984,106). 
LKY wanted to force the LF to repress the mass riots and lose its popularity. 
Marshall was not baited; he refused to take stern measures and instead 
initiated discussions, which was. interpreted by Chinese students and workers 
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as a sign of "weakness"" (Turnbull 1989,255). The British feared that 
Marshall's soft attitudes towards communist demonstrators and his demand for 
full independence would make Singapore "an outpost of communist China. " 
Marshall resigned, as promised, when he failed to obtain self-government from 
the British and was replaced by his Deputy Yew-Hock Lim. 
While Marshall refused to be baited, Lim responded harshly to the 1956 riots, 
leaving 15 dead and more than 100 injured. The PAP took the opportunity to 
criticise the LF as anti-democratic and ironically, neo-colonial (it was LF that 
wanted full independence while PAP wanted a merger). The LF lost its 
credential as an anti-colonial socialist party; Lim was seen as a "running dog" 
or lackey of colonialism and the PAP was left as the sole leader of the anti- 
colonial movement. 
In the meantime, the British became more sympathetic to calls for self- 
government and agreed to grant it after the 1959 elections. During rallies, LKY 
accused a communist LF of accepting and misappropriating American funding 
and called for "the immediate resignation of the entire Lim Yew Hock 
government" (Turnbull 1989,262). The PAP, by contrast, symbolised their 
incorruptibility by dressing in white and offered economic and social reforms. 
PAP's victory was complete. LF lost every seat while PAP secured 43 out of 51 
seats. LKY, as PM of a self-governing Singapore, now had "the means to push 
forward its hegemony to the fullest possible extension" (Chua 1995,13). 
Ill. The end of opposition in Singapore 
The PAP-leftwing opposed LKY's (PAP rightwing) alliance with the British and 
considered the merger neol-colonial. It threatened LKY to support Marshall if 
LKY did not stop repressing them. In 1961, it successfully won the Anson by- 
elections against the PAP rightwing. 
Now that legitimacy was based on democratic elections rather than British 
favour, LKY's faction faced a crisis. PAP's popularity had always been based 
That "consultative" government is taken as weak leadership lends some credibility to 
the PAP's claim that developing countries do not appreciate "soft governments" and 
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on the PAP leftwing mass organisations; LKY needed to find a way of 
consolidating his legitimacy, without or without mass support. How could this be 
achieved? As an opposition party, it had baited the LF into repressing 
demonstrators and thereby losing its credibility. As the dominant party, the PAP 
could not use the same strategy against its internal left faction because it had 
to convince the British and the Malayan leaders that PAP was united and 
sincere in its proposal for a merger with Malaya. To consolidate legitimacy 
without its leftwing's mass support, LKY adopted a two-step strategy. Firstly, he 
had to cast out the leftwing; only then could moderate-PAP appear united. to 
Malaya. To achieve this, LKY called for a confidence vote in Parliament after 
purging leftwing leaders. LKY's faction won by the slimmest possible margin 
(majority of one) and expelled the left faction, which then formed the Barisan 
Socialis (BS). In this way, LKY's faction manage to achieve legitimacy without 
mass support; it successfully evaded the test of electoral popularity even while 
acquiring an aura of popular legitimacy based on its parliamentary popularity. 78 
However, electoral popularity remained the most fundamental basis of 
legitimacy and the PAP (now consisting only of the rightwing) could only delay, 
not eliminate, a contest for popular votes with BS in the next elections. The 
PAP was emasculated after the split; while it retained state control, it was left 
with. no more than 20% of its former membership (Pang 1971,14), "not even 
the skeleton, of the Party remained" (Tremewan 1994,27). However, it could 
now take an overt anti-communist stance. Using one-sided radio broadcasts, 
PAP addressed "the nation" as nationalists. Singapore's survival as'a nation 
was tied to the merger and BS was portrayed as a communist organisation 
intent on sabotaging the merger, i. e., Singapore's survival. PAP represented 
itself as "a popular elected government" and BS as anti-nationalist, even 
though BS was more popular than the PAP before the split. Nation, state and 
party became conflated as one inseparable anti-communist pro-merger entity. 
Another attempt to bolster its legitimacy was the 1962 Referendum, which 
presented the people with 3 merger options that were, in actuality, all pro- 
merger: 
are not ready for democracy. 
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1. ... giving Singapore autonomy in education and labour. 2. A complete and unconditional merger 
3. Entry into Malaysia on terms no less favourable than the terms for 
the Borneo territories 
PAP needed the people's endorsement of "A" to justify its continuance In office. 
It claimed that the second choice was in keeping with BS's demand for 
"complete merger; " BS disagreed and encouraged blank votes to embarrass 
the PAP (Pang 1971, Footnote 104). Although 71 % voted for "A, " the PAP's 
victory was tainted by the considerable 25% blank vote 
Besides propagating an anti-communist pro-merger ideology, the PAP also set 
about solving problems by creating jobs for a rapidly growing population. By 
1963, its 4-Year-Plan was achieved ahead. of schedule (Turnbull 1989,277) 
and its impressive results in industry, housing and education were appreciated 
by citizens. 
By the 1963 elections, PAP had successfully deprived the BS of Its mass base. 
The conflation of nation and party allowed PAP to further repress the BS 
"legally" (de-registering, banning, deportation, detention without trial; the 1963 
Operation Cold Storage detained 100 "radicals, " Clutterbuck 1984,158) and 
electorally (snap elections, freezing funds, smear campaigns). Using'the British 
election technique of one-member constituencies designed to produce strong 
effective government in 2-party states (Turnbull 1989,278), PAP won 73% of 
the seats with less than 47% of the votes, leaving the left with mass support but 
without state power. 
Despite PAP's measures tq weaken it, BS captured 33.3% of the votes, 
indicating that had PAP not repressed BS, BS might well be the dominant party 
in Singapore today. PAP admitted that success was never a certainty in 1963 
(Pang 1971,17). After the elections, PAP continued to purge BS-out of 
thirteen MPs, three were arrested and two fled. BS also committed a series of 
mistakes (it failed to consolidate its base and boycotted Parliament in 1965), 
78 As mentioned in Chapter 1 (US Presidential Elections, Al Gore and George W. 
Bush), a democratic leader is not necessarily a popular leader. 
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thereby losing the opportunity to become the main opposition party and spelling 
the end of opposition in Singapore for decades to come. 
Having effectively silenced any leftwing anti-merger opposition, PAP found that 
after many years of courting Malaya, the Malayan PM was no longer Interested 
in a merger with Singapore (Turnbull 1989,266-267). The fallout was the 
culmination of fundamental ideological difference and was triggered off by an 
arrogant PAP gesture. PAP advocated multi-racialism while Malaya's UMNO 
advocated Malay communalism. PAP was concerned there was no non- 
communist party to present Malayan Chinese Interests and took it upon itself to 
"save" Malaya from Chinese communists (MCP) by offering itself as a non- 
communist Chinese option during Malaya's 1964 elections. The Malayan PM, 
who feared the Singapore government would plan a Chinese take-over of 
Malaya, saw this as a breach of faith (PAP had previously declared It would not 
contest in Malaya) and declared solidarity with the Malayan Chinese 
communists, thereby repudiating any alliance with PAP. PAP had no choice but 
to declare independence and concentrate its effort on the mammoth task of 
building an independent modern nation-state. 
4C. BUILDING A PRO-PARTY STATE 
The PAP did not come to power on the basis of its popularity. While in 
opposition, it entered parliament through allying itself with popular parties and 
upon entering parliament, baited the dominant party to take harsh measures 
and lose popular credibility. After manoeuvring itself into a dominant position, 
the PAP further consolidated power through coercion that was justified as 
protecting Singapore from communism. Since it was not a genuinely popular 
party, the PAP understandably sought to ground its legitimacy on 
administrative and economic foundations. 
LKY also understood that party legitimacy could not be sustained by his 
charisma (Vasil 1984,64) and sought to perpetuate it by inscribing party values 
into the states machinery, i. e., by building a pro-party state that would give the 
party "legal legitimisation" (Weber 1946,78). Legitimacy was to be based on 
the efficiency of a bureaucratised "administrative state" (Chan 1985a, 74; 
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C. M. Seow 1985a, 112). ' New institutions and safeguards that promoted the 
PAP's vision of a good state were entrenched in the Constitution to "outlast 
Lee's tenure as Singapore's paramount leader" (Tan and Lam 1997,3). 
Western observers are perplexed by Singapore's "soft authoritarianism. " 
Authoritarianism is "softened" through embedding party values Into the Inner 
logic of institutions. The first generation leaders inscribed party values onto 
state, which allowed repressive party objectives (anti-ideological fragmentation 
in parliament and society) to be achieved by legislation and state bureaucracy, 
thereby "softening" the party's image. Second-generation leaders had to 
"soften" their authoritarianism even more. By the early 1980s, citizens were 
beginning to criticise the government for over-regulating and interfering with 
private life. Second-generation leaders realised that the surest foundation of 
their legitimacy was not in "charismatic" or "legal legitimisation" but In 
"traditional legitimisation 79" (Weber 1946,78) and sought to inscribe party 
values unto the nation through "social engineering. " With the second- 
generation leaders' attempt to re-define its basis of legitimacy, the PAP state 
appears to have shifted through all three of Weber's types'of legitimisation: 
from charismatic (pre-Independence struggles) to legal (first-generation) to 
traditional (second-generation). 
I. Inscribing the party onto the state 
While the boundaries between party and nation-state have become blurred, the 
party is highly centralised and well defined. At the top, the PAP consists of 12 
members chosen by a secret list of cadres, who in turn are chosen by the 
Central Executive Committee. This cadre system allows LKY, the Secretary- 
General, to retain central and undisputed authority over the ruling party 
(Bellows 1970,24; Chan 1985b, 159). This cadre system ensures that the day- 
to-day administration of the party is in the hands of the Parliamentary- 
ministerial wing. 
79Paternalism, unlike authoritarianism, sees authority as benevolent, which legitimates 
citizens' dependency on the state and encourages personal loyalty towards the 
authority-centre (Pye and Pye 1985,27-29). 
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Through constitutional reforms, Singapore's legislature remains a unicameral 
parliament. Chan (1 985a, 72) noted that unicamerialism Is preferred by leaders 
of new states who need greater power and authority to deal with the problems 
of development. Unicamerialism was thought to "respond more readily to the 
search for efficiency and to make the right balance of authority between the 
various institutions of government easier to achieve. " 
PAP leaders believed that political neutrality of the civil service was unworkable 
in developing countries. Additionally, unlike other Asian societies (Indonesia, 
Burma, India), Singapore's civil service was relatively uninfluenced by 
nationalism/patriotism. As such, the civil service had to receive "political 
education. " LKY (1959, in Vasil 1984,122) exhorted civil servants to see the 
survival of the democratic state as their vested interest: 
The civil service, in order to contribute its maximum in the critical tasks 
before the nation as perceived by the PAP, had to be fully Informed of 
the objectives, priorities and policies of the party and imbued with a zeal 
to achieve their fulfilment. They had to be made to view the 
programmes as their own. 
Instead of de-bureaucratising, which was fashionable in the late 1950s era of 
decolonisation and democratisation, the leaders were aware that "to denigrate 
and abuse the civil service until ... it loses all confidence ... land] the respect of 
the public" would lead to "a collapse of administration and its floundering In 
inefficiency, corruption and graft" (G. E. Bogaars, foremost civil servant, in Vasil 
1984,123). 
The bureaucratisation of the civil service is a key strategy in achieving "the 
administrative state" via a "deliberate depoliticisation of the political arena" 
(Chan 1985a, 73; C. M. Seow 1985a, 112). Within an administrative state, 
politics is weaved into management and the bureaucrat's contribution becomes 
more significant than the elected politician's. The PAP takes pains to recruit the 
"best" (through rounds of streaming in education). When candidates prove 
themselves, they are approached for party membership. The PAP has been so 
successful that "after the first two elections, the PAP became really an 
administration. It was no longer a party. And the civil service has become a part 
of that" (Rajaratnam, a senior PAP minister, in Vasil 1984,127). While some 
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consider this "administrative turn" as "pragmatic" and "value-free, " others argue 
tliat the strategic division between the technical and the administrative is the 
politics of the modern state's management process (Chua 1995,126; 
Habermas 1975,68-75). 
The PAP has strong influence over the judiciary and its power of legislation is 
strengthened by the lack of judicial independence. Half of the Supreme Court's 
appointments are short term; PAP leaders closely screen tenured positions. 
Judges who have ruled against the government have found themselves in 
trouble; their rulings have also been reversed by parliamentary legislative 
amendments (Rodan 1989,203). 
To discourage political participation, the PAP relied heavily on legalised 
sanctions rather than hard repression. Instead of arresting the opposition, the 
PAP sued and bankrupted them. [Later, the PAP deployed Ideology (Asian 
Values) to discourage dissent. ] Institutions that tend to be oppositional (e. g., 
unions, media) were centralised and managed directly or Indirectly by the 
government. Non-institutional political activities were dealt with legislatively. 
Ultimately, the government could always rely on the Internal Security Act to 
detain without trial, which was used frequently in the 1970s. 
Upon gaining self-government in 1959, the colonial Printing Presses Act was 
revised in 1960 to prevent foreign interests from gaining a foothold in 
Singapore (Turnbull 1989,309). Immediately after this revision and through the 
1970s, reporters and editors were detained and several newspapers banned. 
Having removed these "obstacles, " the process of centralising the media began 
in the 1980s. Newspapers Ind publishers were merged into a conglomerate to 
form the Singapore Press Holdings. While the merger was officially claimed to 
prevent media wars, such centralisation made government control easier 
(D. Birch 1993,16-17). Journalists protested In a rare (and Illegal) 
demonstration with placards, to no avail. 
Licensing was another key strategy of controlling media and public groups. 
Under the 1972 New Printing Presses Rules, media licences had to be 
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renewed annually on condition that owners do not run articles that will cause "ill 
will or misunderstanding between the government and people of Singapore and 
... Malaysia; or which ... excite ... racial emotions, or which glorifies 
the use of 
violence in politics' (D. Birch 1993,17). 
Control was also gained through legislation on ownership and funding. 
Directors of media companies must be citizens; shareholders are not allowed 
more than 3% of the equity (although a 1974 Amendment Act allows the 
government to waive this rule if it so pleases). Finally, the government also 
attempts to "cultivate" the press by establishing 'cosy' relationships between 
editors and ministers to make 'journalists more aware of the basic facts, ... to 
feel the nuances and textures of political developments" (D. Birch 1993,18). 
Tremewan (1994,194-221) argues that there Is a "criminalisation of politics" in 
Singapore. This refers to administrative laws, especially against the opposition, 
which defines what constitutes "legal and illegal politics. " Gatherings of four or 
more may be broken up by the police; groups that want to hold meetings must 
register as a society under the Societies Act and satisfy the Registrar of 
Society (which the Internal Security Department oversees) that it is not contrary 
to national interests. Non-political societies that dared to engage in political 
arguments have suffered considerable reduction of powers through legislation. 
When the Law Society criticised the Newspapers and Printing Presses 
(Amendment) Act in 1986, the government introduced the Legal Profession 
(Amendment) Bill, which restricted the Law Society to commenting on 
legislation only when requested by the government. Politics and professional 
interests were separated and politics was marked "Out-of-Bounds" ("OB 
markers") to laypersons. 
Individuals have also been targeted. Opposition politician Jeyaretnam has been 
charged with libel and fraud, bankrupted, Imprisoned and suspended from 
Parliamentary duties on tax evasion charges. Civilians have also been 
criminalised, albeit in a gentler form. Local writer Catherine Lim was chided by 
the PM when she hinted about PAP factionalism. 
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What possibilities are there for a civilian to participate politically? The PM 
argues that, if "you want to politick, you form your own party or join Mr 
Jeyaretnam, " an opposition politician. Yet if they want to do so, they would face 
many obstacles (Cf. Tremewan 1994,163 for a list). 
Besides criminalising politics, Tremewan (1994,211) argues that crime was 
also politicised to discipline the lower sectors of society into obedience. This 
may be seen as the process of nationalising citizens, a way of inserting the 
relevance of the state in lives that would otherwise be scarcely affected by the 
state's existence. Citizens needed to be taught "the rules of morality, civic and 
professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the 
sociological-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order 
established by class domination" (Althusser 1969,6). Citizens are shamed or 
fined when they trespass the rules of good social conduct, such as urinating in 
lifts, littering or failure to flush the toilet. Over time and generations, coercive 
laws have become norms and are now seen as the natural, civilised pose of a 
"gracious society. " 
ll. Amending the constitution to prevent parliamentary opposition 
While the PAP's monopoly lasted, backbenchers were encouraged to supply 
"loyal opposition" to create an aura of political contestation within the 
Parliament proceedings, which are televised nationally (Chan 1985a, 82-3). 
The PAP's monopoly ended in 1981 when an opposition MP was elected in a 
by-election. The PAP was in a state of disbelief and considered it a "freak 
election. " To forestall further protest votes in the 1984 elections, the 2"d DPM 
Rajaratnam argued that: 
I 
The theory of democracy as opposition is founded ... on intellectual dishonesty.... No opposition enters the parliament to help a government 
govern well... Put bluntly, the role of an opposition is to ensure bad 
government (Asia Yearbook 1983 in Tremewan 1994,158). 
The PAP also wanted to woo citizens back by showing them that it was 
responsive to their needs for opposition. It conceded (to popular opinion) that 
an opposition might be desirable, not necessary (Tremewan 1994,159). In 
preparation for the 1984 elections, the PAP demonstrated its responsiveness to 
130 
citizens by amending the constitution to establish the Non-Constituency MP 
(NCMP) scheme. In the event that less than three opposition MPs were 
elected, this amendment would provide for the appointment of top three scoring 
opposition candidates as NCMPs. 
When the opposition gained an additional seat in the 1984 elections, 
registering the highest level of protest votes against the PAP since 1968, LKY 
felt so "coerced" by the electorate that, in the first hours after the election, he 
questioned the merits of the one-man-one-vote system, suggesting that it may 
be necessary"to try to put some safeguards into the way in which people use 
their votes to bargain, to coerce ... and get what they want" (Chua 1995,154- 
5). The NCMP scheme had obviously failed to stem the tide, its ineffectiveness 
further confirmed when the opposition spurned the offer of an NCMP seat to 
make up the minimum of 3 opposition MPs (Tremewan 1994,160). 
After the 1984 elections, the Feedback Unit was set up to facilitate 
consultation. Its ideological message was, again, that parliamentary opposition 
was unnecessary because the government was responsive to citizens. In 1987, 
LKY's son Hsien-Loong Lee launched the'National Agenda'to "enable all 
Singaporeans to participate in formulating the means of attaining the goals 
identified by the Government's Vision of 1999" (Quah in Tremewan 1994,161). 
This reveals the PAP's paternalism: even while trying to be open-minded, it 
attempted to mould citizens' desires by offering them assistance/tutelage to 
fulfil their national selves. By the 1990s, the Feedback Unit has come to be 
popularly joked of as the Feedback "black hole. " The government invites 
feedback but does nothing with it (at times, it explains why it cannot accept 
suggestions). Public mistrust became so intense that ministers had to prove 
that they had implemented some suggestions and to flag them in the media. 
These were some PAP strategies to keep liberal developments at bay. When it 
became clear that the opposition vote against the PAP had consolidated (at a 
consistent level of about 25%) despite the continuous use of anti-opposition 
election strategies (changing constituency boundaries, snap elections), the 
PAP realised it had to take more drastic measures. 
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Before the 1988 elections, the Constitution was again amended to create the 
Group Representative Constituency (GRC), Three or more constituencies may 
be grouped together into one GRC to raise the threshold of votes needed by 
the opposition to get elected into parliament in the first-past-the-post electoral 
system. Its aim was to 'dilute opposition votes with neighbouring constituencies 
which strongly support the PAP' (L. Lim 1989,184). The strong public reaction 
that GRC provoked compelled the PAP to come up with a more satisfactory 
justification than Asia's brand of democracy. The government then presented 
the GRC as a scheme to ensure minority representation. Although the 
government went to considerable lengths to convince the electorate, many 
minority citizens resisted being singled out ethnically. eo 
The Nominated MP (NMP) scheme was another constitutional amendment. 
NMPs are non-politicians nominated by the public and selected by a committee 
of elected MPs. The NMP scheme aimed to introduce non-political party 
contestation in Parliament, and "reduce the circulation of dissenting voices 
outside the official political sphere and agenda" (Tremewan 1994,171). 
In 1991, the PAP again amended the constitution to establish an Elected 
President (EP). It has been debated whether the EP is simply "a pragmatic 
move to safeguard national reserves81" or another "constitutional device to 
perpetuate PAP dominance" (K. Tan 1997,79). The EP would have the final 
say over the release of political detainees and has the power to veto almost 
any bills; no party would be able to govern without his co-operation. The 
creation of EP increased control by the executive (PAP's CEC) further; the 
President's executive actions were immuned from judicial review. The EP 
scheme indicated that it has become Imagine-able to the PAP that it may lose 
its parliamentary monopoly or majority. Should it happen, the EP scheme could 
so In my fieldwork, many minority interviewees - old and young - explicitly stated that 
they did not require a minister of their own race to represent them and that an MP from 
any minority is sufficient. 
81 On a per capita basis, Singapore's reserves are the highest in the world. Even then 
they are grossly understated (US$16.9 billion In 1988) because Singapore values its 
instruments at purchase price rather than at current value, e. g., gold at US$35 an 
ounce rather than current value of US$376 (Tremewan 1994,174). 
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help the PAP maintain power. The public distrusted the EP scheme and 
believed that the position was tailor"made'for LKY. Public reaction was so 
negative that LKY was forced to say that he would not "necessarily be the first 
EP" (Tremewan 1994,174/194). Despite negative public reactions, the bill was 
passed. 
It was clear that the EP was designed for a loyal PAP cadre in mind, someone 
who would not question Cabinet decisions. Teng-Cheong Ong, a faithful PAP 
ex-minister, won by a slim majority (over an unknown businessman) to become 
Singapore's first EP. While announcing his plans to retire in Aug 1999, he 
revealed that he had been "circumvented by some ministers and senior civil 
servants and treated as a nuisance when he asked too many questions" 
(SCMP 12/08/1999, http: //www. singapore-window. org/sw99/90812sc. htm). 
Despite the constitutional attempts to forestall parliamentary opposition, the 
opposition vote has consolidated at about 20 to 25%. The PAP's, near- 
monopoly appears to be pillared by anti-pluralist democratic practices, which 
allowed the PAP gain a disproportional number of Parliamentary seats. In 
1984, with about 63% of votes, the PAP gained 97% of total seats. In 1988, 
with 62% of votes, it gained 99% of total seats. Since the 1980s, Tommy Koh, 
Singapore's ambassador to the UN, advocated the merits of proportional 
representation (PR). I. e., with 20-25% of the vote, the opposition should have a 
quarter of the parliamentary seats. Support of PR has Increased due to the 
growth of a liberal middle class (de Cunha 1997, Gomez 2000) although it Is 
highly unlikely that the PAP would accept such a system. However, such social 
consciousness does give an Indication of the liberalist pressures that the PAP 
Is beginning to face. 0 
Ill. Extending the party through mass organisation 
Besides using legislation to penalise citizens into compliance, the PAP 
attempted to inscribe itself into everyday citizen life through mass organisation. 
The basic unit of the party is the party branch. There is one such unit in each 
electoral constituency, which may be served by sub-branches (Chan 1985bß 
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160). A community centre Is also provided for every 200 households 
(C. M. Seow 1985b, 177). The CCs were important for the PAP to reach out to 
citizens, to bring a sense of statehood and nationhood to citizens who would 
otherwise have no interest or identification with the party/government/state. 
Being of immigrant stock, many could not read. As such, radio and CCs (with 
televisions and officials who explained policies) were important channels of 
political communication and tools of nationalising the population. In 1970, LKY 
remarked that, 
In the early days, voluntary associations ... took place largely on the basis of common geographic and racial origin... It was only when these 
groups became rooted to Singapore permanently ... that new 
associations have emerged, which do not draw their membership on the 
basis of the districts or origin... The Community Center marks the 
beginning of this long process of identification with the country. 
With growing literacy, the top-down communication function of CCs faded and 
had to re-invent itself to remain relevant in the everyday life of citizens. The 
establishment of Residents Committee and later the Citizens' Consultative 
Committee represent. PAP's "experiment(s) at grassroot democracy; " each new 
scheme tried to establish a meaningful institutional link and to attract local 
participation (C. M. Seow 1985b, 186). Presently, CCs serve social and cultural 
needs, e. g., sports, tuition, childcare and cookery lessons. 
"Meet-The-People" sessions are organised routinely for MPs to deal with petty 
problems of the citizens and to placate their anxieties regarding state 
legislation, e. g., school entry, purchase of home. MPs are aware of the 
importance of this contact with the masses-it is an important way of 
neutralising potential dissent (Turnbull 1989,307), which may otherwise lead to 
withdrawal and alienation (C. M. Seow 1985b, 186) or anti-government 
whispering campaigns. Already, the Chinese-educated resent being drawn into 
the state system and felt discriminated because they do not speak English. 
As "nurser(ies) of citizenship" (Turnbull 1989,275), CCs are a material 
embodiment of the abstract idea of "statehood" in everyday life and are an 
important tool for consolidating and mobilising consent/acquiescence. CCs play 
such an important party function that the PAP admits that grassroots 
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Institutions should be distinctly "pro-party" and access to them should be 
denied to the opposition (Tremewan 1994,164; C. M. Seow 1985b, 190-1). This 
is because CCs 
accentuated the populace's dependence on a whole range of 
government agencies for services and facilities... people develop a 
strong stake in the continuing stability of the system since any major 
disruption on the status quo would ... affect... the supply of those 
services essential for daily living (C. M. Seow 1985b, 174). 
Having eliminated opposition, secured monopolistic control over state organs 
and having extended the party through mass organization, the PAP, as the sole 
representative of the nation, can now embark on the project of building a pro- 
party (economic and cultural) nation. 
4D. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM: BUILDING A MODERN ECONOMY-NATION 
Upon securing complete parliamentary power, the PAP Identified its most 
urgent goal as the creation of a modern economy. The PAP believed that, with 
proper employment and housing, racial riots and various political agitations 
would cease-improvements in standards of living (materially) would serve as 
a panacea for social-political ills. 
This assessment that economics (prosperity) would render politics irrelevant 
led the PAP to define its approach as pragmatic and supra-ideologically (Chua 
1995,57-60) and its goal as simply "national survival. " Far from being supra 
ideological, the PAP's rhetoric of "pragmatism" aimed to manage local labour 
and capital and build a particular modern economy-one that avoids state- 
welfarism and democracy (later described as Asian Capitalism and Asian 
Democracy). For Chan anddEvers (in Hill and Lian 1995,191): 
The pragmatism to which the national identity refers Is one of purposive 
rational action, one of means-end calculation, one of technology and 
science. Citizens are admonished to identify with the economic success of 
the state which demonstrates the correct policies have' been applied. As 
these policies are not based on an explicitly stated ideology nor even on 
purely political considerations, but on rational and scientific principles, any 
criticism of these policies can be branded as Irrational. The prestige of 
science and technology is used to buttress not only the day-to-day policies 
but also the social and political system resulting from such policies, because 
leaders will ask If such a system is not derived from the very principles of 
scientific and rational action. The supremacy of this pragmatic identity or 
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technocratic consciousness can thus be used to legitimised tight political 
control and eventually an authoritarian political system. 
I. Creating a national working class: taming and proletarising 
citizens 
To build a national economy, the PAP needed to create a national working 
class and "proletarise" immigrant-citizens (Tremewan 1994,49). This required 
that the masses be "uprooted from local communities, In order to become 
citizens - recognised as equal before the law - of an industrialising nation- 
state, housed in cities, taught in common schools, assembled in common 
workplaces, exposed to common mass media, meeting the common demands 
of economic growth and nation-building" (Kwok 1993,5). 
Following Marx's observations about the rise of capitalism, the PAP needed to 
dispossess citizens of their means of subsistence (especially land) so as to 
create a "reserve army" ready for capital exploitation. This process was 
achieved largely through the Land Acquisition Act (inherited and amended from 
British colonial rule), which empowered the government to acquire any land 
deemed necessary for national development, including acquisition on behalf of 
private developers; the rate of compensation of which was to be determined by 
the state (Chua 1995,130). Scholars suggest that unjust means were used to 
acquire land. For Chua (1995,131), the government legitimated its "illegal" 
actions by arguing that its goals of attracting foreign investments and of 
offsetting for British neglect, was necessary. Within these ideological 
paradigms, compulsory land acquisition for public housing could be carried out 
without apologies and even allowed the government to occupy the moral 
highground in terms of its commitment to the people. For those who were 
unconvinced by these ideologies, undisguised coercion was used. Tremewan 
(1994,47) noted that state demolition teams were often accompanied by police 
riot against farmers and rural dwellers who resisted, although public protests 
faded with the arrest of BS leaders in 1963. Citing George and Pugh, 
Tremewan (1994,47) reported that extended periods of passive resistance 
invited "fires of convenience; " serious fires broke out on several occasions 
when coincidentally, "few fire-engines would be available, the water pressure 
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would be low and the firefighters would have defective equipment and engage 
in 'rather odd target selection. "' 
However, dispossessing citizens of their means of production is insufficient. As 
Marx observes, "vagabonds" can always resist proletarisation and seek greener 
pastures. In Singapore, the fact that citizens are highly mobile Immigrants -a 
problem that persists to this day in the form of "brain drain82" - made the PAP 
realise very quickly that the strategy of dispossessing citizens by itself was 
counter-effective since deprived citizens could seek greener pastures. I. e., the 
creation of a modern economy and a national working class requires some 
form of nationalism or territorial identification - that people have a sense of 
belonging to the very land they are deprived of. The battle for citizens' national 
belongingness is an ongoing one. During his National Day Speech83 (Aug 
2001), PM Goh announced a new scheme to give Singaporeans a new stake in 
a new Singapore in the form of a "New Singapore Shares, " where, like previous 
counter-recession measures, wage increases were tobe tied to economic 
performance. 
For first-generation PAP leaders, economic identification with nation was to be 
achieved. materially through the creation of a "stakeholders' society" (and 
ideologically through the Singapore Dream, see later). The public housing and 
national pension schemes are especially important in creating such a nation. 
Singapore's public housing programme, which houses 85% of the population, 
is internationally commended. M This programme of forced resettlement or 
"forced suburbanisation" does not merely address the people's housing needs 
but also performs vital politrcal functions. By destroying traditional communities 
and networks of support, and by forcing citizens to give up their land to become 
82 The emigration of its local talents. At its worst In the mid 1980sß emigration rates 
were speculated to be as high as 12.5% (for a country with 3 million citizens). 
83 In an economic crisis, communitarian dimensions must become more dominant to 
sustain capitalism. His entire speech was an attempt to redistribute more to the 
working class while protecting capital interests. This scheme was praised and 
immediately studied by Hong Kong officials. 
84Many praise Singapore for having the highest home ownership rate In the world 
(http. //www. ncpa. org/studies/s198/s198. html). However, it should be remembered that 
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long-term tenants of public housing, proletarisation is made inescapable - 
citizens have no choice but to sell their labour to have a home. Besides making 
citizens dependent on the national economy, the public housing programme 
also gave citizens a stake in the nation, so that they do not become Individuals 
who have "nothing to lose by casting a protest vote" (Tremewan 1994,62). 
The Housing Development Board (HDB) exercised enormous power through 
controlling flat allocation. Because public housing promoted nuclear families 
(which is more conducive for producing a patriarchal, capitalist society, Cf. 
Chua 1995,115; Tremewan 1994,59-60), traditional kin and ethnic 
communities were fragmented and citizens were forced to re-build85 (imagined) 
community with multiracial86, non-kin strangers with whom the only common 
culture they share is nationality. These new communities aimed to disrupt the 
social bases of oppositional political organisations and encourage the 
emergence of a politically convenient balance of ethnic and working class 
communities (Y. Yeung 1973,14-15; Hua 1983,96; Minchin 1986,249). These 
new communities are also likely to be highly state-mediated since the PAP's 
community centres are the only public places in housing estates that people 
can gather and interact. 
The Central Provident Fund (CPF), a state pension scheme based on forced 
savings, linked domestic capital formation, forced housing and labour supply. 
Tremewan (1994,53-54) argued that because savings are deducted directly 
from the workers' wage, CPF is more accurately a scheme for "withholding 
wages. " The CPF forces workers to pay in advance to support themselves 
(housing, health care, pension, family responsibilities) so that workers continue 
to be consumers and not b6come dependent on future capital expenditure 
either by the state or the corporations. CPF was one among many schemes to 
the scheme heighten social inequality since working class citizens do not have access 
to freehold ownership but must re-buy their homes every 99 years. 
85 The sense of social alienation was extremely high; suicide rates soared (Tremewan 
1994,51). For more descriptive accounts, see Chapter 6C on the plight of the older 
Chinese-educated. 
86 To undermine any sense of neighbourhood identity based on ethnicity, inter-racial 
mixing is enforced through quotas for each of the three races in each block of public 
housing apartment. Owners may only sell their flats to a household that is not already 
racially over-represented in their block. 
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manage capital-labour relations. Over the years, the percentage contribution of 
worker and employer has increasingly tilted in favour of the employer. In 1955, 
workers and employers contributed equally (5%) to CPF. By the mid 1980s 
when the PAP was weakest, workers contributed 25% while employers 
contributed 10%. Presently, workers and employers each contribute 20% 
(http: //www. ncpa. org/studies/sl98/s198. html). For the working class, given the 
low level of state welfare support, the CPF Is the only practical means of 
providing for their retirement. Because the PAP-state control access to forced 
savings, citizens fear (whether rationally or not) that non-cooperation with the 
state's labour policies may jeopardises their future security. 
Capital-labour relations were also regulated by the 1968 Industrial Relations 
Act and the collective bargaining role of unions was further reduced with the 
establishment of the PAP-backed National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), 
which was tasked with promoting "good" Industrial relations. The NTUC was 
established in place of other unions as an umbrella organisation for labour 
organisations. The NTUC sought to avoid a'confrontational' relationship 
between labour and employers and establish 'mutual trust and co-operation' in 
its place. In 1968, unions were prohibited from strikes and lockouts through the 
Industrial Relations (Amendments) Act. Bargaining was also disallowed during 
the first 5 years of a new company's operation. Bargaining on behalf of the 
workers was left to the National Wage Council (set up in 1972) and the position 
of secretary general of NTUC eventually became a cabinet post (Tremewan 
1994,33). The 1982 Trade Union (Amendments) Bill further emphasised good 
industrial relations and broke large industrial unions down into 'house unions, ' 
thereby reducing the collective strength of labour (Chua 1995,61). 
ll. Subordinating local capital to foreign capital 
Besides regulating labour, high CPF rates (40% of net wage), along with rising 
wages, make Singapore the country with the world's highest savings- rate, 
(http: //www. ncpa. org/studies/s198/sl98. html) and provide a major source of 
capital for the government to undertake industrialisation, to the extent of 
competing with and dominating local capital. Having created and tamed a 
national working-class and having acquired a stable source of capital for its 
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economic projects, the PAP government, as the largest employer, is now able 
to mould the economy in a very particular way-one where, unlike the other 
Asian NIEs, there is little chance for a strong local capitalist class to emerge 
(theoretically a class important for its counter-hegemonic potential) and where 
"the PAP was able to sacrifice not only workers but also local capitalists to the 
greater competitive power of foreign capital" (Tremewan 1994,32) 
For Tremewan (1994,31), the subordination of local workers and bourgeoisie 
to foreign capital is a theme that underlies the PAP's economic visions at each 
stage of economic development. Between 1959 and 1965, the PAP advocated 
a strategy of a common market and political merger with Malaya to stimulate 
import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). ISI was based on an alliance with 
foreign capital after independence, which would allowed foreign capital to retain 
its interests and to profit from the acquisition of raw materials, low local wages 
and provision of technology and credit. 
The failure of a political and commercial merger with Malaya (after 1965) led 
the PAP to strive for export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) between 1965 and 
1978. This required the formation of a disciplined workforce, which coincided 
with the PAP's strategy to maintain its political dominance through capitalist 
expansion. The PAP's control over labour and its offer of major tax incentives 
to foreign investors successfully attracted foreign investment. However, 
Hamilton (1983,57/63) noted that in contrast to other Asian NIEs, EOI was 
undertaken almost exclusively through the inflow of direct foreign investment 
and-that "foreign capital has so overwhelmed indigenous firms that the latter 
has'played no role in most export industries and a small role In the rest. " 
The low-wage E01 strategy was so successful that it not only solved 
Singapore's unemployment problem, it created a labour shortage. Thus, from 
1979 to 1986, the PAP waged a Second Industrial Revolution to move out of 
low-wage, labour-intensive manufacturing to capital-intensive, higher value- 
added manufacturing. Again, MNCs were invited, which decimated budding 
local capital (Tremewan, 1994,36). Although productivity improved, escalating 
labour costs without sound technological upgrading and the failure of foreign 
140 
capital to transfer advanced technology to Singapore (two-fifths of Singapore's 
key decision making positions were occupied by non-Singaporeans) led to the 
failure of the Revolution and an economic recession in 1985. Noting 
Singapore's lack of technological expertise and PAP's weakening hegemony, 
the PAP realised the need to embark on a new economic strategy. 
The second-generation government envisioned the creation of "Singapore 
Inc= instead of completing the Second Industrial Revolution, the strategy 
shifted towards "technology-less industrialisation" or "ersatz capitalism, " 
towards developing Singapore as a service centre (middleman) for offshore 
exploitation (Yoshihara 1988,115-116). Singapore was to become an 
"internationalised" economy that exploits other ASEAN economies on behalf of 
Western capital (Mirza 1986,173/192/272). Ideologically, Singapore was 
represented as the "gateway to Asia, " as a native who was fluent in English and 
Asian-languages, a capable local guide for foreign capital as they navigate a 
complicated and corrupted but charming and cheap Asia. 7 
Through various reformulations, the imagined national economy remains 
unchanged-an "internationally competitive" capitalist economy through strong 
state leadership/influence over local labour and capital to create an 
environment that is attractive to foreign capital. Despite some deviations (social 
welfare), welfare is provided "in such a way as to maximise profitability and also 
control of workers" (Tremewan 1994,72) 8S 
By and large, the PAP-government had been very successful in achieving its 
goals of creating a modern, internationally competitive economy - for more 
than a decade, it had contetfided fiercely, and often emerged the world's freest 
economy, busiest port and best airline. However, these accomplishments 
required that it impoverishes and subordinates the interests of local proletariats 
e' E. g., (1) building an industrial park in Suzhou (China) to help foreign capital gain a 
foothold in China and (2) forming a Batam growth triangle with Malaysia and Indonesia 
to attract foreign investments (Cf. Kahn 1996,62). 
88Many Americans believe there is considerable social welfare in Singapore and are 
surprised when I argue that Singapore exhibits a rather "pure" form of capitalism. 
Singaporeans joke about Singapore being "Singapore INC" because they recognise 
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and bourgeoisie to foreign capital interest (Rodan 1989,210). Indeed, 
T. George (1973,8) goes so far as to argue that it is because Singapore is 
economically tied to foreign (Western) capital that LKY can afford to be "not 
dependent on populist appeal and free from the need to playto gallery. " 
George's observation that the PAP does not try to be popular echoes my 
analysis that the PAP has never been truly popular; it has always managed to 
marginalise opposition and successfully avoided contests based solely on 
popularity. That the PAP manages to maintain hegemony without popularity is 
a testimony of the PAP's leadership skills - how was it able to, time and again, 
to persuade citizens that unpopular coercive policies were beneficial and 
necessary and to convince citizens to consent on coercion? To this end, 
different generations of PAP leaders attempted to legitimise coercion and 
secure national identification on different imaginations of nation. First- 
generation leaders sought legitimacy and identification based upon economic 
nationalism (next'section) while second-generation leaders sought to 
supplement the PAP's economic legitimacy with cultural nationalism. 
Ill. Legitimating coercion: the myth of the fragile nation and the 
Singapore Dream 
Authoritarianism is made to seem necessary and beneficial for citizens through 
a conflation of party survival with national and personal survival. The PAP's 
legitimacy crucially relies on the meta-myth that Singapore needs the PAP to 
survive, which requires the perpetuation of other myths and dreams. 
The most common myth is Singapore as a fragile nation. In any information 
booklet about Singapore, Singapore is described as a small English-speaking 
multiracial city-state with no natural resources. This connotes that Singapore is 
highly susceptible to racial unrest, global economic trends and Western values. 
Together with historical accounts of Singapore's reluctant national birth, what is 
emphasised is the infirm boundary and status of Singapore as a nation-state, 
which heightens Singapore's fragility as a nation. Told daily, the moral of this 
that social welfare are extended only to workers, not to citizens. "Social welfare" is more accurately "company benefits. " 
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story/myth is that a co-operative people is Singapore's only economic resource 
and hope for survival. 
Singapore's fragility finds relief in the PAP's capabilities. Historically, 
throughout political upheavals, LKY has been mythologised as "the Father of 
Singapore", a self-sacrificing hero who took the burden of independence 89 
without whom there would not be Singapore. Together with its impeccable 
image of incorruptibility, these myths install the PAP as the guardian of the 
nation. 
While the myth of the fragile nation legitimised coercive policies and allowed 
the PAP to successfully appeal to citizens for national sacrifices, the process of 
creating a successful capitalist economy is not complete until workers have 
been ingrained with a competitive mentality and desire to constantly upgrade 
their social situation and skills. 
This was what the Singapore Dream campaign sought to do - to ingrain a 
desire to "succeed" -a metaphor for a spirit of capitalism. E. g., Malays were 
highlighted as a problematic group not because they were not willing to work 
hard but because they lacked the spirit of capitalism - they preferred to be 
hardworking low-paid gardeners than exploited waiters (Alatas 1977,168). 
Despite Singapore's fragility, citizens are encouraged to dream the Singapore 
Dream of material prosperity. A media-led campaign, the Singapore Dream 
was given a catchy formulation as the "5Cs" (car, credit, cash, condominium, 
career) and was later inspired a similarly titled Mandarin soap serial. The 
Singapore Dream captured'the public's imagination and created a strong 
national consensus about the type of society "the people" wanted, provided a 
language and framework (e. g., social expectations) that guided social, inter- 
personal interactions and inscribed a certain preferred reading/code of moral- 
conduct. 
89 Even though the PAP believed independence to be unviable and discouraged It. 
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The Singapore Dream institutionalised a spirit of competitiveness ("Confucian 
work ethic") that enables the reproduction of a particular (Asian) capitalism. To 
be interpellated into the Dream, citizens must accept Its premise that everyone 
has a chance, i. e., that there is equality and meritocracy. Immigrant-citizens 
found it easy to identify with these values. 90 Having little expectations of welfare 
and being self-reliant, achievements and failures were attributed to Individual, 
not systemic factors. Hoping that their children will be able to secure the 
Dream, no sacrifice (coercive policies) was considered too great. Additionally, 
the "5Cs" are status symbols whose consumption Is highly regulated and taxed 
(especially car and private property in land-scarce Singapore). To 
achieve/maintain the Dream, citizens must remain unceasingly competitive. 
The "5Cs" are typically prestige items with high investment and re-sale values, 
e. g., property, career and education, which are not ends in themselves but 
investments for greater financial reward. In this way, the "5Cs" creates, 
simultaneously, instant and (partially) delayed gratification. This has been 
described as a feature of Asian capitalism. Lian (2001) observes that it is 
unusual that a high-income city-state like Singapore with a per capita income of 
US$23,000 saves excessively and exhibits an abnormally low level of private 
consumption. In 2000, "Singapore's abnormally high savings rate results in a 
whopping gross national savings to GNP ratio of 52% and a paltry private 
consumption to GDP ratio of 39%. Such a low consumption ratio is usually 
found in war-torn economies. " 
Recognising that education was the key to achieving the "5Cs", parents 
supported the government's plan to "develop every child's economically useful 
capabilities to the full" (Turntull 1989,301) - such as not speaking dialects to 
their children (Chapter 5). The British and Confucian tradition of ritualistic, 
instrumental exams provided an avenue for the general disciplining of workers 
and contributed to the emergence of a society based on certification (Chua 
1995,66/111-113). Standard exams also provided a platform for embedding of 
80 Chua (1998) argues that Singaporeans, as immigrants, have never been strangers 
to modernisation and have been adaptable to each period of change in the 
modernisation trajectory because of the absence of a 'pre-colonial', traditional or tribal 
culture. 
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the ideology of meritocracy since failure was to be explained by personal rather 
than structural factors. Students are also streamed from age nine to distinguish 
leaders from workers and the various grades of workers. There was also an 
attempt to practice antenatal streaming (Tremewan 1994,114) through the 
Graduate Mother Scheme -explaining low-achievement genetically, LKY 
wanted to use tax incentives to encourage graduate women and to encourage 
lesser-educated women to have lesser children. 
The Singapore Dream appears to be so successful that it has filtered into 
commonsense. It is no longer articulated officially but constitutes the tacit 
agenda behind the struggle to remain internationally competitive. Citizens are 
quick to pick up on the quickest path to the Dream whenever the government 
envisions the future of the economy. For one interviewee, "when the 
government announced more engineers are needed, everyone wants to 
become an engineer the next day. " The Singapore Dream, by fusing personal 
desire and national goals, makes the PAP's coercive policies appear essential 
for national-personal survival. By encouraging citizens to dream a Dream that 
only the PAP can bring to bear, authoritarianism, as a package deal, is 
rendered tolerable, even necessary. 
4E. THE PRICE OF SUCCESS 
By the 1980s, the PAP was at its peak of. self"confidence. It had centralized 
control of agencies with political potential (trade union, media, community-- 
centers, etc. ); its leadership had brought about an "economic miracle. " Yet, It 
was at this point that the PAP faced a legitimacy crisis. The 1980 elections 
marked the high-water mark of the party's hegemony. In a 1981 by-election, its 
parliamentary monopoly was broken; in the 1984 elections, its total votes 
declined 12% to 64%. 
This situation - of losing hegemony when it was most economically successful 
- has been described as "the price of success. " With prosperity, Fukuyama's 
"end of history" thesis threatens to come true. As Singapore moved towards 
late-capitalism, contradictions in the logic of capitalism threatened to tear 
society asunder (ideologically). Indeed, the PAP's hegemony was so 
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challenged that the PAP admitted that opposition may become a regular 
feature of post-1980s politics and measures were taken to subordinate or 
contain, rather than eliminate, dissent. 
The mid 1980s saw the maturing of a new generation of citizens. The 1980 
census showed that more than 78% of the population were Singapore-born 
(Turnbull 1989,319); they had no war experience, were likely to be better 
educated, more exposed to Western ideas and have the desire to "try 
something new. " l. e., the government "just can't always be telling them to 
compare their situation to that of the 50s and ask them to be grateful" 
(ST19/9/1984). 
Prosperity led to stratification along class and ethnic lines; the Singapore 
Dream became irrelevant for some (middle-class liberals) and Inaccessible for 
others (working class, Malays). They made liberal demands on the government 
(to compromise the logic of capitalism): to provide welfare for the poor and to 
allow more democracy for the middle-class. The discourse of "Singapore Inc" 
arose to describe how citizens perceive their relation to their government - as 
workers, units of labour, "baby factories 9'" Emigration of local talents, or "brain 
drain, " was also at its peak92 and the government became frustrated at losing 
its most valuable workers. 
The PAP's alienation from the people was also caused by party arrogance and 
stagnation. With strong leaders, subordinates developed a habit of "following 
instructions. " A second-generation leader admitted that: 
I sleep well knowing that if something goes terribly wrong, the PM Is 
there to take care ofvthe situation... This is the same feeling held by 
other ministers of the second generation" (Vasil 1984,151). 
Without political competition, the PAP grew arrogant and did not care to be 
popular or accountable. Dhanabalan, a PAP minister, asserted that, "there are 
certain key institutions in Singapore that must be beyond reproach - 
parliament, courts and so on" (Tremewan 1994,165). In fact, the PAP prides 
91 A common response to the Graduate Mother Scheme. 
9212000 migrants in a population of 3 million in 1987 
(httpJ/www. unesco. org/most/apmrnwl3. htm). 
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itself on being a government who does not "bend to popular opinion" (Turnbull 
1989,308; Vasil 1984,151). LKY was aware of his party's unpopularity but was 
"unrepentant: " 
I have often been accused of interfering with private lives... I say without 
the slightest of remorse... we would not have made economic progress 
if we did not intervene on very personal matters - who your neighbour 
is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language 
you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people think. 
That's another problem. (LKY, National Day Rally 1986). 
Chin-Chye Toh, a founding father of the PAP and now an unwelcomed 
dissident said: "We have no check on the use of power, the major issue here is 
centralisation of power in the hands of those who have been In power too long, 
but not long enough for people to realise It" (Paul 1992,11). Safety valves for 
institutional criticisms were also closed due to a "voluntary abdication of power 
by the electorate. " Over time, dissent was muffled and driven out of the 
parliament unto the streets (Chan 1985a). 
The degree of the PAP's alienation from the people is indicated by their 
disbelief in the 1984 election results (the opposition secured 37% of votes and 
PAP votes declined 12%), to the extent of calling it a "freak election. " 
"Accustomed to the euphoria of applause of the early days, old leaders reacted 
with excessive sensitivity to domestic and external criticism" (Turnbull 1989, 
326-327); LKY felt so coerced by the electorate that he questioned the merit of 
the "one-man-one-vote" system. This election shock brought about an intense 
realisation that dramatic measures had to be implemented, including the early 
retirement of LKY and other first-generation ministers, a lowering of the PAP 
benchmark of electoral success to 60% (Milne and Mauzy 1990,75), and 
"safeguards into the way in#which people use their votes to bargain, to 
coerce... and get what they want" (Vogel 1989,195). 
Besides safeguarding electoral and political processes, the PAP attempted to 
find a new consensus and middle-ground to unite the. nation. There were 
attempts to retain its economic ideology based on the Singapore Dream. The 
PAP realised that regardless of economic performance, citizens must be 
persuaded that the PAP is Singapore's best/only option (for economic survival). 
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The ideological challenge was then to keep the Dream alive for all, since it is 
the belief in the Dream, rather than its accomplishment, that is the foundation 
of the PAP's economic legitimacy. 
For those lacking in the qualifications to dream, the Dream must be sustained 
by a belief in meritocracy, by a belief that if not them, then their children can 
achieve it. The government also embarked on campaigns to encourage these 
citizens to lower their expectations. For those overqualified to dream the 
Dream, the challenge was to prolong the relevance and primacy of economic 
goals. The ceiling of what constitutes "necessity" was raised, thereby delaying 
the moment when non-basic dreams (i. e., non-"bread and butter, " non- 
economic dreams) such as democracy becomes relevant. 
Ultimately, the PAP's attempt to find ideological unity was undercut by a more 
fundamental problem: in building a modern economy and society, the PAP, 
through encouraging "rugged individualism, " had over-legitimated individualistic 
discourses. The over-emphasis on pragmatism also created social problems: 
abandoned aged parents, decreased birth rates, the alarming percentage of 
career-minded women who were not marrying or having children. 
As long as citizens feel they have the rights to act "pragmatically" in their self- 
interests, it would be impossible to find a national consensus. Since these 
problems were by-products of capitalist success, and the PAP government was 
unwilling to dilute the ethic of competitiveness (the logic of capitalism) or 
compromise its goal of capitalist development, the only option was to 
implement an ideological solution. While retaining the ethic of competitiveness, 
the PAP must simultaneously introduce a supplementary counter-individualistic 
(communitarian) ethic to channel away excessive individualism. This is 
precisely the aim of the Asian Values project. 
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Chapter 5 From citizens to Singaporeans 
Cultural nationalism in the second generation 
"Singapore Is Lee Kwan Yew, SIA (Singapore 
Airlines), Telecoms, but that's the government, for 
goodness sake, not the people! " 
(Head of psychological defence, in Gwee 1987,27). 
5A. THE NECESSITY AND DIFFICULTY OF IMAGINING A NATION 
1. Nationalism as a new basis of legitimacy for the PAP 
The first generation leaders' "stakeholders' society" policy of giving Immigrants 
a material stake in, Singapore so that they will stay on as citizens resulted In 
utilitarian and materialistic bonds between citizens and the state, rather than 
bonds of solidarity and patriotism (Hill and Lian 1995,218). National pride was 
based economic development (compared with neighbouring countries). By the 
end of its rule in the mid 1980s, the first-generation PAP government realised 
that pragmatic immigrant-citizens did not hesitate to move to greener pastures 
and Singapore was faced with a severe "brain drain. " Even ministers were 
willing to migrate "if the price is right" (Cotton 1993,12). The government 
wondered whether the next recession would trigger a mass migration. 
Realising that any further attempts to build an economic nation would only 
promote utilitarian citizenship, but realising that the scale of migration called for 
urgent measures, the new second-generation government simultaneously 
pursued a two-pronged approach. In the short term, it tried to "make Singapore 
the best home. " To this end, the second-generation PAP government was 
highly successful - Singapgre was ranked by Fortune magazine (1996) as the 
world's third best city for work and living, after Toronto and London 
(http: //mita. gov. sg/speech/speeches/v2On6002. htm). However, this was 
insufficient because such pride and citizenship is temporary and conditional 
upon Singapore remaining the world's best home. Ultimately, the PAP- 
government would have to embark on projects of cultural nationalism so that 
citizens no longer think of themselves as workers in "Singapore Inc. " but as an 
imagined, organic community that they belonged to. 
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Internationally, there are also benefits for Singapore In representing Itself as a 
cultural entity and not merely an economy. Marriott (1963,27) points out that 
"no state, not even an infant one, is willing to appear before the world as a bare 
political frame. Each would be clothed in a cultural garb symbolic of its alms 
and ideal being. " Lane (in Lai 1995,180-181) notes that the eagerness to 
establish national/cultural identity is "more pronounced in newly formed 
societies with one-party system in which a ruling elite pursues clearly defined 
goals. " Claiming cultural difference could serve to silence Western criticism of 
the non-democratic nature of one-party statehood. 
Nationalism is useful for governing because it is able to transform a state 
community that suffers the same system of coercion (Weber 1946,78) into an 
imagined community where citizens have affective bonds. As an "administrative 
state" (Chan 1985a, 74) whose rule was based on legislation/coercion, the PAP 
sorely needed such a transformation to woo politically alienated citizens. 
In order to take into account this transformative power of nationalism, the 
nation should be seen not only as an imagined community (Anderson 1983), 
but specifically, as one that has forgotten that its shared culture is constituted 
by its shared system of coercion. This conceptualisation of nation allows 
different theoretical camps to be bridged. 
On one hand, nationalism is seen as an expression of the essence of nation 
(Breuilly 1982), as constituted through the will/belief of individuals. For Renan 
(1994,18), the essence of the nation is the moral conscience of a group, or the 
willingness of its members to sacrifice themselves for the community. For 
Weber (1994,22), a nation'requires that members share a common myth of 
descent. Anderson (1983) also emphasises the subjective lateral bonds 
between citizens. 
A second camp sees nation as more than a product of subjective will. Giddens 
(1994,34-35) holds the most polar, statist and anti-subjective definition of 
nation-the nation is a `bordered power-container' administered by a state with 
a formalised monopoly over the means of violence within its territory. For Stalin 
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(1994,20), "a nation is a ... stable community of people, formed on the 
basis of 
a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup. " 
Deutsch (1994,27) argues that a nation is held together by its members' 
communication; "nationhood" is shaped by the community's "communicative 
efficiency and facilities. " This is not unlike Andersen's thesis where the printing 
press is a condition of emergence for nations. Deutsch observes additionally 
that nations are characterised not by lateral bonds of solidarity between 
citizens, but also by a centralised communication link. Connor (1994,45) 
distinguishes between nation and ethnicity: a nation is a self-aware, and often 
politicised, ethnic group. This implies that a nation requires some form of 
centralised co-ordination, a well-defined sense of boundary andcentre. 
A nation may be subjectively real but it is also centrally administered by the 
state. Thinking of nationalism as the transformation of a state community Into a 
nation allows the two camps to be bridged. It also allows us to see the benefits 
of nationalist projects and understand why the PAP wants a new basis of 
legitimacy. National values, if internalised by citizens, encourage the 
development of governmentality, or self-governing citizens (Foucault 1979). 
Once a citizen has internalised national values, he can endlessly discipline 
himself and others, allowing state myths becomes citizen beliefs and state 
morality becomes privatised as personal ethics. 
ll. Difficulties in Imagining a Singaporean nation 
Language, ethnicity and religion are common building blocks that states use to 
construct nations. However, these standard recipes for the construction of 
national identity failed in Singapore. -By exploring the paths that Singapore 
could not take, many assumptions about what constitute "nation" and "culture" 
are exposed. 
Almost every theorist considers nation to be (ideally) constituted by the 
common culture of citizens, whether this be "daily plebiscite" (Renan 1994,17), 
"common myth of descent" (Weber 1994,22) or a "common economic life" and 
"common psychological makeup" (Stalin 1994,20). The interesting question is 
whether common culture can be said to exist in Singapore. 
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National/common culture needs a stable community. Singapore was and 
remains an immigrant society with no stable community. 93 At the moment of 
independence in 1965, the bulk of its citizens were immigrants who had every 
intention of returning to their homeland. Singapore represents Itself as lacking 
in natural and human resources. To survive Singapore has to be internationally 
competitive. I. e., Singapore "should" import global/"foreign talents" when 
necessary (about 20% of the workforce is foreign) and not be protectionist 
towards its citizens. Citizens joke about Singapore being Singapore INC. (run 
by PAP bosses) rather than a home; poet Tzu-Pheng Lee likens Singapore to a 
hotel that "makes the tourist feel at home. " PM Goh even quotes a popular 
joke: "Singapore wants to be global? Okay, I'll leave. " 
Can an elastic, non-stable community have a common culture? Was there 
common culture in immigrant Singapore? Anthropologists (Clammer 1985; 
Benjamin 1976) argue that there had always been colonial and coolie 
(indentured labour) "cultures. " However, the PAP, despite claiming to be anti- 
colonial, hold the elitist perception that only high culture can count as national 
culture and finding an absence of high Asian cultures in Singapore, proclaimed 
Singapore to be a "cultural desert" and looked to Western cultures to civilise 
Singapore's national self. Unlike countries like Indonesia. who can claim a 
glorious revolutionary (anti-colonial) past, Singapore could not. Colonialism, 
Japanese occupation (WW2), a failed merger with Malaysia and a peaceful 
handover of power from the British (with no anti-colonial resistance) were all 
too embarrassing a past. 
Nationalist sentiments are strengthened by defining the national self against an 
other. Lacking in resources, Singapore survives on its skills as a middleman 
and is highly dependent on the co-operation and supply of others. As such it 
cannot try to raise nationalist sentiments through defining itself against a well 
defined other. Border skirmishes are always "life-threatening"-Malaysia's 
threat to cut off the water supply never fails to cause a national panic. When a 
9315% have considered emigrating, 20% of the workforce is foreign, emigration rate 
reached 16000 out of 3 million population (1989). 
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Filipino maid was sentenced to death, other Filipinos maids working In 
Singapore resigned, almost causing a national crisis. Instead the PAP Identifies 
opposition politicians as its others. However, such a strategy is not always In 
the PAP's favour because citizens do sympathise with the opposition. 
Common culture is also assumed to be homogenous/shared by all. Tilman 
(1987,154) observed that, "geography, history, language and culture have all 
conspired against the countries of ASEAN to make their task of nation-building 
and economic development more difficult. " Given the violent racial conflicts in 
the 1950s and 1960s, assimilating all immigrant groups Into one homogenised 
ethnicity was impossible. Nationalising "Chinese values" would be politically 
dangerous since the Chinese were immigrants in a predominately Malay 
Muslim region. Even without ideological prominence, the Chinese in Malaysia 
and Indonesia were cautious that their financial dominance would Incur the 
violent envy of native Malays. A Singapore nation based upon minority "Malay 
values" has more claims to authenticity (or indigeny) and In fact, is adopted 
rhetorically to placate Malays in the region. Malay is Singapore's "national 
language" but English is its "working language. " Singapore students sing the 
national anthem in Malay every morning during flag-raising, albeit without 
'strong emotions' (ST26/7/91). A Malay national culture would alienate the 
Chinese majority and is unlikely to be supported by the Chinese-dominated 
PAP government. 
The most homogenous image the PAP government could conceive of was a 
multicultural model based on the three major homogenised ethnicities left over 
from colonial rule (Purushotam 1995, Ang and Stratton 1997): - Chinese, Malay, 
Indian and Others (CMIO). tingapore's multi-racialism is a rigid one where 
mixed ethnicity is not recognised- citizens were either Chinese, Indian, Malay 
or Others. In schools, "mother tongue" is not the first language learnt, nor the 
language spoken by one's mother or father, but the language defined by the 
ethnicity of the father. Singapore's multi-racialism is also rigid in that it is not 
allowed to find its own racial equilibrium-a "significant" Chinese majority 
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(Chiew 1990a, 11) must be maintained at all costs, even if artificially through 
immigration sa 
By the mid 1980s, a bottom-up culture did emerge based upon Singlish, a 
hybridisation of English and local languages and dialect. However, because the 
government desired a pure common culture, Singlish was banned from TV and 
radio as "bad English. " Singapore tried to escape Impurity and hybridity (and 
multiracialism) with Asian values. Multi-racialism (e. g., bilingualism and 
religious knowledge (RK) project) failed because it emphasised racial 
distinctiveness rather than national commonness. The ideology of "Asian 
values" was thought to be supra ethnic, thus having the potential to unite 
Singapore as a nation rather than divide it into ethnicities. However, "Asian 
values" was also too vague (Asia is extremely diverse, culturally) and was 
useful only against the West, not within Singapore. 
Ang and Stratton (1997,12-14) note, "Singapore's desperate attempt to 
escape, at least at the official level, its hybrid fate, the perceived curse of its 
impurity. " "In its very conception Singapore's national Self cannot escape the 
tension created by [Western-Asian]-binary. It is a tension which cannot be 
resolved precisely because Singapore's national identity depends on it. " This 
produces extreme anxiety about its identity and concerns about pollution 
(Clammer 1985,165). Unable to imagine itself as an organic nation with a 
homogenous (ethnic) culture, Singapore constructs its identity upon its lack-it 
see itself as a problematic nation whose national identity is projected into the 
future. 
Paradoxically, while the 'Asian' heritage of each race is located in the past, 
Singapore's national 'Asian-ness' is projected into the future, something which 
in the present needs to be constantly struggled for. Increasingly, these 
struggles are fought over in the media. While bilingualism and the religious 
knowledge projects were predominately located in the sphere of education, 
Shared Values approximated to the status of a "pure ideological exercise; " it 
94Singapore kept an open door to wealthy Hong Kong citizens who were worried 
about the 1997 handover. 
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was strictly a media project un-translated (and some would argue, 
untranslatable-able) Into statues, acts and policies. As noted by Schiller (1989, 
30), the media industries today serve as "sites for the creation, packaging, 
transmission, and placement of cultural messages" and "they have greatly 
grown as their importance and centrality to the corporate economy increases. 
J. Thompson (1990) describes this as the "mediazation of cultures" - the way in 
which symbolic forms have become increasingly mediated by 
mass 
communications. Understanding how important the media is for the 
construction of national identity, and realising that non-Western societies are 
constantly inundated with Western media products, the Singapore government 
embarked on a strenuous media project to, defend Singapore against 
Westernisation and to promote its own values and way of life. 
5B. TOOLS FOR NATION-BUILDING 
While the first-generation leaders relied heavily on legislation ("administrative 
state"), second-generation leaders aimed to Influence behaviour through ISAs. 
The MITA was set up to co-ordinate psychological defence. E. g., while the 
Ministry of Health teaches children to brush their teeth, it is MITA who is 
responsible for changing perception of dental health. While the Ministry of 
Education is tasked with romanising Mandarin, it Is MITA's task to prepare 
citizens to accept this change. In all these campaigns, the MITA and the media 
are important partners. 
Although the government does not own the media, the MITA and its statutory 
boards have extensive power over media organisations. The print media is 
managed directly by MITA. Through a process of centralisation since the 
1980s, the Singapore Press-Holdings owns most of the nation's print media. 
Such centralisation allows for easier, centralised government control with an 
expansion of the role of the Public Relation Officer (PRO) of each Ministry and 
Statutory board. While Singapore's Constitution provides the right to freedom 
of speech and expression, the Parliament can limit these rights for the sake of 
protecting public interest and morality. 
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The Newspapers and Printing Presses Act of 1974 is the dominant law 
affecting the press. The Act requires newspapers and magazines to renew their 
licences annually. In 1986, the Act was amended to empower the minister to 
restrict the circulation of publications that "engage in domestic politics" (Kuo 
and Ang 2000,407). Since then, the 1986 Act has been used to terminate or 
gazette (limit circulation) a few foreign publications. The Undesirable 
Publication Act prohibits the circulation of publications "contrary to public 
interest. " 
The Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA) supervises broadcast media. 
Radio broadcasting was dominated by Radio Corporation of Singapore and 
grew speedily when faced with foreign competition (Indonesian/Batam station 
"Zoo" in 1988). Stations changed their styles and imported DJs, speedily 
increasing the popularity of radio. There are now more than 18 radio private 
and public radio channels (P. Ang 1998,160; D. Birch 1993,30)., 
Over the years, broadcast media have been increasingly privatised and the co- 
ordination between national policy and broadcast media has become less 
direct. Television broadcasting used to be supervised by the ministries but in 
1980, was separated from the government as Singapore Broadcasting 
Corporation (Kuo and Chen, 1983) and later privatised-as Television 
Corporation of Singapore, owned by the Singapore International Media 
Holdings. A public service, called Channel 12, provides 2 channels dedicated to 
minorities, sports and the arts. Privatisation purported yielded "considerable 
improvements" (in quantity and quality) - viewership for prime time English TV 
programmes rose 38% while radio audiences grew by 11-28% (McDaniel 1994, 
168). Supporting the government's plans to make Singapore a regional hub, 
the television industry increased local productions. 
There is also an influx of cable and satellite programmers since 1993. The 
Singapore CableVision is already broadcasting more than 40 channels, 
although each channel has to be government approved. By 1998, the SBA 
licensed some 26 satellite broadcasters to broadcast from Singapore. Despite 
the desire to go regional/International, satellite dishes are banned and allowed 
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only for financial Institutions. (P. Ang 1998,160-161). Cable television and 
Internet are also merging as Singapore achieved the target of wiring all 
750,000 households for cable television by 2000 ahead of schedule. Cable 
television represents a wider project to wire the island for the Information Age. 
Singapore has four satellite earth stations that does not only provide uplink and 
downlink services but also production and distribution services, thanks to a high 
degree of digitalisation that brought ISDN connections to more than 10,000 
subscribers (Kuo and Ang 2000,415). 
The SBA's regulation of the Internet ("Class Licensing Scheme") has been 
contradicted and mellowed by Singapore's desire to become a global IT hub 
(ST18/3/1995). Unwilling to wield a heavy hand, the government encouraged 
citizens to perform psychological defence, or self-censorship. The private 
sector (parents and the media industry) was told to shoulder the moral 
responsibility of censoring (ST8/3/1986) so that the SBA can oversee the 
Internet with a "light-handed approach" (ST25/10/97). 
Besides overseeing the media, MITA and its posted PROs in ministries and 
statutory boards also actively "cultivate" journalists. Baksh (1987,14) observed 
that government PROs have become "more responsive to the needs of the 
media. " They "no longer regard the media as a nuisance to be tolerated but an 
important and natural ally in their communication with the public. " 
The government also exerts influence through the market. The advertising 
market has expanded vigorously since 1980, to US$800 million in 1997 (Kuo 
and Ang 2000,408). Named "campaign country" (Peters 1989,22), 
advertisement agencies acknowledge government departments are "stalwart 
advertisers" known for polished and award-winning work. Annually, at least S$1 
million is spent promoting National Day songs each year. According to the 
Head of Psychological Defence, these songs are important tools. of 
psychological defence. By "captur[ing] the feeling of that moment, " they 
succeed in getting citizens to "put [their] hearts, [their] minds and [their] skills to 
our defence" (Gwee 1987,26). 
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Over the years, campaign strategies have become more sophisticated. 
G. Thompson (1974,28) noted that LKY's technique of not using slogans but 
keynote words (e. g., clean, gracious, rugged) makes it easy for government 
ideology to diffuse into common vocabulary: 
As we used these words of congenial association, their familiarity brings 
conforming actions. It is interesting to see how, just by the use of such 
simple proto-type concepts, the people have appreciated, adopted and 
acted them. There Is a purposive use of the media. Communication Is 
not a gimmick; it is not an emotional bath a people take from time to 
time. 
Culture minister Dhanabalan, in the 1980s, recognised the need for campaigns 
to be persuasive without the benefit of legislative support. Gwee (1987,25-26) 
and Peters (1989,24) observed that hard-sell approaches reminiscent of the 
early years ("Don't Litter. Fine $500") have given way to the soft-sell 
approaches directed at private issues (e. g., marriage, toilet behaviour). E. g., 
the campaigns to match-make graduates do not make explicit statements but 
show a boy-meet-girl situation with a voiceover: "it's just an introduction, the 
rest is up to you. " 
I. Media penetration and challengee5 
To understand the reach of government campaigns, it is necessary to know 
how much the media has penetrated everyday citizen life. Living in an urban 
environment with high English-literacy (93% in 2000) and economic prosperity, 
Singaporeans are ardent media users highly exposed to (English language) 
foreign media. Despite having the smallest population in Asia, it is the largest 
single-country market for the FEER and the second largest market for the 
AWSJ. 
8 major dailies (3 English, 3 Mandarin, 1 Malay, 1 Tamil) share a total 
circulation of 1,197,301 per day in year 2000, with English language papers 
commanding more than 50% of the circulation. Circulation averages 32.4 per 
100 population, ranking Singapore as the highest in Southeast Asia (Kuo 1993, 
243; Gunaratne 1998,22). Radios and televisions are popular and practically 
universal, with 73.9% radio receivers and 22.4% television receivers in 2000. 
95 For a comparison of media indicators in Asia, see Appendix 7. 
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Within Asia, Singapore also has the highest volume of computers and Internet 
hosts per capita. Singapore Is a nation of enthusiastic computer users. 30% 
have PCs, a rate comparable only to the USA (New Scientist 25/3/1995,38- 
39). Singapore was the first in the world to use optical fibres in commercial 
telecommunications network and is only behind Japan In the production of hard 
disc for PCs. 
Although Singapore has developed one of the most advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure in Asia, its faces many challenges to its 
aspirations to become and IT centre. With the highest per capita cinema 
attendance, Singapore should constitute a significant advertising market, if not 
for its small and linguistically fragmented population. 
Secondly, the goal of becoming and IT hub requires that Singapore remain 
open to Western technologies and ideas. Kuo and Ang (2000,418) observed 
that the government has tried to manage contradictions by separating different 
categorises of information and treating them differently. This strategy of 
"compartmentalisation" (financial versus political) is reflected in the current 
policy of granting permits for setting up satellite antennae to financial 
institutions96 on the basis that they need such information to make themselves 
internationally competitive. 
However, "compartmentalisation" remains based on a strategy of censorship, 
which is fast becoming untenable with rapid Internet expansion. LILY, in a 
landmark speech at the Asian Media Conference in 1998, spoke of the need to 
develop new strategies of managing information without suppressing dissent: 
lamented that inforncation technology... has made it impossible for 
inconvenient news to be suppressed for long. Thus, governments have 
to work with the technology, not suppress it. 
It is precisely the need to control without suppressing dissent that leads the 
PAP to embark on the Asian Values project. Instead of "compartmentalising" or 
96 In 1991, financial institutions incurred losses because, without satellite, they learned 
of the Gulf War 30 seconds late. 
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suppressing dissent, the PAP looked to the Asian value of communitarianism - 
the subordination of personal difference to community interests - to maintain 
one-party dominance by allowing ideological diversity without fragmentation. 
5C. THE VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF ASIAN VALUES 
1. The meaning of "Asian Values" 
Fears of Westernisation emerged as early as 1965 (Hill and Lian 1995,82) and 
sharpened significantly with the PAP's electoral decline in the mid 1980s. The 
PAP's economic performance no longer awed a freedom-loving post-war 
generation born into material prosperity. Given that Singapore's working 
language was English, which made it more "soft-shelled" to Western influences 
(Pakir 1993,82), prevailing social and political problems such as "individualism" 
and "liberal attitudes" were readily attributed to "Western" influences. Having 
identified an enemy, the government can now rouse citizens to participate in 
Singapore's total defence - military, economic, social, civil and psychological. 
However, until the Michael Fay incident in 1994 where an American teenager 
was canned for vandalism, AV had little popular currency and had been 
perceived as the government's project against the West, not the people's 
concern. With this Incident, Western values became associated with lax 
standards of social discipline (punishment of crime) and citizens begin to see 
the relevance of AV in their lives and the need to be "cultural soldiers" in the 
"total defence" of Singapore against Western Values. 
By the PAP's own admission that the problems it faced were side effects of 
success, these social problems are more accurately materialisation of 
ideological contradictions than Western problems that require Asian solutions. 
"Individualism" is a logical consequence of runaway pragmatism and 
competitive instrumental rational ity-qualitiesassociated with the Asian work 
ethic. 
Two developments influenced how AV was to be reformulated. Firstly, having 
succeeded in altering economic and work attitudes among the proletariat, the 
second-generation government's nation-building project now required that it 
intrude into citizens' private sphere to mould their lifestyle choices - e. g., to 
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flush toilets, to have three babies, to marry early, to choose to be a teacher. 
Given- that these areas of life cannot be monitored and penalised, the new AV 
construction has to secure citizens' wholehearted co-operation, Le., the battle 
was no longer for people's minds but for their hearts. 
Secondly, prior to the mid 1980s, the PAP seemed to "genuinely" believe that 
prevailing social problems were Western in origin and sought to promote 
multiracial AV through language (AV as Bilingualism) and religion (AV as 
Religious Knowledge). The implementation of these multiracial programmes 
brought two realisations. (1) These programmes became, again, too 
successful, to the extent of over-legitimating communaVethnic discourses and 
demands on the state. The PAP realised that a multiracial formulation of AV 
and the promotion of multi-ethnic Identities worked to fragment rather than 
consolidate national consensus. (2) By the mid 1980s, there was increasing 
awareness that the "West" was within and inevitable, rather than an external 
threat that a nation can seek "cultural ballast" against. E. g., the bilingualism 
that was promoted was one where English was prioritised as first language and 
one's Asian mother-tongue was relegated to second language. Poets and 
citizens considered Singaporeans "bananas" - yellow outside, white inside. A 
PAP minister recalled that a British Army major had praised Singaporeans as a 
"well-colonised people" (STWeekly 29/8/1993 in Ang and Stratton 1997); 
suddenly, Singaporeans were not so proud of speaking excellent English 
anymore. 'Western" values and the English language have become so much a 
part of life in Singapore that it became impossible to exorcise the West without 
destroying the very nation that the PAP sought to build. 
Unwilling to endure the consequences of the nationally divisive policy of 
multiracial Singapore and unable to expel the West, the PAP re-envisioned 
Singapore as a culturally homogenous Asian nation, one that no longer aimed 
at a denial of the West, but at a subordination of it. It now sought to define AV 
as "Shared Values" (SV) and to secure a new consensus based on 
communitarianism. 
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To understand the meaning of AV, it is necessary to remember that the PAP's 
vision of the ideal nation was not necessarily an Asian nation - civil and 
opposition members have been criticised for being too "Eastern. " The SV 
formulation crystallised the PAP's goals - AV was not promoted to preserve 
"Asian-ness" but was a project-to (re-)legitimise certain economic and political 
structures - "Asian Capitalism" and "Asian Democracy" - that have come 
under challenge. 
This recognition that AV Is not merely a cultural project implies that critiques of 
the constructedness of AV - whether because Asia is infamously 
heterogeneous or because culture is always constructed (e. g., Purushotam 
1995; Clammer 1993; Tamney 1996; Benjamin 1976) - miss the point. The 
government does not deny this charge: Rajaratnam (1990), a senior PAP 
minister, agrees that race, religion, language and culture were "creations of 
men" that need to be "Singaporeanised to suit our needs and tastes. " The 
government is aware of the benefits that self-Orientalism97 brings-it silences 
Western critiques and brings in tourist dollars. 
To understand the meaning of AV, it is necessary to situate AV within a wider 
economic and political context of ideological contestation, instead of focusing 
on (the accuracy of) its substantive content. It is in this context that I want to 
highlight two opposite yet complementary meanings of the AV project - 
competitiveness and communitarianism. Given that competitiveness requires 
individuals to put self over others while communitarianism requires individuals 
to put others over self, how can AV simultaneously refer to both values? 
The AV project never aimed to make Singaporeans/Singapore less competitive 
or reverse/halt the "westernisation" of Singapore insofar as it is necessary 
economically; it only aimed to dilute Singapore's vulnerability to unfavourable 
Western trends (including Fukuyama's observation of the end of history) within 
the constraints of global capitalism. Just as English was prioritised as first 
language during AV's bilingualism campaigns, similarly, communitarianism was 
never promoted at the expense of, but to enhance national competitiveness. As 
97 To actively reproduce powerful elite's representation of oneself. 
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such, communitarianism (the smaller AV project of SV) should be understood 
as a subdominant ideology to supplement and to be subordinated to the wider 
AV project of sustaining Asian Capitalism and Asian Democracy through 
sustaining the dominant ideology of competitiveness. 
How does AV (competitiveness and communitarianism) sustain Asian 
Capitalism and Asian Democracy? By emphasising communitarianism and 
consensus over conflict, AV creates a normative centre that guides media 
policy, civil society and inter-personal interactions. Good Asian citizens value 
prosperity over Western dreams (of non-consensual democracy). They also 
subordinate personal whims to the good of the community - the "silent (Asian) 
majority. " By allowing ideological pluralism without fragmentation, AV de- 
legitimises dissent and legitimises authoritarianism. 
I/. Bilingualism: A mother-tongue for cultural ballast 
THE LOGIC OF BILINGUALISM 
To achieve multiracial unity, English was chosen as the working language 
because it was supra ethnic or "ethnically neutral" (Kuo and Jernudd 1994,34). 
Despite public furore, the government closed down Nanyang University -a 
university sponsored by Chinese businessmen and the heart of pro-China 
communist sentiment - and set up a national schools system with English as 
first language (Gopinathan 1994,75-88). 
The government's attempt to promote English and de-ethnicise citizens proved 
too successful. LKY commented that during the National Day Parade: 
The compere spoke in English, and the whole National Stadium .. * 
responded as one..! the spectators sang together, when once they 
could not even laugh at the same jokes (ST18/8/1986). 
Once English became popular, fears of de-culturalisation and "Westernisation" 
intensified. In 1989, LKY regretted that Chinese schools had been shut so 
quickly (Pakir 1993,83) and sought to re-ethnicise citizens. Believing that "the 
learning of the mother tongue was synonymous with the learning of a whole 
value system" (Gopinathan 1994), the government promoted bilingualism as a 
"cultural ballast" to Westernisation. 
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The logic behind bilingualism was a very peculiar one. Firstly, learning English 
was not equated with the acquisition of Western values but learning Mandarin 
was equated with the acquisition of Asian values; citizens could be bilingual 
without being bi-cultural (Clammer 1985,22). Secondly, bilingualism did not 
imply equal status between English and Mandarin (Pakir 1993,73). Should 
students find bilingualism unmanageable, they would be demoted to a 
monolingual stream where they studied only English, not their mother tongue. 
Thirdly, "mother-tongue" referred to the father's ethnicity rather than language 
spoken at home. Fourthly, Hokkien (the most common dialect) and Market 
Malay (the most frequent cross-ethnic language of communication, Pakir 1993, 
79) were. rejected in favour of Mandarin because Mandarin, as a written 
language, permitted non-face-to-face communication. Additionally, Mandarin 
was associated with high Chinese culture of calligraphy and with China, a huge 
consumer market. 
Mandarin, was alien to Singapore, neither spoken at home (less than 10% of 
Chinese in 1978, S. H. Tan 1995,30) nor in public places (1.2% in food 
markets, Ministry of Communications and Information 1989,57). Fishman 
(1989,414) believed that language needed to be learnt in a total environment 
and that it was insufficient if learning was limited or restricted to schools alone. 
The Speak Mandarin Campaign (SMC) was launched in 1979 for precisely this 
reason. 
STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION 
Bilingualism was first implemented through the educational policy of making a 
minimal level of Mandarin competence a prerequisite for admission into the 
next level of education. It increasingly became a national campaign (SMC) to 
provide a total learning environment for the acquisition of an "alien" language. 
The SMC was inaugurated in 1979 with a broadcast public rally and thereafter, 
strenuously publicised through the media. Television provided LKY with a 
public forum to make lengthy appearances (McDaniel 1994,180). The press 
covered promotional activities and ran features such as a "bilingual page. " 
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Slogans and songs were inserted in as daily "fillers" in print and broadcast 
media (Kuo 1984,29-30). Although the SMC was a heavy media campaign, 
Kuo (1984,34) argued that the media did not play a significant role; the media 
accepted bilingualism as a given political decision that they should implement 
and acted as a passive supporter. 
I have previously delineated the government's strategies for promoting Asian 
values. Strategies of defining and discouraging are associated with first- 
generation rule; strategies of debate and incorporation are the hallmarks of 
second-generation rule. The SMC was promoted chiefly through first- 
generation strategies. 
The media was used to define a new common sense. Through the media, 
dominant ideas were allowed to "accumulate and classify the world for others" 
and become a "horizon of the taken-for granted, " defining "what the world is 
and how it works" (Hall in Eley and Suny 1996,31). The SMC sought to equate 
Chinese-ness with Mandarin by exposing citizens to its logos and slogan 
constantly, especially one that associates Chinese ethnicity with Mandarin. In 
local television serials, Mandarin was represented as a language that was 
spoken at home (Quah 1990b, 60) by Chinese families with good Asian 
values. 
The government attempted to alter citizen's commonsensical perception of 
reality. Besides creating and standardising an entire Mandarin vocabulary for 
everyday items (Kuo 1984,33), it also sought to present what ought to be as 
what already is so that a public (national) ideal would be (mis) recognised as an 
already-existing reality. It was a commonsensical understanding that market 
hawkers prefer dialect. Ministers argued that this was not so based upon their 
personal experience (which was hardly reliable since people tended to be 
guarded with what they say, and what language they spoke, to ministers) and 
substantiated this claim with the statistics that 82% of Chinese Singaporeans 
could speak some Mandarin (Ministry of Communications and Information 
1989,55-59). The logic is that "if one can, one should" and that, since 82% of 
Chinese can speak Mandarin, therefore they are. 
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Where persuasion failed, the government pressurised citizens to speak 
Mandarin. In the 1983 SMC speech entitled "A language for the sake of our 
children, " the government applied emotional pressure on parents to support 
Mandarin for their children's sake (getting good grades and jobs). Accepting 
that there were emotional costs, such as creating a linguistic generation gap, 
ministers continued to appeal to parents to sacrifice themselves for their 
children and the nation through a discourse of good parenthood. 
Within the discourse of good citizens, it did not matter that citizens preferred 
dialects, the fact that they could mean that they should. By framing the issue as 
one of competence and disregarding/de-legitimising citizen's preferences - 
parents who resisted Mandarin were bad parents/citizens who did not want 
what was good for their children and their country. Through the conflation of 
parental and patriotic responsibility, (non-)conformity was moralised and also 
objectified: individuals' language behaviour was to be explained by one's 
(willingness to gain) competence, not personal preference (S. H. Tan, 1995,33). 
Ultimately, the government relied on legislation to speed up campaign success. 
Special Assistance . Plan (SAP) schools were set up for talented students to 
study both languages at "first language" level. Understanding the 'pragmatic' 
nature of Singaporeans, the government ensured that (scholastic) conformity 
would be "reward[ed] after school" (Kuo and Jernudd 1994,31), e. g., career 
advancement. It is not always clear if the government was more reliant on 
encouragement or penalisation in promoting bilingualism. Despite strong public 
objections, policies were passed to curtail the use of dialect in public. Dialects 
were banned on television And radios; dialect commercials were phased out; 
and the much-loved Hong Kong Cantonese movies had to be dubbed in 
Mandarin. Dialect names were also romanised into "pinyin"98 for school children 
(Kuo 1984,31-33; Kuo and Jernudd 1994,36-37; Gopinathan 1994,74). To 
ensure that students applied themselves seriously to learning Mandarin, the 
government raised university entrance requirement to include a pass in 
98 E. g., my romanised dialect (Teochew) name is "Soak-Fang Sim; " my romanised 
Mandarin name is "Shufen Shen 
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Mandarin and used a dual-standard weighing scheme where scores for both 
first and second language were equally important (this was scrapped in 1985) 
(Hill and Lian 1995,87; Gopinathan 1994,74179). 
A LIMITED SUCCESS 
Kwok (1981,96) commented that campaigns exert some pressure on 
organisers and target population to attain the predicted outcomes. Their 
success is easily overestimated. As a campaign, SMC and bilingualism seems 
to have fared poorly (McDaniel 1994,178). Although dialect speakers are 
dwindling steadily, the gains are being made in favour of English rather than 
Mandarin (Pakir 1993,78). At the same time, LKY noted the persistence of 
clan and dialect loyalties in elections. Opposition politicians who won were 
bilingual and fluent in'dialects (Gopinathan 1994,73). Vague statistics like 
"81 % speaks more Mandarin more often" (ST28/9/1981) and faint praise that 
SMC is "quite successf ul"(ST1/1 0/89) hint that it has fared below 
expectations-bilingualism is not yet Irreversible, as LKY had hoped 
(ST4/10/89). 
Campaigns also easily lend themselves to rhetorical manipulation. Messages 
and slogans may be promoted and performed without conviction (Kwok 1981, 
96). Kuo and Jernudd (1994,41) observed that citizens may "know what 
(policies) want but [do] not modify (their) own language behaviour. " 
Additionally, language acquisition does not imply culture acquisition; there exist 
"mono-cultural bilinguals" and "bicultural monolinguals" (Beardsmore, 1994, 
49). 
Bilingualism failed as a means of shoring up PAP's legitimacy and ameliorating 
political alienation; SMC's favouritism towards Chinese-ness deepened social 
faultlines. Media programmes segregated races, heightened awareness of 
racial difference (Quah 1990b, 57) and made the Chinese more Chinese 
(Benjamin 1976,121/129) than China nationals (ST15111/98). Minorities 
suffered inferior media programmes and unfair immigration policies to 
artificially maintain a Chinese-dominated multi-racialism (Tamney 1996,97). 
Dialect-speaking (elderly) Chinese were also angered by the ban of dialect 
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programmes and retaliated by watching Malaysia TV (McDaniel 1994,187). 
The PAP also showed itself to be "Western-elitist" when it revised its SMC goal 
from targeting the masses to nurturing a core group of ethnic elite to serve as 
"standard bearers" for the rest of society (ST9/4/1994): as an interviewee TSK 
explained, what the PAP meant by "Chinese elite" was not people who 
graduated from Chinese universities (such as Nanyang University, which the 
government closed), but English-educated elite who were bilingual enough to 
be useful for business/political relations with China and with the electorate. 
Ultimately, the bilingualism policy failed because its implementation was 
subordinated to nationalism and international capitalism. In a multiracial 
society, bilingualism encouraged ethnic diversity; it divided rather than united a 
nation. This tension between multi-racialism and nationalism stemmed from 
Singapore's lack of ethnic homogeneity ("the curse of impurity") and the 
government's elitist dismissal of Singlish culture. Bilingualism and the 
preservation of Asian values also contradicted the dominance of the English 
language in global capitalism and the goal of being a borderless information 
hub. Ultimately, bilingualism and Asian values were projects to be subordinated 
to the national project of economic survival and growth. 
III. Confucianising citizens: The Religious Knowledge programme 
IMPORTING CONFUCIANISM FOR ASIAN CAPITALISM AND 
ASIAN DEMOCRACY 
Interest in Confucianism arose with Lodge and Vogel's (1987) attempt to 
explain the decline of Western economies and the rise of Asian economies in 
the 1980s. Dichotomising national ideologies into two idealtypes 
(communitarianism and individualism), they concluded that Confucian values, 
with its emphasis on communitarianism99, hardwork and ascetism (Pye and 
Pye 1985; Tamney 1996,103) produced a superior capitalist work ethic and 
society - one that could ward off excessive individualism and put a check on 
welfare demands. Locally, the 'signs' of excessive individualism included 
'excessive job-hopping' and singles wanting to live apart from their families by 
applying for housing to indulge in "hedonistic" lifestyles (Chua 1995,157). 
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The Singapore government sought to inscribe Asian values through religion 
after the poor success of their bilingualism programme. After having been 
restricted to the private sphere, the practice of religion was revitalised (Kuo 
1992). In 1984, the RK programme made religious studies a compulsory and 
examinable subject for students at upper secondary levels; students could 
choose from Bible Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, Confucian Ethics, Hindu 
Studies, Islamic Studies or Sikhism. 
Scholars have questioned whether Confucianism is native to Singapore (Kuo 
1992). Foreign experts (including from the West) were hired to design school 
curriculum (Hill and Lian 1995,202) after local monks' proposals (for Buddhist 
Studies) were criticised for being impractical and failing to select the 'desirable 
national values" (Kuah 1991,32). Some argue that what the government 
desires is actually Victorian values or a Protestant work ethic (Chua 1995,151). 
The Confucian emphasis on scholarly examinations complements and provides 
cultural legitimacy for Singapore's meritocractic ideology. Within Confucianism, 
rulers gain their "mandate" to govern on the basis of their discipline and moral 
standing, allowing them to legitimately claim, "the government/father knows 
best. " 
With RK and Confucianism, AV shifted from being a defensive project against 
the West to a project to entrench a positive form of Asian work ethic in support 
of Asian Capitalism - one that is ascetic and materialist/consumerist 
simultaneously. The Confucian ascetic is not simply a happy worker; he also 
does not fear exploitation since society's needs take precedence (Tamney 
1996,175). 
The good Asian worker is keen to accumulate and consume, despite the 
Confucian disdain for the merchant class. Within Asian Capitalism, ascetics 
must believe that "Greed is not evil... greed gives you the will and motivation to 
" In Chapter 1, I argued that there is a significant gap between Confucianism and 
communitarianism and that their confusion/conflation is a deliberate political project. 
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succeed" (STWeekly 26/6/1993). A director of education told Hindu Studies 
teachers that progress is "walking in $200 French or Italian-made high-heeled 
shoes instead of inexpensive locally-made shoes" (ST24/6/1984 In Tamney 
1996,27). The ideal "Asian" worker is the Japanese who Is reputed to never 
job-hop and consumes not out of need but out of national duty (Chua 1995, 
152). The unique combination of Confucianism and capitalism would 
encourage consumerism without liberalism-good citizens would understand 
that their rights and individualism extend to only where their wallets can take 
them. 
Most importantly, Confucianism/communitarianism prevents the evolution of a 
capitalist state into a welfare state during late-capitalism by restraining 
excessive individualism and welfare demands. The good Confucian citizen is 
self-reliant. Since he places community before self, the citizen makes no 
personal (welfare) demands on the state but would provide welfare assistance 
to members of his community. By this very sophisticated sleight of hand, a 
"capitalism with socialist characteristics" is achieved (Vogel in Tamney 1996, 
69) and the state is absolved from the provision of social security. Already, 
Singapore provides minimal social security according to the International 
Labour Organisation. 
Confucianism also supports "Asian democracy. " The Confucian individual is 
constantly aware of being a part of five basic relationships: sovereign and 
subject, father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, friend 
and friend. To be a person is to know that one's obligations to others are more 
important than what one obligations to one's self (Tamney 1996,103-105). The 
ideal Confucian society is one where everybody fulfils a role faithfully. In the 
Confucian Ethics textbook, students were extolled to ask'what is expected of 
me? ' not 'what can I get out of this? ' (CDIS 1985,83). 
The Confucian self is opposite different from the liberal self; it aims for social 
harmony, not self-actualisation. In Singapore, this would mean being a 
productive worker for national survival and an obedient citizen for social 
harmony. Such self-cultivation enables ideological subordination. Within the 
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discourse of multiracial bilingualism, subordination is achieved through the 
construction of citizens as being intrinsically flawed-being ethnic, they are 
partial and biased and so should leave politics to the supra-ethnic, impartial 
government. With RK, Confucianism was not considered a religion but a body 
of ethics. Being supra religious, the Confucian state is seen as the only body 
that is objective and ethnically neutral, un-inflicted with religious/ethnic 
chauvinism. 
Confucianism encourages paternalism with its emphasis on loyalty and 
obedience to authority. Since rulers are "mandated" to rule (by meritocratic 
examinations), they choose to consult others at their own discretion and co-opt 
others. The Confucian ideal of harmony ought to sustain lasting PAP 
dominance (Tamney 1996,182). Confucianism was expected to hasten the re- 
centralisation of authority (Chua 1995,161-4; Weber 1946,225) and slow down 
democratisation. In this way, Confucianism actually "forces people into 
obedience for no reason other than to protect the interest of a small minority, " 
and is "diametrically opposed to the democratic idea" (Tu 1984,23/29). 
CONFUCIANISM ABANDONED 
Confucian Ethics as an RK school subject failed to attract Chinese students. 
Tamney (1996,37-39) explains that, "in keeping with the Chinese's utilitarian 
approach to religion and the spiritual" (e. g., fengshui, luck), Chinese students 
preferred Buddhist Studies because it was easier to pass. 
Confucianism and RK did not repair political alienation. Despite being a secular 
ideology (which implies being non-ethnic, since there is a strong relationship 
between religion and ethnicity in Singapore), minorities were not fooled by its 
"Chinese-ness. " Many "superior" Confucian values contradicted the cultural 
values of minorities. E. g., the government criticised the Malays' lack of 
diligence (Rajaratnam in Tamney 1996,98). Alatas (1977,168) argued against 
the myth of the lazy Malay - what the Malays lacked was not the willingness to 
work hard but the spirit of capitalism; Malays preferred to be hardworking low- 
paid gardeners than to be an exploited waiter. 
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Confucianism also alienated the "liberal" young generation. Singapore society 
had become too irreversibly "Westernised" to respond to attempts to elicit 
conformity. Confucianism requires "the pressure of public opinion" (Kuo In 
Chua 1995,159), which was experienced as a constraint on individualism 
(Fukuyama 1992,242). What was produced was not consensus but "imposed 
conformity" (Clammer 1993,40). A 1989 survey found 15% of the population 
(the young, tertiary-educated, "politically alienated") were considering 
emigration (Chiew 1990b, 73). Confucianism had so disconcerted citizens that 
a minister had to placate public sentiment by reaffirming that "each person Is 
intrinsically worthy of respect" (ST15/1/1991). 
RK did not mend social faultlines either. Christianity, a'Western" religion, had 
gained many inter-ethnic converts. In 1987, Malays (mostly Muslim) protested 
the Israeli President's visit and called for greater government sensitivity (Cf. Hill 
and Lian 1995,205-206). In the same year, members of a Catholic 
organisation, which had become concerned with social justice, were charged 
with "Marxist conspiracy" and detained without trial. The government realised 
that RK intensified religious fervour and over-legitimated religion as a source of 
counter-ideology discourse (Chua 1995,31), so much so that they contested 
the government's hegemony in the public sphere. RK ceased to be compulsory 
in 1990 and was replaced by a Civics/Moral Education programme in schools. 
The "Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill" was passed not to ensure 
harmony between religious groups but to prevent 'religious leaders [from] 
straying beyond the religious realm' (Cf. Tamney 1996,35; Hill and Lian 1995, 
193). 
The failure of the Confuciariisation programme can be traced to contradictions 
within capitalism between the need for private accumulation and the need to 
provide social welfare (Rodan 1993a, 63). Hall notes the impossibility of 
combining of capitalism and community (communitarianism): "if you drive the 
notion of enterprise far enough, you undermine any sense of tradition, or 
organic belongingness to society" (Hall in Tamney 1996,184). 
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So far, multiracial AV deflected welfare responsibilities to ethnic organisations. 
Such multi-racial ethnicisation divides rather than unites the nation. With the 
failure of Confucianism and bilingualism to shore up PAP's hegemony, the 
government conceived the SV project, having learnt that national ideologies 
based on multiracialism tended to heighten social divisiveness rather than 
unity-something that a one-party government desperately needs to remain the 
sole representative and guardian of national interest. 
IV. Shared values 
SHARED VALUES AS PURE IDEOLOGY? 
These tensions impacted the government's third attempt to reformulate AV. 
Abandoning multiracial ideologies and their socially divisive effect, SV 
emphasised national unity based upon secular and supra-ethnic values. 
Nevertheless, SV seemed unable to break out of its Confucian bias, as 
indicated by the use of Confucian terms ("jun-zi") (Clammer 1993,42/45; 
Tamney 1996; Chua 1995,35). 
The SV (1991) programme identified five Asian ideals that should be shared by 
citizens: 
1. (nation before community and) society above self 
2. upholding the family as the basic building block of society, 
3. resolving major issues through consensus instead of contentions 
4. stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony 
5. regard and community support for the individual 
"Nation before community" was inserted into the first imperative to subordinate 
ethnicity and religion to nation (In Singapore, 'community' refers to ethnic 
community. ) The fifth valuewas added later as a concession to public concerns 
that Confucianism tended to breed authoritarianism (Chua 1995,32). Its 
affirmation of individualism is modest-it does not encourage a liberal but a 
responsible subject committed to helping others. 
Some scholars (Kuo 1993,20) argue that, unlike bilingualism and RK, SV has 
not been translated into legislation or policies. It remains "a discursive artefact" 
(Chua 1995,33), a disembodied, un-institutionalised ideology (Clammer 1993, 
42), a pure "ideological" project (Hill and Lian 1995,219). Firstly, the 
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government realised that tying material/moral consequences to ideological 
projects secured pragmatic conformity, not consent. With SV, the government 
sought to move beyond being an "administrative state" whose rule is based on 
waning economic hegemony (not because of declining national achievements 
but due to decreasing priority of economics to citizens) to government based 
on ideological hegemony. 
In its non-multiracial formulation, SV is difficult to implement. Besides being 
vague (Heng 1990), AV is a metaphor for desirable values that are missing in 
Singapore (Kuo 1990; Rodan 1993a, xiv). Had these values been pervasive, it 
would not been necessary to enshrine and propagate them (Clammer 1993, 
35). AV is less an everyday reality than an ideal, a top-down project with little 
popular resonance (Clammer 1993,38). Knowing citizens' dislike of 
government propaganda, the term "national ideology" was discontinued in 
favour of "shared values" to give it an aura of popular authenticity (Quah 
1990a, 2). 
Some scholars argue that without material embodiment, SV would fail and that 
campaigns have always been justifications for policies, not ideological ends in 
themselves. I do not agree with this position. Firstly, SV is embedded, although 
not in formal policies but in informal, seemingly "organic" institutions such as 
the moral gaze and social expectations of one's community. More importantly, 
its success must not be measured by behavioural changes but by citizens' 
discursive reproduction. To be successful, the ideology does not have to be 
always adhered to; it suffices that SV serves as a strong normative centre 
(preferred reading) such that alternatives have to contend with, and thus, 
reproduce it even as they seek to challenge it. Nowhere is the reproduction of 
the SV discourse more enthusiastic than in the media. Thus, SV can be seen 
as a way of managing the media to manage citizens. Through the'mediazation' 
of cultures (J. Thompson 1990) where the media plays an increasing role in 
commodifying/packaging culture for consumption, the media's construction of 
SV becomes speech acts that are fulfilled through citizens' articulation of, them. 
The media is not merely a (transparent) government mouthpiece, nor simply a 
catalyst but a primary definer of culture. 
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ASIAN JOURNALISM: CONSENSUS. CONTENTION, 
CONSULTATION 
SV is more than a discursive artefact: communitarianism contributes to the 
legitimisation of Asian Capitalism and Asian Democracy. Communitarianism 
absolves the state from providing social welfare and places the responsibility of 
community welfare on communities themselves - whether in the form of ethnic 
self-help (during multiracial AV formulations) or as family self-help such as the 
Parents Maintenance Bill, which allows the state to force working children to 
support their aged parents. Communitarianism also legitimises Asian 
Democracy models of journalism. Asian TV news channels have been 
launched to provide news from an "Asian" perspective while Asian-styled 
journalism has been hotly debated in the press. While the SV project may be 
invisible to public eyes, it can be said to be successful if the media disciplines 
itself to provide responsible "Asian Journalism" and to perpetuate the myth of 
Singapore's Asian-ness to its readers. 
To secure media support, the government suggested a "development media 
model" as opposed an irresponsible Western libertarian model, alluded to by 
headlines such as "Time for the British media to put their house in order". 
(ST4/4/1988), 'Western media's coverage of Asia is wide off the mark" 
(ST11/12/1991), "Political journalism in UK turns cheap and nasty" 
(ST9/9/1993): 
What is Asian Journalism? What is a nation-building media? Firstly, Asian-ness 
is not simply geographical but a quality of being consensual. Such an idealtype, 
of Asian media as consensdal ignores the clamorous media in Taiwan and 
India (Heng 1993,39). While some Asian media may not be 
"Asian/consensual, " it is assumed that all Western media are non-consensual. 
This assumption causes the local English daily to be suspected of being not 
Asian/consensual enough. As an English language newspaper, the ST does 
not qualify as "Asian. " Yet, it is the only media to provide a supra ethnic, 
national perspective on Singapore. Unfortunately, being supra ethnic also 
means being "de-culturalised, " making ST "the weakest line of defence" against 
Western influences (Heng 1990). ST compensates by checking itself diligently 
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(Heng 1993,36)100 but is still considered too critical by the government. Ethnic 
media, on the other hand, are happy to work within the government's 
multicultural framework by promoting ethnic cultures (Arasu 1990; Heng 1990; 
Rasheed 1990; Yeap 1994,64). 
Secondly, Asian-ness is not necessarily communitarianism-it is debatable 
whether its policies are beneficial for the community or for authority (Chan 
1971). A central distinction between authoritarianism and communitarianism is 
whether citizens have a say in what they consider best for their society. In the 
case of Singapore, it is certainly a case of "the government/father knows 
best/better. " 
Thirdly, Asian-ness is often equated with consensus. However, the definition of 
"consensual" depends on whether it is considered natural to criticise. 
Development theorists are divided on the issue. At one extreme, it is held that a 
nation-building media should provide only positive government news 
(Ramaprasad and Ong 1990,43-44) because its role is to integrate not divide 
(Rosario-Briad 1986,124). Philippines President Aquino reminded journalists to 
"build up rather than tear down" (in Petersen 1992,183). 
A more moderate view argues that the media in developing countries should 
focus mainly on development-related topics, providing criticism only where 
warranted. Keeping close to popular concerns, the media should focus on the 
"desire and difficulties of development, " since it is foremost on the minds of 
Asians (De Jesus 1996,3). 
A parallel debate took placS between the ST and Zaobao (ZB), a Chinese daily. . 
ST justifies its critical stance by arguing that it provides what the people want. 
ZB suggests that ST opposes for the sake of opposition (ST21/12/96), adding 
that because ZB does not see government as a necessary evil, it "do[es] not 
suffer from a psychological burden of needing to be critical to be seen as 
credible or professional. " ST retorted that 'a patriotic press is not an uncritical 
press, " implying that allegiance to the nation was not the same as allegiance to 
100 See T. LTan (1990,9-10) for an extreme example. 
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the government/party (Fernandez and Leong 1995). To keep the media 
ideologically credible, the government realised that it must allow the media to 
criticise the government. As such, the issue was no longer censorship but how 
much emphasis to give to criticism (Heng 1993,39-41; Tamney 1996,61). 
Many ingenious strategies have emerged in the attempt to allow limited 
criticism. F. Seow (1995,77) observed that American newspapers anchor their 
perspective in their editorial, allowing diversity in the rest of the newspapers. 
Singaporean newspapers anchor their perspective in every article, which allows 
less ideological diversity. Frequent readers would be familiar with the ABA 
styles of local commentaries-the critique "B" is always located in the 
penultimate paragraph. Seasoned readers would know how to "cut to the 
chase" and read only the last two paragraphs. Another strategy is to begin a 
report with a positive headline followed by a neutral sub-headline and an 
increasingly critical text (see insert ST 4/4/1998). 
Malayian PM Mahathir provided one of the strongest arguments for a 
consensual media. Because the press is not elected, the government is the 
only legitimate and committed guardian of national/public interests: 
a newspaper is a private enterprise owing nothing ... to the public... It 
is 
therefore affected with no public interest. It is emphatically the property 
of the owner, who is selling a manufactured project at his own risk" 
(Hamilton in Mahathir 1985). 
While the ideal of public good can hardly be challenged, what can be 
challenged is the belief that consensus, rather than contention, better serves 
the public. The "consensus versus contention" frame creates a false dilemma 
that dismisses other options like compromise or consultation and traps the 
debate into a question of whether technocratic governments are good for 
society, overshadowing the more pertinent question of whether investigative 
journalism also benefits society. Of the many articles on Asian journalism 
(since 1985, in the quarterly journal Media Asia), there were only 2 writers 
(exiled opposition politician F. Seow (1995,77) and Australian academic 
Petersen) who went beyond this framing. 
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The local media is highly co-operative (Heng 1993,39), resulting in a tame 
media that is over-anxious to interpret the government's minds and publish 
compatible views that even a government minister questioned the press' self- 
censorship (T. L. Tan 1990,14). Such "nation-building" media can work against 
the government. The government does not want too subservient a press, 
knowing that a press that quotes only "PR lines" would lose its credibility and 
not be able to serve the government (ST4/4/1994). 
Clammer (1993,42-3) argues that in Singapore, "consensus" does not mean 
consultation or compromise but the Imposition of PAP's point of view, after 
going through the motions of a public debate. Despite the rhetoric of 
'consensus versus contention, ' there is no mechanism (e. g., mass 
organisations that are genuinely independent with a power base of their own) 
for a genuine consensus-building to take place. He observes that it is almost 
impossible to find an example of a government policy that has been 
fundamentally changed or abandoned because of public pressure. 
The frame of consensus versus contention successfully creates an aura of 
debate. At the same time, it discourages debaters by labelling them as 
troublemakers and "rebels without a cause. " Understood in this way, SV is anti- 
difference and as such, an ideology par excellence for perpetuating 
"democratically" the ideological hegemony of a one-party state. 
V. The logic of Asian Values revisited: Ideological pluralism 
without fragmentation 
After many trials and errors'at formulating AV and after reaping ideological 
contradictions and paying the prices of success, with SV, the PAP government 
has arrived at a crystallised grasp of the logic of maintaining one-party rule 
democratically and refined the AV project into a lean and focused project that 
permits pluralism without ideological fragmentation. 
The SV project crystallises the logic and premise of the various AV 
formulations: the myth of the fragile nation (Chapter 4) is perfectly 
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complemented by the AV myth of the dangerous citizens, which reaffirmed the 
PAP's role as the guardian of the nation against its dangerous citizens. 
AV de-legitimises dissent through a series of strategies, which can be 
characterised into four "rounds" (each incremental strategy will be discussed in 
detail for the rest of this section). (1) AV constructs citizens as dangerous 
(partial and self-interested) subjects and de-legitimises the credibility of their 
opinion so as to secure their complicity to self-censor. (2) Should citizens fail to 
be convinced that they are dangerous and practice self-censorship, AV 
employs a discourse of responsible communitarian behaviour, reminding 
citizens of society's moral gaze and communitarian expectations to encourage 
citizens to privatise their dissent. (3) If dissent cannot be stopped normatively, 
AV legitimises the portioning of spheres of competencies and the limitation of 
public sphere access to "expert" citizens. (4) Should these public sphere 
obstacles fail to prevent dissent from surfacing into public discourses, AV 
trivialises dissent as the voice of a "vocal minority" and subordinates it to the 
voice of a constructed "silent (Asian) moral majority. " 
(1) Earlier multiracial formulations (Bilingualism and Religious Knowledge) 
constituted subjects as intrinsically/racially flawed, partial and (racially) biased. 
Their entrance into the public sphere was deemed dangerous to the multi-racial 
harmony of a fragile nation and subjects were encouraged to privatise their 
dissent. This strategy de-legitimised not only Western dreams but also Eastern 
dreams: views that detracted from official visions were either "too Westernised" 
or "too Eastern/racially chauvinistic. " Within this discourse, it was the PAP 
government's duty, being the only "im-partial" and ethnically neutral (or supra- 
ethnic) party, to protect Singapore from Singaporeans. 
This strategy was especially used against opposition politicians. Yet, such 
labels were effective only if citizens believe that the opposition posed a genuine 
national threat. Much ideological work had to be done outside elections to 
saturate the labels with symbolism and reality so that it strikes sufficient fear in 
citizens' heart to secure their consent of coercion against the opposition. To 
this effect, the daily AV project of representing "racial" citizens as dangerously 
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biased and reminding citizens of the historical reality of racial riots is crucial in 
setting the scene and inducing latent fears which could then be stoked during 
elections to legitimise coercion. 
(2) With SV, "communitarianism" became a buzzword; citizens ought to be 
consensual "Asians. " Citizens may speak but should not insist and should 
communitarianly defer to the wishes of the silent/moral majority -a group that 
only the PAP has the power to represent. Such construction of 
good/responsible communitarian behaviour and the gaze of the moral majority 
sought to induce citizens to conform and privatise their dissent. 
The way the media sought to ingrain a communitarian commonsense became 
subtler. In the 1980s, national values were directly discussed and propagated 
to youths (McDaniel 1994,178). With SV in the 1990s, commands gave way to 
gentle voice-overs in campaign advertisements. Instead of lecturing citizens on 
filial piety, the media showcased the joy of harmonious Inter-generation 
relations. Rather than chiding citizens for irresponsible consumption, the media 
reported negatively on youths using credit cards, leaving viewers to draw the 
relevant ideological conclusion for themselves. 
However, this is a very weak line of political defence because it is completely 
reliant on citizens' goodwill, without the state being able to punish non- 
conformity. The only "punishment" that could be levied upon non-conforming 
citizens is "public shaming, " which the government continues to practise (e. g., 
publicly naming scholars who break their bonds). However, this is difficult to 
practice without the keen and active consent of a genuine (rather than a 
constructed) moral majorit $. 
(3) With SV, citizens are'no longer imagined as racial but as "Asian. " The SV 
subject is no longer intrinsically/racially flawed but a communitarian Asian with 
an active interest and concern for society. The meaning of political participation 
is transformed from a threatening act of racial chauvinism to a natural 
extension of a citizens' care for society. No longer able to dismiss "dissent" as 
chauvinist, new strategies of managing dissent must now be found. 
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Unable to convince citizens to privatise dissent, the government sought to 
manage public space. To restrict public sphere access, spheres of competence 
were created (Hill and Lian 1995,224) to install a moral and technical hierarchy 
between experts and lay citizens. Technically, the government recruits from the 
cream of the crop, streaming students from as early as nine years of age to 
pick future leaders. Morally, the government presents itself a group of morally 
upright Confucian gentleman by meting out harsh punishment for corruption 
and through the myth of LKY/PAP's sacrifice. Being mandated to rule, the 
Confucian government argued that, "those who want'political space' must earn 
it" (ST4/12/95) and that politics is for politicians: if citizens want to "politick, " 
they should join political parties. 
Out-of-bounds (OB) markers were used in the 1980s to delimit what consisted 
appropriate topics and styles of public discussion. Because OB markers are 
vague (the government refuses to clarify them), the government has the 
freedom to "keep shifting the goalpost' (ST4/12/1995). Not knowing the 
boundaries, citizens will tend to prefer to "err on the side of caution, " thereby 
becoming even more cautious, conservative and paranoid. 
A distinction was also made between civil society and civic society. As an Asian 
state, Singapore should not imitate Western liberal models; good Asian citizens 
should build a "civic society, " where community and state relations are not 
adversarial (Hill and Lian 1995,233). To rid civil society of its Western 
adversarial baggage, MITA Minister Yeo (ST25/6/91) argued that "conflict for 
the sake of a civil society will not do; the result, in fact, will be most uncivil. " 
What Singapore needed wAs a civic society not a civil society. With this glide 
from civil to civic, the government shifts the focus away from issues of culture 
and ideology to civics, administrative and municipal issues. What is achieved 
with this glide, as with the use of OB markers, is the separation of the civic/civil 
from the political, and the subordination of civilians to politicians. Diversity is 
channeled into civic society without being able to affect political society 
(Clammer 1985,161). 
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The problem with these measures is that citizens were not always convinced of 
the illegitimacy of their opinions, i. e., dissent was not always successfully de- 
legitimised or neutralised, merely privatised. Where social faultlines had 
become so developed that it is no longer possible to keep them out of public 
discourses, new strategies of dissent management must be found - strategies 
that do not repress or block public sphere access but contain dissent within the 
public sphere. 
(4) Dissent containment is a qualitatively different strategy and indicates the 
emergence of a third-generation style where dissent is not repressed but 
incorporated/subordinated. This strategy especially targets new media 
technologies where censorship is no longer possible. The gesture of admitting 
dissent into the public sphere should not be mistaken as the bestowing of 
legitimacy on alternative ideologies; even while promoting dissent from the 
levels of the "streets" and "coff eeshops" into the public sphere, AV 
simultaneously discredits it within the public sphere. 
The Singapore 21 project employs many sophisticated strategies for containing 
dissent. It aims to rally citizens to the PAP's vision for Singapore in the 21St 
century; it is a clear attempt by the PAP to secure a new consensus and rally 
citizens behind an updated Singapore Dream. Dissent is de-legitimised through 
a few strategies. 
Firstly, recognising that social faultlines and ideological contradictions cannot 
be easily bridged, the government sought to position itself as an Ideological 
middleground by framing different positions as an either/or dilemma and 
presenting its position as ttie best balance, after having considered alternative 
positions.. The Singapore 21 project sought to incorporate polar, positions within 
its master discourse of an Asian balance of five dilemmas 
(http: //www. gov. sglsingapore2l/menujogo. html): 
1. Less Stressful Life Vs Retaining the Drive 
2. Needs of Senior Citizens Vs Aspirations of the Young 
3. Attracting Talent Vs Looking After Singaporeans 
4. Internationalization/Regionalisation Vs Singapore as Home 
5. Consultation and Consensus Vs Decisiveness and Quick Action. 
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By using a dilemma frame, the government is able to address citizens' dissent 
and discursively creates a semblance of democracy. E. g., the demands for a 
less competitive and more democratic lifestyle is pitted against the worry of 
official sympathisers that Singapore will lose its international competitiveness if 
it slows down. In these dilemmas, the underlying theme is the framing of, 
economic prosperity and liberalism (individualism) as mutually exclusive rather 
than mutually enhancing. Citizens are put in their place-as partial (liberal or 
moral) individuals with conflicting interests, thereby establishing the 
government as the impartial arbitrator and sole representative of the "silent 
majority" and national interest. Without representing citizens as liberal and 
egoistic, the state would not be able to derive its moral legitimacy. 
Secondly, pro-democracy voices are typically represented as voices of the 
"vocal minority" to be pitted against the concerns of the "silent/moral Asian 
majority. " The "reality" of this "silent majority" is made real through statistical 
surveys, where the weight of the middle/norm is most convincingly captured 
with visual bell curves and charts. 
Thirdly, 'the demands of the vocal minority is presented as idealistic and 
unviable while the silent majority's preference is seen as more 
commonsensical, reasonable and "middle-ground" compared to the vocal 
minority, who are often chastised for failing to offer "constructive criticism, " 
which implies that their participation is desired only if it is constructive towards 
the goal of the PAP/majority. The demand that criticism be constructive Is a 
strategy that is very powerful and difficult to argue against. Many agree with the 
sentiment, despite their reservations (Quah 1990c, 96; Rasheed and 
Mahizhnan 1990,86). This is a way of securing feedback and improvement 
without conceding political tenure and implementing two previous Ideological 
values- to de-legitimise opposition for the sake of opposition (plural 
democracy) and to insist that civilians participate minimally by suggesting 
viable alternatives and leaving politics to the government. 
These strategies allow the PAP to appear tolerant of pluralism when, in effect, 
they subordinate dissent - citizens have felt so un-consulted that they have 
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challenged the government to name a policy where it had actually recapitulated 
on a decision because of popular opinion. These strategies ensure that dissent 
is contained within the public sphere and not allowed to gain parliamentary 
representation (leading to a two or multi-party government). Such "tolerance" of 
pluralism and faithfulness to the (silent/moral) majority lends the PAP 
government an aura of democracy and allows the PAP to legitimately proclaim 
itself as not only the guardian of multi-racial harmony but also the guardian of 
democracy. 
This strategy of securing hegemony through subordination should be 
distinguished from the more frequently theorised strategy of incorporation (Hall 
1977; 331-333; Brown 1993) and its variations (expansive and transformative 
hegemony, Gramsci 1971; Mouff e 1982). The communitarian strategy of 
dissent subordination may even be a more evolved or refined ideological 
strategy, since, compared to (Western political) liberalism, it allows for purer 
forms of (non-welfare state) capitalism and (one-party) government. As 
Huntington (1991,108) observed, "a political far less skilled than LKY could 
have produced democracy in Singapore; " Instead, Singapore initiates an 
alternative "Asian" trajectory of political evolution. 
The ideology of communitarianism appears to have more "elective affinity" with 
the hegemonic strategy of subordination while liberalism appears to have 
greater affinity with the strategy of incorporation. Communitarianism, as an 
anti-liberal ideology, believes in the subordination of individual rights to 
community interests. A type of "communitarian govemmentality" results: Pye 
and Pye (1985) observed that Confucian subjects have a high threshold of 
tolerance for cognitive dissonance, which indicates the successful creation of 
moral subjects. Unlike liberal ethical subjects, moral subjects value face and 
conformity to varying social expectations; they are less likely to be concerned 
with ensuring ideological consistency between their beliefs and practice or 
attempt to live a principled, context-invariant life. The communitarian state, 
unlike the liberal state that arbitrates between individuals and groups, is not the 
sum of its individuals but a transcendental, sui generis entity (Durkheim 1965). 
Especially in Confucian communitarianism, the state is mandated to* do what is 
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best for society, even if this means being unpopular. In this way, AV appears to 
be an ideology par excellence for the maintenance of one-party ideological 
dominance. 
5D. HEGEMONY INCOMPLETE AND DELAY TACTICS 
As an "unrepentant island of discipline, " the PAP's success In securing 
obedience without sacrificing its authoritarianism is closely watched and 
admired by other Asian nations (Newsweek 25/12/1995). For Clammer (1985, 
159/166-167), the nature of this hegemony is more of acquiescence than 
identification, acquired through social control (bureaucracy, economic rewards) 
and ensuring that dissent is "absolutely subordinated" so that there is no 
serious alternatives at the articulate level. 
Why do citizens obey without believing? Why are campaigns only partially 
successful? To be successful, ideologies have to be banal-"familiar, continual, 
not consciously registered as reminding" (Billig 1995,8) and commonsensical 
by operating at an unconscious "sub-stratum" level. However, campaigns often 
aim to change within a short time with scientific rhetoric to change the habits 
that uneducated citizens have developed over time. Campaigns in Singapore 
are also accompanied by material consequences (e. g., fines - Singapore is 
joked as a "fine" country), forcing citizens to be conscious, rational and 
calculative in their life choices. 
The chasm between campaign and citizens' reality makes citizens suspicious 
of government propaganda. Far from being "popular-national, " state ideologies 
are undisguisedly top-down. The head of psychological defence lamented that 
"the Singapore brand" has always been the government, not the people, 
making his job very difficult (Gwee 1987,27). It does not help that the 
government sends out contradictory messages about themselves as moral 
Confucian gentlemen ("jun-zi") while the PM's pay is four times President 
Clinton's. 101 Additionally, a government-controlled media compromises its 
101 According to Sintercom (http: //sintercom. organise/sef/ministers_pay. html), citing 
the Economist, the annual salaries of some Presidents/PMs are: 
Singapore US$780,000 (Cabinet ministers' pay start from US$419,285) 
USA US$200,000 
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credibility (Lull 1991). The head of psychological defence reveals that, because 
of their cynicism, citizens especially suspend belief in the media during election 
years, withholding "strong emotions" and initiative when singing national songs 
(Gwee 1987,26-27; Hill and Lian 1995,37). 
Even though citizens do not completely accept the government's 
representation of reality, they also have great difficult articulating a coherent 
alternative. Firstly, official frames are difficult to resist, especially when the 
Singapore government constantly asks citizens to compare themselves with its 
less fortunate neighbours while omitting information on more successful 
countries (Ward 1995,30). 
Secondly, where policies are highly questionable, the government represents 
these issues as technical problems requiring technical solutions. E. g., instead 
of debating whether censorship is desirable, the Singapore framed it as a 
technical challenge to design the world's first Internet censorship software. 
Citizens joke that they would not be surprised if the government would simply 
opt for a technical solution to the problem of citizens not flushing public toilets 
by designing a technology to monitor errant toilet users, completely bypassing 
debates on personal privacy. 
Thirdly, the illusion of democracy and expert rule makes it difficult for citizens to 
articulate their different opinion/ 'feeling" with certainty (Cf. women's account in 
Chapter 6C). "Fewer Singaporeans think they affect public policy" 
(ST28/11/1998) despite the government's encouragement for feedback. 
Citizens joked that "the Feedback Unit" is a blackhole where suggestions 
disappear. Even votes for tie opposition during elections are trivialised as 
"mere protest votes" (D. Birch 1992,92). The media, as a stage for democracy, 
plays an important role in the illusion of participation (D. Birch 1992,86). While 
citizens suspects censorship in ST's Forum Page, it is not until a website 
publishes these uncensored letters ("Not-the-ST-Forum-Page" in 
www. sintercom. org), that citizens could be certain of censorship. 
Germany US$160,000 
Britain US$122,000 
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That citizens conform without believing suggests a form of communitarian 
governmentality different from liberal/ethical governmentality. Anti-smoking In 
"liberal" London concentrates on telling Individuals about dangers to their 
personal health. In a communitarian society, we would expect that the same 
campaign would encourage smokers to create a smoke-free environment for 
everyone's sake. However, anti-smoking campaigns in Singapore employ a 
mixture of communitarian and pragmatic discourses. They remind smokers of 
others' gaze (e. g., a sexy girl saying, "I wouldn't want to kiss a chimney"). 
Smokers quit smoking to gain popularity rather than for health reasons, or they 
may not quit but privatise their smoking/dissent (e. g., smoking when "sexy girls" 
are not present). This is precisely the phenomenon of the "Ugly Singaporean, " 
who leaves behind good habits when freed from constraining contexts - e. g., 
not flushing in public toilets, spitting and speeding when they cross the 
Singaporean border. 
The PAP's (Asian Values) hegemony on is based on a repudiation of liberalism 
(and de-legitimisation of individual rights and desires). As such, the PAP's 
hegemony is tinged with a sour taste; the PAP itself often describes its 
electoral victory as bitter-sweet while the local presses describe the PAP has 
having won the people's minds but not their hearts. Where dissent is not 
neutralised or incorporated but merely privatised or subordinated, the PAP 
draws upon some delay tactics to sustain its hegemony. 
To pressurise citizens into short-term conformity, the PAP often creates moral 
panics (e. g., "How to destroy Singapore: BGYeo" ST24/8/1992). If citizens 
believe in the doomsday scenario, or if they value the present enough, they will 
feel pressurised to "tolerate" coercion. 
"Crises" are effective because the Singapore nation is conceived not as an 
organic nation but as a problematic nation that is "perpetually plagued by 
existential crises of national economic survival" (cf. Clammer 1985,25/165; 
Ang and Stratton 1997; D. Birch 1992). The mass media are employed to stage 
Canada US$ 98,000 
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"spectres of crisis" (Hill and Lian 1995,34; D. Birch 1993; Clammer 1985,27) 
so that the leaders can present themselves as saviours. E. g., Singapore was 
portrayed as an unwilling nation abandoned by the British and the Malayans 
and forced to be independent in a cutthroat economic jungle. 
These "scenarios" - PM Goh's pet word - create "an atmosphere of psychosis" 
(Regnier 1991,230) that speeds up citizens' acceptance of government 
policies. According to a minister: 
one of the things we can do to get a little further down the road a little 
faster is to raise the spectre of total disaster as the alternative... sooner 
or later they [the citizens] will change (Betts in Hill and Lian 1995,34). 
The PAP government, although hegemonic, is not a popular one. (Cf. Chapter 
4 on how the PAP avoided popularity contests). LKY unrepentantly states that 
Singapore would not be what it is today had he not dared to be unpopular. 
Throughout its rise to power, the PAP had never depended on popularity to 
gain legitimacy. To this day, it still relies on delay tactics to tide it through 
legitimacy crises and to postpone the moment when it would be forced to rely 
solely on popular legitimacy. 
How likely is a counter-ideology to emerge? Tamney (1996,192) argues that it 
is difficult for an alternative ideology to capitalism to emerge. For Leys (1990, 
127), ideologies do not have to be loved to become hegemonic, it is sufficient 
that they have no serious rivals. To this end, the Singapore Dream remains 
unrivalled in its popularity and taken-for-grantedness (See Chapter 6). 
There are also obstacles to a united opposition. Opposition parties lack funds 
and credibility and are divided along race and class lines. The Workers' Party 
fights for social equality while the Singapore Democratic Party articulates 
middle-class concerns (Tamney 1996,191-2). Civil society groups take a 
reformist stance, providing "constructive criticisms" that are easily incorporated 
within the dominant ideology. Laws against public gatherings mean there is no 
opportunity for dissent to congregate and find enough support to form a united 
opposition. 
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Brown (1993,18) argues that exclusionary corporatism can give way to 
inclusionary corporatism if there are mass organisations with "relative 
autonomy" since they can easily slip out of government control, e. g., In 
Malaysia (Hill and Lian 1995,183) and one-party states do topple. There may 
also be cracks within the dominant ideology. If these are allowed to widen, the 
PAP may lose more than the 25-30% of votes that it already concedes 
regularly to the opposition. When dialect TV was banned, citizens switched 
over to Malaysian channels. The keen competition from Hong Kong and 
Malaysia to become a regional IT hub pressurises the government/media to 
improve Singapore's competitiveness as an open economy. 
The project of hegemony is never complete. The PAP's hegemony is sustained 
by citizens' subordination of dissent, which in turn is based on how much 
credibility they give to the government's representation of reality vis-ä-vis their 
own. In the next section, I will examine this gap between national and personal 
reality, whether it exists, how it is bridged, and the consequences they have on 
the reproduction of the PAP's hegemony. 
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Chapter 6 Postures towards authority 
The everyday legitimisation of authority 
and de-legitimisation of dissent 
Acknowledging that it is no longer possible or desirable to censor, the PAP's 
aims to allow ideological pluralism without fragmentation. Rather than work to 
eliminate diff erences, authority must work through, around and despite dissent. 
This chapter tries to illustrate how this is achieved in everyday life through 
focusing on the everyday strategies that citizens use to manage (legitimise or 
de-legitimise) authority and dissent before evaluating in Chapter 7 whether 
there is ideological unity amidst such modification, such as a preferred reading 
against which citizens negotiate, or a central normative system against which 
citizens feel compelled to justify their non-conformity. 
Assuming that ideologies have to be localised and adapted to become popular, 
this chapter will focus on the range and complexity of such ideological 
modification. To this end, "posture" is a superior concept because it bypasses 
tendencies in cognitive and linguistic approaches to establish coherence and is 
centrally concerned with hesitations and contradictions. By posture, I refer to 
the accumulated consequence on one's subjectivity due to the regular practice 
of strategies of dissent-management. Although there are infinite ways of 
managing dissent, in this dissertation, I prefer not to list them singly but to 
categorise them into four postures based on whether and how authority/dissent 
is (de-)Iegitimised: 102 
(a) "No dissent" - disgent is refuted 
This posture tends to draw upon the subdominant 
ideology/discourse of communitarianism and the myth of LKY's 
national sacrifice, which induces unconditional loyalty and 
renders anti-government criticisms unthinkable. 
102 My scheme has some correspondence to len Ang's (1985) and Stuart Hall's (1973) 
models: 
Preferred reading Negotiated reading Oppositional reading 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
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(b) Dissent is outweighed/neutralised by consent 
This posture tends to draw upon the dominant ideology/discourse 
of pragmatic self-reliance. Although their low expectations of the 
government makes them easily satisfied, citizens' "consent" Is 
conditional upon the government providing an environment where 
citizens can "get on with their lives" without governmental 
disturbances. 
(c) Dissent is privatised 
In the previous two postures, consent is dominant because 
dissent is neutralised. Here, dissent is neither neutralised nor 
fully legitimised for various reasons - the lack of technical/moral 
qualifications needed to gain credibility in the public sphere and 
the longing to succeed in the very system that is resented. This 
identification/discourse of sound social ideals (meritocracy, 
equality, etc. ) despite their flawed implementation diminishes the 
desire and ability to imagine alternatives. 
(d) Dissent is subordinated 
Alternative ideals are imagine-able and draw heavily from 
'Western" discourses of democracy and social welfare. 
Unhampered by low qualifications or by a longing for social 
success, dissent is publicly articulated, but may be 
contained/subordinated by the government. 
Although it would be more logical to start from either ends where dissent is 
least or most pronounced, I prefer a radial approach starting with discourses 
based on the dominant ideology103 because they constitute the centre around 
which other postures derive their significance and meaning. This centre serves 
as a type of preferred reading and is prevalent not only numerically but also 
qualitatively - through being foremost in popular imagination. Without fail, 
every interviewee imagine "others" in the image of a successful "kiasu 
Singaporean, " competitive, successful (on his way to achieving the 5Cs) and 
afraid to lose out, a "pure" fictional subject of the dominant ideology. Leaving 
aside comparisons with pure subjects until Chapter 7, in this chapter, I will 
explore "real subjects" who often embodies public discourses with less purity, 
intensity and in more complex ways. 
103 Ang's (1985) analysis of Dallas audience uses this strategy. Audience positions are 
linked in relation to a centre, which she identifies as "the ideology of mass culture. " 
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6A. PRAGMATIC ACCEPTANCE: THE DISCOURSE OF ECONOMIC 
SATISFACTION AND THE NEUTRALISATION OF DISSENT 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS POSTURE 
Since coming to power in 1959, the PAP has considered the building of a 
modern economy its most urgent political project. Just as political scientists 
argue that economics is a very good indicator of whether the incumbent party 
will be re-elected (CNN, Voice of Democracy, 6/1/2001), the PAP believed that 
with improvements in living standards would bring an end to socio-political ills. 
Indeed, if politics is defined as the process through which "groups of people 
unite behind some leadership to compete, bargain and negotiate in the shaping 
and sharing of political power to influence or control policy direction" (Chan 
1975,51), then, for Chua (1995,40), only the decade of transitional rule from 
colonial rule, attempted merger and independence (1955-1965) can properly be 
labeled "political. " Since coming to power, the PAP strove to render politics 
irrelevant and install economics as the center and heartbeat of the nation. An 
understanding of how this economic discourse is translated into commonsense 
would shed light on the "puzzle" (to Western observers) of why citizens are 
willing "to trade political rights for economic growth. " 
The significance of this posture lies in its breadth and depth. Even the most 
anti-government interviewee (and opposition) acknowledges that, "the PAP has 
done a good job" and criticizes only its side effects. This is tantamount to a 
concession that, not only is the PAP an excellent government, but also that 
economics is a relevant, if not central, criteria for evaluating governance. That 
the government was "too successful" in inculcating a Confucian spirit of 
capitalism (so much so that citizens have become too competitive at the 
expense of valuing community, thereby requiring communitarianism as a cure 
or supplement) indicates that its dominant ideology of competitive, "rugged 
individualism" has become deeply entrenched in Singapore society. 
More importantly, the perception of national economic prosperity prevents 
ideological fragmentation and the emergence of credible alternative by 
providing "proof" of the superiority of PAP and its values (Asian Values). 
Officially, the name of "economic prosperity" is evoked as a prelude to all sorts 
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of coercion; popularly, it motivates citizens of all posture groups to adopt 
various strategies of managing dissent (denial, privatization, subordination). In 
these ways, the official discourse of (PAP's/national) economic performance 
and popular discourse of (personal) economic satisfaction constitute the most 
basic and important basis of government legitimacy, upon which other (official 
and popular) strategies of legitimating authority and de-legitimating dissent are 
founded. 
H. THE LOGIC OF THE NEUTRALISATION OF DISSENT: THE DISCOURSE OF 
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION 
This posture is defined by a particular strategy of balancing discourses - the 
subordination of dissatisfactions so that satisfactions outweigh dissatisfactions: 
[ALI8]: Everything is good except... 
[AZ9]: The government cannot be expected to tackle everything... 
Unlike the concept of "subject position, " this "posture" is signalled not by the 
absence of, but by a willingness to subordinate, discontent. Given that the 
government actively promotes a supplementary communitarian ideology to 
address the side effects of success in late-capitalism, there are few citizens 
who are unaware of the contradictions and problems of the Singapore model 
(e. g., interviewees frequently cite inferiority complex as a side-effect of 
meritocracy). 
In terms of content, the satisfactions (economic satisfaction, orderly society, 
safety) and dissatisfactions (stressful lifestyle, over-regulation, repression of 
opposition) expressed by this group is not unlike those of other posture 
groups. ' 04 Should the analyst look simply at singular utterances without looking 
at how interviewees combine various discourses, the qualitative difference 
between complaining about (inevitable) side-eff ects and a total rejection based 
on a disagreement in principle would be lost. In fact, it can even be argued that 
104 PM Goh cited a media survey 
(http: //www. mita. gov. sg/speech/speeches/v2On6002. htm). Economy and social 
harmony were two of the top five things that Singaporeans were proud of. Over- 
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an acceptance that is based on awareness of "side-effects" may even be a 
more stable form of support for authority. "Posture, " unlike the "subject 
positions" created by particular discourses, situates utterances within the wider 
context of the total transcript so as to arrive at an inter-textual or inter- 
discursive understanding of the meaning of an utterance. "Posture" considers 
how citizens put discourses into perspectives and decide, despite complaints, 
that the government is a good "package deal. " 
In a research on hegemony, the crucial question is, to what extent is this 
phenomenon, of "neutralisation of dissent" an effect of the PAP's ideological 
project, i. e., the successful grafting of PAP values on social values. The rest of 
this section attempts to discuss the role of the discourse of economic 
satisfaction in the everyday neutralisation of dissent and the moulding of a 
posture of pragmatic acceptance. I hope to answer these questions by 
analysing the basis of their economic satisfaction. To what extent (and how 
directly) is their satisfaction based on personal (sociological-biographical) or 
media "ways of knowing" (which includes information, opinions, frames) and 
how do they bridge contradicting versions of reality? The key argument is that 
for this posture, obedience/conformity with government projects is accidental 
and conditional - while citizens' values and practices may coincide and 
legitimise government authority, they also have some independence and can 
constitute a challenge to government authority. 
Ill. WAYS OF KNOWING: PRIORITISING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGES 
WHEREVER POSSIBLE 
When looking at the sources of knowledge interviewees draw on to 
substantiate their economic satisfaction, a pattern that emerges is that they rely 
heavily on observations from their personal life and hardly borrow the media's 
language or opinions, except reluctantly, when asked to comment on unfamiliar 
or international events. While their discourses may echo certain government 
frames (e. g., economics as priority, Singapore is economically prosperous), 
regulation, lack of freedom and the government browbeating the opposition were 
among the top ten they were ashamed of. I 
197 
they do not reproduce others (e. g., fragile country with dangerous citizens, the 
Singapore Dream). 
During interviewees, I was struck by how "materialist" the PAP's basis 
legitimacy is105 -all discourses of satisfaction with the government rested on 
assessments of material accomplishment. What makes its legitimacy "doubly 
materialist" is that interviewees do not refer to abstract material 
accomplishment of the nation (which remains too "imaginary" to them) like 
GDP and "economy" but refer to material improvements that are tangible in 
their personal life, e. g., traffic efficiency, running taps, improvement in their 
housing environment. 
Discourses of economic satisfactions is always substantiated with detailed 
empirical observations from daily life, rather than with citations from the media: 
[KPT593-602]: Now, lifts ... go up to every floor.., traffic lights work fine... I stand at my flat window and look down. Every 10 minutes 
the light turns red. Even if you rob and get into a car, even if you 
pass this light, you have to stop at another light. Singapore is the 
safest place. 
Interviewees dedicate themselves to improving their personal material situation 
and are highly disinterested in politics. Despite having lived through many 
political upheavals and despite being dissatisfied with the PAP's treatment of 
opposition politicians, many were not familiar with the names of opposition 
politicians nor think them important: 
[AZ1 0]: Me: Do you follow the JBJ (opposition politician) case? 
AZ: I don't think it is important. 
Me: Why not? 
AZ: This is a very small matter, one person only. 
More interestingly, not only do interviewees (in posture 6A and 6B) see politics 
as less important than economics, they also have a particular conception of 
when politics becomes important. For AZ(10), there is no such thing as political 
issues, only practical ones - when asked whether he discussed social issues 
with friends, AZ replied that he solved his problems by going to the Town 
105Realising how much of the PAP's ideological groundwork is achieved through its 
public housing and public health policies. I re-drafted Chapter 4 to focus on the PAP's 
consolidation of economic legitimacy. 
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Council, i. e., there are no problems that cannot be solved by the administrative 
state. 
Additionally, many interviewees consider politics relevant only when there are 
economic problems. Both older and younger interviewees believed that political 
unrest happens "only if there isn't enough food" (AZ10). This is because 
economics is the only real issue; any power struggle during a period of 
economic stability/prosperity is excessive and motivated by power-hungry 
individuals: 
[KPT584-587]: Although Singapore is small, we have very high 
[financial] reserves, it's LKY's good work. The US says our politicians 
shoot down opposition... Let's not talk about this; those who crave for 
power will not make good government. 
This "almost myopic" focus on personal life and non-concern with national 
situations come across again in the types of news that interviewees are 
concerned with. Especially among older immigrant-citizens, a sociological 
group that corresponds most with this posture, there is a noticeable disinterest 
in local and especially international news generally, with the exception of the 
Asian economic crisis. With hindsight, I can see that most interviewees are 
only interested in news that has a direct impact (especially negative economic 
impact) on them; they seem uninterested in local opposition parties, campaigns 
and civil society developments or in international events. 
This narrow concern is associated with a heavy reliance on personal ways of 
knowing wherever possible, 106 to the extent of disregarding the media's 
representations unless they are "proven" true in their own life. They are so 
unwilling or unable to rely on media as a source of knowledge that rather than 
rehash media platitudes, they prefer to not comment even on non-politicised 
social issues. 
[ALI7] Me: is there a Singapore culture that is different from other 
countries? 
ALI: Difficult. If we travel, then we can see. 
106For Information on the Asian economic crisis, citizens had little choice but to rely on 
the media. While it Is not surprising that they reproduce the media's comparative 
frame (comparing Singapore only to worse-off homeland states, e. g., Malaysia, 
Indonesia), it was surprising that interviewees did not initiate comparisons to better-off 
homeland states (India, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China). 
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Me: Do you travel often? 
ALI: To quite a number of places, but not long enough to make a 
diff erentiation. 
This observation of low media-reliance is supported by observations of their 
media habits. They are not regular media users. This Is not surprising since the 
older generations, being largely illiterate, are not catered to in national media. 
Interviewees spoke of their altered media habits since the government banned 
dialects from broadcast media. Neither do they "waste time" (AZ9) with 
alternative communication channels such as the coffeeshop, preferring to 
devote themselves to their families. 
This contrasts with later postures, where interviewees fabricate information to 
justify their view (Chapter 6B), seek out rumors to substantiate their counter- 
hegemonic arguments (Chapter 6C) or rely on foreign media for alternative 
perspectives (Chapter 6D). By contrast, these interviewees feel no pressure to 
hide their "lack" of knowledge, which in actuality, is an unwillingness to 
formulate a (hasty, stereotypical) opinion rather than a lack of knowledge. ALI's 
position is more significant if we consider that, as a pre-state Malay immigrant- 
citizen, he would have considerable knowledge of Malaysia that he could draw 
on to compare Singaporean culture with. By contrast, interviewees In other 
posture groups were quick to reproduce trite media representations of 
Singaporean culture and draw upon essentialised stereotypes of Singapore- 
Malaysian cultural differences. On the topic of "young people today, " this 
posture group was similarly unwilling to chastise the younger generation, 
something that the communitarian group (6B) constantly did. Instead, they 
empathised with the young and spoke about the difficulty of making a living In 
the present. 
Time and again, when confronted with irrelevant topics, this group chooses not 
to reproduce salient media discourses. The only instance when media 
discourses were directly drawn upon was the economic crisis; otherwise, 
wherever possible - to the extent of declining comment - they prefer to rely on 
personal rather than media knowledge. 
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Cynics may argue that media effects can still be inferred. Popular discourses of 
economic satisfaction may clearly be an ideological effect, indeed, that popular 
discourses coincide or echo pro-government discourses may mean that the 
dominant ideology or ethic has become so entrenched and localized that its 
official antecedents is no longer clear. This could be read, furthermore, as an 
effect of agenda setting, where anti-government discourses are classified out 
of the media and over time, classified out of popular consciousness. In this 
way, interviewees become unable to clearly articulate their anti-government 
dissatisfactions, which serve to neutralize dissent, and in the long run, silence 
it. 
There are some arguments against this position. If interviewees neutralize 
dissent, it is not because they are persuaded by government justifications but 
because they witness these tangible'changes. If dissent is subordinated, it is 
not subordinated to state or media discourse, but to their personal experience 
of satisfaction. 
Interviewees' discourses echo only certain government ideologies. E. g., 
interviewees do not subscribe to the myth of the fragile nation and its 
dangerous citizens. Additionally, despite valuing material well-being, 
interviewees do not identify with "the Singapore Dream" or the (Confucian) 
spirit of capitalism. Indeed, many, being from the pre-state immigrant 
generation, had not even heard of the "Singapore Dream" and certainly did not 
desire possessing the 5Cs: 
[AZ6-7]: I only want to have enough to buy a refrigerator and a colour 
television so the kids will stay at home. 
These are merely some examples of gaps between popular and government 
discourses. Rather than list gaps between government ideologies and popular 
values, I prefer to discuss them thematically in the following sections to infer 
determining influences and establish the relative influence of government, 
sociology and contextual influences. 
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IV. SOCIOLOGY: A PRE-STATE MENTLITY OF SELF-RELIANCE AND LOW 
EXPECTATIONS 
To explain the neutralisation of dissent via the prioritisation of economics is 
insufficient; it would not explain why citizens continue to feel economic 
satisfaction even their personal economic situation is not rosy. Economic 
satisfaction and dissent neutralisation appears to linked to a third phenomenon 
- interviewees' low expectations, which suggests that there is little dissent for 
citizens to neutralise in the first place. 
Low expectations correlate significantly with a sociological group. Older 
immigrant-citizens tend to place a high premium on self-reliance and have no 
expectation that the state will take care of them. My observation is supported 
by a ST(11/4/1998) survey finding that it was those aged between 35-45 who 
desired the "Singapore Dream of the 5Cs", rather than the younger "post- 
65ers" (those born after Independence in 1965) or the older pre-state 
immigrant generation. This generation difference is reflected in an interview 
with a 3-tier family. Grandfather KPT(683), like other old immigrants (AZ6, 
ALIB), wants "enough to pass down to [his] son" and had not heard of the 
"Singapore Dream. " His middle-aged son (CST645), like other pre-state 
interviewees (BL91), desires the 5Cs but lacks the necessary qualifications. 
The young graduate (YJT621) has the qualification but believes "there are 
more important things than these. " 
The advantage of researching a young nation-state like Singapore is that there 
is still a generation of citizens who have lived a large part of their life in pre/non- 
modern- nation-state Singapore. As such, the discourse of these pre- 
state/Immigrant citizens is important as a "control group' 07" and as a 
comparative "pre-state mentality" against which the nature of discourses of 
post-state citizens can be contextualized. 
107 This assumes that their discourse have not altered significantly-an impossible 
situation to "control" outside the laboratory. However, this group appears to be 
relatively alienated by the media. Their contact with newspapers is also minimal given 
their illiteracy and high reliance on dialect broadcast, which was banned by the 
government. All immigrant citizens initiated conversation about this ban and spoke 
about how they adjusted to it. Many do not watch TV because "there is nothing 
interesting" and "actors speak (Mandarin and English) too fast. " 
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What is this pre-state/national mentality like and what elective affinities does 
the pre-state subject have with the subject of Asian Capitalism and Asian 
Democracy? 
The pre-state subject's strong belief in self-reliance and low economic 
expectations makes him a good Asian Capitalist subject. 
Self-reliant citizens who value "face" make good "Asian Capitalism" subjects 
because they are strongly against welfarism. KPT also praised the government 
for rewarding diligence rather than handing out welfare: 
[KPT589-603]: The government didn't want complacency. Instead 
of welfare, they think of other ways of caring for people. Now lifts, 
they go up to every floor ... to take care of the 
handicapped. This 
develops the hardworking attitude of Singapore to look for jobs and 
support family. Everyone must stand on his own. 
In a community that shares the value of self-reliance, individuals who are 
dependent on social welfare suffer shame: 
[KPT569-574]: If you do not improve, you will earn [little], you cannot 
face people, you develop an inferiority complex... If you cannot provide 
for yourself, you cannot provide for your family or get married; you 
cannot have children. No children mean you cannot pass down the 
generation. Then you keep having inferiority complex. 
Within (Asian) Capitalism, responsible selves are expected to see to their own 
needs through private savings and investment -a trait of "Asian" capitalism. 
The expectation of self-reliance and shame of not being self-reliant explains 
why one interviewee was shocked that her friend married a man who had no 
insurance policy, which, in an Asian capitalist system, indicates that the groom 
was not serious about his future. 
Self-reliant pre-state/immigrant citizens believe in high savings and suspect 
credit spending - features of Asian Capitalism. Without exceptions, all 
cautioned against spending beyond their means, warning that society will 
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become messy if citizens "don't know themselves" (H0270-280). 108 The value 
of self-reliance also makes welfarism un-imaginable, even for those who are 
young and Western-educated. One Western-educated interviewee asked, 
"How would we have enough to pay for health and education (i. e., be self- 
reliant) if we are taxed 50%? " 
Additionally, a community that believes in self-reliance is more likely to be anti- 
protectionism. Asian Capitalism's emphasis on meritocratic competition offers 
no protection for local labour against international competition. While this is a 
sore point for a vocal minority, most citizens accept this and try to adapt to the 
situation. Many take up the government's call to "upgrade" their skills to better 
compete with foreign labour (ALI1, KPT447) and respond to the government's 
call to "lower [their] expectations. " When asked whether he has difficulty finding 
a job, RM(125) replied that he did not have difficulties because he was not 
choosy, - unlike (imaginary) Others. ALI believed that it was more "sane" for 
citizens to upgrade and adjust rather than make demands of the state: 
[ALI9]: [During the economic crisis]. People have to reduce their 
expectations. You have to adjust your expectations to your capability. 
Any sane person would do that. 
Besides having low economic expectations, immigrant-citizens have even lower 
political expectations. Having witnessed the fragility and temporality of polities 
(British colonialism, Japanese Occupation, Malayan Federation), Singapore is 
not a taken-for-granted reality with secure boundaries and essence. KPT, AZ 
and ALI were keenly aware that Singapore is. "a Malay land" where non-Malays 
stay only if they work for their "board: " 
[KPT580-583]: Singapore does not belong to the Chinese. LKY was very 
shrewd in dealing with the local Malays and give privileges to them. The 
majority [Chinese] earns and provides for the rest so the locals actually 
support us to be independent and do not allow the neighbouring 
countries to attack us. 
They do not expect authorities to be concerned with the welfare of the "little 
man" and would submit to whichever authority is in power, to the extent of 
108 I had a culture shock in the US. My lack of credit history was viewed negatively to 
disqualify me from renting apartments, rather than viewed positively as an indication 
that I have never lived on borrowed resources. 
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speaking English during colonialism, Japanese during WW2 Occupation and 
Malay during Federation: 
KPT(431-443): I came to Singapore when I was 14. During WW2, the 
Japanese came and threw bombs. We had to "own-self do, own-self 
eat [depend on ourselves], the British prisoners of war were kept at Fort 
Caning... I subject myself to the particular person in authority... What 
the Japanese wanted, I sold. We had to learn Japanese; I addressed 
them as masters. 
Indeed, this group had difficulty grasping the notion of representative/popular 
government. When asked about whether the media and government reflected 
the people's voice, the closest understanding of "representation" that HO could 
comprehend was aesthetic realism: 109 
[HO127-134]: Me: Does the ShinMin [a tabloid] reflects the people's 
voice? 
HO: I don't understand 
Me: Do they report things that little people are interested in? 
HO: (Silence) 
Me: How do local programs compare with imported Taiwanese 
programs? 
HO: Taiwanese shows, they use magic... it's not realistic... 
Their lack of expectations of the state is paralleled by a willingness to adapt to 
coercive policies, rather than resist or criticise them, even when they perceive 
policies as unfair. Self-reliant citizens with low expectations make good "Asian 
Democracy" subjects. By self-adjusting to, rather than protesting against, unfair 
government policies, citizens perform the "Asian" duty of avoidance of 
confrontation with authority, allowing national discourses/policies to be 
perpetuated despite private disagreement, and to even acquire an aura of 
consensus. 
A topic that interviewees initiate is the banning of dialects in broadcast media, 
i. e., TV and radio programs became completely inaccessible to dialect- 
speaking pre-state citizens. '" Rather than protest the ban, KPT(713) simply 
"[went] to sleep if there is nothing for [him] to watch" while STC(367) sought live 
street entertainment (Teochew street opera). Many older citizens complained 
109 "Realism" Is Hall's (1997) first and most basic of three understandings of 
"representation " 
110 Even in 1979 (14 years after Independence), about 90% of public Interpersonal 
communication was in dialect (Ministry of Communications and Information 1989,79). 
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about the quality of TV programmes. For STC(330), TV English was spoken to 
quickly while KPT knows insufficient Mandarin to watch TV. All minority 
interviewees complained about the quality of minority programmes but adapted 
privately. Those who could afford it subscribe to cable TV while others acquired 
illegal TV boosters to receive Indonesian channels. 
Such "tolerance" of state intervention makes citizens appear docile and 
obedient. However, this may be less an indication of obedience than a 
manifestation of the immigrant value of self-reliance and survival instinct. Some 
scholars argue that this indicates ideological success in de-politicising the 
population. "' However, this thesis is unable to explain a phenomenon: if the 
government is ideologically successful, why does it continue to accuse its 
citizens of being materialistic (not surrendering their vote until they receive a 
tangible return) and of seeking greener pastures? 
Indeed, the case of illegal TV boosters suggests that this posture group has 
some degree of independence from state ideologies and that their 
"reproduction" or non-contest of authority should be seen less as a case of 
obedience than coincidence between dominant values and immigrant values. 
Dissent is neutralised less by identification with dominant discourse than by a 
combination of low expectations and a pragmatic, conditional assessment of 
the benefits - measured in a solely personal material way - derived from the 
particular/current authority. 
What is important here is less the determination of whether this posture is a 
result of "popular" or "national" values whose authenticity is questionable, but 
rather to identify, as any stddy of hegemony must, the moments when state 
and popular discourses correspond, and when they do not. Having. explored the 
"elective affinity" between immigrant mentality and Asian Capitalism and Asian 
Democracy, I will now identify how this immigrant mentality can be counter- 
hegemonic and present an obstacle to the PAP's hegemonic project. . 
"' Conceptually, mediardeological effects are impossible to refute. Media platitudes 
like "why the government cannot do more" (ST23/07/1998) can Influence citizens to 
think that, "the government is already doing all it can. " 
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V. THE LIMITS OF ACCEPTANCE: PRAGMATISM AND CONDITIONAL 
COMPLIANCE 
The best "evidence" that this posture legitimises authority based on 
convenience rather than obedience is indicated by how the pragmatic self- 
reliance of citizens can take on a life of its own, independent of the state's 
ability to control it. 
Firstly, the PAP appears to have successfully proletarised citizens but not 
necessarily instil in them the spirit of capitalism to accumulate beyond 
subsistence. From my own research and from media surveys, the vision of a 
society of "kiasu" (afraid to lose, to be competitive at all costs) citizens appears 
to be more utopian than real. Contrary to official discourses, the younger 
generation is not as materialistic as is thought. An ST (30/06/1996, 
http: //cyberfair. gsn. org/sngs98/19960630-2. html) survey based on 418 
Singaporeans in their 20s reported that, "they are more realistic and 
reasonable, and considerably less fickle, then they are often made out to 
be. ""2 
If this ethic of accumulation is weak in the younger generation, it is practically 
non-existent among the older generation, 113 who are unaware of the 
"Singapore Dream" and are concerned only with "filling stomachs" and securing 
"a roof over [their] head. " 
[KPT656-682] Me: Have you heard of the Singapore dream? 
KPT: (pause) ... No.... I don't listen to politics... I never care about these things. I 
Translator: (explains the 5Cs) 
KPT: I only care about daily living, enough to eat and spend. These 
things are not important. I only care about my son, grandchildren. 
do business for 50 years to provide children a place to live... If I 
earn enough, I'pass it down to the next generation so they can live 
more comfortably. 
112 Chapter 7 argues that the government/media's insistence on (mis)-representing the 
youth as materialistic is a strategy to create a moral panic so as to discourage/lower 
expectations, thereby de-legitimising demands on the state. 113 HO presents an interesting case of two mentalities in one person. She does not 
expect prosperity for herself but hope for the 5Cs for her children. 
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[AZ6-7] Me: Do you know the Singapore Dream? 
AZ: I'm not sure 
Me: (explain) 
AZ: I don't need these... I need television, refrigerator... We need 
our own colour TV so that the kids can watch and don't go loitering. 
Me: Do young people want these things? 
AZ: I don't know. Young people have their own reasons. 
[ALI8] Me: Do you dream the Singapore dream? 
ALI: What is that? 
Me: The 5Cs. 
ALI: Oh. People like me, we have a roof over our heads, I make 
enough money to eat. 
Me: Do you think young people want this? 
ALI: I think most young people don't go all out for them. What they 
want is a comfortable life, a natural desire ... when I was young, I 
also. 
In AZ's and ALI's accounts, we see them extending their own goal of 
subsistence to the younger generation. Contrary to media discourse, AZ and 
ALI do not see the younger generation as materialist, but merely as struggling 
for subsistence. Although they had ample opportunities and authority (as old 
people) to criticise the younger generation, they demonstrated a high degree of 
empathy (awareness of the contextual pressures on others). All defended the 
young's desire as "natural" (ALI8) or "they have their own reasons" (AZ6-7) and 
were aware of the social cost ("inferiority complex, KPT572) if they did not 
succeed. ALI(8) went to the extent of saying, "if I was young now, I would have 
to do the same. " 
This deep empathy (sensitivity to individuals' contextual situations) is part of a 
wider worldview regarding tomporality, agency and community. This worldview 
is instilled by their experience of the transience of Singapore's political 
structures: in less than five decades, Singapore has been a British colony, a 
Japanese occupied territory, almost a Malayan federal state, an independent 
nation-state and, as LKY threatens, could potentially re-merge with Malaysia. 
Not surprisingly, they see their relation to the environment as one where they 
have to continually struggle to adapt to an unstable (or temporarily stable) 
environment. Success and failure is never fully attributed to Individual agency, 
but also partly to one's circumstance ("luck, " "fate, "), although one is obliged to 
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do their best to survive regardless of what changes the environment presents 
one with. ' 14 
This would explain the dramatic lack of a sense of imagined community. In 
reading the transcripts of immigrant-citizens, I was surprised by the blatant 
disregard of institutional agency; interviewees framed accounts in terms of 
individuals embedded in their situations. Unlike coff eeshoppers who blamed 
the state (Chapter 6C), the state did not even seem to exist In this group's 
worldview. They did not accord it blame/credit, suggesting that the state Is not 
even considered a well-formed/bounded agent in control of its existence but a 
temporal/historical entity. This can be seen in two examples. 
Firstly, interviewees seemed to have an inability to impute agency 
(credit/blame) to the state even when its interference in their personal life is 
obvious. WCM(322-373) lost a large sum in shares during the economic crisis 
and blamed herself from being "greedy" and not selling them off earlier. 
Curious about how an uneducated housewife who did not understand decimals 
and percentages come to have an interest in shares, I prodded her into telling 
me how she started this hobby. State agency was established momentarily - 
the government had encouraged housewives to invest their life savings into 
shares - and forgotten immediately, 115 as though the thought was too alien to 
be remembered. She reverted to blaming herself when while telling me how 
widespread the problem was (all her friends were in the same situation). 
Secondly, even while expressing satisfactions, these interviewees did not 
necessarily attribute praise to the PAP. KPT(580-583) praises LKY without 
attributing full agency to him. LKY is not complimented for his power, but for 
being "shrewd in his dealings" and for successfully cajoling more fundamental 
114 Unlike the communitarian group who opts for a moral explanation, this group 
explains non-achievement in a meritocracy circumstantially. 115 This was not the first time this link had been forgotten by WCM. She had watched 
the movie "Money No Enough" -a local movie so popular that even housewives and 
retired citizens watched it-where government blame was Implied. In the movie, a 
woman asked a man which shares to buy. He replied: "Simple! If the government says 
buy, you buy! " She then asked: "what if I lose money? " He replied: "then blame the 
government! " Later in the movie, the woman lost her money. While no direct blame 
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forces to cooperate. LKY is not seen as a primary agent but a survivor who 
succeeded in a difficult' situation. 
Similarly, ALI praises Singapore without directly attributing, indeed trivialising, 
government agency by saying that the PAP had an easy task because of 
Singapore's small size:. 
ALI(6): We are more advanced *[than Malaysia]. Singapore will be of a 
higher standard than a country like Malaysia... Because Singapore is a 
small country, easy to develop, easy to educate people... 
The significance of such "faint praise16" emerges when the reader understands 
that the preferred reading is one where Singapore's success is exclusively 
attributed to the PAP's governance (especially, as the myth of fragile nation 
insist, Singapore has no natural resources and was crisis-prone). This view is 
so hegemonic that even the opposition acknowledges the PAP's success. As 
such, the slightest deviation/modification in the reproduction of this account 
constitute an act of resistance-where loud praise is expected, citizens' silence 
or "faint praise" on this subject can be deafening. Additionally, the significance 
of such "faint praise" becomes clearer when we recognise that interviewees 
hold this position despite the resonance between personal and media realities. 
If interviewees have difficulty attributing agency and reality to the institution of 
the state, there is even more difficulty in getting them to see Singapore as 
"nation, " as more than just a temporal context, as an imagined community with 
some organic agency. ' 17 Their overwhelming sensitivity to contextual agency 
and belief in the impermanence of political institutions breed a particular sense 
of community - one that is minimally "imagined. " 
They do not identify easily with essentialized or problematised/hybridised 
identities. While the communitarian group (chiefly first-generation citizens) 
was placed on the government, the government's responsibility has already been 
implicated. 
'" A few years ago, the government accused the opposition of offering only "faint 
praise" to it. " For Durkheim (1947), society is more than the sum of its parts. It develops a life of 
its own independently of its parts; it is a sui generis entity that generates collective 
effervescence. 
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struggled to maintain their "ethnic/linguistic culture" (Chapter 6B), this group 
spoke whatever language was necessary for survival. Many had difficulties 
subscribing to even the most commonsensical identities. AZ(1) considered 
himself a Chinese-looking Malay with a Chinese mother and a British colonial 
birth certificate. He was unconcerned about his racial purity: "as long as nobody 
bothers me, it's okay whether I am Malay or Chinese. " For KPT(455-463), his 
Singaporean nationality was a matter of administrative convenience. When 
Malaysia and Singapore separated, he choose to register with a Singaporean 
clan association along with his family for fear that the state officials would 
misspell his name, thereby breaking up families and clans. Needless to say, 
none were able to distinguish between ethnicity and nation. 
Additionally, although many referred to China as their homeland, the "China" 
they referred to was clearly not a state, country or a nation - all of which 
required an "imagined" sense of community - but a metaphor for the 
provinces/clans their forefathers came from. Whenever interviewees spoke 
about visiting China, they indicated particular villages and listed the extended 
family members they had there. E. g., STC visited China 4 times and HO visited 
China 10 times - but both visited the same village on all their trips. The 
significance of this devotion emerges when we consider the inconvenience of 
such journeys. It is common knowledge that when visiting China, one has to 
distribute large amounts of money to relatives. Although the story is often told 
about third-world relatives who eagerly acknowledge distant kinsmen from a 
more developed country for the money and gifts they bring, the fact that 
interviewees perpetuate these burdensome practice suggests that what Is 
home/homeland is not China as an imagined community but as 
blood/patrilineal relations. 1$ 
Bearing this un-imagined sense of community in mind, previous excerpts bring 
additional insights. In excerpts on their non-awareness of the Singapore 
Dream, interviewees also revealed the importance of family. KPT(656-682) 
wanted only to accumulate enough to "pass down to the next generation. " In a 
capitalist mentality, accumulation is an end itself. For these interviewees, 
1 8Cf. my critique, via Liang, of the myth of communitarian Asia in Chapter 1. 
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accumulation appears to be a means to an end-an ensured lineage (KPT569- 
574). 
While the government has successfully proletarised the population, they have 
not succeeded in preventing them from becoming what Marx considers 
"vagabonds" - most clearly Indicated by the PAP's continuous struggle with the 
problem of emigration ("brain drain. ") The heart of the problem appears to be 
citizens' a-nationalism: far from partaking in the myth of the fragile nation and 
its dangerous citizens, interviewees believe they must survive despite political 
upheavals. In fact, every interviewee in this posture group believed that citizens 
have no duty to the nation-state (only to their families) and "politics" - including 
resisting colonialism, communism and authoritarianism - should be left to the 
politicians. When asked about Singapore-Malaysia border conflicts affecting 
citizens' everyday life, all interviewees in my fieldwork immediately translated 
this national issue into the personal issue of whether their taps would still run 
while asserting that, "wars are between governments, they have nothing to do 
with citizens. " This is yet another indication of how citizens believe that life 
should be guided by sheer survival instincts and not by political/nationalist 
mobilisations. Needless to say, the discourse of sacrificing for the nation - the 
defining trait of the next posture group - is completely absent. 
Vl. REPRODUCING THE STATE TRHOUGH PRAGMATIC ACCEPTANCE 
In detailing this posture group's mentality, I have sought to argue that their 
everyday neutralisation of dissent is less a case of a happily ideologised, well- 
disciplined proletariat than a case of coincidental acceptance of pragmatic 
anational citizens that the PAP has failed to "nationalise, " a group whose 
consent is highly conditional upon tangible improvement in the material 
situation of their personal life. Such a basis of legitimacy is contingent and 
fragile-the government constantly worries about the erosion of its legitimacy 
during economic recessions. 119 
19 Chapter 8 continues where this leaves off: how the PAP attempts to rescue Its 
legitimacy during economic crises through securing an economic legitimacy that Is not 
based on economic performance but on its "track record! 
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In this sense, it is Inaccurate to identify such "runaway pragmatism120i as the 
price of success (i. e., that the PAP had been too successful). Being "too 
successful" ideologically is tantamount to ideological failure because Ideological 
success is not merely the inculcation of a particular (Asian work) ethic because 
ideologies always contain inconsistencies and contradictions. Ideological 
success is to be achieved through a fine balance between the dominant ethic 
(competitiveness) and its negative side-eff ects (communitarianism). The over- 
legitimisation of either only serves to encourage the development of 
legitimate/viable alternatives. 
Despite its relative autonomy from authority, such "runaway pragmatism" does 
contribute to the everyday legitimisation of the state. State intervention 
acquires an aura of consensus when citizens self-adjust and do not protest 
even when they disagree. By not voicing their disagreement, citizens 
complicitly reproduce state authority. They make real the "silent majority" that 
the media constructs and that the government claims to represent. They permit 
the creation of an aura: of consensus that allows the government to dismiss 
alternative opinions as vices of the "vocal minority. " Furthermore, as we shall 
see in the next posture, this "silent majority" is not merely a discursive 
construct; it also has a material and psychological reality. By imagining that 
/f, 
one's significant others are part of this "silent majority, " citizens try to second- 
guess social expectations and fulfil them, thereby intensifying social 
conservatism, hence reaffirming the hegemony and centrality of state values 
for the organisation of inter-personal life. 
120 Hardt (1992,123) provides an excellent critique of the Ideology of pragmatism, 
citing Horkeimer: "pragmatism reflects a society that has no time to remember and 
meditate. " Pragmatism is often an effective strategy to persuade members to work 
within social/ideological constraints rather than to "idealistically" long to change the 
social order. 
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6B. PATRIOTIC COMMUNITARIANISM: THE MYTH OF THE SACRIFICE AND 
THE REFUTATION OF DISSENT 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS POSTURE 
The PAP's economic legitimacy, no matter how strong and hegemonic, is one 
that is insecure, being conditional upon economic performance. Furthermore, 
its achievement of economic prosperity, coupled with its campaigns of the 
Singapore Dream, may inadvertently raise citizens' expectations to an 
insatiable level (Cf. Krugman's argument that the Asian economic miracle is 
unsustainable) and thus make their ideological success more illusive. 
"Asian Values" is the PAP's attempt to secure a new basis of hegemony- one 
that is hopefully less conditional on economic performance - through 
inculcating communitarianism. However, because the superiority of "Asian 
Values" is itself an economic argument -its claims are substantiated by 
"evidence" of outstanding economic accomplishments - it is deeply 
questionable whether its communitarian ideology would truly achieve relative 
autonomy from its economics base. To this end, a close. examination of this 
posture would provide insight to this question. How do citizens substantiate the 
superiority of communitarian values- do they believe communitarianism is 
superior because it produces prosperity or do they do so for less conditional 
reasons? 
This posture is significant secondly because many scholars have argued that 
the "Shared Values" project of communitarianism is difficult/impossible to 
materialize (Chapter 5). They argue that "Shared Values" was an abstract 
ideology and that it was not translated into policies that could affect citizens' 
life. The existence of this posture group - no matter how rare and few in 
numbers - is conceptually significant because it offers an insight into how a 
seemingly un-materialise-able ideology can filter into everyday popular 
discourses. 
Perlmutter's (1981,179) theory helps us to understand this process of 
ideological materialization and to grasp a further reason why this posture group 
is significant. He argues that modern/soft authoritarianism is sustained less by 
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ideology than by the legitimized intervention of state Institutions into all aspects 
of life; and that in justifying state interference at the most private levels, 
economic arguments are less effective than moral arguments. Placed within a 
wider theory of state projects to achieve governmentality, it would appear that 
authoritarianism is more easily legitimated by moral governmentality (based on 
non-individualising, anti-liberal ideologies such as communitarianism) than by 
ethical governmentality (based on liberal ideologies). 
This helps us understand the significance of the role this posture group plays in 
ensuring that Singapore society remains a highly moral one. As the "vocal 
minority" within the conservative "silent majority, " the tendency of this group to 
police others embeds communitarianism in everyday life. From the accounts of 
other groups, this group - Imagined by others as representative of the silent 
majority - seems successful in wrangling rhetorical compliance or display of 
patriotic communitarianism from others through their articulate social 
expectations and moral gaze, thereby successfully instilling a moral 
governmentality where public morality guides inter-personal life.. 
H. THE LOGIC OF THE REFUTATION OF DISSENT: THE MYTH OF THE 
SACRIFICE 
This posture is characterized by a fervent refutation of the legitimacy of dissent 
and extensive reproduction of government ideologies. Such unconditional 
loyalty to the government is substantiated typically upon economic and moral 
discourses. 
The discourse of the PAP'sr economic performance occurs occasionally, but in 
a different guise than when it appears in the pragmatic group's discourse. 
Here, interviewees spoke positively about the national economy, even if they 
had not personally benefited from its prosperity. Besides referring to a more 
abstract or "imagined" community (e. g., "economy"), the communitarian group 
also saw the PAP's economic performance as evidence of its technical and 
moral efficiency. 
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While it is not difficult to see how economic legitimacy can translate into 
technical legitimacy, the process of translating economic and technical 
legitimacy into moral legitimacy is subtler. This translation is achieved through 
drawing upon the Confucian conflation of a moral government as a technical 
government, where technical efficiency is achievable only through moral 
discipline and intense rigöur and where "sages" are expected to provide 
exemplary leadership 
More frequently, this group relied on non-economic substantiation of PAP's 
moral legitimacy. All interviewees in this group spoke about LKY as having 
performed the first communitarian act of sacrificing for the nation, which binds 
citizens in webs of unconditional loyalty to "the father of Singapore. " This 
endows LKY with un-challengeable moral legitimacy to govern and intervene 
into every aspect of citizens' life. 
The construction of this myth of sacrifice requires the postulation of national 
heroes, villains and scenarios of a threatened nation. For this group, it is very 
clear who the good and bad guys are. LKY, as the "father of Singapore" 
(SLH931), could do no wrong while opposition politicians are "traitors" 
(LDS609) guilty of "moral crimes" (SEW503). LKY's goodness is irrevocably 
confirmed by his single historical act of "sacrifice, " which proves his good 
intentions towards Singapore beyond doubt; any future mistakes would be 
more than redeemed by this single act. Citizens who accept this myth accept 
his authority unconditionally. 
When probed further, interviewees were vague about the dire circumstances 
Singapore was rescued froth with this sacrifice (see 6B111). They preferred to 
focus on the magnitude of LKY's sacrifice -a lucrative law career. 
[LDS639-643]: LKY could have been a very rich guy 
Me: isn't he rich now? 
LDS: If he practised law, he would be the best! But he gave up all 
these years. His sacrifice, we should be grateful, it's for our good. 
[SLH927-929]: Mr. Lee has done a lot for us. Without him, there's 
no Singapore, he is a father to Singapore... 
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Besides LDS and SLH's use of "father", others also described state-citizen 
bonds with paternal undertones. For CST(895), citizens should not "cha-jui" 
(interrupt). In daily usage, adults use this term to scold children for not 
speaking out of turn, i. e., they should be "seen and not heard. " PTN(610-621) 
similarly narrated a Chinese story where a loving emperor sacrificed himself for 
his beloved subjects. 
These familial metaphors perform vital ideological functions. Firstly, they 
transform authoritarianism into "tough love" or "soft/popular authoritarianism. " 
The paternal sacrifice of a loving father testifies to the saviour's good intentions 
and benevolence. 
Secondly, by representing LKY as "father, " an impersonal government is 
personalised and a historical event is made relevant to present everyday life. 
Because the sacrifice is unconditionally given, it can never be fully repaid. 
Eternally indebted citizens can only be "grateful" and pledge their unreserved, 
undying loyalty. 
[PTN610-632]: A general commits a sin. A loving emperor wants to 
spare him. What can he do? The Emperor stabs himself on the 
general's behalf. The general cannot say, "I don't want it, " or hope 
to redeem his freedom by fighting a few more battles... This 
happens in Chinese stories all the time... you have to believe in my 
good intentions. If you suspect ulterior motive, there is nothing 
more that can be done. 
The sacrifice discourse is an "all or nothing" frame with no in-between 
positions; one either accepts it wholeheartedly or rejects it. Given LKY's 
mythical perfection, there are never any "good" reasons to oppose the 
government; the opposition) is merely "opposing for the sake of opposition" 
(SEW809) -a basic tenet of democracy. This imperative that citizens trust their 
government unquestioningly is consistent with the Confucian belief that leaders 
are mandated by heavenly will and "without weakness" (Pye and Pye 1985,66- 
76). The act of checking on the government is tantamount to ingratitude. Thus 
any opposition is "traitorous, " and a "moral crime. " Thus, SLH(913-914) 
believes that the opposition should be "ashamed" and "apologise" since 
"leaders are entitled to be hypersensitive to any hint of criticism. " 
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Thirdly, the sacrifice myth legitimises a moral hierarchy. By accepting the 
sacrifice, citizens accept an unequal relationship where, as "infantile 
subjectsi12' in need of tutelage, they surrender their rights to self-knowledge 
and accept that "father knows best. " Every interviewee in this group perceived 
the mass as being incapable of deep thoughts and unworthy of 
media/government representation [SEW], LDS(359-361/642) criticises 
ungrateful young people who think "they know better than LKY" how to run 
Singapore. While the previous group could not grasp the concept of 
representativeness, this group believes that the government should represent 
social ideals, not "the people, " and guide them with these ideals. 
[SEW681-685]: Those lower society, if you ask an ordinary citizen a 
social issue, they cannot answer. These little people, you have to sit 
down and talk to him slowly and lead him. 
[SLH788-789]: Those uneducated people who don't know who to think, 
they can easily fall into traps [and create social disorder] 
[HO184-189] Me: Do you like that programme? 
HO: I have no authority to do sol ... We are not big shots or have 
qualifications! 
Fourthly, this myth justifies state intervention into citizens' private life. While the 
previous group (pragmatic acceptance) see themselves as "parts" smaller than 
the government, they do not see the government as morally superior. On the 
contrary, they believe that citizens should be self-knowing and self-reliant, 
rather than be dependent on the state. This group, on the other hand, eagerly 
awaits government tutelage. SLH explained how 2 "national"122 sitcoms 
educated her about "shoulds" and the "right things to do: " 
[SLH578-582]: "Growing Up" is serious. [The actress] has 2 or 3 
boyfriends and must choose... For her future, she should choose 
someone who can take care of her... 
[SLH591-594]: [In "Under One Roof"], the father is the one to solve the 
problem and [give advice], the show always ends with "the moral of the 
story is... " 
121 Cf. Berlant's (1996) theory of infantile citizenship. 122 "National" because "Under One Roof" showcases a multiracial (i. e., national) 
community and its interaction while "Growing Up" showcases the history of a "typical 
Singaporean family" from pre- to post-state stages. 
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Similarly, LDS expects the media to teach good values and complains that 
tabloids "should" not disseminate representations of low (immoral) culture: 
[LDS241-248] [Tabloid journalists] have money in their eyesl The juicier, 
the more people will wait at the newsstands for sensational news. [We 
have to teach] what is acceptable, what is to be discardedl 
Ill. WAYS OF KNOWING: PRIORITISING MEDIA IDEALS OVER PERSONAL 
REALITY 
That this group looks to authority and the media for tutelage suggests a strong 
identification with national ideals as personal values. Indeed, not only are their 
narration of their lives set against the background of national history, they also 
constantly underscore the relevance of historical and media events to their 
present lifestyle. 
Media representations of nation influence their discourses at various levels. At 
the most direct level, they look to the media to teach citizens about making the 
"right" choices. For SLH (above, also LDS), the media (newspapers, tabloids 
and sitcoms) should serve as a model for how citizens should interact with 
multiracial communities and within the family hierarchy. 
This group's discourse also reveals the less direct media effect of framing- 
interviewees appear to have internalised the media's frames without any 
recollection of the contents of such a frame. A conceptual question emerges at 
this point: how can we ascertain media effects just because citizens use a 
similar frame, especially if they hardly draw upon media information or terms? 
Very simply, we can ascertain media effects because citizens tend to apply 
these frames on topics tha(they have no direct access to except through the 
media, e. g., on government and opposition politicians. 
In re-constructing the sacrifice myth, citizens were vague about the threats LKY 
saved Singapore from, preferring to focus on his personal sacrifice. This 
selective focus performs an important ideological function, since there were no 
genuine threats to Singapore's sovereignty. Until the last moment, LKY sought 
a merger with Malaysia. (In fact, it was the "traitorous" opposition who fought 
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for independence; LKY fought against It. ) Independence was not won by LKY 
but "imposed" overnight with the failure of the merger. Despite this groups' 
familiarity with the circumstances of Singapore's birth as a nation-state, they 
continue to insist that LKY sacrificed himself to rescue Singapore from 
"threats. " 
Their discourses echo the media's moralised frame. Here, media effects does 
not take place at the level of affecting opinion on specific matters but in 
creating a general impression and the internalisation of a moralising frame 
where citizens prioritise intentions over facts. Frames for thinking about 
politicians are moralised through a variety of strategies. Firstly, all interviewees 
(except coffeeshoppers, who actively seek alternative media) had little grasp of 
the substantive disagreement between political parties. The media hardly 
reports on opposition activities and almost never on their ideologies. Should the 
media report on the opposition, it does so in a highly moralised way, 
criminalizing the opposition as not only inefficient but also dishonest and, 
dangerous with "hidden agendas" (LDS). Even if citizens are unwilling to 
consume such moralised media products, they have little alternative sources. 
Starved of substantive information, many citizens turn to easy judgements of 
intentions. In this way, the media streamlines the citizen's way of thinking into a 
highly moralised one. 
Secondly, the media reifies LKY's sacrifice into a national myth. From citizens' 
accounts, this myth is particularly disseminated through visual and audio 
media. In recent national history revival, the image of LKY overwhelmed by 
tears at the announcement of Independence is firmly etched in every citizen's 
mind. It is constantly telecast in black-and-white, a reminder of a time when 
Singapore was backwards and its future uncertain. In expressing their pride in 
Singapore, citizens often reproduce lyrics used in National Day songs: 
[LDS363]: There was a time, when people said that Singapore won't 
make it, but we did... 
[RM1 96]: This is my country, my home 
Because their identification with LKY's sacrifice is based on a generalised and 
emotional sentiment that suggests audio and visual media effects, they are 
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placed in a strange situation where they are convicted of the correctness of 
their opinion but are unable to explain their position (because audio and visual 
media content are difficult to reproduce conversationally). It Is in this context, 
where media effects are so deep yet almost untraceable informationally, that 
we can appreciate their creative attempts to substantiate their beliefs. 
Compared to other posture groups, this is the only group that fabricates 
information-the pragmatic group avoids commenting on topics they do no 
have first-hand knowledge about while later groups seek alternative information 
sources (rumours, Western media) to substantiate their positions. 
SLH and LDS draw from unverifiable sources in their criticisms of the 
opposition. Even though LDS was from the police force in pre-state Singapore, 
he could recall why the opposition was repressed and relied on me for 
information. His language was highly metaphorical and empirically unverifiable, 
being constructed by pejorative allusions (e. g., rubbish, criminal, traitor, 
transparent, black, vested interest, hidden). Yet, despite the non-credibility of 
their sources (friends in intelligence, parents), LDS and SLH spoke confidently: 
[SLH926-929]: My parents say JBJ [opposition politician] is a really 
stubborn man. It's true. They said Mr. Lee has done a lot for us. 
Without him, there is no Singapore. 
[LDS608-625]: I have friends in intelligence. The opposition talks 
rubbish. TanWahPiow is a criminal, a traitor of Singapore... He 
cannot return because he's writing rubbish, our courts are very 
transparent, I'm sure. 
Me: What about SingaporeHerald and NanyangSiangPao [banned 
newspapers] 
LDS: Er... (pause) 
Me: It was a case of black operation 
LDS: Yes, black operations. Who financed it? I was in the police 
force then, they were inciting races against races. NYSP was 
taking the Chinese issue. 
Me: What about SingaporeHerald? 
LDS: SingaporeHerald, who were the financiers? 
Me: Ow family. 
LDS: Yah, Ow family, they had vested interest. They had a hidden 
agenda. 
Me: What was their agenda? 
LDS: To cause conflict in Singapore for their own good. 
Drawing on unverifiable sources, SLH imagined a dangerous Malaysia. When 
her credibility was challenged, she argues that her imagination was more 
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credible than the media because the well-intentioned government censors 
"scary" information. [Meanwhile, she contradicted herself: censorship was 
needless because people would continue to cross the border. ] 
[SLH814-832]: [Malaysians] find faults with Singaporeans. If the 
taxi-driver is against Singapore, he can drive to lonely places and 
kill us! 
Me: Has this happened? 
SLH: Eh, so far, no. 
Me: But you imagine it happens? 
SLH: Yah! You never know! Even if [authorities] know, they won't 
tell. Common people may feel frightened! People cross the 
causeway[border] everyday, they need money to feed their families 
so I don't think [people] will bother about that. 
This group uses unique, informal "word-of-mouth" sources ("friends in 
intelligence, " "parents" and even imagination). Such sources have low "public" 
credibility and high "private" credibility. Because it is personalised (friends, 
parents), they are very believe-able, especially when disseminated by "well- 
intentioned" others. In the case of SLH, she uses a combination of reliable 
sources (her parents) and her imagination to substantiate her belief that the 
government has good intentions. 
Such a moralising frame, where the focus is shifted away from a substantive 
evaluation of governmentlopposition to an evaluation of its intentions, performs 
an important ideological function. By focusing on intentions, support for the 
government is rendered unconditional because the government's intentions 
have been fixed and frozen at the moment of LKY's sacrifice. Short of being 
guilty of corruption (see Chapter 8), such moral legitimacy is almost impossible 
to uproot. 
IV. SOCIOLOGY, MATERALISM AND COMPENSATORY MORALITY: THE 
PERFORMANCE OF PATRIOTIC COMMUNITARIANISM 
Although there seems to be strong media effects, it is imprudent to pronounce 
media effects simply by looking at the contents of interviewee's discourse 
without considering the contextual meanings of their acts, e. g., from what 
contexts do they draw upon communitarian discourses. When interviewing 
interviewees in this group, I was constantly faced with "irrelevant replies" 
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(Chapter 3). It was not until I saw conversation as a speech act rather than 
strings of factual utterances that I realised that interviewees were not 
necessarily speaking to me but to some "hidden audiences, " especially 
significant others that they could not publicly confront. 
Looking at when and against whom communitarian discourses were deployed, I 
discovered that the target groups were usually significant others from 
interviewees' immediate community who were more materially successful. 
Indeed, LDS, SLH and HO spoke about how they had been ridiculed previously 
by these more successful others; for them communitarianism seemed to 
provide a way for them to regain social status through moral capital. 
In the following excerpt, HO was bothered that her neighbours thought her 
stupid for sending her children to Chinese (i. e., inferior) schools. The problem 
was that she herself was not confident that her choice was a good one - she 
did not say that Chinese schools were equally good. She accepted that she 
was "stupid" and argued that these "inferior" Chinese schools were better for 
children of people like her with backwards (village) thinking. At the same time, 
she tried to "get back" at her ridiculing neighbours through the interview, 
transforming her choice-less act as the choice of a good moral person who 
knows her place, who tried to be self-sufficient and not be a drain on society: 
[HO146-171]: We have ancient China thinking. Children should 
understand China's culture, our villages, agriculture, streets... If we say 
"Shantou" province, they will know. If they study English, everything will 
be messy. They wouldn't even know their grandparents! It's about 
respecting seniors, one's ancestors. Our neighbours sent their children 
to English schools and [the children] scold their parents vulgarly: "You 
people from China are useless, you are pigs. " Previously, it was those of 
us who send our children to Chinese school that got scolded! 
Me: who scolded you? 
HO: Neighbours looked down on us for sending our children to Chinese 
school... Each child cost 100 dollars ... and we have 6 children. 
Where 
are we to get the money? We are not thick-skinned enough to borrow! 
We work hard to raise our kids! 
In the following excerpt, HO's "irrelevant replies" to my question suddenly 
become very meaningful when read in this context of how communitarianism 
(not being selfish by being uncaring towards world events) provides 
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compensatory morality. I was clearly not HO's intended audience-HO was 
clearly responding to an accusation that was definitely absent in my question: 
[H055-67] Me: What newspapers do you read? 
HO: ShinMin[tabloid], I read everything, from front to back. 
Me: Any particular section? 
HO: All! Whatever happens, I want to know about it. If not, I [will be] 
sitting at home stupidly, knowing nothing about the outside world, I must 
know a bit! 
LDS used communitarian discourses for a similar rhetorical goal of getting back 
at those who jeered at his relative lack of social success. LDS presented 
himself as a good citizen who respected other races, unlike his brothers-in-law, 
who were "fanatics jealously guarding [their] culture. " From his statement, "I am 
not too educated to respect other religions, " it seemed that he had been made 
to feel inferior before because of his education: 
[LDS180-190]: Certain people are fanatics... My mother-in-law goes to 
my father-in-law's grave every ChengMeng[Chinese festival of the 
dead]. Her sons are all highly educated and have no time for these. So 
who helps her? Mel I drive her there at 5aml Her sons won't do it; they 
are too highly educated, university educated. 
How is it possible that materialism and morality are so intricately linked? These 
biographical experiences of ridicule suggest a politics of compensation, a 
rhetorical goal that communitarian discourses of patriotic morality appear to 
readily lend themselves to. Within a meritocracy, less-educated citizens are 
regarded as inferior and this communitarian group has by and large, 
internalized others' gaze of them as "stupid" and "uneducated. " 
Communitarianism, which aims to de-legitimise over-competitiveness, adopts a 
language of patriotic duties and national sacrifices and offers an alternative way 
of gaining the social status interviewees fail to achieve through meritocracy. 
With communitarianism, they can now decry the immorality of materialism and 
of those who are preoccupied with materialistic pursuits. E. g., while the 
pragmatic group and the communitarian group both value self-reliance and is 
against credit spending, the pragmatic group is more concerned with the 
consequences on themselves and their families (immediate community), while 
the communitarian group worries about the consequences on society 
(imagined community), to the extent of fearing that "society will be messy! " 
(H0151 /270). 
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In an extended excerpt, HO insisted on exaggerating the dangerousness of 
citizens - quantitatively ("a small sector") and qualitatively ("necessary") - when 
though she was forced to concede that it was not really so: 
[H0261-280]: Young people want material luxury. I may be kiasu [afraid 
to lose out] but I don't borrow! Some people borrow. Even if a small 
sector do so, it's bad enough. Society will be messy. Now people use 
credit card, it's terrible! 
Me: What about borrowing to buy homes? 
HO: It is necessary but if you can't return, you shouldn't borrow. You 
must know yourselfI 
Such exaggeration despite concession suggests that a performance of patriotic 
communitarianism also accords the speaker moral capital. Admitting that 
borrowing was "terrible" but necessary, HO narrowed her criticism to a smaller 
group (defined post-facto by their inability to repay loans). She was determined 
to represent the practice of this small group as a social disease that could tear 
society asunder. Her- statement that "society will be messy" is telling: living of 
credit was (not "could be") dangerous not only for personal lives or the 
economy, but for "society. " HO's moral panic might have been induced by the 
"Asian Values" campaigns where Asian capitalism, with its unique feature of 
high savings, is presented as a superior way of organising a national economy 
and society. While she did not use the rhetoric of Asian Values, HO saw 
borrowing and credit-spending as symptoms of an alternative (non-traditional, 
perhaps Western) value system that threatened social order. 
The depth to which materialism is valued in Singapore society can be seen by 
interviewees' almost-automatic self-defence of their lack of education and by 
their enactment of "revenge' in front of the researcher rather than the intended 
audience (where they risk being called "bad losers. ") Had they truly rejected 
materialism, they would not perceive themselves (as others perceive them) as 
"lacking, " and there would be no need to seek communitarianism for 
compensatory morality. 
Such "elective affinity" between the needs of the underclass with the myth of 
the sacrifice has been theorised by Weber (1 996a, 95-117). Weber argued that 
to accommodate the needs of the masses, religions might be formulated 
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generally with the emergence of a personal, divine or human-divine saviour as 
the bearer of salvation. Additionally, religious relationship to this saviour 
personality becomes the pre-condition of salvation. If Weber is right, this 
group's receptiveness to myths and exemplary salvation must be understood in 
the context of their under-privileged social position. Within Confucianism, 
citizens' (internalised) perception of their material inadequacy translates into a 
sense of moral inferiority. The sacrifice myth (of a charismatic and exemplary 
leader) gives hope of salvation and provides an alternative source of 
sociaVmoral status. 
The extent to which citizens require such salvation myths seem to correlate 
with the intensity of their feelings of being "stuck here. " Unlike older immigrants 
who consider China or India as their first home, the communitarian group 
comprises of first-generation citizens who, being born and raised here and 
being not well educated enough to be geographically mobile, experiences a 
sense of "stuck-ness" not just geographically but especially in their class 
trajectory. (This feeling becomes stronger as we move to later postures 
dominated by young uneducated citizens). 
V. THE LIMITS OFACCEPTANCE: CONVENIENT COMMUNITARIANISM 
Besides raising one's inferior social/moral status, communitarian discourses 
also conveniently imbue the speaker with a cultural-moral authority to Impose 
and interfere in others' life. The best indication that this communitarian group is 
ultimately guided by pragmatic instincts is how they choose when to use which 
communitarian discourses. 
S 
Firstly, this group consistently chooses to understand culture as ethnic 
(multi racial'CMIO) culture, rather than as "shared values. " What Is Ironic is that 
this group thinks that they are performing patriotic duties and being loyal to the 
PAP by paying tribute to an outdated PAP ideology, whether out of non- 
awareness (that multiracialism has been superseded by communitarianism) or 
for personal convenience. There is some indication that they are at least 
partially aware of the "Shared Values" project since they only argue for the 
maintenance of ethnic culture in the private sphere, acknowledging that citizens 
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should still be Singaporeans in public. E. g., SLH(272-275) explained that she 
considered herself Singaporean at work and Indian during "traditional times, " 
when they were no other races around. 
In dramatic contrast to the pragmatic groups' lack of need for ethnic identity, 123 
this group is deeply anxious about any perceived loss of cultural values. HO 
and SEW sent their children to Chinese schools so that they will not forget their 
ancestry. However, this "Chinese-ness" appears to be a metaphor for 
something else - for HO (see H0146-171 above), it does not symbolize 
Chinese fine arts or language, but a respect for authority, as opposed to 
Western disrespect for one's parents. 
For this group, ethnic cultures can be clearly distinguished and are mutually 
exclusive (note LDS's use of "although. ") LDS was very critical of Eurasian 
values, which to him, meant the lack of respect for authority, seniority and other 
races-the qualities that the government associates with Western values. He 
actively tried to deny his Eurasian-ness through "sino-cising" himself. 
[LDS260]: When we make decisions, it's far from the Eurasian style. 
They think they are above everyone because they are Eurasians. My 
family, we mix freely (with other races). 
[LDS280]: Although I am Eurasian, there is Chinese respect in my 
family. Before (the children) eat, they have to address the grandmother. 
When this group speaks about preserving ethnic values, the primary value to 
be preserved is respect for authority and seniority (filial piety). HO and LDS 
argued for the importance of obeying authority/seniority for its own sake, 
regardless of whether seniors were, as the younger generation would typically 
complain, deserving of resdect. For the young, respect is. an achieved, not 
ascribed (with age), status. 
Communitarianism is also used to legitimise a cultural respect for authority 
outside the family (Cf. five key hierarchical Confucian relationships). Authority 
often takes a patriarchal form, the clearest example being the extension of 
familial metaphors to LKY as "the father of Singapore. " Communitarian 
123 Clan identity (based on blood) Is somewhat less "imagined" than ethnic identity. 
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discourses representing citizens as "selfish" or "dangerous" are also mobilised 
to legitimise authority's intervention into citizens' private lives. Echoing the PM's 
complaint, SLH(460) criticised young educated women for being "fussy" about 
marriage partners and rejecting arranged marriages. Women are also criticised 
if they did not stay at home, act shy and were unobtrusive in public. Citizens 
who interrupted ("cha-jui") the government with their criticism were also 
chastised as little children who didn't know how to be "seen and not heard. " 
In terms of state-citizen relationships, "respect for authority" means citizens 
should be "open to suggestions" from the government because LKY deserves 
citizens' unreserved loyalty. 
[SLH343-344]: Singaporeans are open-minded. The government, 
whatever they do to us, the people accept it. Now during hard times, 
citizens can really co-operate. 
[LDS359-361]: People in their 20s, 30s, they think LKY Is very strict. If 
he allows everyone to run their own way, we won't have MNCs and a 
multiracial country. 
By framing their actions as cultural defence, this group bestows on itself the 
duty to intervene in others' life. Citizens profess to have no self-interest and to 
be guided strictly by communitarian instincts. While the pragmatic group 
believed "politics should be left to the government, " this group believes in 
actively supporting government. LDS writes to the media regularly to support 
government policies. HO believed citizens who are unconcerned about 
community are "selfish: " 
[H089-93]: If the whole world is [unconcerned] and things don't improve, 
that's tragic. I cannot be so selfish. All of us must care, surely we cannot 
just think of ourselves, isn't that selfish? 
Such an interventionist posture requires a particular conception of agency that 
conforms with the myth of the fragile nation and its dangerous citizens. Unlike 
the pragmatic group, to them, national threats are embodied by malleable 
forces, particularly "people with no moral fibre" (LDS522) rather than by the 
context. This differential attribution of agency/blame explains why the 
pragmatic group refuses to chastise the younger generation as materialist and 
immoral, preferring to empathise with "I may have 'to do the same, " while this 
communitarian group actively singles out groups for criticism. 
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The strategies citizens use to secure moral capital have Important ideological 
effects. LDS used a rags-to-riches story to construct his moral legitimacy to 
intervene. His meritocratic fairy tale was used to conclusively prove that 
Singapore is meritocratic, "if [I] can do it, so can you. " Failure was explained by 
personal weakness and "lack of moral fibre", echoing the Confucian equation of 
success with moral discipline. 
A second strategy is to insist on the public relevance of laws despite personal 
irrelevance. Many argued along the lines that one could not be so "selfish" as to 
only want programmes that one likes, i. e., no one should complain about 
programmes they dislike since others (the majority) probably like it. While later 
groups would criticise some laws as a sign of over-regulation, this group 
defends them, arguing that although personally irrelevant, these laws are 
necessary for "lesser-educated people who don't know how to think" (SLH798) 
so that Singapore would not end up a "mess" like China (H0211-212). 
A third strategy of interference is through social work, especially religious social 
work. Many religions, along with communitarian ideology, believe that a moral 
self triumphs over, not adapts to, the context (versus the pragmatic group, 
where life is about endless adaptation to survive). SLH(399/848) gave alms to 
her temple to help her ethnic community; LDS(462) and his wife helped those 
who have strayed by counselling them; SEW (and PTN) were pastors in 
Chinese churches. Together, they performed very important ideological 
functions. Firstly, by proving that meritocracy works ("if I can do it, so can you), 
they encourage citizens to be "long-suffering" towards the system while de- 
legitimising the voices of those who were less successful by representing them 
(e. g., coffeeshoppers) as "sour grapes" or "complainers. " Secondly, by 
attending to those "poor in spirit" (PTN308), 124 they give hope, thereby 
performing the psychological defence duty of being optimistic about the system 
("to believe in Singapore's future"). Such social work provides private solutions 
to social problems and resolves dissatisfactions on a "case-by-case" basis. 
'24 In a meritocracy, this means those with blocked social trajectory. 
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By insisting on the relevance of public values, a moral community is created 
where everyone has to fit in. This moral economy has a certain objective reality 
-it interpellates individuals against their will. Even the most "bo-chap" (Singlish 
slang, referring to the "switched-offs") citizen Is aware of the "invisible 
pressures" of others' gaze and what others will say behind his back. He can 
choose not to respond, but he cannot shut them out (see Chapter 6C). 
To what extent does this communitarian group practise what they preach, 
especially when personal and national ideals contradict? 
The gap between patriotic words and deeds is most visible on the issue of 
Singaporeans shopping in Malaysia (which is less expensive), thereby 
stimulating Malaysia's, rather than Singapore's, economy). Other groups 
dismiss the PM's call for patriotic sacrifice to shop domestically, arguing that 
the PM has no rights to make such demands. Only this corhmunitarian call 
(SLH, LDS and WCM) supported the PM's call. Yet, even while claiming to be 
patriotic, WCM explained that she stopped going to Malaysia because there 
were too many complex forms to fill, i. e., she stopped shopping in Malaysia for 
reasons of administrative convenience, not communitarianism. 
SLH conveniently distinguished between what was good and what was 
practised. She believed it was right for the PM to teach people what to do. 
While criticising "others" who do not follow his instruction, she excused her lack 
of obedience as an exception and even represented it as obedience to a higher 
communitarian value. Her (not other's) patriotic duty was to spend her money 
wisely, and even to help Singapore's neighbours! 
[SLH406-411]: 1 go to Malaysia whenever I am free, things are cheaper. 
[SLH711-722] Me: The PM said people should spend locally 
SLH: Yahl They must try to spend the money in Singapore. Many take 
advantage of the exchange rate, we spend a lot there! It's not true that 
we are not spending! Some Singaporeans are selfish; they don't want to 
help our neighbour [Malaysia] growl 
This group is not as communitarian as they claim to be, especially when it 
comes to decisions about their children's future. Then, communitarian 
discourses give way to pragmatic justifications about why communitarianism 
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should be suspended on particular issues. Although eager to maintain Chinese 
culture, LDS and SEW's children did not study Chinese as first language 
because it was a difficult subject to score in. LDS(1 48) even said that had he 
married an Indian wife, he would still insist that his children study Chinese as 
their "mother-tongue" because "that's where their bread is buttered. " 
While all interviewees seemed to be guided by pragmatic concerns, this is the 
only group that tries to represent their pragmatism as communitarianism. Most 
of the time, citizens simply conflate national duty with personal pragmatism: 
when asked what their national duties were, AS, PRL and LYN replied that it is 
their duty to study hard and succeed (individually). When confronted with 
situations requiring personal sacrifices, such as not shopping in Malaysia, 
many again argued that their first responsibility was to their family, arguing that, 
"without the family there is no state 
Vl. REPRODUCING THE STATE THROUGH COMMUNITARIAN ACCEPTANCE 
By actively reproducing public values, this group exerts a significant pressure 
on all citizens, especially through their self-bestowed duties of cultural defence 
and "well-intentioned" social work. In any society, socially pessimistic members 
constitute a dangerous force: the credibility/inclusivity of the nation and its 
values are threatened by their existence. The state must find ways to prevent 
them from contending publicly for a counter-hegemonic redefinition of nation. 
The social work that this communitarian group performs does precisely this 
task of psychological defence of encouraging those without hope to be 
"optimistic about Singapore's future" (Cf. Total defence cartoon). Social 
workers and Chinese(-edudated) churches are especially complicit in 
maintaining the meritocratic system by encouraging citizens to be "long- 
suffering" and seeking private solutions to social problems. 
Despite their communitarian discourse, the meaning of such discourse appears 
to reside less in its substantive content than in the rhetorical goals (of 
compensatory morality). Taking into consideration their actual practice and 
what they wish for their children, they appear to be strongly guided by 
pragmatism. In this sense they are not unlike the previous pre-state immigrant 
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ground, except that they excuse/justify their pragmatism as communitarianism 
towards "others" (non-national, non-imagined) "communities, " like the family. 
Despite its (substantive) meaninglessness for this group and those they 
successfully pressurise into conformity, the hegemony of AV is maintained. 
Despite private irrelevance, interviewees' continued reproduction of 
communitarian discourses serve to reinforce the centrality and relevance of 
communitarianism as a moral/respectable discourse for public life, de- 
legitimising discourses that promote Western Values of liberalism and 
individualism/personal desire. 
The value of "respect for authority" and the communitarian discourse of 
patriotic duties works to de-legitimise discourses of personal desire and rights 
and ward off values of individualism, liberalism, democracy and welfarism. 
Resentment towards communitarian discourses is especially felt by minorities 
and by women (Chapter 6C). RAS(590), a Malay woman, feel doubly burdened 
by her ethnicity and her gender; she felt "owned by society, " burdened by so 
many social expectations and was tired of having to find acceptable/legitimate 
justifications for her personal desires'. 
Such experience of frustration and communitarian ownership indicates the 
power this small communitarian group wields in upholding patriotism as 
society's preferred meaning and to force others to become morally 
accountable. Indeed, the hegemony of Asian Values is not merely indicated by 
citizens' reproduction of its discourses. Hegemony is better indicated by 
citizens who, against their will, find themselves having to use it as the only 
publicly (inter-personally) Idgitimate frame and feel the need to justify 
themselves to an imagined moral majority. 
232 
6C. CHOICELESS TOLERANCE: THE DISCOURSE OF "NO VIABLE 
ALTERNATIVES" AND THE PRIVATISATION OF DISSENT 
L THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS POSTURE 
If Leys (1990,127) is right that, "for an ideology to become hegemonic, it is not 
necessary that it is loved; it is merely necessary that it have no serious rival, " 
then this posture group may be the most crucial target group in the 
government's hegemonic project. Instead of preaching to the converted 
(Chapter 6A, 6B) or to the un-convert-able (Chapter 6D), this is the group that 
will decide the PAP's margin of electoral victory. Since the opposition vote has 
consolidated at a consistent 25%, whether the PAP manages to maintain their 
total percentage votes above the 66.6% benchmark crucially depends on its 
ability to woo this group. 
As a group that must be won constantly, this group is significant in the way that 
it has "perfected the art of pressurising the government with [their] votes, " 
thereby limiting the types of victory that PAP can have. Although it is not 
impossible to win them over and make them less "angry, " these cases of 
ideological successes are so few that the PAP needs to rely on more ad-hoc, 
policy-based strategies (especially during pre-election periods) to temporarily 
"sweeten the ground. " 
As a group that is ever ready to defect (to a viable alternative), the PAP 
government frequently resorts to overtly or covertly coercive policies, which 
suggests that the PAP has not succeeded in developing a strategy for 
containing such dissent. Whereas dissent among the challengers (posture 6D) 
Is contained within the public sphere, this group's dissent resides in'the cracks 
and crevices of the social fabric, in the semi-public/semi-private spheres of 
national political life. This group's discourses filter so easily beneath society's 
"social skin" (Noelle-Neumann 1984) because their dissent is 
motivated/embedded in everyday life125 and resonates easily with other 
citizens. This resonance accords further significance to their role in the 
(counter-)hegemonic process: they serve as primary group leaders who 
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articulate and disseminate everyday dissatisfactions that may otherwise not 
surface into popular discourse and imagination. 
H. THE LOGIC OF THE PRIVATISATION OF DISSENT: THE DISCOURSE OF 
"NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES" 
In this posture, dissent is not neutralised/outweighed by satisfaction so that 
there is overall satisfaction (as in 6A). However, unlike the next posture group 
(which similarly harbours a high level of dissent), this group is compelled to 
privatise its dissent. 
Interviewees who exhibit this posture speak about a wide range of 
dissatisfactions that could be loosely described as anti-modernity. However, 
this broad generalisation is barely useful given opposing complaints - some 
long for a more traditional social order while others wants a more liberal one. 
In terms of the content of their dissatisfactions, this group is not dissimilar to 
other groups. What distinguishes this posture is how this dissent is un- 
resolved, which gives this group a restless quality. Recall that for the pragmatic 
group, dissent is neutralised. For the "challengers" (Chapter 6D), dissent Is 
"resolved" through the identification of a viable alternative. By contrast, this 
posture appears "closeted" - their desire to criticise the system is intense but 
they lack the (technical, moral) credibility to do so publicly. Publicly de- 
legitimised but privately unconvinced of such de-legitimisation, this group 
refuses to be silenced and develops highly sophisticated strategies of 
articulating and re-legitimatising dissent in semi-public/private spheres. 
Ill. WAYS OF KNOWINGfTALKING: STRATEGIC SELF-BELITTLING 
How does this group cope with the public perception of their lack of credibility 
and their own belief in the legitimacy of their opinions? This group develops a' 
unique strategy based on the principle of "sensitivity" so that they can articulate 
their dissent without suffering consequences. 
125 By this I mean that this group does not draw upon abstract discourses (e. g., 
democracy and equality in chapter 6D) but upon everyday problems (e. g., cost of 
living. ) 
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When asked about what "sensitive topics" are, most declined comment and 
even chided me for asking about such "open secrets. " However, they were 
willing to explain to me (as a "Westernised" scholar who has lost touch with 
Asian political protocol) why certain things were sensitive. To help me secure 
the cultural literacy to navigate social communications, JIM(312-408) and BL 
simplified my "crash course" in political sensitivity Into a list of when dissent 
should be most covert or overt depending on how trustworthy (public/private) 
" the audience: 
Public (untrustworthy) Ministers 
A Researchers 
Colleagues 
Strangers: Other races, Foreigners, 
V Coffeeshoppers, Taxi-drivers 6 
Private (trustworthy) Opposition politicians 
It seems that "sensitivity" is a combination of content, context and 
consequences. "Sensitivity" directs speakers to strategically/selectively manage 
the overtness/covertness of his dissent to match (what he anticipates as) the 
audience's position. Interviewees classify audiences as "private" (trustworthy) 
or "public" (untrustworthy). What is "private" for a group may be "public" for 
another group. E. g., the coff eeshop, as men's "hang-out, " constitutes a semi- 
private space for men but a "public" for women. I. e., "public" and "private" are 
not absolute categories but qualities referring to the trustworthiness of the 
audience. 
What is interesting, secondly, is that audience trustworthiness is not a matter of 
inter-personal familiarity or personal qualities but the social and political 
consequences of discoursd. Socially, sensitive topics may cause a loss of face 
when . speakers are 
forced to take sides on a sensitive topic (BL56). Face is lost 
by "saying things that people don't like to hear, that people cannot accept" 
(MRT601-609). Politically, for MRT(254) and BL(42-61), sensitive topics are 
topics where one could be sued for commenting on. Discourses that are likely 
to fetch the least political consequences are those speaker-audience 
126Taxi-drivers are usually people who are "fed-up" with the system and decide to 
become their own boss. Within Singapore Inc., they would constitute a kind of 
escaped proletariats. 
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exchanges based on anonymous and informal interactions. Thus, JIM would 
trust an anonymous jogger more than a fellow colleague. Before the Interview, 
JIM and I also explicitly negotiated the degree of covertness-he explained that 
he would speak differently if I chose not to take notes, to take notes only or to 
tape-record the interview. 127 
Having partitioned public/private, this posture group adopts a duplicitous 
strategy of (seemingly) de-legitimating their dissent in public while legitimising 
their dissent in private. There is considerable gender difference in how this 
strategy is achieved. Both uneducated coffeeshop men and educated 
professional women cannot advocate alternative social orders without , 
compromising their credibility. Professional women cannot support an 
alternative social order (e. g., greater liberalism) without losing their moral 
credibility (being labelled "immoral") while coffeeshop men cannot do so 
without losing their technical credibility (being labelled "non-expert"), which in a 
Confucian society signifies a lack of moral discipline. 
The different credibility problems of these two groups generate different 
strategies of managing dissent. Coffeeshoppers try to gain credibility without 
being accountable; they typically make claims with some degree of certainty 
but do not substantiate them. In fact, they seem eager to deny that they are the 
original source of their claims, preferring to attribute it to anonymous sources 
such as jokes, rumours and alternative media. At the same time, they display a 
high distrust in local media, which they see as the mouthpiece of the 
government. THM(322) and MRT believed the local media could only be "half- 
trusted" and argued that because Singapore is so small and orderly there was 
insufficient daily news to report, hence the media had to construct fictions to fill 
pages. 
Another strategy of denying their culpability of disseminating dissent is to 
ensure that the interviewee knows that it was only because of the interviewer's 
initiative that they converse about such "political" topics. E. g., BL(216) uses the 
127 Unwilling to sacrifice the flow of the interview by my slow shorthand, I opted for an 
in-between format where he or I could choose when to have the tape-recorder 
switched off. 
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phrase, "since you mentioned it.... " to prefix his politically incorrect opinions. By 
waiting for others to initiate conversations, coffeeshoppers present themselves 
as merely passive followers. 
Even after such abdication of discursive originality, coffeeshoppers continue to 
be careful when articulating dissenting statements, such as by speaking 
indirectly. MRT(350) answers questions indirectly, criticising media censorship 
in Asia generally to imply that it exists in Singapore: 
[MRT347-360] Me: Is media coverage balanced in Singapore? 
MRT: Western countries wouldn't hide events. Taiwan, HK, China, I 
think their reports are biased towards government. Countries that says 
good things about themselves, the credibility is suspect. 
Generally, my interviews with coffeeshoppers tended to be based on a game 
where they would only reveal as much as I would, and where each person's 
incremental revelation of dissent serves to up the stake for the other. 128 At no 
point did any coff eeshopper give up; they usually outlasted me. However, there 
seemed to be a point beyond which they trusted me enough to speak relatively 
freely. This point seemed to precipitate whenever I spoke about my dissertation 
-a public statement of my political incorrectness. While I may not be more 
politically incorrect than them, the fact that I was willing to "come out" and take 
responsibility for it seemed to earn their trust and bring on their concern for me. 
At the end of the interview, they always cautioned me not to write about 
sensitive topics in my dissertation. 
Finally, should they speak directly, coffeeshoppers belittle their own authority. 
Although BL claims to know "nothing, " his grasp of historically significant dates 
indicates otherwise. Additiohally, his abdication of discursive authority is 
insincere because his "excuse" - that he had no first-hand knowledge -, 
applies equally to any living person: 
1281 am aware that such interview strategy deviates quite far from the ideal of 
qualitative interviews where the Interviewee speaks and the Interviewer listens. With 
coffeeshoppers, I felt the interview was as much about my opinions as about theirs 
and was concerned that I could be "leading" them. However, at no point did I feel that I 
was rigid and the conversation contrived, as I did with some other Informants. In this 
way my interviews with coffeeshoppers may be thought of more as a type of 
(recorded) ethnographic research rather than "interview" because I had to be a 
participant to be an observer (Cf. Chapter 3, especially with Thomas). 
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[BL42-61] Me: The media says Singaporeans are kiasu, what do 
you think? 
BL: I refuse to speak about [coffeeshop talk]; it's all politics. I know 
nothing about politics, I am not a politician; It's too dangerous. I 
can't say that in 1819 this happened. It's only hearsay; it's very 
dangerous so I don't know. 
The coffeeshoppers' style of talking does not aim to alter the discursive 
certainty of the speaker, but rather to avoid accountability. Their belittling of 
their own discursive authority is rhetorical. Such posturing of self-de- 
legitimisation differs dramatically with the professional women's ways of self 
de-legitimisation, which embraces accountability. They emphasise the 
subjective accuracy of their claims but limit their universality (or universal 
relevance), and thus political challenge. 
This difference can be seen in the way both groups speak about media 
censorship. While coffeeshoppers pronounce there to be media censorship 
without substantiation, professional women cite their observations and offer 
speculations. They prefer to first appeal to the listener on an emotional basis 
("you can feel it") before substantiating their "sixth sense" with intelligent and 
detailed media analyses. It is curious that individuals so skilled in rational 
analysis should so dis-empower their discourse by almost dismissing their 
opinions as no more than a "feeling. " Such a posturing of uncertainty should 
not be attributed to insufficient "rationalisation" but needs 'to be explained 
otherwise. 
When the women speak, they tend to be deferential and pose counter- 
hegemonic views hesitantly (e. g., "the economic crisis may not be a bad 
i 
thing. ") The effect of using double negatives is the reaffirmation of the 
hegemonic, which has to be deferred to even as it is being negated. Unlike the 
direct disagreement of coffeeshoppers, women's use of double negatives 
performs respect and demonstrates linguistically the burden of hegemony 
(preferred reading) that these women have to bear. 
They also use a highly metaphoric and emotional language. DEX framed the 
desire for less authoritarianism in terms of a request to the government to 
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consider the people's feelings, unlike coffeeshoppers, who framed this as a 
demand that the government fulfils its election promise of a more consultative 
style. Despite having the "rights, " women shun legal discourses in preference 
for emotional discourses, thereby maintaining an appearance of meekness and 
morality (to "request, " not "demand" or even "suggest"). 
DEX belittles her'discursive authority despite knowing that she represents the 
view of her cohort. She would say, 'We Nantah [Chinese university] graduates 
feel that ... " While the use of "we" should have significantly strengthened her 
claim, the use of emotional verbs like "feel" exert such a powerful weakening 
effect that the overall claim, no matter how substantive and representative, 
remains weak. This is one of the many instances where professional women 
"deliberately" fail to allow their claims to realise their full discursive potential. 
Many professional women were at a loss for words during interviews and 
resorted to metaphors (compare this with coffeeshoppers' familiarity with 
media/political language). In criticising the government's shutting down of 
Nantah (a Chinese university funded by the Chinese community) and the 
subsequent Speak Mandarin Campaigns, DEX(324) used metaphors such as 
"killing the mother (Nantah)and then saving the eggs (Mandarin)" and that the 
government was "insincere" towards citizens. She was also angry that the state 
demolished the National Theatre, which was funded by citizens' contribution, 
without consulting the people. To her: 
[DEX379/387]: A lot of things in Singapore, "national" doesn't mean 
alive... whatever you contribute is wiped off straight away. 
Instead of using these metaphors, coffeeshoppers would have succinctly 
charged the government for not respecting Chinese culture and for wanting to 
create a "safe" Chinese culture that could be moulded by the government 
rather than by the Chinese community itself. Of course, coffeeshöppers would 
then suffix this claim with, "but we cannot be sure about it, we don't know 
politics. " 
To an extent, media habits can explain the two different styles of talking- 
coff eeshoppers use a sharper language while women use a weak(-ened) 
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emotional one. All five coffeeshoppers read at least three newspapers a day to 
increase their chance of collecting useful (politically incorrect) Information. JIM 
even tapped into Reuters to widen his repertoire of "quotable" Information, 
which allowed him to speak credibly while allowing him to abdicate discursive 
responsibility and originality since he was merely be citing others. By contrast, 
the professional women's average is a dismal zero, worse than that of 
uneducated housewives who at least flip through evening tabloids. 
This astounding statistic becomes understanable when we hear their 
explanations. SE, being unmarried, lives with her family; she said she would 
read the newspapers regularly if her father subscribed to an English daily. 
Through SE's case, we can see how women's media habits are constrained by 
government housing policies, which are in turn based on an "Asian" sexual 
morality that frowns upon cohabiting couples. Land-scarcity and housing laws 
which prevent owners of public housing to rent their rooms means there are 
few rooms for rent in Singapore, I. e., there are hardly opportunities for 
unmarried people to become householders and to make household decisions 
regarding media consumption. In nuclear families, women tend to be busy with 
children and media consumption, again, becomes a matter to be decided by 
the husband. In dual-income (young professional) families, newspapers are 
available at work and given the long working house, it seems pointless for them 
to subscribe from home. This explains RAS's situation: she does not subscribe 
to newspapers from home because she has access to newspapers at work and 
because she has no time to read at home. If she has time off from caring far 
her children after work, she would rather go online. 
With so many patriarchal constraints, professional women are perhaps, 
sociologically, the group with the least "time" or freedom from social 
expectations (versus "time-wasting" coffeeshoppers). If they have difficulties 
consuming mainstream media, they have even less access to alternative 
media. 129 Furthermore, some public spaces like the coffeeshop are regarded 
as "men's space" and are usually unwelcoming to women. 
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The two groups' differential access to (alternative) Information sources could 
explain why, despite being highly educated, professional women's discourse Is 
characterised by uncertainty and dis-empowerment. It would appear that, unlike 
coffeeshoppers, their thoughts/dissent are not reinforced by any media and 
thus, they have not developed a shared language or frame of reference. 
Media habit may explain the differential style of talking between the two groups, 
but it cannot explain the more important question of why this posture group co- 
operates to belittle their discursive authority. Are they convinced that they lack 
public credibility; what motivates them to privatise dissent? 
IV. SOCIOLOGY: THE BURDEN OF SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE TRAP 
OF DESIRE 
The modernisation of Singapore society and economy required that certain 
social values be inculcated into the citizenry. To this end, the PAP government 
has very successfully mobilised citizens to embrace a national consensus 
based upon a dominant ideology of national economic competitiveness, which 
requires citizens be consumed by a desire to succeed materially. Grafted upon 
the discourse of Confucian meritocracy, material success becomes a signifier 
of personal moral discipline - one's social/moral status or credibility is based 
upon one's material achievement. What is achieved with the embedding of the 
material onto the moral is the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1984) - 
dissent dies out because citizens do not articulate them for fear of social 
isolation ("losing face") -a strategy that, incidentally, allows state 
authoritarianism to be transformed into societal authoritarianism. 
It is in this context that we understand why citizens are willing to conform to 
various social expectations-non-conformity would not only compromise their 
personal economic success but also their moral status. In a Confucian 
meritocracy, one either succeeds or feels inferior (Cf. KPT569-574), and this is 
129 Several minority women express irritation at being cut off from the grapevine 
because they do not speak Mandarin (LV412). 
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precisely the strategy the government and its silent majority uses to do- 
legitimise the complaints of "losers. " 
Unlike the pragmatic group who is barely nationalised and lacking a sense of 
(imagined) community and a grasp of state agency, this posture group has 
anti-government complaints. They consist largely of first-generation citizens 
who grew up under the first-generation PAP government and received 
centralised/nationalised education. While they do not have high expectations of 
the state or employ discourses regarding "rights, " they are impatient that the 
government should ensure that Singapore economy and society is as fair (to 
them) as it, should be. Being non-immigrants and with heavy family 
commitments, there is a sense that they are "stuck" here geographically and in 
terms of class trajectory as prosperity intensifies class stratification. 
Coff eeshoppers are especially sore about their blocked social trajectory. All of 
them were aware of the Singapore Dream but said they did not have the 
qualifications, thus luxury, to dream the Dream (BL105). While successful 
citizens may consider this the "jealousy" of the uneducated, it Is also necessary 
to consider if their complaints are legitimate. Coff eeshoppers typically consist 
of Chinese-educated men (non-tertiary educated) whose Chinese education 
was devalued (because of its links to Chinese communism) for the creation of 
a modern Singapore economy. 130 
In a society that values self-reliance so highly, it is easy to represent 
coffeeshoppers as "bad losers" or "sour grapes. " The media presents 
coff eeshoppers as inferior citizens not because of their lack of material success f but also because they are (morally) lazy time-wasters who spend their time 
complaining in the coff eeshops instead of upgrading their skills. Such 
representations de-legitimise their authority to speak and trivialise the content 
130 I suspect coffeeshoppers are basically people who originally wanted to be left alone 
and not be drawn Into a national economy. When they were forcibly deprived of their 
means of production by a benevolent paternal state, they were caught In a dilemma - 
should they be self-reliant (which is no longer possible given their proletarised state) or 
to be rewarded for their compliance (in return for proletarisation, the loving "father" 
should take care of them). It Is in this context that we can understand the angst behind 
the coffeeshop slogan: "it is better to die than to be hospitalised" (because 
hospitalisation bills can kill). 
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of their dissent. These simple labels easily enter the public's Imagination and 
becomes quickly internalised as society's gaze, exerting pressures on 
coffeeshoppers to self-censor or expect to have their "inferior" Ideas jeered at. 
The effectiveness of such societal authoritarianism cannot be underestimated. 
SE(365-368) felt so inferior and insecure that she could not retort to English- 
educated classmates who called her "china" (pronounced "chee-na, " a slang for 
country bumpkin). It was only with the rise of the Asian Values campaign, which 
re-legitimised Chinese values, that the idea of retorting with the term "bananas" 
(slang for Westernised Asians; for being yellow outside, white inside) became 
imaginable. However, that Chinese values became Imaginable does not mean 
that the status of the Chinese-educated has Improved. Many Chinese-educated 
interviewees spoke angrily that when the government sought Chinese elites, 
they did not mean the Chinese-educated but English-educated scholars who 
were fluent in Mandarin. 131 
The Chinese-educated display such a high level of class consciousness that 
the label of Chinese-educated has been widened to include non-Chinese who 
feels similarly alienated from the nationalisation (Singapore Dream) process. 
Not dissimilar to the use of "black" in England, the meaning of "Chinese- 
educated" transcends ethnicity to refer to a loose collection of "social failures" 
who experiences a similar structure of feeling as "second-class citizens" in their 
own country (MRT318, VH564, TSK373/380). 
If coffeeshoppers are alienated from the nationalising process, professional 
women are overloaded with national duties. They are expected to be career 
women and producers of g6netically superior children for the nation. While 
men's patriotic status is assured by their conscription, women have to achieve 
this through communitarianly conforming to social expectations of moral 
mothers. Even then, this male freedom is a "privilege of the majority. " If a 
Malay male speaks out against the state, he would be morally suspect and 
131 This resonates with the observation that "Asian Values" is a subdominant Ideology; 
at no point was the goal of an Asian nation prioritised over the goal of global economic 
competitiveness. 
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considered pro-Malaysia while a Chinese male would suffer no such 
consequences: 
[ALI2-3]: That is the dilemma [Malays] face. Sometimes you have to 
support Singapore although you are Malay. Especially on Malaysian 
issues, although they are Malays, blood brothers... 
Women, especially minority women, do not have this freedom. Had they 
spoken like men, they would have been labelled "aggressive" and their 
sexuality questioned (as "butch. ") They have to maintain their national and 
private selves through privatising, hedging, justifying, etc. 
As a mother and successful Malay professional, RAS felt worn out by the 
number of people she had to please. RAS was angry that as long as she spoke 
English with greater ease, she would be deemed "an Insufficient Malay" 
because Malays were expected to speak Malay regularly. (English-educated 
Chinese suffers no such expectations. ) It did not matter, she added, that her 
command of Malay language was probably far better than those who criticised 
her with their market Malay (RAS145). She was frustrated that she has to 
continually "prove" her Malay-ness, "I cannot do something because I want to, I 
always have to justify, people will talk" (RAS643). The pressure on her was 
greater because she is a Malay professional woman. 
[RAS589]: As a minority, you are not owned by yourself but by the 
community. Your success will be the community's success. If you want 
to give up being a doctor and become an artist, do you know what flak 
you will get! Being a majority, you have the freedom; as a minority, you 
have to care about what the community thinks. 
RAS was keenly aware of how her burden of social expectations was 
constructed by media representations. She criticised the media's moralisation 
and criminalisation of Malays: 
[RAS730-749]: When a girl who fell onto train tracks], the TNP [tabloid] 
talked about what type of family she came from, she was jobless and 
her mother mentioned she didn't return home the night before. What 
has that to do with her falling? .... 
In court cases, it's even worse. Defendants should be anonymous but 
the media will give pseudonyms, an obviously Malay name. What I 
really cannot stand is when they do not reveal names but say, "speaking 
in Malay, the criminal said... " 
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Professional women are very aware that they carry the burden of the nation 
and sometimes wish for a different type of nation, one that is less burdensome 
on women. Professional women unanimously shared the very rare (and 
politically incorrect) opinion that the economic crisis "might not be a bad thing. " 
Tired of old definitions of success, DEX hoped to see a less materialistic 
nation, RAS hoped to see less pressures on her to be a role model for her 
community, SE hoped for less arrogance among the English-educated so that 
she would not have to feel so ashamed of not being one. 
Although deeply dissatisfied with "the system, " both groups believe there is little 
they can do. What motivates them to privatise their dissent? What holds them 
back from turning their backs on the system? Why do they perceive there to be 
no viable alternatives? 
Although, both groups feel compelled to conform to social expectations to avoid 
being discredited in public, moral explanations are hardly sufficient given the 
extreme pragmatism of Singapore citizens. What do citizens fear they will lose 
if they become morally discredited? 
Coffeeshoppers are paranoid about being arrested for speaking their minds. It 
is not clear how much the discourse of political repercussion reflects 
coffeeshoppers' real fears, or if this was a way of masking less macho, less 
heroic fears. It is unlikely that they are truly paranoid-they are well aware that 
they are not opposition politicians and that very few opposition politicians are 
actually repressed. It is possible that they may fear the economic 
consequences of publicising their dissent, which could land them with "social 
bad luck" when it comes to"public ballots and job promotions. At heart, 
coffeeshoppers are men with families; they are pragmatic and would not risk 
their family's well being. As such, their self-censorship may be more 
economically motivated than politically motivated. Furthermore, the successful 
embourgeoisiement of the population makes Its newly rich citizens more prone 
to conservatism and to prefer "erring on the side of caution. " It does not help 
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that coffeeshoppers pay too much attention to rumours, which often create a 
paranoia that conveniently reproduces the status quo. 132 
At the heart of this posture and its inability to see viable alternatives is the 
niggling desire to succeed within the system, or at least, have their children 
attain the Singapore Dream. Despite their deep dissatisfaction with the system, 
all interviewees invest considerable resources in their children's education to 
give them a head start (along the path to the Singapore Dream). 
The most, convincing evidence is the non-resolution of this conflict (to be pro- 
system or anti-system) can be seen in Thomas, an Interviewee who was 
already highlighted in chapter three for his violent and thorough anti-system 
attitudes. Thomas was extremely sensitive to any signs of social optimism, 
which I suggest be read as an aversion to the dominant Ideology. He was 
dedicated to living a life opposed to everything the system encouraged. He 
insisted on a life of waste and was angered even by my recorder and notepad, 
which I now recognise, upon hindsight, as Icons of our differential Ideologies 
and trajectories. Thomas was so sensitive to my every act of system- 
affirmation that, when he asked me what my hobbles were and I replied "let me 
think, " he erupted into violent anger and banged on the table. After mulling over 
this and other episodes when he became angered whenever I was being "too 
busy, " I realised that the fact that I had little time and recollection of my hobbles 
signified that I was preoccupied with being gainfully employed -a definite sign 
of being system affirming. 
It is in the context of Thomas' thoroughness In being anti-system that we can 
appreciate his next commefit, made when he was drunk. While sobbing over 
the phone, Thomas admitted that he wanted his children to grow up just like me 
-socially. and ideologically optimistic. 
It is only upon understanding how deeply rooted is the desire to be successful 
within the system that we can appreciate the sense of "trapped-nass" that this 
132 It would be interesting to consider the source of rumours. E. g., the rumour that 
"There are identification numbers on the voting slip" would surely benefit the 
incumbent ruling party. 
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posture group feels. They are "stuck" here not only geographically and in terms 
of class trajectory, but also ideologically. Their desire for material success - 
Singapore style - requires that they embrace the very ideology and system- 
affirming practices that they criticise. Thus, it is not completely accurate to say 
that this posture group's dissent is de-legitimised by society's moral gaze and 
social expectations. It Is more accurate to say that it Is their desire to succeed 
in the very system they criticise that trivialises and de-legitimises their dissent. 
V. THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE: THE DE LEGITIMISATION AND RE- 
LEGITIMISA TION OF DISSENT 
As a group that experiences the flaws of the dominant ideology on a regular 
basis and who is "ready to defect, " the Chinese-educated constitutes a sizeable 
group that, potentially, can be rallied by counter-hegemonic ideologies. In this 
section, I want to look at the ongoing battle between the government and the 
citizens to de-/re-legitimise dissent by considering how successful the 
government is in convincing citizens of the inferiority and illegitimacy of their 
dissent. 
Among those whom the government manages to win over, the role of social 
workers and churches'33 were cited as institutions that helped them 
rehabilitate, repent a life of waste and embrace the value of hard work and the 
value of social success/status. These institutions, by attributing responsibility 
for the self away from the system to the self, promotes the ideology of 
meritocracy -if citizens do not succeed, it is because they did not work hard 
and that if they choose to work hard, success will always be within grasp. 
The state/media's success is convincing citizens of the illegitimacy of their 
dissent can be seen in interviewee's rehabilitated discourses. CST, despite 
complaints about costs of living, learnt to be a "good loser" and accepted that 
the English-educated deserves the best jobs. VH(17/34/61) admitted defeat 
("how could I compete? ") when his girlfriend left him for a more highly educated 
133 As another example of Thomas's thoroughness at blocking off the system's attempt 
to make him less angry: he refused to be interviewed until he was sure that I would not 
evangelise to him. 
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man, believing that she acted wisely. XX understood that his credibility is 
permanently compromised by his criminal record and struggled to regain his 
dignity as a responsible, self-knowing person who did not need supervision (by 
probation officers). However, a little dissatisfaction still lingers as an "inner 
voice" in his heart -a voice that he knows he could never articulate publicly: 
[XX112]: If you do something wrong, [adults] will nag at you, ... "didn't I tell you to study hard? " In my heart, I think: "We have 
already tried our best, what else do you want from us? " 
During the economic crisis, SE(400) kept quiet when she was made redundant 
through "a conspiracy. " She was afraid of being labelled a "trouble-maker" and 
become blacklisted by other companies. To explain her lack of retaliation, she 
blamed herself for being "lazy" and rationalised that she did not want to be un- 
cooperative, rather than blame the state for not protecting workers. By framing 
herself as lazy, SE's discourse renders invisible the bureaucratic obstacles that 
encourage citizens to take the "lazy" way out and accept their situation. 
That there are instances of discursive rehabilitation do not necessarily mean 
the government has succeeded in recovering the consent of this group. Very 
often, the same interviewee can be persuaded in one instance and 
unconvinced in another. There are also instances when rehabilitated citizens 
"fall back" into being anti-government. As a Chinese-educated person, SE's 
attitudes towards English-speaking girls in her school changed from 
admiration/imitation (SE140) to helpless anger (SE350) with the "Speak 
English" campaigns, where Mandarin speakers were punished and made to 
feel ashamed of their inability to speak English. Finally, there is a core group 
that seems impervious to the government's attempt to court them. They are 
likely to have experienced dxtreme personal injustice, e. g., MRT and Thomas, 
whose educations were halted respectively by the closure of a Chinese- 
university and by a change in the national grading system. 
Where citizens remain unconvinced, they tend to engage in rhetorical 
compliance. Women were especially skilled at appearing obedient. Knowing 
how burdensome it is to comply with traditions, most perform them to maintain 
face but would not demand it of their children. RAS protested against the Malay 
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but un-Muslim wedding custom where bride and groom sit on a raised platform, 
a Hindu custom. As a compromise, she agreed to sit on it briefly to have her 
photograph taken, which can then be circulated to the relatives. Similarly, WCM 
knew her sons-in-law were unable to pay her daughter's brideprice. To maintain 
her status (a mother's worth is indicated by how much her daughters fetch), 
she instructed her son-in-law to write her a cheque (which would be displayed 
to relatives) that she would not cash. 
Although such rhetorical compliance can be said to reproduce authority, it is 
nevertheless important to recognise the potential for resistance in these 
practices. Wanting the best for their children, these women have decided that 
these burdensome expectations and traditions would not plague the next 
generation. Additionally, they are aware that it is only through conformity that 
they can secure the moral credibility they need to re-legitimise dissent, i. e., 
they understand that resistance often requires an indirect route and that 
resistance is sometimes only possible or more effective from within. 
Although RAS(116/121) find her ethnic duties inconvenient, she tries to do 
enough to satisfy others, ' refusing to give anyone an excuse to criticise her 
private life. She reads the Malay newspapers whenever she feels guilty of 
being "an insuff icient Malay. " When criticised for giving her son piano (i. e., 
Western) lessons, she compromised by immediately giving him Arabic lessons 
as well. RAS understands that she can legitimately be free from criticism only if 
she is above reproach, i. e., if she conforms and fulfil their expectations. 
While the women are generally content with privatising their dissent, 
coff eeshoppers work to re-lbgitimise their dissent so that their opinions can be 
articulated publicly, e. g., by scrutinising alternative 134 popular literature, 
jokes and rumours for information to substantiate their opinions. Another 
strategy of re-legitimising is to denounce government experts as textbook 
administrators with "paper qualifications, " in contrast to coffeeshoppers, who 
are schooled in the "university of life. " Thomas even considers his education in 
the coff eeshop more significant than his school education. 
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A third strategy of re-legitimising dissent is to posit the Chinese-educated as 
the authentic and rightful repository of "Asian Values. " Using a discourse of 
(citizens') hearts and minds, coffeeshoppers argue that the culture of the 
Chinese-educated is more sincere while the government's "Asian Values" 
project is merely an odd mix of values packaged together and labelled Asian 
"to keep minorities happy. " With this culturalist twist, their-dissent can no 
longer be trivialised as complaints of "bad losers" but Is now re-legitimised as 
defence of an "Asian" way of life. 
Vl. REPRODUCING THE STATE THROUGH UNCONVINCED TOLERANCE 
This posture reveals that the government has very successfully mobilised 
citizens to exert their moral gaze on errant citizens, i. e., the government's 
hegemony is achieved through a sophisticated inculcation of fear of society's 
(meritocratic) gaze and the creation of self-governing moral subjects. 
This posture reflects an ideological "stalemate" between the government and 
citizens. The government is unable to successfully de-legitimise their dissent 
while citizens are unable to completely re-legitimise their dissent either. While it 
is debate-able whether "tolerance" is "acceptance, " stalemates must be 
considered as a victory for one-party governments because its one-party 
dominance/hegemony, even if incomplete, remains unchallenged. As Leys 
argue, hegemony is not maintained by citizens' affirmation of public consensus 
but by the absence of counter-hegemonic discourses. 
The government's legitimacy is not reproduced without costs. Economically, 
MRT(549) notes that even foreign talents who are recruited to rejuvenate the 
economy are unable to do so because they have to be careful to avoid 
sensitive subjects. Socially, should dissent be consistently denied redress, it 
may become so saturated as to implode. After all, this posture group has very 
strong counter-hegemonic potential. They only await a "viable" alternative, or 
leaders to rally them. As such, the government's project of hegemony is far 
134 For MRT(409), there is hardly any media that has relative autonomy from the local 
media. 
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from secure. Besides discouraging these groups from entering the public 
sphere, it must also prevent these groups from being rallied by activist groups 
who are not discouraged from contesting the government publicly. It Is this 
group that we will meet next. 
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6D. CHANNELLED CHALLENGE: THE DISCOURSE OF "NO CREDIBLE 
OPPOSITION" AND THE SUBORDINATION OF DISSENT 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS POSTURE 
Inspired by a viable alternative vision of nation, and possessing the technical- 
moral credibility to disseminate this vision, this posture groups' public challenge 
to authority is something that the government cannot afford to take lightly. 
Firstly, their public articulation of alternatives exposes the population to 
possibility of a viable alternative. Should their visions take root in the popular 
imagination, they could emerge as organic intellectuals leading supporters 
towards a political alternative. Secondly, this group refuses to be trivialised. 
Their expert style of speech is usually very convincing and has on occasions 
caused bureaucratic civil servants to stumble in the public's eye. Thirdly, their 
social success gives them "role model" status, which significantly boosts the 
credibility of their opinions. The government is sometimes hard-pressed to find 
a way to handle this group, since it is precisely the credible opposition that the 
PAP government rhetorically invites. 
Managing the dissent of this group requires great sophistication. Sociologically, 
this group is the nation's most talented but ideologically, they are perhaps the 
nation's most alienated citizens. Being highly educated and internationally 
mobile, the government is aware that this group cannot be won 135 - since 
their broad international exposure brings them into direct knowledge of viable 
political alternatives to the PAP's one-party domination - it can only try to slow 
down their physical and ideological migration. 
However, even this is difficult and can be achieved only at great cost to the 
PAP government. Despite communitarian campaigns to de-legitimise pluralism 
and to represent those who desire opposition for the sake of opposition as 
"rebels without a cause, " this-group remains unaffected and has even grown. 136 
'35 As the economic crisis deepens and as popular sentiments against foreign 
expatriates in Singapore mounts, the government, unable to justify its preference for 
foreign talent, faces increasing moral and popular pressure to bring local talents 
home. 
136 Election analyses observe that the opposition vote has consolidated at 25%. 
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Because this group desires political pluralism, the PAP knows that their 
consent can only be gained at the expense of its one-party domination. 
At the same time, to retain a semblance of democracy, the PAP cannot deploy 
coercive policies to contain their dissent and must invent very sophisticated 
strategies to, if it is even possible, allow ideological pluralism without 
ideological fragmentation. The significance of this group lies then in the way it 
captures the ongoing struggle between the PAP government and its finest 
talents-turned-dissidents and in the way it gives us a glimpse into the future of 
the art of government. The PAP government is already admired and closely 
studied by world governments for its resistance to liberal democracy and its 
ability to sustain popular dictatorship ("Asian Democracy"). Can the PAP further 
improve on its already sophisticated strategies of maintaining one-party 
ideological dominance? 
H. THE LOGIC OF THE ARTICULATION OF DISSENT: THE DISCOURSE OF 
SINGAPORE INC. 
This posture group is characterised by their insistence on not privatising their 
dissent and their demand for a public (rather than a case-by-case) solution to 
social issues. In popular songs, this posture group distinguishes itself from 
citizens who tolerate authority without complaint. Using popular song analogies, 
if the acceptance groups (Chapter 6A and 6B) "swallows shit" and if the 
tolerance group (Chapter 6C) "holds shit in their mouth" (or even spitting in 
private), then challengers "vomit shit" back out. These metaphors of 
swallowing, spiting and vomiting recur in the lyrics of local bands: 
Detragrammatos uses vomiting sounds as a symbol of their non-conformity 
while Opposition Party sings (Phua and Kong 1996,226): 
Everyone tells us what to do 
Everyone forces shit down our throats 
They expect all their shit to be swallowed 
Quietly by us without a single choke. 
This group understands the importance of not speaking "off the record" and of 
being "quotable. " A non-elected MP Walter Woon caught the public's eye as an 
MP who was not afraid "to go on record. " This group understands that if they go 
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off the record, the media cannot publish their views and what is achieved Is the 
non-circulation of alternative perspectives in credible media. "Speaking on 
record" can spark a filter-down effect; It empowers listeners by giving them 
quotable/credible resources that they can use to (re-)legitimise their previously 
de-legitimised dissent. It can also reverse "the spiral of silence" (Noelle- 
Neumann 1984); it may successfully set public agenda and spark public 
discussions that could help individuals clarify if they are indeed the vocal 
minority or part of a not-so-moral majority, i. e., whether the articulation of their 
dissent would reap social isolation or solidarity. 
This insistence on public-ness is remarkable in a society where paranoia is rife 
and where "covering one's back" is a deeply entrenched survival instinct. This 
insistence also brings challengers head to head with the government's 
classification of sensitive topics. What the government regards as sensitive is 
partly the "public-ness" of an opinion. "Public-ness" Is firstly quantitative - "on 
the record" opinions can be circulated in the credible media without restrictions 
and secondly qualitative - opinions that threaten the government's authority are 
sensitive. Catherine Lim, a local writer, was chastised by the PM himself when 
she voiced coffeeshop rumours on the national daily. There was nothing wrong 
with what she said, it was where she said it; she did not recognise that the 
government tolerates rumours on "sensitive" subjects but not their public 
articulation in credible public spheres. 
So far, I have not discussed in detail the content of any interviewee's 
dissatisfactions; this is because this final posture group's discourses best 
articulate the dissatisfactions that other groups experience In milder degrees. A 
theme that sums up the dissent of various groups Is the discourse of Singapore 
Inc. versus Singapore as a home. All citizens complained about "the rigid path" 
that they are compelled to follow, with no second chance and where deviations 
are de-legitimised and made un-walk-able. It Is also impossible to legitimise 
"alternative paths" because such attempts would be read as a political 
challenge of the superiority of the PAP's national vision and values. 
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What citizens detest about this rigid path is not only Its rigidity and the way it 
forbids other paths, but also the "ugliness" and "soul-less-ness" of this path. 
Interviewees complain that Singapore economy/society has become focused 
on materialism (and instrumental rationality) such that means (e. g., wealth) 
have become ends in themselves, and that citizens are roused to dedicate 
themselves fully to the achievement of economic personal and national ends at 
the expense of all other goals. EH and TL were especially critical of the 
"technologisation" of society, where citizens are encouraged to pursue 
whichever path is most lucrative. Their concerns are echoed widely in popular 
discourse that Singaporeans are "insincere" and do not follow their "hearts, " 
and by the popular metaphor of "engineers" as the epitome of such "lack of 
soul: " 
[TL304-309]: The government said we needed more engineers ... Suddenly, everyone wanted to be an engineer. They didn't 
consider what is it that [I] want, is this really [me]? ... This takes 
conformity to an extreme, [they want] a comfortable lifestyle at the 
expense of personal integrity. 
[EH398-407]: On TV, children were asked whether they want to 
study EM1 [English and Mandarin as first languages] or EM2 
[English as first and Mandarin as second language]. The child said 
EM1. Why? The child replied: "Because my mother says it's 
better. " The child was then asked if he knew what EM1 meant. The 
child said: "I don't know but I know it's better. " 
A teacher was quoted as saying "Instead of trying to quantify what Is valued, 
Singapore values what is quantifiable. " In Singapore Inc., what are valued are 
quantifiable indicators of success such as the "5Cs. " Many Interviewees 
complained about Singapore being too competitive, small and expensive - even 
everyday items have become items of competition for status (EH477). To avoid 
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losing face, people conform to material standards and try to attain what others 
see as icons of success. In popular music, local band Global Chaos (Phua and 
Kong 1996,223) criticises Singaporeans for their 
Uncontrolled greed 
Impetuous desire to be rich 
Immune to worldly issues 
Addicted to worldly pleasures 
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That the government has successfully inculcated in the citizenry such 
"uncontrolled greed" and instituted (through social expectations) a "rigid path" 
indicate the successful inscription of the dominant Ideological values unto 
citizens' everyday life and unto collective dreams/fantasies. It is precisely 
citizens' adherence to this path/ethic that produces "the Ugly Singaporean" that 
citizens and local pop bands criticise. In actuality, "the Ugly Singaporean" and 
"Singapore Inc. " are merely part of the wider side effect that results when the 
dominant ideology is inscribed to the extreme. 
Ill. WAYS OF KNOWING: KNOWING AND ARTICULATING IDEOLOGICAL 
ALTERNATIVES 
Challengers exert deliberate control over their media consumption. Poor 
students like EB and her friends prefer pooling their resources together to take 
turns to buy a newspaper of their choice to reading newspapers their families 
subscribe to. The significance of such practices should not go un-noticed - 
these practices create new media consumption units based on friendship and 
common interests, rather than on patriarchal and authoritarian relations (where 
the head of the household, usually the most senior male, makes media 
decisions for the household. ) 
All challengers exhibit a high reliance on foreign media. All have access to 
foreign media, usually via the Internet or foreign newspapers at public libraries 
(EH) and work spaces. Additionally, for minority challengers, their families tend 
to serve as an alternative public sphere; EB's awareness of racial 
discrimination was heightened through listening to her grandparents' and 
parents' criticisms of the different types of discriminatory practices levied 
against them. 
Such reliance on foreign/alternative media is premised upon a perception of the 
local media as "dangerous" and the foreign media as a "refuge. " How is the 
local media "dangerous" and what does it endanger? In my own experience, it 
is an uphill task to maintain ideological distance and to not give in to enjoying 
"the world's (third) best home. " Every time I return to Singapore, I experience 
the same ideological struggles while watching local drama serials with my 
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family. In the first week I would fume and refuse to sit through the programme. 
In the second week, I would shake my head throughout the programme, which 
seriously compromised my family's viewing pleasure. By the third week, I could 
be bored. In a few more weeks, I could even cry with the characters. In a 
situation where it is easy to become happy living In a gilded cage - at least one 
that is prettier than "other backward Asian countries"- it is too easy to lose 
one's ideological distance without communities and networks of support. It Is In 
this context that we can appreciate the "alienation" challengers experience and 
what the Internet means to them. 
The local media is strongly distrusted as something "appalling" (LV84) and 
misguided (EH628), not only because of its promotion of materialism but also 
because of its pro-government coverage. While the communitarian group 
expects the local media to provide moral guidance, challengers see the local 
media as something they have to "protect" themselves against (LV56/84, EH), 
usually through avoidance, refusing its preferred meaning or reading only to 
"fuel [their] anger at social injustice" (LV601). They expressed disappointment 
in Singaporeans' lack of courage to veer off the rigid path and stated that, 
rather than form a community with "such Singaporeans, " they would prefer to 
be socially isolated, or retreat into cyber-community. Many challengers (TL583) 
are cyberspace junkie for whom the Internet is a "lifesaver" and a "refuge; " they 
explicitly say that without the foreign media to provide a resonating perspective, 
their mental alienation would be complete. 
Challengers do not only feel a strong need to communicate with each other, 
they also feel the need to communicate their dissent to the public. Here, I want 
to discuss some strategiesIchallengers use to articulate dissent, beginning 
from the least to the most directly confrontational. 
(1) Humour is a strategy where social issues are confronted publicly but 
indirectly. Usually anonymous, (a) political jokes and songs can be found at 
websites and bookshops. The dominant theme in this type of literature is 
political repression, usually captured in a caricature of events surrounding 
opposition politicians. At Sintercom's website 
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(www. sintercom. org/sef97/songs. html), there is "a collection of politically 
incorrect songs. " Out of 5 songs, 3 portray light-heartedly the PAP's pursuit of 
the opposition. The other 2 short songs are National Day Parade songs 
modified, one of which comment strongly on political 'repression. 
This is my country, this is my luck 
There's a SDU, to choose my wife [Social Development Unit] 
There's a ISD, to guard my life [Internal Security Department] 
We are Singapore, Singaporeans... 
These jokes and cartoon often filter into mainstream media. In the Singapore 
Bulletin, the PM was reported to have quoted the joke that "Singapore wants to 
go global? Okay, I'll leave! " 
(b) Humour is also employed to remind readers that the PAP and citizens that 
the PAP is only human. In a tabloid, an anonymous cartoon column entitled 
"murmur" was at time used to de-mythologize the PAP by pointing out its 
human weakness. This discourse of the PAP as "only human" de-mystifies 
their authority and legitimises articulations of PAP's (humanly) flaws. Such 
establishment of the PAP's humanness can be further used to ameliorate the 
PAP's harsh criticism of flaws in citizens. E. g., journalist Cherian George 
(ST7/4/1998) argued that young should not be criticised for being idealistic 
because they were behaving exactly like the PAP founders were when they 
were young, adding that the PAP took pride in their idealism in envisioning an 
independent Singapore. 
(c) In daily life, humor can also be used to turn the tables on normative 
expectations. EB494 joked herself out of difficult social expectations. Refusing 
to feel ashamed of her inal ility to pay for'restaurant dinners, EB confronted the 
expectations that Eurasians were rich by telling her friends that, "If you are so 
rich, you can treat me. " 
(2) Mis-applying the government's discourse: This strategy mischievously mis- 
applies the government's values to produce counter-hegemonic readings. A 
common example is the government's call to citizens to do their best 
("Productivity campaign") and to make Singapore "world-class. " Many worn-out 
citizens point out that this call to be "world-class" is a rod the government uses 
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to discipline citizens into workers. Mischievous citizens mis-apply lt to "bad 
values. " In a popular local movie "Money No Enough, " there was a funny and 
solemn moment when a gang pledged solemnly to be "world-class" gangsters. 
The movie then proceeded to show how Singapore gangs invited "foreign 
experts" from Hong Kong to train them into "world-class" gangs. Another 
example is to parody the local media's journalistic awards. Citizens decided to 
give the award of "Photographer of the Year" to "the photographer who 
captured the tranquillity at Chong San" during the 1997 elections. This Is an 
ironic award-the local media had severely distorted the Image of the huge 
supportive crowd who supported the opposition at Chong San. 
(3) Insisting on a public dialogue: (a) Although "challengers" have increasingly 
turned to alternative media to publicise their views, they are aware that it is 
important to disseminate their views and challenge the government in the 
mainstream media. LV explained that other media, especially specialised 
media (e. g., financial or sports), are likely to be read by a niche group who 
already share the writer's opinion; as such, it is not worthwhile to "preach to the 
converted. " More importantly, activists strive to stir public consciousness and 
this public (in the quantitative sense) can only be reached via mainstream 
media and (in the qualitative sense) through engaging the government and 
convincing the public of the superiority of their opinions to the government's. 
(b) Challengers define what is seen by the state as success into something 
negative. They do not see negative consequences as merely side effects but 
re-frame the issue into one where the negative consequences outweighs 
success, or even claim that targeted goals (success) are undesirable for 
society. E. g., "challengers"'argued that suing the opposition might, in the short 
term, "successfully" preserve PAP's position but in the long term would stunt 
the development of democracy. They further argued that the development of 
democracy was more important and beneficial for society than the 
maintenance of PAP's position (ST27/6/1998). 
[BJ566-571]: The PAP always says that we are a democracy, we 
believe in consultation, we believe in consensus and that is exactly the 
line I take. We [a media organisation] are about consensus. 
Me: You make them put their words into practice? 
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BJ: Yah, we are about thinking intelligently about the future, no short- 
term solution, no ad-hoc solutions. 
(c) With Internet technology, the Sintercom website created a way of 
monitoring the censorship activity of the local media. It started a "Not the ST 
Forum Page" column. This website encouraged readers who sent letters to the 
ST Forum Page to forward a copy to it. All these letters would be published on 
the webpage in full, allowing readers to see even the letters that did not got 
published and what was censored (by highlighting censored sections in red). 
(d) Challengers criticise the government's sincerity by holding it to its rhetoric, 
e. g., "(world-class) democracy. " By appropriating government rhetoric, 
challengers' demands cannot be so easily dismissed. Through this strategy, 
challengers force the government to close the gap between rhetoric and reality. 
TL334 quoted the national pledge, which includes the value of democracy and 
equality and argue that it is the "purest" and "highest" embodiment of the 
values of a people and these values should not be bent to what the government 
may consider "contingencies. " Challengers using this strategy are quick to latch 
on to the government's rhetoric, e. g., election promises of a more consultative 
style. 
(e) Challengers challenge the rigor of the state by pointing out contradictions 
between policies. Strategies 3d and 3e are confrontational because 
"challengers" point out the inefficiency of the government in achieving its own 
goals, i. e., the government fails by its own standards. This internal critique 
(disagreement with means not ends), gives challengers an appearance of 
agreement with government goals and also a certain expert status to point out 
the flawed logic/inefficiency of the government's means In its pursuit of its 
goals. To use strategy (3d) and especially (3e) requires hard work and citizens 
must follow issues consistently to develop a long-term understanding. E. g., 
LV44 collects newspaper cuttings as a resource to debate with the government. 
One notable Internet example comes from "Mr. Brown, " who parodied the 
government's campaign of "Singapore National Education. " Many of his 
grouses repeat the themes discussed previously (Appendix 8): 
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I have learned lately: 
1. That we need to set up a Committee to discuss systematically 
how we can have Creativity. 
2. That our leaders say we must be creative and independent of 
spirit, therefore we. must do as they say and be creative and 
independent of spirit. 
3. That we are given a choice on upgrading our flats but when we 
choose not to and convince others, it's not desirable, we are 
selfish... 
An example from my sample of inter-policy contradiction includes the 
contradiction between materialism and Singapore's soul (EH251), between the 
call to be more competitive (putting self above others) and the Gracious 
Society Movement (putting others above self. ) The government responded to 
such exposure of its contradictions by refining Its ideological strategies; It 
reframed social issues as dilemmas137 through the Singapore 21 project 
(http: //www. gov. sg/singapore2l/menu_logo. html): 
" Less Stressful Life Vs Retaining the Drive 
" Needs of Senior Citizens Vs Aspirations of the Young 
" Attracting Talent Vs Looking After Singaporeans 
Internationalization/Regionalisation Vs Singapore as Home 
" Consultation and Consensus Vs Decisiveness and Quick Action. 
Confronted with these new dilemma frames, most people find their "alternative" 
positions absorbed into the mainstream representation. This dilemma frame 
paralyses and channels debate within pre-empted either/or options. E. g., either 
Singapore become more competitive or lags behind the rest of the world. 
Framed as such, Singaporeans who argue for less competition are represented 
as the "vocal minority" and charged as "selfish" (and Nun-Asian"). Within this 
frame, the government takes the subject position of the neutral outsider who 
must co-ordinate the selfish interest of partial citizens to prevent chaos. Within 
this frame, alternative causes are already "dead on arrival" because the 
dilemma frame expects challenges (as "vocal minority") to be ready to 
compromise for the silent majority on the other end of the dichotomy. 
137 Cf. Billig (1988) on how Ideological contradictions can be reproduced/naturalised 
as personal ideological dilemmas. This seems to be precisely the PAP's goal here. 
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(f) Challengers challenge the accuracy/technocracy of the state by pointing out 
that policies do not attain targeted goals, i. e., the government has not been 
diligent/rigorous enough in thinking through policies before implementing them; 
the legitimacy of the policy is thus questioned. This Is similar to (d) but requires 
more technical rigour. Francis Chong is a citizen who has caught the eye of 
many challengers because of his balanced and close checks on the 
government's figures and arguments. His exchanges with the government tend 
to be continuous because he relentlessly pursues civil servants until they give 
him a satisfactory explanation. His strategy is especially complemented by the 
Internet medium. It is not easy to publish the entire chain of correspondence in 
print media. At www. sintercom. org, the chain of correspondences can be read 
continuously and a unique and strategic effect is achieved-the reader can see 
how civil servants keep changing their stance or repeat standard bureaucratic 
replies. The reader can also see that although civil servants always end their 
correspondence with "feel free to call or write to us. " As the correspondence 
dragged on, they were so exasperated by Chong's persistence that they no 
longer welcome his "feedback. " More significantly, the correspondence 
between Chong and the government was always terminated by the 
government's reply that they would look into the matter for an indefinite period, 
and that "it will be at the discretion of (the government) whether they would 
comment on your latest comments. " Chong's relentlessness reveals that the 
government is not as accountable as they claim, and that its call for citizens to 
give feedback is mere rhetoric. 
IV. SOCIOLOGY: ENVISIONING A SOCIETY BEYOND MATERIALISM 
This group is highly reliant on foreign media to sustain their perception of viable 
alternatives. Besides relying on foreign media, this group is also well travelled; 
their conviction also stems from having witnessed the viability of alternative 
ideological systems. Their media habits and "ways of knowing" Ideological 
alternatives immediately suggest a very particular sociology. 
Who are "the challengers"? Because of their antagonistic stance and high 
public profile, their background has been the subject of several media articles 
(ST4/7/1998, ST6/10/1998). The Feedback Unit reported that more people are 
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giving feedback across the board. Two in three want to be consulted on policies 
that affect them, while two in five want to be consulted even on policies that 
would not affect them personally. The number of people giving unsolicited 
feedback via email has doubled from 1996 to 1998. They have become more 
confident, as indicated by the significant decrease in the number of anonymous 
Internet postings (less than 30 out of 300). This means that "challengers" are 
not sociologically confined and that more citizens are becoming more "intense" 
challengers. This makes it difficult to speak about "challengers" as a specific 
group; it is more useful to think of a posture of challenger than to think of a 
"challenger. " 
Educated under the national education system and influenced by the national 
identity campaigns (during the transition from first to second generation rule), 
challengers are exclusively post-state citizens who display an Intense sense of 
imagined community. Their desire for political participation and concern about 
their society is evident in their discourse about "the kind of society I want my 
children to grow up in. " They appear as a group who, because they have 
expectations (unlike the pragmatic group), are deeply disappointed. Many 
citizens express anger at the "blackhole" that their feedback to government 
ends up in, and many interviewees express extreme frustration at their concern 
and inability to influence policies. Statements like "Why do I even care? " recur 
frequently in many interviews. Their mental migration appears to be a way of 
coping with such intense frustration. 
As a post-state generation, citizens were born into a prospering Singapore. 
Materially comfortable, they are uninterested In the Singapore Dream and long 
for freedom-to pursue their non-material goals. 1 During the duration of my 
fieldwork in Singapore, I met many graduates who were happy living In 3-room 
flats (a type of poor man's apartment). A media poll also concluded that young 
Singaporeans are not as materialistic as the government represents them to be 
(http: //cyberfair. gsn. sngs98/19960630-2. html). Because this group is 
uninterested (rather than unable, like the communitarian and coffeeshoppers) 
in material accomplishments, this means that government attempts to secure 
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national or party loyalty through economic stakeholding are likely to achlovo 
limited success. This group values freedom too much to, as interviewo©s 
reveal, be tied down by private property (one of the 5Cs) that would take 20 
years to pay for, in which time they would not dare to change jobs and have no 
chance to travel. 
It is not clear whether this Indicates the onset of a neo-liberal mentality (Cf. 
Rodan 1993b) that Is desirous of personal freedom, or more left-leaning 
inclinations. Perhaps there Is a little of both. There Is a very small but specific 
cluster of interviewees who display a high level of class consciousness, a 
concern for the underdog (de Cunha 1997) and a deep commitment to the 
social re-distribution of income, at the expense of their own privileges. 
Additionally, they display a strong sociological imagination and understand that 
it is necessary to change the system to change citizens' mindset because 
citizens are highly "moulded" by media campaigns. They do not blame 
individuals for conforming to the rigid path but blame the state for making it 
difficult for citizens to behave otherwise. Whereas SE blamed herself by being 
lazy, challengers argue that overcoming government bureaucratic obstacles 
could tire even the most ardent citizen. 
This left-leaning sub-group is identifiable by occupation: they have a strong 
belief in the importance of providing public service and display a strong disdain 
for corporation because they "cannot imagine working overtime so that my 
boss can buy another yacht. " This sub-group appears to have made their 
existence felt as early as 1984 when graduate women (who could have 
benefited) protested the "Graduate Mother Scheme" -a scheme that sought to 
reward graduate mothers with tax incentives. During the economic crisis, many 
graduates (e. g., YJT) voluntarily accepted pay cuts so that fewer workers would 
be made redundant. Such willingness of graduates to sacrifice their material 
benefits indicate firstly that the younger generation has developed a strong 
sense of imagined community and secondly, that their sense of national 
solidarity is one that takes communitarianism much further than the 
government would like it. 
138 Challengers are reflexive about how their ideological position may be a luxury that 
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V. THE LIMITS OF CHALLENGE: THE DISCOURSE OF "NO CREDIBLE 
OPPOSITION" AND THE SUBORDINATION OF DISSENT 
Very few challengers give in to their migratory inclination. Even those who have 
exited the country may not be completely sure of the correctness of their 
decision - TL fears that compared to his Singaporean peers, his British 
university programme would not push him hard enough and that, not reading a 
ton of books a week, " he would slacken off and lose his competitiveness. 
Clearly, TL was not fully prepared to turn his back on the imperative of being 
competitive. 
Those challengers who stay within the system fight a different battle - to "resist 
being sucked into the system. " This is especially the case in Confucian 
societies where mandated rulers are "entitled to be hypersensitive to any hint of 
criticism" (Pye and Pye 1985,66)-citizens who wish to criticise the 
government would have to do so deferentiallyt39 and perhaps, from within its 
ranks. Where resistance is possible only with conformity, there is always the 
possibility that dissent would be incorporated, neutralised or if it is 
"constructive, " harnessed to strengthen the very system the challengers want to 
put an end to. 
Challengers' fears of being sucked Into the system or being "normalised" come 
from a range of sources. Here, I will begin with those sources of normalisation 
that are perceived as most external to the self = sources that tend to work 
through the subject's context to impact his posture to authority - and proceed 
to sources that increasingly'works through the citizens' subjectivity. 
The most external of these sources of normalisation include being subdued by 
the fear of political repercussion. Many minority challengers fear being accused 
of stirring up racial tension when they speak about racial discrimination against 
them. Should the government punish a challenger, paranoia would spread 
their economic/class position can afford. 
139 Examples have already been given throughout the dissertation, e. g., double 
negatives (EH359), criticism of side effects, and the ABA format of criticism. 
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especially quickly in a society where people already prof or to orr on tho lido of 
caution. 
Bureaucracy is also a formidable obstacle that can break a challenger's spirit 
and alter the expectations that challengers have of their (imagined) supporters. 
When LV(300) had to deal with extensive bureaucratic procedures over a 
prolonged period, she began to feel weary and redirected her frustration to "the 
ungrateful masses" - "if they don't care, why should I waste my time fighting for 
them? " For those challengers who work within the civil service, there is the fear 
that everyday routine and organisation culture would blunt their posture of 
criticism. LV(521) spoke reflexively about how she struggled and then gave In 
to the restrictions of being a civil servant. 
While the above forces of normalisation works through the challengers' context, 
there is another type of forces of normalisation that works through the 
challengers' subjectivity. Firstly, it is not easy for any citizen to completely 
relinquish the dominant ideological values and desires (for material success) 
that they hive been ingrained with since childhood. As such, there is always 
the possibility that challengers would be "sucked back into the system" or 
trapped by their own desires. 
However, this seems to be a weaker force of normalisation than the normative 
pressures of communitarian compliance. Challengers have very little weapons 
to fight against the label of "vocal minority, " unlike the government's arsenal of 
economists, demographers and other social scientists who lend their academic 
authority to the construction of the silent majority. Should challengers refuse 
such de-legitimisation of their voice, it would be difficult for them to build a 
strong case against the silent majority. 
Should challengers "truly" believe that they are the vocal minority, they would 
internalise the communitarian dilemma of whether the government should carry 
out. the will of the majority or minority. Such a dilemma would lead naturally to a 
subordination of one's dissent to the wishes of the majority - dissent is not 
necessarily privatised since citizens can still speak about their subjective 
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especially quickly in a society where people already prefer to err on tho lido of 
caution. 
Bureaucracy is also a formidable obstacle that can break a challenger's spirit 
and alter the expectations that challengers have of their (imagined) supporters. 
When LV(300) had to deal with extensive bureaucratic procedures over a 
prolonged period, she began to feel weary and redirected her frustration to "the 
ungrateful masses" - "if they don't care, why should I waste my time fighting for 
them? " For those challengers who work within the civil service, there Is the fear 
that everyday routine and organisation culture would blunt their posture of 
criticism. LV(521) spoke reflexively about how she struggled and then gave In 
to the restrictions of being a civil servant. 
While the above forces of normalisation works through the challengers' context, 
there is another type of forces of normalisation that works through the 
challengers' subjectivity. Firstly, it is not easy for any citizen to completely 
relinquish the dominant ideological values and desires (for material success) 
that they have been ingrained with since childhood. As such, there is always 
the possibility that challengers would be "sucked back Into the system" or 
trapped by their own desires. 
However, this seems to be a weaker force of normalisation than the normative 
pressures of communitarian compliance. Challengers have very little weapons 
to fight against the label of "vocal minority, " unlike the government's arsenal of 
economists, demographers and other social scientists who lend their academic 
authority to the construction of the silent majority. Should challengers refuse 
such de-legitimisation of their voice, it would be difficult for them to build a 
strong case against the silent majority. 
Should challengers "truly" believe that they are the vocal minority, they would 
internalise the communitarian dilemma of whether the government should carry 
out. the will of the majority or minority. Such a dilemma would lead naturally to a 
subordination of one's dissent to the wishes of the majority - dissent is not 
necessarily privatised since citizens can still speak about their subjective 
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preferences in public while deferring to what is good for community (as dotinod 
by the government. ) 
Where the will of the majority is presented as the prioritisation of prospority 
over democracy, such compliance with the will of the majority is also 
compliance with the dominant ideology. Such compliance and subordination of 
dissent is especially likely because challengers genuinely care for the welfare 
of the underdogs. Should they be persuaded that prosperity is what the 
majority wants, they would see their compliance as a heroic/patriotic act of 
sacrifice of their own preferences. Challengers certainly do not want to become 
leaders without followers and given the many repressive and bureaucratic 
obstacles, would not want to fight for something that the masses do not want. 
A final strategy that is successful in subordinating dissent - which interviewees 
reproduce - is the discourse that there is "no credible opposition. " This 
discourse can be seen as a sequel to the discourse of "no viable alternative. " 
Knowing that it cannot convince challengers of the illegitimacy or non-viability 
of ideological alternatives, the government now seeks to convince challengers 
that, despite there being viable hypothetical alternatives, there are not credible 
politicians to lead the country towards that direction. As such, the project to 
realise the viable alternative must be postponed. (This ideological strategy of 
"no credible opposition" is accompanied by a policy to prevent credible 
members of civil society from becoming credible opposition politicians. The 
PAP machinery conscientiously checks whether civil society leaders intend to 
run for office. As long as they have no such intentions, their criticism will be 
tolerated. ] 
Despite their distrust of the local media, many challengers unquestioningly 
accept the media's representation of opposition politicians as incompetent and 
dishonest. What is impressive about the PAP's hegemony is that it has even 
convinced human rights activists that the PAP government welcomes 
opposition but "there just isn't any good men In opposition. " 
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However, the perceived lack of "credible opposition" dons not signify the and of 
dissent. Such discourse merely slows down, re-channels and re-Invonts the 
demands for multi-party system ("opposition for the sake of opposition") as 
demands for a responsive government. Since the 1980s, citizens have 
successfully pressurised LKY's early retirement with the promise of a 
consultative government under PM Goh. In the liberal mood In the 1980s 
amidst citizens' clamours for participation, the Feedback Unit and other similar 
government institutions were set up. By 1990s, citizens realised that those 
institutions were "a blackhole where feedback disappears into" (ST04/07/1998). 
These perceptions so compromised the Feedback Unit's credibility that 
ministers now bear the burden of proof; they have to "prove" that "public input 
can lead to policy changes. " To ensure that the government does not only 
listen but also act, the 1 980s call for feedback has sharpened into the 1990s 
demand for "pre-policy consultation. " Although the discourse of a "responsive 
government" is not necessarily a challenge to one-party dominance, lt clearly 
has the potential to serve as or usher in a discourse that Is more directly 
challenging to one-party rule. 
VI. REPRODUCING THE STATE THROUGH CHANNELLED CHALLENGE1 ° 
Although the strategy of subordinating dissent appears successful, Its success 
is diluted when considered in the light of the PAP government's broader goal of 
inculcating a sense of belonging so as to deter the migration of its best talents 
("brain drain. ") The irony is that if the government successfully convinces 
challengers that they have nothing in common with the moral majority, this 
would only intensify their alienation and speed up their (mental) migration, (. e., 
the more successful the government is in containing (subordinating/privatising) 
dissent, the less successful it will be in reversing the alienation and (mental) 
"° While this group may give in to the dull compulsion of the economic (Abercombie et 
al 1980), challengers are hardly a group of happily alienated workers. Their "consent" 
or tolerance is better characterised by Sloterdikj's (1988, chapter 1) notion of 
"enlightened false consciousness, " where people who "support" capitalist values may 
do so out of Ironic awareness of the relations of reproduction and their systematic 
alienation. 
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migration of the very talents that could lead the nation towards greater 
economic prosperity - the key basis of PAP legitimacy. 
141 
Challengers exhibit a deep sense of alienation (to the extent of not being able 
to befriend or trust "soul-less" Singaporeans and hopelessness ("why do I even 
care? "). This "structure of feeling" must be understood within a context of the 
contradictions of the dominant and subdominant ideologies. Challengers are 
rightly the "trophies" of the PAP's success in developing local talents and 
instilling a sense of national belonging in its citizens. However, the Asian 
Values project might have over-legitimised communitarianism, with the 
consequence that challengers prioritise it over the dominant ideology and 
imagine an alternative community based on solidarity rather than a community 
based upon competition (Singapore Inc. ), as envisaged by the PAP. 
Furthermore, the government's success in subordinating dissent may have 
created the unintended consequence of strengthening challengers' solidarity 
with each other. TL and VG find it difficult to befriend people who are not like 
themselves and form strong friendships with those who reject dominant 
ideological values. There is also a sub-cultural norm within "hip" humanities 
circles where it is not "cool" to be pro-PAP. In coffeeshops and among 
intellectual circles, it is a taboo to ask citizens who they voted because even if 
citizens voted for the PAP, there is a counter-hegemonic subcultural norm that 
pressurises them to do otherwise. 
By legislating anti-democratic policies and singling out civilians for 
punishment/shaming (e. g., naming bond-breakers), the government may 
sharpen challengers' definition of their community. Phua and Kong (1966,222) 
argued for the existence of a subculture that is recognisably different from, and 
to me, even opposed to mainstream culture. Regardless of whether 
challengers feel themselves a community, the ruling elite has identified them as 
a subculture and banned their activities. For these challengers, the coercive 
government serves as a common enemy that not only unifies them but also 
provides a better defined ideological-substantive basis for the emergence of an 
141 MRT commented that foreign talents have difficulty contributing to Singapore's 
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anti-government community. By enraging challengers, such coercive acts often 
serve to weed out less committed challengers (who may be frightened into 
privatising their dissent) and "fuel the anger" and commitment of others. 
These developments indicate that even if the PAP succeeds in blocking "viable 
alternatives" and "credible opposition" in public and succeeds in securing 
citizen complicity in privatising dissent, its success is only temporary. This is 
because dissent is not neutralised/vanquished, merely postponed, privatised or 
subordinated. Over time, underground/privatised dissent may become more 
saturated and pointed in its challenge, even causing an Implosion. As such, the 
PAP's hegemony is not "maintained, " merely "prolonged" since its present 
ideological "victories" only serve to weaken and render less secure its 
hegemonic basis in the long term. 
Admittedly, it is very difficult for the opposition to appear credible in citizens' 
eyes, which means that challengers are, for now, reduced to dancing around 
the issues and having to fight for political freedom through civil (rather than 
political) opposition. To this end, Singaporeans seem well equipped; journalists 
often remark that Singaporeans have perfected-the art of pressurising the 
government with their vote. They have not succeeded in institutionalising 
democracy but if democracy is not thought as a stage but as an incremental 
process or a utopia, then Singapore society has certainly inched forward. 
With this group, we arrive at the crystallisation of the contradictions of the 
system: the logic and contradictions of capitalism clashes head on because 
challengers insist on public confrontations. It is no longer possible to refute, 
neutralise, privatise or subordinate dissent against capitalistic rule. This brings 
us to an important question: having observed the everyday process of 
legitimating authority, it is now necessary to identify the bases of 
legitimacy/hegemony of the PAP government and the moments of hegemonic 
crisis. Here, the PAP's hegemony appears so plagued by internal 
contradictions that it can hardly move forward without unintentionally over- 
legitimating either its dominant or subdominant ideology. 
economic development because they are not allowed to be creative. 
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This motivates us to think about the art of government and especially the art of 
prolonging one-party dominance in a situation where its hegemony is so 
saturated with ideological contradictions and where governments can no longer 
censor or bully the opposition or citizens into compliance if it is to remain 
credible, where compliance has to be secure through Confucian 
("gentlemanly") rule. 
Having identified some delay tactics such as the creation of moral panics and 
spectres of crises (Chapter 5), in the conclusion chapters, I want to move on to 
consider how governments in different countries navigate such challenges, and 
particularly to examine why some one-party states collapse while other thrive. 
Has one-party rule indeed reached the end of its history as Fukuyama (1992) 
suggests, or is it possible for authoritarian governments to evolve, e. g., into 
"soft authoritarianism" or "popular dictatorship? " How is it possible to sustain, 
without coercion, consent on authoritarianism, or consent on coercion? 
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Chapter 7 Hegemony without popularity 
The moral centre as the foundation of soft 
authoritarianism 
I have often been accused of interfering with private lives... I say without 
the slightest of remorse... we would not have made economic progress 
if we did not intervened on very personal matters - who your neighbour 
is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language 
you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people think. 
That's another problem. (LKY, National Day Rally 1986). 
Beneath Leys (1990,127) assertion that, "for an ideology to be hegemonic, it is 
not necessary that it is loved, merely that it has no serious rivals" lies an 
important but rarely pondered issue of the place of dissent. In a hegemonlc 
state, what is the configuration or balance of hegemonic and counter- 
hegemonic elements? If hegemony is not the absence of dissent, what then is 
the balance between consent and dissent? Where does dissent reside? 
Theories of ideological incorporation abound (Cf. Mouffe, Brown, Gramsci). 
They tend to be highly theoretical and vague about the constellation of consent- 
dissent - what does it mean to say that state Ideologies "seep" Into popular 
imagination, "fuse" national and popular dreams or "provide a language" to 
articulate collective fantasies (Hall 1988b, 176)? In these observations of the 
hegemonic process, there is a focus on consent without the theorising of 
dissent, which is necessary for a more rounded understanding of the 
hegemonic process and for thinking about counter-hegemony and hegemonic 
crisis. Indeed, Leys' assertion implies that in securing hegemony, the process 
of defusing dissent is more Important than the securing of consent. 
Especially in the case of Singapore - where its citizens are described as 
"famous for complaining, " it is important to investigate how hegemony can 
reign amidst rampant dissent. In Part 2 and 3, I have Identified several 
strategies of defusing dissent practised by the state and by citizens, suggesting 
that dissent that cannot be de-legitimised "hides" In the underground or cracks 
and crevices within public discourse while attempting to re-legitimise Itself. On 
a broader picture, such privatisation and subordination of dissent Indicate that 
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rather than being based on identification, the PAP's hegemony is based upon 
rhetorical compliance - one where citizens feel compelled to comply in public 
despite disagreements. Taken further, the PAP can even be described as 
unpopular, but hegemonic142 -the local Chinese press described the PAP's 
electoral victories as "bitter" and the PAP as having "won the people's minds 
but not their hearts, " Thus, especially in the case of Singapore, there Is a need 
to go beyond the theorising of consent to a theory that actively focuses on the 
particular configuration of consent/dissent. 
In the absence of suitable theories, I want to draw upon an observation that 
emerged during fieldwork - the ubiquitous presence of hidden audiences and 
interviewee's fierce dialogues with them. This observation is theoretically 
important firstly because the characteristic of this imaginary audience is 
consistent across all interviewees and secondly, because this imaginary 
audience resonates with the media portrayal of the Ugly Singaporean - Mr 
Kiasu (Afraid-to-lose, i. e., competitive). 
142 Cf. Chapter 4's observation that the PAP had never been truly popular prior to 
securing to its one-party dominance and after that, has always avoided elections 
based on popularity. 
273 
Mr Kiasu has obvious links to the dominant Ideology; he Is the embodiment of 
the ethic of capitalist accumulation as well as Its side effects of ungraciousness 
and absurd competitiveness; he Is the Ideal competitive worker-citizen of 
Singapore Inc., but "ugly" when judged by non-capitalistic standards. Although 
there is Indication (see later) that he does not represent that majority or the 
average Singaporean, yet, by embodying the contradictions of the system, he 
captures the popular imagination by allowing citizens to articulate their 
everyday dilemmas, anxieties and by situating them within a national structure 
of feelings. 
Although Mr Kiasu is not a "normal" Singaporean in the statistical sense, he 
has become synonymous with the "moral majority" and the "rigid path" that my 
interviewees believe other Singaporeans are walking and which they believe 
other Singaporeans expect them to conform to. Through Mr Kiasu, the 
dominant ideology becomes a moral centre that guides citizens' everyday inter- 
personal and personal conduct through mediating social expectations and 
one's self-image. 
My concept of a moral centre draws from Neale's (1977,14) observation of an 
ideological centre that, while being an analytical construct, appears to subjects 
as subjectively real. Dominant yet Invisible, this concept of an Ideological/moral 
centre also resonates with the PAP's explicit ideological strategy of "holding the 
middleground" - where state values serve as the norm or preferred reading, 
against which deviations must be justified. By representing It as the 
commonsense or will of the moral majority, the moral centre Induces 
competitiveness and conservativeness, which In turn sustains Asian Capitalism 
and Asian Democracy and tenders alternatives unthinkable. In the following 
section, I will explore the breadth, depth and exclusiveness of this moral centre 
in the popular imagination while analysing the ideological function it serves. 
7A. THE PERVASIVENESS OF A MORAL CENTRE: RHETORICAL 
COMPLIANCE AND THE EVERYDAY LEGITIMISATION OF AUTHORITY 
A recurring theme throughout my fieldwork was the presence of a strong 
normative centre ("the rigid path") that exerts pressure on citizens to conform to 
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the norm of being successful (rather than being communitarlan). Against tho 
wishes of many citizens, the centrality and dominance of the PAP'S Confucian 
work ethic and economic ideology (Singapore Dream) continue to be 
reproduced, serving as frames through which citizens make sense of how 
society perceives them (successful or not) and as a standard against which 
failure must be justified. Through being institutionalised as the (imagined) gaze 
of society, the centrality/hegemony of official values in everyday inter-personal 
life is* ensured. 
The reach of the moral centre. The strength and breadth of this moral centre is 
most convincingly indicated by how citizens see no alternatives to the PAP and 
to meritocracy, which PAP represents as the superior "Asian" way of self- 
reliance (Vs inferior 'Western" welfarism). The consensus that the PAP has 
"done a good job" Is unchallenged. Even the opposition accepts this, preferring 
to criticise the side effects of the dominant Ideology In favour of (PAP's 
subdominant ideology of) communitarianism. In Singapore, opposition parties 
aspire to become a supplementary party, not the dominant party. The notion of 
an opposition government remains unimaginable to citizens, indicating that as 
an ideological construct, "no viable alternatives" has secured near complete 
consent. 
The reach of this centre is also convincingly signalled by how the "have-nots" - 
those with the greatest cause to disbelieve in meritocracy - is often its strongest 
proponent. Despite (or because of) their lack of "qualifications to dream" the 
Singapore Dream, working-class parents invest their hopes in their children. 
HO(185-303) did not even feel qualified to comment on media programs but 
spoke angrily about the discrimination against her daughter. Even Thomas, 
who lives out his belief that he has no future by wasting his money, confessed 
that if he had children, he would want them to grow up like me- well educated 
and socially optimistic. In securing the hopes of the have-nots for their children, 
the PAP prevents them from constituting a mass that can be readily rallied by 
alternative ideologies. 
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Those who criticise meritocracy do so without rejecting It. Thoy may quostion 
whether the good life is equally accessible and cite racial/linguistic 
discrimination to argue that meritocracy is not functioning properly. Such 
criticisms do not challenge the ideal of meritocracy but rather its 
implementation. In fact, such (constructive) criticism assists the government to 
ensure genuine meritocracy, rather than pose an Ideological alternative. By and 
large, citizens/'workers" ("Singapore Inc. ") believe that they must be self-reliant 
and upgrade their skills if they want a better material life; l. e., citizens believe 
meritocracy to be a fair way of distributing rewards. That none reject the 
principle of meritocracy indicates the government's unbroken hegemony on Its 
economic ideology. 
The exclusivity of this moral centre. The strength of this moral centre Is 
indicated by the way it excludes or renders unthinkable alternative lifestyles. 
Many found it stifling to have to conform to expectations, calling this centre "the 
rigid path" with "no second chance" (TL393/423), full of "invisible pressure" 
(TE0225), where one has "no room to breathe" (EB441). 
What is stifled is not merely personal and social liberty but also the ability to act 
on human nature. Jokes about Singaporeans are Inevitably punchlined by the 
stereotype that Singaporeans cannot act without government instructions: 
Two men 'and a woman are marooned on an island. If they were British, 
the two men would share each other; if they were French, the two men 
would share the woman. What would they do if they were 
Singaporeans? 
Answer: Wait for instructions. 
Citizens complain that Singaporeans are penalised for following their hearts. 
EH(251-260) complained that the government raised the university fees for arts 
faculties to "encourage" students towards engineering degrees. For BL(155- 
162), it was "unnatural" and hypocritical to ban Singlish, since "even judges and 
lawyers talk like that. " TEO was irritated that citizens were not allowed to 
express their human emotions: 
[TE0329-331]: Why are we always discussing how to cope and 
welcome foreign talents? Of course, it is hoped that we will welcome 
them. But it is human nature, if they are here to snatch your rice bowl, 
you will be unhappyl 
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The intensity of citizens' exasperation with what they see as unroasonablo 
government regulations is best glimpsed by a joke. Citizens claim they would 
not be surprised if pigeons were fined for shitting on the streets, indicating that 
citizens have given give up trying to understand the government's justification; 
they will simply obey its incomprehensible demands. 
Besides alienating citizens from their personal desires and human nature, the 
centre also renders alternative ideologies unthinkable, thereby maintaining the 
hegemony of Asian Capitalism and Asian Democracy. The typical response to 
the viability of welfarism is, "how can we afford health and education if wo pay 
50% tax? " Similarly, the coffeeshop slogan of "it's better to die than to go to the 
hospital" (hospitalisation bills can "kill") protests against the cost of health care 
without demanding state assistance. Despite the complaints about high costs 
of living, coffeeshoppers ultimately believe in self-reliance. Such absence of 
'Western" welfarist demands should be seen as an ideological success of the 
PAP's Asian values. The PAP government has successfully promoted a model 
of state-citizen relationship where the state, despite being portrayed as a loving 
father, has no such responsibilities towards its children. 
Alternatives to Asian Democracy - e. g., multi-party democracy - though 
imaginable, are rendered non-credible partly because the opposition Is 
presented as incapable of delivering economic prosperity since it lacks the 
PAP's "track record. 143 More crucially, this criterion/definition of good 
governance is premised upon the assumption that the moral Asian majority 
values prosperity over all other national goals, i. e., that the moral centre or 
popular will is, as journalists frequently remarked, one that is happy to trade 
political freedom for economic prosperity. 
The depth of the moral centre. The depth of citizen's internalisation of the 
centre's values can be seen in how all interviewees take materialistic 
competition as a frame of reference, even if as a point of departure. Citizens 
feel disciplined/framed in against their will and compelled to comply. 
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One such guiding frame Is the preoccupation with self-improvement and with 
"not wasting. " This has unique implications for what constitute status symbols 
within "Asian capitalism, " which Is characterised by high investment and high 
savings (unlike Western capitalism's high investment and high spending). 
While needing to display material wealth, status Items must both be costly 
(high spending) and wealth generating (high investment/savings). Not 
surprisingly, the status symbols in Singapore are the 5Cs (car, condominium, 
career, cash, credit), which have high "re-sale" values, unlike concert 
attendance, expensive holidays or designer clothes. 
The preoccupation with self-improvement ("upgrading" and being productive 
indicate a high degree of social optimism and identification with the centre. By 
contrast, the act of "wasting" is a sign of refusal of the centre's values. Most 
citizens display an aversion to wasting. For WCM(235-236), anything that does 
not have "use value" is a waste of money. For PTN, to not be busy doing night- 
courses is to waste time. TL, who is studying overseas, worries constantly that 
his university will "waste" his potential by not making him "read a ton of books a 
week" as Singaporean students do. 
It is also in this context that we can appreciate Thomas's defiant display of 
"wasting. " He describes himself as a'wvastrel", a *good-for-nothing" and angrily 
accused me of "insincerity" when I could not remember what my hobbies were, 
i. e., that I do not "waste" time on them. In a highly competitive society where 
every moment/resource counts, where one has to keep running to maintain 
one's social position (and where relaxing means losing any advantage one has 
gained), Thomas's courage in daring to waste Is tantamount to burning his 
bridges. The more he wastes, the more difficult It Is for him to catch up. Yet, 
Thomas's practice of "wasting", however oppositional In symbolic terms, Is 
meaningful only when framed against the dominant ideology of material 
aspiration. 
'43 This is something the opposition can never secure without first being voted Into 
government so that it can start building up Its "track record" 
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The strongest indication of the hegemonic strength of this moral contra lins In 
citizens' rationalisation of the negative effects of "klasuism "'" All Intorviowoos 
are aware of "kiasu-ism" and struggled to distinguish between good/bad/"supor. 
hyper" kiasuism (EB376, JIM, AS, RM), What Is the point of all those 
distinctions? Such rationalisations allow citizens to see themselves not as ugly 
individuals who compete for socially meaningful but personally meaningless 
success, as individuals who have "sold out. " Such rationalisations Indicate how 
deeply hegemonic the dominant ideology Is - despite its inconvenience and 
meaninglessness and its despite undesirable manifestations, interviewees 
struggle to conform to the dominant ideological values of competitiveness, 
considering them as evil but necessary. 
This illustrates the degree of ideological success (hegemony) of the PAP. It 
succeeded in getting citizens to Internalise Ideological contradictions 
(competitiveness and its ugly side-eff ects) as personal dilemmas. Billig (1988) 
uses the term "ideological dilemma" to underline that it is not only consistent 
ideologies that are reproduced but that Ideological contradictions can also be 
reproduced/naturalised as personal Ideological dilemmas, i. e., that Ideological 
contradictions need not be reproduced as counter-hegemonic dissent. This is 
precisely the PAP's ideological success, where dissent Is transformed Into 
consent by inscribing ideological contradictions organically into citizens' 
everyday "structure of feelings. " 
r 
If I were to reconstruct an image of Singapore from interview transcripts, the 
image of "an unbearable heaviness of being" and the metaphor of "pressure 
cooker" would certain apply. Rapid modernisation in Singapore has not led to 
anomie but to the enthusiastic over"interpellation of every citizen Into nation- 
144 Mr Kiasu originated as a popular movement that was critical of PAP's dominant 
ideology. However, before this counter-hegemonic movement could dent the PAP's 
hegemony, the PAP embraced Mr Kiasu and embarked on a "Gracious Society 
Movement" to incorporate this counter-hegemonic discourse into its new subdominant 
ideology of communitarianism. By representing Mr Kiasu sympathetically rather than 
critically, kiasuism was made to appear necessary and more amusing than ugly. 
Additionally, through the Movement, contradictions (competitiveness vs. 
communitarianism) were represented as personal dilemmas requiring citizens to find 
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building projects (for the "total defence" of Singapore). Most interviewoos 
complained about the "invisible pressures" they face, how they are "owned by 
the community" and are not free to act on their own preferences. E8 complains 
that there is "no room to breathe; " TL and many young professionals complains 
about the "rigid path" and many professional women were secretly delighted 
with the economic crisis because they hope it will dilute society's high 
expectations of them to attain ever higher levels of success. 
These pressures are also incessant and interminable because, true to the 
capitalist ethic of accumulation, the PAP always ensures that there Is always 
either a higher (economic) goal In sight or a crisis just around the corner that 
the nation must unite to triumph over. With a never-ending stream of crises and 
national expectations, the privatisation or subordination of personal 
difference/dissent becomes a habitualised practice, a taken-for-granted 
defence mechanism against the need but inability to act on one's preferences. 
Why do citizens conform? Firstly, to a large extent, the PAP has succeeded not 
only in creating proletariats, but also to see to their "embourgeoisiement" 
(Goldthrope and Lockwood 1969) - if not materially then at least ideologically 
through giving them hope of attaining the Singapore Dream. 
However, this identification must be qualified - it is only a partial one. An ST 
poll (30/6/1996) reported that young Singaporeans are "more realistic and 
reasonable, and considerably less fickle than they are often made out to be. " 
Yet, while none of my interviewees longed for the Singapore Dream, all wanted 
a "comfortable life" and "would not mind" If their children could secure the 
Singapore Dream. This indicates that the Singapore Dream and Mr Kiasu 
embodies an extreme or ideal that citizens, in principle, identify with but which 
they do not realistically believe they can/want to achieve. 
To understand why citizens conform, it may be helpful to think about what 
penalties they perceive there to be if they do not conform. My interviewees 
explained their conformity with social expectations, which suggest that the 
their own subjective balance rather than as a national problem requiring a nationwide 
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dominant ideology of being competitive and materially successful has bocomo 
so deeply lodged in popular imagination that citizens simply assumo that othors 
think like this and feel they have to either behave similarly or justify thoir 
deviation. 
That citizens are motivated by social expectations, or "face" Indicates that they 
practice a type of rhetorical compliance - they would comply in public despite 
their private disagreement. Although this may appear to be a weak basis for 
government hegemony, I would argue In the next section that rhetorical 
compliance or governmentality by "face" constitute a good enough basis of 
authoritarian legitimacy/hegemony. Such moral governmentality allows non- 
liberal governments to secure hegemony without having to be popular In 
(Asian) societies with weaktabsent civil societies. 
7B. THE SOFTENING OF AUTHORITARIANISM: EMBEDDING COERCION IN 
PUBLIC MORALITY AND THE CREATION OF "FACE" GOVERNMENTALITY 
That the PAP's hegemony is founded upon rhetorical compliance may be 
interpreted as a sign of the limit of the PAP's ideological success (Cf. Kwok 
1981 later). However, such an interpretation exposes liberal assumptions, 
where ethical compliance or convicted consent Is the only measure of 
ideological success against which other forms of compliance are found 
wanting. It is through such liberal lenses - which the local Chinese newspapers 
does wear - that criticisms such as "the government has won the people's 
minds but not their hearts" can be made. These criticisms reflect a gross 
misunderstanding of the ideological goals of the PAP - LKY very clearly states 
that he is not concerned about "what people think, " only what they do. 
Such an interpretation also fails to consider other ways (besides the liberal 
preference for ethical self-government and emphasis on cognitivist subjects, 
Cf. Neale 1977,10/11/18) through which state ideologies can be Inscribed onto 
the popular body. 
de-emphasis on competitiveness. 
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Looking at Singaporeans' everyday discourse, thorn Is clearly an alternative 
site/strategy of Ideological Inscription. Pro"PAP values are presented as public 
morality and inscribed onto inter-personal relations through citizens' concern for 
"face" (what others think of oneself). It Is In the context of this alternative site of 
ideological inscription that the concept of "hidden audience" becomes 
theoretically significant. 145 
While Interviewees hardly talk about "face", they do constantly invoke a "hidden 
audience" -a group of generalized others, whose expectations of the 
Interviewee could not be known to the Interviewee directly (since those others 
are not limited to one's significant others), but, I would argue, through the 
media's construction of a "silent majority. " Indeed, Interviewees perceive that 
"others" expect them to conform to the norms and values caricatured by Mr. 
Kiasu - an ugly (grace-less), over-competitive Singaporean. In this sense, the 
concepts of' a "hidden audience" and a "moral majority" allow us to see the 
process through which public morality and official discourses are normalized In 
a communitarian fashion (as social expectations rather than as a Individualistic 
fashion, as ethics) to serve as a "middleground" -a term the PAP uses to 
describe its political strategy - social life. 
Through equating state ideologies with the values of the moral majority - 
something that communitarian ideologies with their emphasis of 
"community/majority before self" Is especially prone to do - state coercion is 
145 I would like to explain the relationship between the different analytical sections. In 
writing this dissertation, I had some difficulties In deciding which analysis should 
structure the other: media coverage or interview transcripts. To some extent, It Is 
prioritising the analysis of popplan discourse over media coverage that led me to posit 
the presence of hidden audiences, which further allude to the existence of a 
normative/moral centre, and finally to trace It to the media construction of the "silent 
moral Asian majority. " Had my starting point been an analysis of media coverage for 
media discourses/frames and then an investigation of popular discourses to see If 
particular discourses/frames were repeated, I might have focused on those aspects of 
popular discourse that reproduce media discourse, while Ignoring those aspects that 
stem from other "ways of knowing" (e. g., jokes and rumours). Because my starting 
point was patterns in popular discourse (without trying to structure them according to 
media frames/discourses), which were then traced to various media and non-media 
sources, media effects (along with effects of other non-media forms of 
communications) were deduced post-hoc. I. e., only those media discourses that could 
be traced in the interview transcripts were described; my analysis of media coverage 
was far from comprehensive. 
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transformed into the societal discipline while legal penalties aro transformed 
Into the (imagined) disproving looks of the moral majority. In this way, "taco, " as 
the society's moral gaze, allows for state coercion to be embedded Into tho 
popular body and to appear indirect, organic and moro legitimate (since the 
state is merely following the will of the majority), thereby transforming hard 
(governmental) authoritarianism Into soft (societal) authoritarianism. 
To understand how face works to become pro-status quo, it is necessary to 
understand what face is and how it is gained and lost. Face Is a combination of 
social-economic and moral status, the two being conflated through 
Confucianism where one's material achievement is regarded as a signifier of 
one's moral discipline. Within Confucian discourse, the good citizen works 
incessantly for material goals and not beyond It because these material 
achievements are the expression of one's morality and an end in itself. 16 This 
explains why Confucian societies do not have higher social goals than 
materialism - something that neo-liberals see as disturbingly superficial. Hero, 
SEW seems to have difficulty imagining non-material Eastern dreams: 
[SEW194-221]: From an Eastern perspective, people want to fill their 
stomachs before they think about democracy. 
Me: Singapore has quite successfully fulfilled that goal. What's next? 
SEW: Mmm... In some Asian countries, people still live below the 
poverty line 
Me: What about Singapore? 
SEW: If you take Singapore 30 years ago, standards were not high. We 
needed a strong government to implement the right policies. Ideals of 
democracy must be introduced slowly or it will create a disorderly 
situation. 
Me: What Eastern goals are there after filling stomachs? 
SEW: (long pause) 
As a moral status that is completely derived from the material, "face" strongly 
encourages citizens to be "competitive" and conservative. Face encourages 
incessant competitiveness because one's material-moral status is always 
16 There is so much resonance with Weber's Calvinists here that it Is Impossible to 
not mention it. The Calvinists have no way of being assured of the status of their 
(predestined) salvation, thus, material achievement becomes the only signifier of how 
close/far they are to their Ideal state. Where material accomplishment becomes 
conflated with morality, and where it Is moral to "work for the sake of working" - In the 
Confucian case, for the sake of moral training - what Is produced is a cultural ethic 
that easily "electively affiniate" itself with the spirit of capitalism. 
283 
positioned relative to others', i. e., even If a person is highly accomplished, his 
material-moral status will decline If he becomes complacent and allow others to 
"close ranks. " The concern for face also dictates that a person acts according 
to sociaVother's expectations. Singaporeans are often thought of as slippery, 
with ultra-sensitive antennae to help them avoid "sonsitivo topics" that could 
cause themselves and others to lose face. MRT explained that face Is lost 
when an "aggressor" traps a "victim' into a situation where the latter cannot 
respond without suffering moral consequences, Le., where contradictory moral 
expectations clash and prevents the victim from being able to perform 
rhetorical compliance. Face is "saved" by maintaining social harmony, which, In 
Inter-personal interactions, means that spheres of legitimate controversy must 
be avoided and that conversations should take place strictly within spheres of 
consensus (Hallin 1986, see chapter 8). What citizens' preoccupation with face 
achieves is a situation where citizens, through policing themselves and others 
into conformity, embed state morality as organic social values. 
The significance of the PAP's inscription of its values onto public morality can 
be better appreciated when situated into the historical and theoretical puzzle of 
hegemonic authoritarianism. Brookner (1995,2-6) noted the emergence of 
modern authoritarianism, where one-party governments retain dominance by 
evolving into "ideological one-party states. ' For Perlmutter (1981,174/179), 
whether authoritarian governments can successfully achieve this evolution 
depend on whether they can "command ideological commitment" or "[turn] 
ideology into organisationally and politically successful arrangements. " I. e., 
whether ideologies become institutionalised, since "authoritarianism is based 
on the intervention of auxiliary instruments Into all aspects of life - private, 
group ... " 
In the PAP's case, its ideologies are grafted onto the Institution of face, public 
opinion and especially the media's construct of "the moral majority. " it Is 
through such inscription that the PAP government inserts Itself organically Into 
inter-personal and personal interactions and Installs Its Ideology as society's 
moral centre and as the commonsensical "middieground" in which all social 
284 
Interactions take place, thereby ensuring Its roiovancolcontraiity In citizons' 
everyday life. 
"Face" or moral governmentality is not necessarily Inferior to the liberal mode of 
ethical govern mentality. Indeed, It may even be more suited for the purpose of 
maintaining authoritarian (one-party) rule because, firstly, authoritarian 
governments require that citizens support its policies despite Inconsistencies 
and contradictions. Because moral subjects conform to contextual moral 
expectations rather than adhere to context-invariant principles or ethics, they 
are likely to be more tolerant of inconsistencies in state policies and would not 
feel motivated to check on the government. Such ideological flexibility is 
complemented by what Pye and Pyo (1985) observed as a high threshold of 
tolerance for cognitive dissonance. Indeed, It Is necessary that subjects of 
authoritarianism be ideologically versatile in public while In private, be oblivious 
to their double-faced-ness or double standards. Without such heightened 
sensitivity (antennae for "sensitive topics") and simultaneous oblivion, should 
authoritarian subjects attempt to establish ethicaldeological consistency, they 
may suffer severe cognitive dissonance and compromise their ability to 
negotiate the many "sensitive" situations in social life. 
Secondly, communitarian/moral governmentaiity is also preferable to 
liberaVethical governmentality because it allows authoritarian governments to 
achieve Ideological pluralism without fragmentation, even if this unity is only 
rhetorical. 
Communitarian Ideologies, Including "Asian Values, " are highly suited for the 
purpose of keeping out ideological alternatives without resorting to coercion. By 
emphasising community over self, communitarian ideologies seemingly allow 
ideological pluralism while preventing ideological fragmentation. Logically, 
communitarian ideologies better allow authority to retain its values without their 
being compromised or diluted by popular demands because communitarlanism 
is based upon the subordination of personal interest to community interests. 
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Liberal Ideologies14'tend to soo individuals as constitutive of community rather 
than as a throat to community and thus, tend to more readily Incorporato 
dissent so as to achieve a "truly popular-national" consensus while 
communitarian subordination is more likely to achieve a rhetorical hegemony. 
LKY (1998) highlights the Importance of this strategy for ono-party states in an 
age where now media technologies make censorship impossible. The PAP 
alms to keep the official voice above the din of democracy by ostablishing a 
clear moral centre (voice of the moral majority) that any dissonting opinions 
would have to contend with and ultimately, be subordinated to. LKY likens the 
PAP's middleground strategy to the Vatican's: 
The Vatican maintains Catholic unity around the world by clearly 
communicating its official or doctrinal position... Catholics may read 
other views... but they make a distinction between the official view and 
the other views. Whether or not they accept the official view is a 
different and separate matter. In the same way, Asian governments will 
require the official view to be carried in the media, along with over views 
over which they have no control. 
LKY clearly acknowledges the rhetorical nature of such hegemony - it does not 
matter if citizens accept official opinion insofar as It serves as a frame of 
reference In Interpersonal life, insofar as it constitutes the "middleground" In 
which social Interactions take place. 
Thirdly, a rhetorical consensus may be superior to ethical compliance because 
it is easier to attain since it does not demand citizens' Identification, merely 
their deference. In fact, citizens' rhetorical compliance produces a hegemonic 
effect-citizens' subordination/privatisation of dissent servos to fragment 
dissent and lends an aura of consensus to official values while concretising the 
otherwise mythical existence of the "silent (major) majority" By contrast, a 
hegemony based on identification is risky because it may over-legitimise 
citizens' rights to prioritise their preferences over society's. Subjects who 
comply out of conviction would be less willing to subordinate their dissent or 
147 1 am aware that my dichotomies of moral-ethical and communitarian"liberal may not 
be meaningful In Western countries. Recently, Danish right-wing parties have begun 
to employ communitarian discourses in defence of liberalism (against foreigners). US 
President Bush similarly exhorts Americans to, as a community, "protect their rights to 
be free" 
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tolerate a consensus that they believe is misguided. In Durkholmlan terms, 
liberalism could intensify "the cult of Individualism" and tear asunder a socioty's 
collective conscience or moral centre. 
Fourthly, a rhetorical unity is also likely to be more broad-basod and thus more 
"national; " a liberal-ethical consensus is likely to be supported In a partisan way 
- with more depth but less breadth. A limited consensus, no matter how deep, 
would not suffice since one-party governments can be logitimatod only by a 
nation-wide consensus. On the other hand, a broad consensus, no matter how 
shallow, would suffice. 
7C. CREATING "FACE" GOVERNMENTALITY: DE-IDEOLOGISATION AND 
THE SUPPRESSION OF AUTONOMOUS ASSOCIATIONS 
The Importance of securing the appropriate mode of governmentality can be 
most clearly seen in the problems that arise when subjects develop the "wrong" 
governmentality. Citizens who are more likely to be concerned with ethical 
consistency tend to be highly ("Western") educated. Deemed as "idealistic" by 
pragmatic others, some challengers experience an overwhelming sense of 
helplessness and frustration at their inability to live consistently with their 
beliefs, to "practise what they preach. * The communitarian group frequently 
remarked that, "society will be messyl" If people no longer conform to what they 
consider are reasonable moral expectations. Three interviewees even implied 
that self-centredness (i. e., ethical governmentality) to be an infectious moral 
disease that causes the young "follow-your-heart" generation to got off the tried 
and tested (rigid) path and to want to take the easy way out to relax, enjoy and 
be complacent. Indeed, nothing is more threatening to the PAP`s moral centre 
than liberal governmentality and Its Imperative to "forget about "face" and to "do 
it because you want to, not because others expect you to. " Such liberal 
governmentality would trigger the fragmentation of society's moral centre and 
usher in the end of ideological consensus and the end of legitimate one-party 
rule. 
Recognising that the Inculcation of the *wrong" govemmentality can seriously 
threaten its one-party dominance, and that late"capitalistic consumerist 
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societies increasingly legitimate discourse of self-desire, the PAP painstakingly 
tries to prevent liberal governmentality from taking root In Singapore socloty. 
The complexity and difficulty of the PAP's task cannot be undorostimatod. It is 
a feat to work against the g10bä1he98mony of liberalism 
(promoted through 
consumerism) and to not drift towards the ena SOC`ß11\Mýßý'SýnýýY 
acquires the cultural infrastructure to evolve into a libeta\ d0Ct10C1OCy 
(Fukuyama 1992). To pull off such a "detour at history's end" (C. Geotg©20t ) 
and hold fast to authoritarian rule in late-capitalism requires exceptional 
leadership skills. 
Here, I want to describe some strategies that the PAP government undertakes 
to ensure the creation of moral governmentality and non-creation of liberal 
governmentality. Unlike the liberal (Western) subject, the Asian subject must 
possess sufficient Ideological flexibility to manage contextual expectations and 
to be comfortable with rhetorical compliance. Although I use the terms 
"Western" and "Asian" to distinguish between different cultural psychologies, it 
is not my Intention to reproduce Orientalist stereotypes but to examine these 
cultural psychologies so as to underscore the political projects undertaken by 
authorities to socially engineer whichever types of subjecthood Is convenient 
for the perpetuation of their rule. 
To this end, the PAP sought to firmly install Its values as society's moral centre 
to de-legitimise ideological alternatives. Firstly, challengers have difficulties 
articulating counter-ideologies because the PAP refuses to define Its own 
Ideological position. As Chapter four observes, the PAP has always displayed a 
high degree of ideological flexibility, affiliating itself with whichever party is 
dominant. Indeed, the PAP'presents itself as a party beyond Ideological 
politics, as a party that is guided by pragmatism-140 
Upon securing state power, the PAP presented itself an "administrative state" 
run by technocrats"managers rather than by politicians. Such self- 
representations tantamount to the "depoliticisation" (Chua 1995,41) of the 
political field and a de-legitimisation of political contestations as "political, " 
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which among older generations connotes "wanting power for Its own sako" - 
something the pragmatic PAP Is perceived not to be doing. 
By claiming to be value-neutral administrators, the PAP establishes itself as 
experts. Since they are logical and rational, anyone who disagrees with them 
must be inaccurate or illogical. Additionally, within the discourse of Confucian 
meritocracy, the PAP's technical expertise translates into moral authority 
because of the Confucian belief that only those with the moral discipline can 
reach the pinnacles of academictexpert achievement. 
Secondly, the PAP government prevents individuals and groups/institutions 
from attaining relative autonomy from its moral centre . 
149 For Perlmutter (1981 
179), this refusal to grant relative autonomy to society constitutes the 
quintessential feature of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is not defined by the 
use of coercion or the ideological justification of coercion - most states do 
this. The unique feature of authoritarian regimes is that it penetrates all aspects 
of life, leaving no institutions with relative autonomy. Modern authoritarianism is 
further characterised by the use of ideology to co-ordinate institutional 
penetration into social and personal life. By this criterion, AV, which sets out 
clear guidelines on good citizenship and nation-building duties, is an ideal 
authoritarian ideology to legitimise state intervention since it demands 
consensual participation from all citizens. 
Ensuring Individuals do not have relative autonomy. Even during rapid social 
change where anomie (normlessness) Is a likely consequence, the PAP 
government embarked on ap array of Ideological projects to ensure that 
Individuals did not become relatively autonomous from the system. Of course 
there were "vagabonds" who refused to be protetarised and there continues to 
be a "brain drain" of local talents who have mentally migrated from the system 
- in these situations, the Singapore government is less concerned with winning 
148 Of course, such pragmatism aims at very particular goals: - capitalist expansion 
rather than welfarism. 
10 Gramsci (1971,245) observed that, In the West, the separation of civil and political 
society is unique to liberal Ideologies. This hints of yet another difference between how 
liberal and communitarian Ideologies choose different apparatuses (civil society and 
moral community respectively) to inscribe/naturalise themselves. 
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them back than In substituting them with foreign talents who are eager to 
secure a share of the Singapore Dream. By and large, the PAP government 
seemed to have successfully bound citizens to Its nation-building projects - 
interviewees complain about over-regulation and having to follow the "rigid 
path. " Clammer (1985) and Tremewan (1994) noted a "militarisation" of 
Singapore society and where individuals were interpellated as soldiers for the 
total (including psychological) defence of Singapore. Such militarisation worked 
towards the creation of a disciplined society where communities are 
encouraged to police each other (shaming remains a strategy of punishment) 
and where the intervention of society's moral gaze into citizens' private life Is 
legitimised (e. g., through sacrifice and moral obligation). 150 
An example of the inculcation of moral governmentality can be seen in the way 
anti-smoking campaigns are advertised. In many countries, anti-smoking 
campaigns would concentrate on conveying facts to convince smokers that 
smoking is dangerous for them, i. e., campaign advertisements aim to secure 
smokers' willingness to voluntarily stop smoking. A particularly memorable anti- 
smoking campaign in Singapore featured an attractive young woman telling her 
audience (presumably male) that she would not kiss a chimney. I. e., smokers 
are encouraged to quit smoking so that they would become more attractive. 
These campaigns seem to be successful in the PAP fashion - students 
smoked in school toilets to avoid teachers' gaze while men avoided smoking in 
front of women they want to attract. Other campaigns are just as "successful" - 
leading to the phenomenon of the Ugly Singaporean who refrain from spitting, 
littering and speeding in Singapore but would so do so readily once across the 
border in Malaysia (SLH describes this behaviour as that of "birds out of a 
cage"). '6' I 
150 Shame appears to have more association with moral societies while guilt is more 
associated with ethical societies, the difference being whether one's moral crime Is 
inflicted by one's (ethical) self or but (moral) others. In local soaps, shame, sacrifice 
and emotional obligations are dominant themes. 
15' One side effect of rhetorical compliance that bothers the government is the 
phenomenon of dirty public toilets, perhaps because toilet behaviour is un-police-able 
by the moral gaze nor technologically (e. g., hidden videos) without incurring public 
wrath. Since citizens keep private toilets clean, a campaign to convince citizens of the 
hygiene benefits would not work. Until citizens become "genuinely" civic-minded and 
flush toilets voluntarily, the government has opted for a technological solution: 
installing public toilets with sensors that flush automatically. 
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Campaigns appear to be highly suitable for (rhetorically) installing state values 
as society's moral centre. Kwok (1981,96) argues that "campaign as a 
technique of persuasion easily lends itself to rhetoric, and that campaign 
messages and slogans may be promoted or accepted without any real 
'ideological conviction as to its validity'" because it induces in citizens a 
"pragmatic efficiency" to respond in some positive or at least meaningful way 
("We don't have a choice so why don't we stop arguing and do what we have to 
do. ") Kwok goes on to argue such rhetorical compliance makes government 
projects appear more successful than they are since campaign organisers and 
target populations are often pressurised to attain predicted outcomes. He 
believed that such compliance do not enhance campaign objectives and even 
"significantly detract from them. " While I agree with his observation that 
campaigns induces rhetorical compliance, the judgement that rhetorical 
compliance is a form of ideological failure reflects a misunderstanding of 
campaign goals. If the PAP's campaigns are aimed at installing state values as 
a moral centre rather than securing identification, then citizens' rhetorical 
compliance sufficiently accords this moral centre (based on PAP values) an 
aura of consensus. 
Ensuring groups/institutions do not have relative autonomy. Although the PAP 
government clearly desires an Ideologically united society, it opposes a unity 
that is independent of the state. Indeed, it prefers a rhetorically united statist 
consensus to one that Is organic and built upon bottom-up consensus. As such, 
one-party governments may find it beneficial to discourage the development of 
a civil society or any organic community that has relative autonomy and that 
can potentially serve as an alternative ideological/political centre. 
The PAP's careful social engineering means that, at present, Singapore has no 
"civil society" to speak of. There are no groups or institutions that can escape 
government jurisdiction since gatherings of four or more individuals are 
considered illegal unless they are registered with the government. When faced 
with citizens eager for political participation, the PAP tries to steer them into 
"civic society" and (municipal) community centres instead. 
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As a part of the strategy of depriving groups and Institutions of relative 
autonomy from the government, the PAP must also prevent the formation of 
organic communities (e. g., subcultures based on Singlish) because these 
bottom-up solidarities may over-legitimise alternative Ideologies and serve as 
alternative centres of morality. In multi-racial Singapore where ethnic Identities 
are more organic than national Identity, extreme care must be taken to ensure 
that ethnic identities be recognised as legitimate without being so over- 
legitimate that ethnic groups feel they have the rights to exert ethnic pressures 
on the state. This was exactly the lesson the PAP learnt with the Religious 
Knowledge Experiment, which turned (wrongly) to religion as an (Asian) ballast 
to liberalism, with the "disastrous" consequences of Islamic groups attempting 
to influence the PAP's foreign policy towards Israel and of citizens converting to 
Protestantism, which emphasised ethical consistent selfhood (Cf. Chua 1995, 
31). 
It is ironic that a government that preaches communitarianism actually 
suppresses the development of organic/autonomous communities (that has 
relative autonomy from it). How then are we to make sense of the PAP's 
communitarianism and more generally, the myth of communitarian Asia? It is 
vital to remember that when Asian (Confucian) governments speak about 
"community, " they do not refer to organic communities but to either the state or 
the family, which is technically not a "community. " Thus, it would be more 
accurate to say that Asian societies are pro-family rather than pro-community 
(Cf. Liang in De Bary 1998,140-141). Indeed, the dominant ideology of 
Confucian meritocracy promotes Inter-citizen competition and Is too Internally 
divisive to encourage the building of horizontal bonds of solidarity that 
Andersen (1983) considers the basis of imagined communities. Within 
Confucian meritocracy, any horizontal identification is more likely the 
recognition of fellow citizens as rivals for upward mobility. 
Although communitarianism seeks to produce citizens who would be willing to 
sacrifice for the nation, what constitutes communitarian success in Singapore 
must be understood within the wider context of the dominant ideology of 
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competitiveness. Comm unitarianism does not seek to devalue competition or 
to prioritise community but to create a caring (communitarian) capitalism where 
social welfare is provided by communities and not by the state. Despite the 
claim of Asia as pro-community, Confucian societies ironically come closer 
than Britain to Thatcher's (market liberalism) ideal that there is no such thing as 
society, only individuals and families. This myth of communitarian Asia also 
explains some puzzling features of political subjectivity In Singapore. Inter- 
personally, citizens see each other as slippery and "insincere; " at the same 
time, citizens are also known to be very dedicated to their families. Again, 
keeping in mind that being pro-family is not necessarily pro-community helps 
us understand that Singaporeans feel no solidarity with their fellowmen 
(imagined community), but only with their immediate (especially kin-based) 
community. 
What "Asian Values" produces then is not communitarian subjects who would 
be willing to sacrifice for the nation but pragmatic economic subjects whose 
acquiescence is conditional upon their personal material-moral gains. I. e., the 
communitarian or "face" governmentality that underlies citizens' everyday life is 
less a "genuine" communitarian instinct to do what is good for the community 
but more a pragmatic and moral instinct to consider what the community would 
think of oneself. 
7D. THE BASIS OF PAP HEGEMONY: FROM ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
TO CONSENT ON COERCION 
Before investigating the nature of PAP's hegemony, it is necessary to first 
consider whether "hegemony" as a concept can still be accurately applied to 
Singapore. "Civil society" occupies a central role in Gramsci's theory of 
hegemony but is an entity that is absent in many Asian societies. Gramsci 
(1971,238/263) himself commented that the state is everything in the East but 
in the West, merely an "outer ditch" or "an armour of coercion" which 
encompasses a more sturdy center of "collective will" represented by civil 
society. Especially in Singapore, not only is "civil society" historically absent, it 
is also consistently prevented from emerging by the Singapore government. 
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Before concluding that "hegemony" is therefore non-applicable to Singapore, 
let us understand what Gramsci considers "civil society" a metaphor for. By 
calling "civil society" a representation (see italics in previous paragraph), 
Gramsci seemed to use "civil society" to signify institutions that have a certain 
relative autonomy from the state (e. g., relatively organic/authentic "centres of 
collective will"). The role of civil society in his theory suggests that he is not 
interested in it for its own sake but in its potential to function as a site and as its 
apparatuses for the embedding ofstate ideologies or incorporation of popular 
ideologies. 
It is because civil society is seen as a crucial apparatus of the state's 
ideological project that its "organicity" and relative autonomy become an Issue. 
Gramsci (1971,124) was aware that leadership involved "a dialectical unity the 
two levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony. " I. e., hegemonic elite 
is not distinguished by the lack of use of coercion but rather by Its ability to 
legitimise (secure consent on) coercion. Gramsci was most articulate on how 
consent and relative autonomy relate- the autonomy of civil society allows civil 
and political society to be confused so that "coercion Is not a State affair but 
effected by public opinion" and confronts citizens as their free choice, more 
effectively transforming single individuals into "collective man" (1971, 
196/242/254/262-263. ) (. e., "civil society" is an apparatus that naturalises 
(renders organic) state ideology and that legitimises/disguises coercion. The 
more autonomous and "organic" this moral centre is, the more useful it is In 
securing citizens' identification and in disguising coercion. 
This description of the role of civil society in liberal societies correspond to the 
role of moral community in 
'Singapore, 
which has less but still some degree of 
relative autonomy from the state. '62 "Asian Values" Is materialised and 
inscribed unto society as a moral "centre of collective will, " particularly the will 
of the silent, moral Asian majority. 
152 There are signs that media and social institutions would become increasingly 
autonomous. In Parliament, the process has already begun to design schemes (NMP, 
NCMP) to incorporate a "loyal opposition. " A media founder explains, "the official 
media is always somewhat compromised by the fact that it is so obviously pro-PAP 
despite all the denial; nobody believes it is not pro-PAP and the PAP knows it as well. 
So it would be good to have independent sources that are not hostile. " 
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The difficulty of applying Gramsci's theory of hegemony to Asian societies is 
not the lack of institutions that can perform the role civil society performs in 
liberal societies - the moral centre serves quite well as an Asian alternative to 
"civil society. " Rather, the difficulty is that their (civil society and moral centre) 
differential degree of relative autonomy so strongly impacts the type of consent 
that it is doubtful whether this type of "consent" counts as consent by Gramsci's 
standard. E. g., through liberal lenses, rhetorical compliance appears to be an 
inferior or even non-existent form of consent, where dissent is subordinated 
rather than incorporated. 
This leads us to the question of what is meant by "consent" or "hegemony. " A 
critique of Gramsci is that what is considered "consent" is often better 
described as apathy, acquiescence, conformity or even the dull compulsion of 
economics (Cf. Key, Partridge, Abercrombie et al). Often, what is meant by 
consent or hegemony is merely the absence of resistance or a "serious rival" 
(Leys 1990), rather than the absence of dissent. Indeed, citizens' willing 
subordination of dissent may be'a better indication of consent since no 
significant ideological work is necessary to ensure that citizens reproduce 
ideologies when it is convenient; true ideological success lies in elite ideologies 
being reproduced/superordinated despite dissent and meaninglessness in 
private life. 
A final argument for the relevance of "hegemony" to Singapore is the 
observation that rhetorical compliance and the subordination of dissent are the 
desired outcomes of the PAP's ideological project. With "Asian Values, " what 
the PAP has achieved is not an imperfect state of (rhetorical) consent but an 
outcome that is painstakingly engineered. Indeed, the PAP undertakes 
extensive projects to under-develop civil society and to pre-empt the formation 
of organic, autonomous popular communities - the very tools that would create 
the liberal governmentality so dangerous to one-party governments. This is 
because the PAP recognises that while these tools (autonomous communities) 
may aid liberal governments to gain hegemony, they actually stand in the way 
of one-party hegemony. 
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What then is the basis of PAP hegemony and what would constitute moments 
of hegemonic crisis? To what extent is the second-generation PAP government 
still reliant on its economic performance and if so, how useful is economic 
legitimacy during economic crises, when the PAP most needs it? 
The answer to this question appears to differ depending on whether we 
evaluate the PAP's ideological projects as abstract ideologies, or as embedded 
ideologies/practices. As abstract arguments, the superiority of "Asian Values, " 
"Asian Capitalism" and "Asian Democracy" must be proven by Asia's superior 
economic performance, i. e., "Asian Values" does not have a relative autonomy 
from its economic "base structure. " 
However, in terms of embedded ideologies, the PAP appears to have secured 
considerable legitimacy. Its legitimacy is no longer dependent on economic 
performance but on a combination of economic and cultural legitimacy. The 
most convincing proof of this is that, during economic crises, citizens "tighten 
their belts" without complaints and continue to support the PAP, to the envy of 
the Hong Kong government, its closest economic rival. 
Even though Asian Values is premised upon economics, in practice, these 
values have become entrenched in the popular body and have acquired a 
relative independence from economic conditions. Through inscribing party 
values unto citizens' everyday habits, routines and postures, and through 
subjectifying social contradictions as personal dilemmas requiring private 
solutions and balances, the PAP has created for itself an "inner ditch" (to 
paraphrase Gramsci) that generates a social/ideological lag to economic 
developments such that an economic crisis need not translate immediately into 
an ideologicaVhegemonic crisis (Chapter 8). 
To identify the basis of PAP legitimacy, it is imperative to ask why citizens 
tolerate authoritarianism and why they continue to support the PAP during 
economic crises. The nature of the PAP's hegemony is highly complex and 
multi-faceted and requires that we find a way to unite the many feelings that 
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citizens experience towards authority-their simultaneous pragmatism and 
rhetorical compliance, the fear, anger and yet desire for social status. 
Citizens do not support the PAP because they believe in "consensual politics" 
(Asian one-party Democracy) but because they see the PAP as an acceptable 
(least-worst) package deal. Certainly, they have a lot of dissatisfactions 
towards authority but they also see no alternatives, accepting that the PAP 
(and its authoritarianism) is necessary for economic growth, and that it is 
worthwhile to exchange political freedom for economic prosperity. This is 
precisely the wider "Asian Values' argument that economic development 
requires political stability (unchanging government) and that democracy would 
bring economic disruption. This wider AV project is complemented by Share 
Values' emphasis on communitarian "consensual politics" to create an 
environment conducive for governmental stability and economic growth. 
The key to understanding the nature of the PAP's hegemony is to understand 
that citizens (and opposition) see the PAP as Singapore's best option. As such, 
they accept and conform to its (economictcapitalistic) values and culture. There 
is an economic consensus on national goals (economic prosperity) that is a 
coagulation of the private hopes and aspirations. There is also a collective 
recognition that this goal requires a certain collective morality (competitiveness 
or kiasu-ism) and the acknowledgement that the moral path to this goal is a 
"rigid" one and one that may even require that citizens not be afraid to appear 
"ugly" (Mr Kiasu) to themselves. 
That citizens see competitiveness as ugly but necessary really tells us about 
the nature and strength of 
PAP hegemony. Their personal aspiration for 
prosperity (Singapore Dream) is the foundation of their tolerance of authority. 
Because they identify with the goals (Asian Capitalism) and accept the PAP as 
their best option to reach this goal, they are motivated to tolerate the means 
(Asian one-party Democracy) to reach these ends. 
This puts into perspectives the many facets of PAP hegemony: that what it 
points to is that the PAP is hegemonic but not popular: citizens may not 
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consider coercion legitimate but would tolerate it - in true pragmatic style - 
because such (authoritarian) means are seen to be justified by their ends 
(prosperity). 
I would argue that this combination of legitimacy is tantamount to consent to 
coercion. That Singaporeans are "famous for complaining" not only indicates 
the magnitude of their dissatisfactions but also indicates that they are aware 
what they are trading off when they vote for the PAP. In accepting the PAP as 
a package deal, they make deliberate, weighted decisions and give their 
consent to tolerate coercion in exchange for economic prosperity. 
Because ends justify (authoritarian) means, the primary basis of the PAP's 
hegemony and the minimal conditions for the maintenance of its one-party 
(authoritarian) rule is the achievement of a consensus on national goals and to 
ensure that this goal is relevant and accessible to all. 
While first-generation PAP leaders founded their economic legitimacy on 
material prosperity during the boom years of an early economy, second- 
generation leaders were faced with a maturing economy and an increasingly 
stratified society, one where the "Singapore Dream" was no longer relevant or 
accessible to all citizens. As such, economic satisfaction had increasingly to be 
achieved ideologically; regardless of economic performance, citizens must be 
persuaded that the PAP is Singapore's best chance for (economic) survival. 
The challenge then is to keep the Dream alive for all, since it is belief in the 
Dream, rather than its achievement, that motivates citizens to accept/legitimise 
authoritarianism as an economic necessity, thereby giving their, consent to 
i 
coercion. 
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Chapter 8 Asian Democracy 
Its challenges and its futures 
8A. THE "PUZZLE" OF HEGEMONY WITHOUT POPULARITY AND THE 
LOGIC OF ONE-PARTY RULE 
What makes long-term rule by a single political party an enticing puzzle Is not 
just that it is rare but that it is not supposed to happen; and the longer the 
period of uninterrupted single-party rule, the more tantalising the puzzle 
(Pemple 1990,5). Its contemporary endurance is especially puzzling, given that 
with globalisation, new media technologies and the hegemony of (Western) 
democratic values, it must have become even more difficult to keep Ideological 
pluralism at bay. Indeed, many one-party governments often find themselves 
having to appear tolerant of opposition and employ a rhetoric of democracy to 
acquire popular legitimacy. 
The task of maintaining one-party dominance may be difficult, but it is not 
impossible, as the continued existence of ideological one-party states 
demonstrate. Indeed, many note the emergence or even evolution of a 
qualitatively different form of authoritarianism- "modern authoritarianism" 
(Perlmutter 1981), or "twentieth-century dictatorships" (Brookner 1995). 
Authoritarianism is softened or popularised when dominant ideologies, as 
"organisational weapons" (Perlmutter 1981,176), are mobilised to organise and 
intervene in all aspects of life, thereby inscribing party values unto the citizenry. 
For Pempel (1990,7), such inscription constitutes one of the most important 
but least analysed factors for long-term single-party dominance and goes some 
way in explaining the puzzle of the durability of one-party states. Indeed, 
Panebianco (1988,4) argues that the longer a party is in power, the greater the 
opportunity to shape its following and the more compelling the pressures for 
social groups, even those originally hostile to the party, to accommodate 
themselves to its seemingly unshakeable control. 
Seen in this light, we can see that enduring one-party rule is "puzzling" because 
of certain assumptions about the nature of legitimacy and hegemony. By 
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focusing on inscription and (Leninist) mass organisation, these authors suggest 
that one-party governments secure ideological dominance because of the 
centrality of their party values/organisation, rather than through citizen 
Identification. If popularity is not assumed to be the sole basis of government 
legitimacy, it is possible (and not puzzling) that governments can be hegemonic 
without being popular. Seen from this light, the puzzle then Is not the tenacity of 
one-party governments but their downfall. If a party's tenure is seen as the 
opportunity to Inscribe party values onto the nation, then the PAP must have 
made better use of its 42 years of dominance to set in place a pro-party 
consensus that may allow it outlast Taiwan's KMT (55 years in power) and 
Mexico's PRI (a record 71 years in power). 
However, especially among 'Western critics, " there is an inclination to sustain 
the puzzle and abnormality of one-party rule; its endurance is always seen as 
something requiring explanation, unlike the endurance of its purported 
antithesis - democracy, which requires no explanation. This moral-political 
desire to sustain the myth that "the West is democratic, the Rest is 
authoritarian" is especially promulgated by the discipline of political science and 
severely limits the usefulness of studies of democratisation (Cf. Hutchinson 
and Smith 1994; Curran and Park 2000). If "democracy" is to remain 
conceptually relevant, it cannot simply describe the nature or goal of 
governments. It cannot be characterised by "popular government" since it Is 
present in authoritarian and democratic societies alike. 
Democracy is also more than the absence of coercion since firstly, by Weber's 
definition, state power is ultifnately protected/outlined by an outer ditch/armour 
of coercion (Gramsci). Secondly, authoritarian governments increasingly 
soften/evolve into ideologically dominant one-party states that are less reliant 
on coercion to contain dissent and do develop an aura of democracy. 1 More 
importantly, constructivists argue that the distinction between coercion/consent 
is not always clear since over time, (ideologically justified) coercion becomes 
internalised as commonsense (Partridge 1975; Key 1961) and every 
153 It may be that authoritarian states depend, on the last instance, on coercion. But 
this is so with any state, defined as an institution with a legitimate monopoly over the 
use of coercion (Weber 1946,78-79). 
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consensus implies an Other against which coercion is justified. Finally, 
democratisation and hegemonic projects have opposite goals. While 
democracy aims to make available "reaVviable" alternatives for citizens to 
choose from, the attainment of hegemony requires that alternatives are 
rendered "unviable. " Indeed, the presence of democracy ("viable alternatives") 
would constitute a hegemonic crisis for any (democratic or authoritarian) 
governments since its hegemony is to be Indicated by the absence of viable 
alternatives (Leys 1990). 
Yet, despite these deconstructions of the myth, many theorists remain eager to 
view one-party rule as an oddity and work to refine their theories to Identify Its 
wellspring so as to bring to an end to this political "deformity. "'M Instead of 
coercion, economic performance is now identified as the key basis of one-party 
government's legitimacy15b; governments have to maintain a minimal level of 
economic satisfaction to secure votes. As proof, researchers cite both 
successful and unsuccessful governments. In Asia, the political legitimacy of 
Asian Democracies (especially in ASEAN) is crucially premised upon good 
economic performance. In Eastern Europe, there was popular support for 
communists parties and for remaining in the "pre-democracy" stage (Dobbs 
1992,11-12) because citizens believe that the transition to market democracy 
would mean the loss of job security and workers having to work harder for less 
money (Kelly et al 1993,13). I. e., citizens were willing to vote against 
democracy to maintain a basic standard of living. In Poland, a virtually unknown 
candidate - Stanislav Tyminsk - posed the most serious challenge to President 
Walesa in the 1990 elections by "offering an escapist dream to ordinary Polish 
voters unwilling to accept the downhill slide of their standard of living in the 
name of economic recovery" (Remington 1993,157). The downfall of dominant 
parties in Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan and Mexico during their recent economic 
crises was also cited as evidence that the tenacity of one-party governments is 
'54 America's humanitarian war against Afghanistan - to be fought with food aids and 
the seduction of popular culture - epitomises the self-righteousness of the "West" and 
represents a minor refinement of Fukuyama's theory that prosperity (consumerism of 
late-capitalism) brings liberal democracy. 
' This theory is also "true" in the economically developed "West. " Political scientists 
argue that the shape of the economy is a very good indicator of whether the incumbent 
party will win the presidential elections (CNN, Voice of Democracy, 6/1/2001). 
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premised upon economic satisfaction, i. e., that economics is the driving force 
behind political change. 
However, even this refinement was problematic - some prosperous one-party 
states simply refused to evolve into liberal democracies and even became 
more hegemonic during economic crises. Although there were only a few such 
counter-examples (and none as outstanding as Singapore), these counter- 
examples were significant enough to indicate that the theory's faulty prediction 
of hegemonic crises in these countries rest upon a mistaken understanding of 
these governments' true basis of hegemony. While economic legitimacy does 
matter, hegemony can be better understood as a complex balance of 
legitimacies, or rather, a balance between legitimacies (consent) and 
illegitimacies (dissent) such that citizens consider it worthwhile to keep 
tolerating authority. 
This understanding of hegemony offers us a more rounded view on how 
various legitimacies - economic, popular, moral, etc. - are situated within the 
wider question of the basis of hegemony. The project of convincing citizens that 
it is "good enough" is one that usually requires a two-pronged approach - 
governments must attempt to secure consent while de-legitimising political 
alternatives. 
In securing consent, economic performance is merely one among many bases 
of legitimacy, which puts into perspective and explains why it is insufficient to 
explain one-party dominance with economic performance. Even if economic 
performance represents a government's chief basis of consent, it would still be 
an insufficient explanation because hegemony is a particular balance of 
consent and dissent; it would still be necessary to consider if dissent is 
sufficiently de-legitimised so that it is subordinated and outweighed by consent, 
such that subjects perceive that the incumbent government is their best option 
and that there are "no alternatives. 056 
156 This Is Leys' (1990) point, although a more intricate point can be made from the 
Singapore case. The PAP tries to ensure that alternatives are not viable; however, 
should alternatives become viable, the PAP would argue that there is "no credible 
opposition" to implement this viable alternative. 
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Conceptualising hegemony as a balance between consent and dissent helps 
us identify the minimal condition, or the logic of one-party ideological 
dominance. Hegemony is not the absence of dissent or the presence of 
ideological pluralism, but rather the subordination of dissent to consent so that 
pluralism does not bring about ideological fragmentation. Such consensuses 
give off an aura of democracy, allowing one-party governments to deny 
opposition representation and to legitimately claim to represent the nation. 
In this final chapter, I will take a comparative approach to identify some 
challenges that have. led to the termination of one-party governments and 
consider how existing one-party governments overcome them. In studying 
strategies of maintaining contemporary one-party dominance, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) deserves close attention. Not only have 
many ASEAN countries prospered, they also remain stubbornly authoritarian, 
to the extent of sparking off a "second wave of authoritarianism" in Asia 
(Öjendal and Antlöv 1998,525). O'Leary and Coplin (1983,13-15) described 
Southeast Asia as the strongest bulwark against democracy globally and 
unique in its resistance of universal human rights. What ASEAN has in 
common is "Asian Values"- only Southeast Asian nations use it to defend 
their authoritarianism (Petierra 1999). How and to what extent does AV enable 
one-party governments to perpetuate their rule and evolve into models of "soft 
authoritarianism? " How viable are "Asian Democracies" and what could 
constitute a hegemonic crisis for them? 
8B. ECONOMIC LEGITIMACY AND ITS RELATIVE AUTONOMY FROM 
MATERIAIJECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
If it is true that hegemony depends on a minimal level of economic 
performance, then economic crises should precipitate a severe legitimacy 
crisis, especially for "Asian Democracies. " Firstly, the superiority of Asian 
Democracy requires economic "proof. " Secondly, the Asian economic miracle 
may not be sustainable. Krugman (1994,70-71), an eminent economist, 
argues that the Asian economic miracle, like the Soviet miracle, was propelled 
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by "perspiration, not inspiration. "157 Thirdly, economists argue that the structural 
weaknesses of Asian Capitalism constitute "fertile ground for a financial crisis" 
(Krugman 1998). Its features of high savings and low spending stunt the 
development of strong local markets, rendering Asian economies susceptible 
to global fluctuations. Fourthly, "face" and corruption seem intimately linked. 
The Asian economic crisis was precipitated by banks giving out loans not 
based on commercial feasibility but by personal/political connections (Rahim 
2000,4), which thwarted the emergence of entrepreneurs and the spirit of 
innovation needed to sustain growth. In Indonesia, "Asian Values" have come 
to signify "KKN" (Indonesia pro-democracy slogan for corruption, cronyism and 
nepotism). The "Asian" practice of telling superiors what one thinks they want 
to hear can hide warning signs of structural crises - which explains why 
American economists and journalists were puzzled by the lack of warning signs 
of such a huge financial meltdown; Ex-President Habibie (Indonesia) also 
complained that he could not have a good grasp of the seriousness of civil 
unrest because his officials presented him with sugar-coated reports. 
However, the structural susceptibility of Asian Capitalism to economic crises 
does not mean that the economic legitimacies of Asian governments are 
necessarily compromised by poor economic performance. During the economic 
crisis, not only was the PAP's economic legitimacy un-dented, it even 
managed, to Hong Kong's envy, to rally citizens to "tighten [their] belts" and 
accept harsh policies aimed at restructuring the economy. During the 
November 2001 General Elections, when Singapore was experiencing its 
deepest economic recession since Independence, the PAP managed to 
improve their electoral percentage by 10% to 75.3%. 
The PAP was able to maintain economic satisfaction through extensive 
ideological projects aimed at altering expectations and perception and at 
sustaining faith in the PAP. Even before the crisis, the PAP had become aware 
that increasing social stratification rendered the Singapore Dream out of reach 
157 He argues that Singapore's 8.5% annual growth over 30 years is unsustainable: the 
workforce grew from 27% to 51 %, investments as a share of output rose from 11 % to 
more than 40%. Such growth is based on one-time increase in changes that cannot be 
repeated since it is based on increased input rather than efficiency (Krugman 1998). 
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for many citizens and undertook a campaign to lower expectations. During the 
crisis, the PAP convinced citizens that the crisis was "regional" and thus 
beyond the control of the government. Many interviewees also reproduced the 
government's comparative frame, where economic satisfaction was based 
upon how well Singapore was doing relatively to worse-off neighbours. Indeed, 
the PAP was so successful that citizens, despite believing that the crisis was 
"regional" and beyond the PAP's control, also believed that the PAP was the 
only option to lead Singapore out of the economic storm. This requires an 
ideological short-circuiting: the logical questions (that citizens in many other 
countries ask) that "if the government is so good, why did the crisis happen? " 
was not even thought. 
The Singapore case is an important exception that helps us crystallise the 
genuine basis of economic legitimacy - perhaps the most fundamental basis 
of legitimacy for any governments. It demonstrates the Incomplete 
correspondence between economic performance and economic legitimacy and 
reveals that economic legitimacy is as much an ideological project to secure 
citizens' economic satisfaction as actual economic performance, since 
economic satisfaction is always Ideologically mediated/defined (Katz 1996,16). 
Gramsci (1971,145) noted the importance of perception on citizens' consent: 
A company [military officers] would be capable of going for days without 
food because it could see that it was physically impossible for supplies 
to get through; but it would mutiny if a single meal was missed as a 
result of neglect or bureaucratism. 
The Singaporean case demonstrates that a government's economic legitimacy 
has relative autonomy from actual economic performance. Indeed, the reverse 
may be true-prosperity may create different dissatisfactions and hegemonic 
challenges. While economic crises render the Singapore-Dream inaccessible to 
citizens, prosperity can make the Dream irrelevant because prosperous 
citizens may decide that it is not longer worthwhile to exchange political 
freedom for incremental material improvement (Cf. Rodan 1993b). If, as 
Althusser (1969,234) observes, ideology "expresses a will, a hope or a 
nostalgia, rather than [describes] a reality, " then the project of securing 
economic legitimacy is less about sustaining double-digit growth than in 
keeping citizens' dreams and hopes alive. 
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This is precisely Hall's and Leys' disagreement with Jessop et at (1998,1990). 
Jessop and colleagues attributed Britain's economic decline in the late 1980s 
to Thatcher's weak economic policies, further suggesting that this political 
failure could mean a "farewell to Thatcherism. " For Hall and Leys, Thatcherism 
was not a failed project but an ideologically successful one - best indicated by 
how even critics of Thatcher could not bring themselves to support Labour 
(Leys 1990,127-128). Hall (1988b, 167) argues that Thatcher had so captured 
the social imagination and commonsense that Labour did not have the cultural 
and imaginative resources to offer a potentially counter-hegemonic alternative. 
Thatcher successfully attributed Britain's economic decline to the market, not to 
the government, thereby invoking popular fears of global competition in support 
of economic protectionism (anti-EU, anti-immigration). Labour, on the other 
hand, was seen as being soft on crime and lacking in strong economic policies 
to deal with global capitalism - i. e., Incapable of protecting white working-class 
Britain against the world. 
If there is some autonomy between economic performance and economic 
legitimacy, why are economic crises threatening? That there is relative 
autonomy does not mean that the ideological (economic legitimacy) is 
completely autonomous from the material (economic performance) and that 
material conditions no longer matter - they matter profoundly. Hall (1988b, 
170) argues that hegemony is a product of specific conjunctures and material 
conditions: 
Gramsci always insisted that hegemony is not exclusively an ideological 
phenomenon. There can be no hegemony without "the decisive nucleus 
of the economic. " 04 the other hand, do not fall into the trap of the old 
mechanical economism and believe that if you can only get hold of the 
economy, you can move the rest of life... The question of hegemony is 
always a question of new cultural order... The notion of a "historical 
block" is precisely different from that of a pacified, homogenous ruling 
class. It entails a different conception of how social forces and 
movements, in their diversity, can be articulated into strategic alliances. 
In what ways does the material matter? Economic performance matters 
because, not only is it the default basis of legitimacy that governments depend 
on to sustain their rule ("economics as the driving force of politics, " as political 
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scientist believe), but also because the material serves as a "base" for the 
ideological. The success/legitimacy of economic ideologies is accumulated 
over long periods of good economic performance. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a simple relationship between hegemony, 
economic performance and economic legitimacy - to remain hegemonic, 
governments must have either economic performance or economic legitimacy. 
This is borne out in the interesting case in Indonesia and Mexico where corrupt 
(economically illegitimate) governments were tolerated during decades of slow 
economic growth and were not seen as a problem until the recent economic 
crisis (The Age 04/07/2000). Rahim (2000,2-6) observed that during the 
miracle years in Southeast Asia, "corruption and authoritarian rule were 
commonly trivialised and not considered as serious impediments to long term 
economic development. Indeed, authoritarian rule was viewed by many 
business leaders... as providing the economic prerequisite for future political 
development. " 
This seems to indicate that, at any one time, citizens would tolerate only either 
economic illegitimacy or poor economic performance, not both. This also 
indicates that during economic crisis, governments sustain their hegemony by 
letting the ideological (economic legitimacy) takes precedence over the 
material (economic performance). However, because economic legitimacy is 
also dependent on the material condition, an extended economic crisis can 
wear off a government's economic legitimacy. 
With this understanding of how governments can lose their economic 
legitimacy - through corruption or extended economic crisis - we can 
appreciate the PAP's foresight in averting a hegemonic crisis. 
Corruption poses the most lethal challenge since it challenges not only 
economic legitimacy but also moral legitimacy. Such moral discrediting of a 
government seems to put a quick end to any ongoing ideological debates and 
makes the termination of its office inevitable. The PRI's 77 years of one-party 
rule was terminated by corruption, not by popular/ideological alienation. "There 
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was little substantive difference ... between Mr Fox and Mr Labastida. Both 
favoured Mexico's pro-market course and promised economic growth" (The 
Age 4/7/2000). C. H. Lee argues similarly that it was less ideological division 
than charges of corruption (during the economic crisis) that terminated the 
KMT's 55 years of one-party rule. Taiwanese election campaigns in 2000 were 
not focused on pro/anti-China issues but on the KMT's corruption. In Indonesia, 
such doubts were deeper than in many other Asian countries. What was 
doubted was not the only the integrity of individual politicians but also the 
values of the party, which meant that citizens could only be appeased by a 
change of party, not merely a change of its leader. 
Cognizant of the threat of corruption, the PAP takes extreme precaution to 
avoid it. Besides their all-white dress code to signify their political purity and the 
constructed myth of LKY's sacrifice that places the PAP's integrity above 
question, the PAP also dissociates itself from corrupted officials (punishments 
range from expulsion to "suicide. ") To prevent ministers from being tempted by 
high pay, the government pay ministers an extremely high salary that is tied to 
the top salaries of the private sector. ' The Singapore government appears to 
be very successful in its war against corruption-not only is it voted the least 
corrupt in Asia (ST04/04/1998), many interviewees contrasted its non- 
corruptibility compared to those of neighbouring countries. 
Secondly, the PAP takes on many ad hoc ideological projects to lower citizens' 
expectations and alter their perception of the economic crisis. All interviewees 
reproduced the media's comparative frame and believed that Singapore's 
situation was not as bad asoits neighbours. They also attributed the crisis to 
"regional" or "market" forces, rather than to the government, and believed that 
the PAP was their best chance out of the economic storm. 
Aware that sustaining its hegemony in an extended crisis requires more than 
merely altering citizens' expectations/perceptions and to "sweeten the ground" 
for oncoming elections, the PAP initiated a S$11.3 billion stimulus package 
158 Implemented in July 2000, civil service salaries were raised by 13%; a small elite 
saw a 50% rise while the bottom 10% of the population witnessed an almost 50% fall 
In income from 1998 to 1999. (http: //www. singapore-window. org/swOO/000803fe. htm). 
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(comprising of measures of various fronts - tax cuts, rebates, concessions, 
etc. ) to combat the recession. A new scheme to give all Singaporeans a 
tangible monetary share in the nation (popularly thought of as a scheme to buy 
all Singaporeans' heart), called the New Singapore Shares" (AWSJ, 
17/10/2001), was launched, with a caveat that low-income residents stood to 
benefit more. 159 At the same time, the PAP is aware that these are merely 
short-term measures and that in the long term, its economic legitimacy would 
have be to sustained through economic performance. Deeply aware that 
ultimately, economics matter profoundly, the PAP is quickly implemented 
austere programmes to restructure the economy because it is also aware that 
such "bitter medicine" had the best chance of being "swallowed" when the 
ground is sweet, when its legitimacy is still strong. 
Contrast the PAP's foresight to governments In Thailand and South Korea, who 
blamed previous governments for exacerbating the economic downturn and the 
Malaysian government, who blamed foreign (especially Western) investors for 
irresponsible speculations in the Malaysian economy - these governments 
seem to prioritise ideological projects over industrial re-structuring. The Hong 
Kong government, by contrast, is urgently aware of the need to restructure their 
economy but is unable to do so because it does not have sufficient economic 
legitimacy to convince citizens to accept the bitter pill. Because of its foresight, 
the Singapore government is likely to recover quickest among its competitors 
and significantly strengthen its "track record" when the economy recovers, 
rendering O'Leary and Coplin (1983,21)'s prophetic Insight that the PAP 
regime "is likely to continue indefinitely" as relevant today as it was in the past. 
8C. BLOCKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF "VIABLE ALTERNATIVES" 
When we say that economic crises can threaten governments' economic 
legitimacy, what is meant is that economic crises could potentially become 
hegemonic crises if previously unthinkable alternatives become suddenly 
viable, leading to an ideological/political fragmentation of society. If hegemony 
is understood as the absence of a "serious rival" rather than as a popular 
159 As usual, the scheme was picked up the following day by the Hong Kong 
government, who expressed admiration and intentions of imitating it. Chinese scholars 
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government (Leys 1990), then the project of de-legitimating dissent may be 
more important than the project of securing consent. Indeed, it seems that 
increasingly, governments are elected or become hegemonic not on the basis 
of their popularity but on the basis that they are the least-worst options, and 
this observation applies equally to authoritarian and democratic 
governments. 160 
In this section, I want to identify some sources from which "viable alternatives" 
emerge and examine how governments try to block them. Perlmutter (1981, 
178-179) noted that modern authoritarianism was constituted radially with a 
party centre that intervened in/organized all aspects of citizen life through 
auxiliary (state) instruments. Diffused but not de-centralised, authoritarianism is 
sustained by the saturation of the political arena with party values (Chan 1976, 
202) so that it is difficult for alternative ideologies to gain a foothold and 
fragment the society's ideological unity. 
With the view that authoritarianism is organized with the party as the heart of 
mass/society organization, I will look at ideological alternatives that emerge 
from within the centre and from outside it. Challenges from within the centre 
are rare but difficult to contain. They tend to be high in credibility and, if allowed 
to secure a popular following, could develop into, a strong counter-hegemonic 
movement. Challenges from outside the centre are more likely to exist in one- 
party societies. 161 Such challenges tend to have lower credibility but are 
threatening because they tend to develop bottom-up from relatively 
autonomous, organic communities and are likely to resonate deeply with 
popular sentiment. 
have expressed similar interest. 
160 Hall (1977,337) described Thatcherism as a form of "authoritarian populism" while 
the New York Times (05/06/2001) described Blairs Labour Party as "not lovable, but 
electable. " Similar sentiments applied. to President Bush during the US Presidential 
elections. 
161 In ideologically plural societies, there are usually already more than one moral 
centre. 
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I. Cracks from within 
Sparks (2000,39-40) observed that in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, elite 
fissures "made it much easier for journalists to say ... what they saw as 
important, " triggering a "golden age of freedom and independence for 
journalists. " Because elite consensus is crucial for popular consensus (Zaller 
1992), even if there is elite dissensus, it is crucial for party members to 
maintain an aura of unity in public. Coming from the highest sources, such 
challenges exist within "the sphere of legitimate controversy" (Hallin 1986) and 
are vocalised by individuals/elites who cannot be easily discredited In public. If 
such credible dissent (viable alternatives) are allowed to circulate publicly, they 
could polarise public opinion, making It impossible for dissent/dissenters to be 
completely purged and causing the system to implode. Factionalism Is so 
damaging that even after a victor (victorious ideology) Is identified, the project 
of rebuilding consensus and "political orthodoxy" - one that reshapes the 
"spheres of consensus and dissent" (Hallin 1986; C. C. Lee 2000,130) - Is 
difficult and dependent on the margin of victory. 
Factionalism can emerge from a few sources. Within the vassal-state system, 
when authority is perceived as "foreign, " pro-independence elite (or a rebel 
local government) may emerge to rally citizens against authority (Slovenia 
against Belgrade, Taiwan against China), thereby whetting an irreversible 
popular appetite for freedom. In Taiwan, it is "indisputable that the in-fighting ... 
within KMT" on the issues of pro-/anti-China "made it possible for [the 
opposition] to come to power" (C. H. Lee 2000). 
A second common source of factionalism Is the prolonged suppression of 
internal ideological difference. In the PRI (Mexico), party splits had become so 
irreconcilable as to warrant voting reforms (Lapper 2000). Presidential 
candidates were no longer handpicked by an "all-powerful president (who) ruled 
like a monarch" (The AgeO4/07/2000) but are selected through internal 
democracy (Hallin 2000,97) 162 or primary elections. 
162 Cf. Bass (1993,77-78) on the 4 ways that succession crises precipitate internal 
democracy. 
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More frequently, factionalism emerges In post-colonial states with the 
retirement or death of first-generation leaders with revolutionary/mythical 
legitimacy, creating a situation where second-generation leaders have to find 
alternative bases of legitimacy. In many post-Soviet Central Asian countries 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
NYT20/02/2001), there is a struggle between monarchical and democratic 
succession, which tends to be "resolved" with a democratic justification of 
monarchy through presenting the successor as being popular as well. 
The PAP took many precautions to avoid allowing the Issue of succession to 
trigger off factionism. Firstly, LKY understood that as long as he lived, party 
unity would be maintained because PAP factions would respect his choice of 
successor. This led LKY to retire early - something atypical by Asia's 
gerontological standards. In Malaysia, citizens joke about DPMs who tire of 
waiting to become the boss (Rodan 2000,175; BT18/06/1999), implying that 
like Suharto (Indonesia), Mahathir may stay on until unceremoniously booted 
out; in Turkmenistan, Niyazov was declared president for life in 1999. 
Additionally, LKY did not retire to give his son (DPM Lee) a smooth succession. 
Wary of popular criticisms of "dynastic authoritarianism" (TIME08/09/1986) and 
of popular rumours about PAP factionalism between LKY's son and Chok-Tong 
Goh, LKY bypassed his son for the post of PM. Goh was ushered in promising 
a new consultative style of government. However these gestures were not 
effective in quelling popular criticisms and rumours. Despite LKY's 
endorsement, PM Goh's team secured only 61% of the votes in his first 
elections as PM in 1991 -a landslide victory by Western standards but an 
infirm mandate by Singaporean standards. It was enough to win but not 
enough to repudiate party-internal doubts about his leadership. Goh's 
immediate reaction was one of desolation and defeat; he had lost an invisible 
battle to prove that he was not the "second choice" and to prove that he was 
not chosen as PM merely to dispel popular dissatisfactions. 
This show of a united PAP front to disprove rumours of "dynastic 
authoritarianism" and factionalism reflects not only the attempt to maintain PAP 
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unity. Such privatisation of elite dissensus is also aided/guided by Asian Values 
of face, respect for authority and avoidance of confrontation. These values also 
guide inter-state relations between ASEAN states. Unlike the "Western way" of 
(humanitarian) intervention, the "ASEAN way" was one of "non-interference, " 
particularly to give face163 and protect each other's sovereignty but not 
criticising and thereby legitimating ideological alternatives in public. Compliance 
to the ASEAN way would ensure that there would always an elite consensus 
that upholds a normative (moral) centre that would make it difficult for 
ideological alternatives to be legitimised publicly. 
However, Ramacharan (2000,60) argues that members' compliance with the 
"ASEAN way" is rhetorical. "Publicly, ASEAN leaders adhere to the vaunted 
'ASEAN way' of non-interference" while privately, behind-the-scenes, quiet 
diplomacy interference take place to resolve issues causing tensions between 
states. " Nischalke (2000,105) argues that the ASEAN way Is a myth, an ideal 
and rhetoric rather than a common practice. The Philippines and Thailand's 
efforts to find an appropriate alternative ("constructive engagement, " "flexible 
engagement, " "enhanced interaction" ST5/7/1998, ST26/6/1998) were met with 
vehement protests. Even though compliance has a high cost, 1M clearly, the 
advantages of maintaining the ASEAN way (e. g., the blocking of credible 
criticisms from other ASEAN states) are seen to outweigh its conveniences and 
costs. It is precisely such rhetorical compliance and "behind-the-scene" 
diplomacy that allows the ASEAN unity to be perpetuated despite 
contradictions and inconveniences. 
I/. Cracks from without' 
There is a consensus among political economists and liberals that a free media 
is the cornerstone of democracy, although they disagree about what constitutes 
a free press (Whistler et al 1993,224). Liberals argue that the market frees the 
183 DPM (Singapore): I don't think I will be able to tap my neighbour on the shoulder to 
tell him ... This Is not how our relationship work... (We, the ASEAN) are not one 
EU, 
not NAFTA. (ST23/7/98) 
'" "Non-interference" incurs high costs to individual nations. In 1997, an Indonesia 
forest fire created a haze over many ASEAN nations. Singapore lost an estimated 
US$8.8. million In short term damage to health, US$4.8 million in tourism and US$6.9 
million in airline revenue (Ramacharan 2000,68). 
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media from state dependency. Because competition is associated with 
freedom, commercial media are believed to be better at presenting political 
alternatives than state-controlled media. This liberal paradigm is partly borne 
out in Korea, Taiwan and Mexico, where market competition has stimulated 
ideological pluralism. Rapid economic growth has allowed big capital to 
surmount the high financial barriers to entry to compete against official media 
(Park et al 2000,116; C. C. Lee 2000,129). In Taiwan, Rongsan Lin, a real- 
estate tycoon, declared war, on the "Big Two" (two main newspapers) by 
distributing free newspapers, successfully pulling in many new-converts after 
the trial period. In Mexico, the launch of a rival television network Aztecs 
spurred the pro-official Televisa to realise the costs of aligning itself with the 
ruling elite rather than the populace-the mere presence of a contender 
motivated the dominant media to be less self-censoring (Hallin 2000,106). 
The BBC is an obvious counter-example to the liberal paradigm; It is better able 
to present political alternatives even-handedly than many unregulated 
commercial media. The issue, as Sparks (2000,47) succinctly points out, is 
that the entry of new media players is no guarantee of pluralism because 
democracy may be negotiated and, organised for the benefit of elite groups. 
The state and the market_can both be enemies of popular expression and 
democracy. 
This is the gist of a political economy approach, where the free press is a 
democratic ideal. In reality, it is difficult for the media to be truly independent of 
the market or the state. Media control is concentrated in the elite, limiting the 
range of views represented. Political economists argue that a market-based 
media system, considered "free" by liberals, may be directed towards 
maintaining control rather than serving democratic ideals (Hallin 1994; Curran 
et al 2000,5). Park's argument against the globalisation thesis (Featherstone 
1990) applies to many Asian states where state power is strengthened by the 
"collusive relations" and interpenetration of state and media elites (Park et at 
2000,121/113; Curran et at 2000,14). 
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The political economists' acknowledgement of the limitations on the media's 
democratic role does not mean that the project of democratisation needs to be 
abandoned. Rather, its aims can be better achieved by identifying the ways in 
which the media are restrained from representing alternatives as viable and 
prevented from constituting a hegemonic threat to one-party states. 
Technological controls. Louise Williams (2000,5-7) observed that 
governments have always tried to control tools of dissemination. In the late 
1960s, Soeharto (Indonesia) deprived political prisoners of pencil and paper. In 
Ceasescu's Romania, typewriters had to be registered; In the Philippines, 
photocopying machines had to be registered. This Is still the case In Myanmar 
today with fax machines. Insufficiently managed, new technologies can serve 
guerrilla purposes, such as the VCR in Thailand, the "mobile phone revolution" 
in the Philippines, the Internet for Falungong members in China and the 
guerrilla Internet newspapers in Laos. 
Today, many ASEAN governments continue to rely on technological control. In 
many countries (Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar), the media is either 
state-owned (Mares 2000,247; L. Williams 2000,13) or overseen by 
government bodies (Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Nain 2000,14). While 
ownership successfully deprives ideological alternatives of media access, the 
Internet is a medium that cannot be easily owned or controlled. For this reason, 
many Asian governments study Singapore's "firewall" strategy of managing the 
Internet. While Myanmar and North Korea prefer isolation, the Singapore 
government is intent on building the entire communications network itself 
("Singapore One"). By 2001, every household in the island will be "online, " 
which allows the government to "wander into ... computers of Internet users" 
(Rodan 2000,169). 
Coercion. Should such technological controls fail to curb the emergence of 
viable alternatives, many ASEAN governments resort to coercion to suppress 
dissent. What is considered anti-government behaviour ranges from locking 
doors at night (North Korea), spreading anti-government rumours in personal 
email chains (Malaysia) to gatherings in groups of more than 4 persons 
315 
(Singapore). Failure to comply can result in "punishment" that ranges from 
suspended media license, public shaming, "drinking tea" with officials (Vietnam, 
Mares 2000,247/254), being sued for libel (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
see Coronel 2000,163), expulsion (China, Indonesia), jail (Burma) and even 
murder (Cambodia, Thai massacre in 1992). 
Such "hard" control does not necessarily work in governments' favour. In 
Malaysia, harsh punishment "outraged the public's sense of natural justice and 
... eroded the traditional Malay reverence for the 'leader'... significantly 
weaken[ing] the UMNO's one party hegemony [and] causing it to be defeated in 
several by-elections" (Rahim 2000,15). Additionally, the media can remain an 
effective ideological tool only if they appear relatively autonomous, balanced 
and not simply as a government mouthpiece (Heng 1993,41). Citizens can 
signal their displeasure with state-controlled media through their non- 
consumption. In Mexico, independent newspapers are more successful In 
competing for readers than the traditional, official press (Hallin 2000,104). In 
Thailand, the government newspaper - Chao Phraya - was so unpopular that It 
folded up after only three months (Chongkittavorn 2000,223). In Vietnam, 
citizens consider party broadcasts (over nation-wide loudspeakers) "white 
noise, " while party newspapers often remain neatly folded and untouched on 
desks (Mares 2000,240). In Taiwan, the United Daily News' circulation fell by 
90,000 copies as a result of a boycott campaign (C. C. Lee 2000,129). When 
the South Korean government forced advertisers to cancel advertisements 
placed in Dong-A Ilbo (an independent newspaper), it triggered an 
unprecedented number of personal advertisements by readers to encourage 
the journalists; civic groups, also boycotted subscription fees for Korea 
Broadcasting System (Park et al 2000,119; J. K. Lee 1996,86-87). 
In the long run, hard authoritarianism fuels and focuses dissent-in Poland, the 
imposition of Martial Law (1981) did not break the opposition but merely drove 
it underground to reorganise until it became strong enough to force 
concessions from the government. The Polish experience was repeated 
throughout Eastern Europe with delayed success. In the Hungarian "media 
wars, " the government experienced a brief victory in quelling independent 
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media chiefs but their success in controlling the media cost them very heavy 
losses during the 1994 elections (Sparks 2000,39/41). 
Market strategies. Knowing that hard authoritarianism can backfire, 
governments often try to soften their control. Increasingly, state power is 
exerted through the market so that the media appears relatively autonomous. 
The miracle years saw a media boom in Asia, with Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Hong Kong competing to become the regional media hub. 
However, the trend towards commercialisation and liberalisation was reversed 
in the economic crisis of 1997. In Thailand, advertising revenue plunged 60%; 
minor media ceased operations while major newspapers halved their number 
of pages and reduced colour printing (Chongkittavorn 2000,230). 
Besides having to cope with "free" market forces, media companies have also 
to endure governments' Intervention into the media market. Foreign media 
eager to break into the China market have no choice but to court the Chinese 
government (L. Williams 2000,9). In dealing with local media, Doronila (2000, 
xv) observes the commonplace strategy of economic strangulation of the press 
through withdrawal of advertising, often by or at the instigation of governments. 
In Singapore (Rodan 2000,184), amendments to the Films Act in 1998 banned 
political advertising. Even in democratic states like Philippines, President 
Estrada engaged "godfather' strategies (Coronel 2000,161) in dissuading 
business-owners from advertising in newspapers critical of him. 
Asian media are highly susceptible to governments' financial influence because 
of the clientalist relationshigs between state and media, which can be traced to 
Confucianism's emphasis on harmonious and paternalistic political 
relationships, where society does not seek autonomy from the state but support 
in official and unofficial ways (J. K. Lee 1996,88; Park et al 2000,112/116). 
Some economic strategies for encouraging dependency - which Pye and Pye 
identifies as the key concept for understanding Asian political subjectivity - 
include government patronage (Philippines, Cambodia, Lao, see Coronel 2000, 
162; Rich 2000,26/34) and ensuring low salaries for journalists so that they are 
reliant on supplies of rice, food (Myanmar, Rich 2000,20-21) and "envelope 
317 
journalism" ("taxi" or "lunch" money are given to journalists for attendance at 
press conferences in the Philippines, Thailand. Cf. Doronila 2000,13; Coronel 
2000,153; Chongkittavorn 2000,221). The most direct strategy for ensuring 
the "interpenetration of elite" is the South Korean strategy of dangling lucrative 
civil service careers and preferential tax treatments to Induce journalist 
compliance (C. C. Lee 2000,126; Park et al 2000,114). 
How beneficial are these "market" pressures In maintaining government 
hegemony? In Thailand, Vietnam and Philippines, intense competition and 
uneven literacy precipitated the phenomenon of tabloidization. Homogenous 
reporting results because the media produce only stories that are guaranteed 
to sell (Coronel 2000,152). It is not clear if such market-led developments 
exert a positive or negative effect on government hegemony. On the one hand, 
tabloidisation can threaten the integrity/centrality of the social-moral values that 
buttress Asian (authoritarian) democracy. (In Hong Kong, tabloidisation Is so 
serious that a local group felt the need to set up a "pollution index" to monitor 
sleaze, fabrication and scandals. Cf. C. Yeung 2000,58. ) On the other hand, in 
Vietnam, tabloidisation can also create a moral panic about social crime and 
convince citizens that yet more social controls are needed (Mares 2000,246). 
Ideological strategies: justifying unpopular governments. Many 
governments do undertake nationalist projects to achieve popular consensus 
and avoid ideological fragmentation to achieve political legitimacy for one-party 
rule. Bass (1993,74-77) highlights three regional variations on this theme: In 
Latin America, governments engaged in pseudo-democratic electoral practices 
(stuffing ballot boxes, The Age04/07/2000) to appear truly popular; Leninist 
Eastern European governments claimed to be protectors of proletariat/mass. 
interest; third-world governments equated the party with the nation and 
represented themselves as the guardians of the nation. 
The project of maintaining popularity is hard work. In Mexico, the PRI was able 
to bridge various class interests only through compromising its own ideological 
values to incorporate a wide range of political tendencies - Including 
revolutionary populism and international corporatism. Hallin (2000,98-99) 
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noted that Mexican political history is often recounted as a series of shifts in 
political direction, by which the PRI maintained the loyalty of its various political 
currents. What caused the PRI to lose its one-party rule after a record of 71 
years was that it tried to legitimise itself on the basis of popularity. For a one- 
party state for whom party-internal and popular ideological unity is vital, such 
attempts to "follow" the masses meant that over time, different ideological 
values become over-legitimated to the extent of causing the party - as an 
authoritarian society's moral centre - to fracture from within. 
The PAP understands this very well and consistently refuses to acknowledge 
that governments ought to be popular. LKY remains unapologetic about his 
views ("never mind what the people thinks") while PM Goh told off some 
citizens who tried to "threaten" him with their votes, cautioning that 
governments that allowed themselves to be swayed by popular whims would 
not make strong/good governments. The PAP is keenly aware that popularity is 
an inferior and unstable basis of legitimacy for one-party governments. Firstly, 
it prevents the party from being a firm moral centre because the society's core 
values are being dictated by current fashions. Contradictory popular values, if 
over-legitimated, could bring about ideological/political fragmentation. 
Secondly, popularity is a problematic basis of legitimacy because it focuses 
inter-party (and intra-party) competition on individuals; such popularity contests 
may over-legitimate charisma as a criteria of good government. Under such 
circumstances, a hegemonic crisis would be precipitated every time a 
charismatic opposition leader emerges. 
Singapore is not unique in its caution against popular legitimacy. However its 
invention of AV represents 
one 
of the best strategies at re-constituting a sound 
alternative basis of government legitimacy. The daring and brilliance of the 
Singapore government's "Asian Democracy" emerges especially in comparison 
to other governments' attempt to legitimise their unpopularity (to de-legitimise 
the relevance of popularity and legitimise alternative basis of legitimacy). 
Third-world governments use several strategies to legitimise their non-popular 
rule. The most radical of this is the complete repudiation of democracy as a 
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colonial institution that the West continues to Impose on the third-world, i. e., it 
is a form of postcolonial imperialism. Harbeson (1986,10-11) observes that the 
more negative their colonial experience, 165 the more African nations are likely 
to perceive democracy as an alien imposition. 
Given the global hegemony of democracy, many third-world governments 
understand that it is impossible to completely refuse to base their authority on 
popularity without incurring international sanctions. Instead, most governments 
try to subordinate democracy without excluding it; e. g., most do not challenge 
the (intrinsic) desirability of democracy but "resist" from within. Of these 
attempts, the "development model" of democracy is perhaps the most 
common. It argues that democracy is a luxury that young nation-states cannot 
afford in the crucial period of nation building (Apter 1970). Malaysian PM 
Mahathir is especially found of this model and modifies Singapore's model of 
"Asian Values" to argue that while democracy Is relevant for Asia, now is not 
the time. 
This model accepts the intrinsic desirability of democracy as defined by the 
West-Le., democracy is not de-legitimised, merely postponed. Because 
democracy. is not repudiated, domestic pro-democracy movements easily 
acquire a certain legitimacy in their resistance of one-party governments. Le., 
although this model aims to secure hegemony for non-popular governments, it 
actually also legitimises domestic counter-hegemonic movements. 
By contrast, Leninist and (Singapore's) Asian Democracy models challenge the 
West's monopoly over the definition of democracy and argue that their unique 
blends of democracy are "superior" to the West's. The Leninist model 
considers itself superior not only electorally and organisationally (high voter 
turnout and mass integration, Bass 1993,74-77) but also morally/ideologically 
165 Democracy as self-rule is difficult to implement because African nation-state 
boundaries often include a plurality of kingdoms (Tanzania, Uganda). Democracy 
within the boundaries'of the nation-state would entail breaking up ethnic groups and 
rendering ethnicity as little more than folklore within an invented nation (Ronen 1986, 
194/197). This means, ironically, that democratisation in African states can only come 
about with a strong state to suppress ethnic conflicts and challenges to political 
centralisation. 
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through representing itself as the guardian of proletariat interests against 
exploitation. 
By making universal claims as to the superiority of its variety of democracy, the 
Leninist model may be perceived as "aggressive/expansionist" and expose 
itself to intense international criticism. This is precisely one of the many 
advantages of the Asian Democracy model- by representing itself as culturally 
particular, it is not accountable to 'Western" standards and in fact, de- 
legitimises non-Asian (Western) criticisms as cultural interference. Yet, 
although too culturally particular to tolerate international criticism, It is 
simultaneously not too culturally particular to rally regional solidarity and 
legitimacy among Confucian, Buddhist, Islamic, Jewish and Hindu nations. 
-Indeed, its appeal to Asian culture makes authority appear organic and natural. 
Confucianism is especially effective at naturalising authority since its emphasis 
on "face" and hierarchical relations dictates that subjects obey authority for its 
own sake. Scholars have noted that Confucianism is guided by ceremony/form 
rather than by ideology (which corresponds with earlier analysis that the PAP 
presents itself as a pragmatic government with no ideological affiliations). 
Besides reifying obedience to authority as an intrinsic social-moral value, 
"Asian Democracy" also does not require that a government be Ideologically 
consistent. AV is a discourse that is flexible enough to hold together Ideological 
contradictions, especially through representing these contradictions as 
dilemmas facing a moral Asian nation. Its two-tiered formulation (dominant 
ideology of competitiveness and subdominant ideology of communitarianism) 
offers, like Thatcherism, a way of reconciling and addressing the contradictions 
of international and late-capitalism. 'se 
While many third-world governments aim to deter democracy by deconstructing 
the primacy of popular legitimacy, Asian Values is outstanding in that it does so 
with fewer side effects. For many ASEAN countries, this new basis of 
legitimacy comes from their phenomenal economic performance. Basing 
168 In Singapore, contradictions between protectionism and global competitiveness 
and between accumulation and gratification are popularly framed as the stressful 
lifestyle of a productive worker versus the less stressful lifestyle of the consumer. 
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government legitimacy, on this has the distinct advantage of allowing the 
dominant government to not even concede to the opposition a fighting chance 
to contest for government. Öjendal and Antlöv (1998,528) observed that 
precisely because elections are based on how well the government has 
delivered the goods ("track record"), there is little chance of opposition coming 
to power democratically. 
The balance between popular and economic legitimacy is particularly skewed 
in Singapore, which testifies to the hegemonic success of the PAP. With the 
AV project, citizens learnt to disdain popular governments as "weak" and 
become convinced that a good government is a strong government who is not 
afraid to be unpopular and to undertake austere policies for long-term 
economic prosperity. 
How far are citizens willing to tolerate authoritarian practices? The PAP 
appears to have successfully legitimised a national closure to ideological 
contestation. In terms of electoral practices, Huntington (1997,10-11) observes 
that elections in Asia are "designed to produce consensus rather than choice. " 
ASEAN governments prefer a "quantitative" model of democracy where 
democracy means submitting to the wishes of the majority ("first-past-the-post" 
system) rather than the "qualitative" pluralism model (proportional 
representation). In Indonesia, Suharto's Pancasila democracy permitted only 
two opposition parties on the premise that a multiparty system was culturally 
alien and inherently destabilising (Rahim 2000,10-11). 
In terms, of collective bargaining, Asian and Western democracies seek to 
contain challenges to authority to different degrees. Pempel (1990,10) 
observed 'that in western democracies, bargaining among interest groups is 
legitimated as the primary procedure for setting national policies, thereby 
removing important policy decisions from electoral politics. For Olsen (1983), 
such incorporation (collective bargaining) emerged in western democracies as 
a paradigmatic alternative to pluralism. Among Asian Democracies, even 
collective bargaining - already a strategy of incorporating dissent - is de- 
legitimised in favour of "consultative government, " where civil society and trade 
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unions are state-led and where "bargaining" takes place outside the ' 
parliamentary process, invisible to the public eye (thereby preventing criticisms 
of government from being publicised. ) 
In terms of the public sphere, participation is limited and "credibility" Is awarded 
only to good/moral citizens - citizens who would subordinate their dissent to 
communitarian interests (as defined by the PAP), who as moral Asians would 
not contemplate immoral (counter-communitarian) alternatives, and who would 
be supportive of nation-building and not express doubts about the system. 
This means that public sphere participation/credibility Is granted only to citizens 
who happen to be sporting a posture of compliance, which is tantamount to 
abstracting citizens from their lived experience (of frustrations/dissent), 
sociology and all the particularities that make them individuals. To paraphrase 
McSherry (http: //www. his. latrobe. edu. aurilas/journaVvol5_2/mcsherry. html, 2), 
the legitimisation of only one type of citizen serves as a (effective) way to 
ensure conformist public expression. Furthermore, this Is not just any type of 
citizen but an abstract and ideal citizen, for whom, to paraphrase Warner 
(1993,235), the moment of apprehending oneself as a public, Ideal or abstract 
citizen is a moment when one becomes indifferent to those particularities167 - 
one's biography, sociology, psychology, etc. - that constitute one. By de- 
legitimating non-abstract and universal concept of citizenship, the public sphere 
is made a safe place where race, class and gender differences or any dissent 
that threatens to fragment national consensus cannot find voice. 
While in some societies, the ideal subject could be described as white, male 
and middle-class, what is interesting is that in multiracial Singapore, this Is an 
empty category since all citizens are "racially-hyphenated" (Chua 1997). Always 
and already racialised, Singaporeans are irrevocable marked as dangerous 
citizens in a fragile multiracial nation that needs a guardian to protect it from its 
citizens. 
167 In Singapore, this would especially correspond to the privatising/subordinating of 
particularities such as ethnicity and religion. 
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By limiting access to abstracted citizens, ideological contestation is rendered 
impossible and national consensus inevitable. While Garnharn and Habermas 
believed that such an abstract, universalised public sphere consensus would 
serve to coalesce collective will and encourage the emergence of a rationally 
determined course of action, Fraser (1992,125) and McSherry 
(http: //www. his. latrobe. edu. au/jilas/journaVvol5_2/mcsherry. html, 4) argue that 
such a consensus is one that can be legitimately imposed on citizens to exact 
submission. For Eley (1992,306-307), such public spheres serve to contain 
rather than stimulate citizenship participation. 
The success and contribution of AV in perpetuating one-party dominance and 
warding off hegemonic crises can be most clearly seen by comparing ASEAN 
and non-ASEAN states. Where democracy is not de-legitimised, governments 
find themselves hard-pressed to accede to popular pro-democracy demands. 
This is the case in Taiwan (C. C. Lee 2000,131) and South Korea (J. K. Lee 
1996,86), where official endorsement of democratic values legitimises 
journalists' embrace of their "watch dog" role and fuels citizens' democratic 
imagination to boycott and protest. By contrast, the media in ASEAN countries 
accepts their nation-building role. In Myanmar, dissident journalists and . 
politicians are criticised as anti-national (Rich 2000,23). In Vietnam, journalists 
are reminded that they are "revolutionary soldiers in the field of culture 
ideology" (Mares 2000,244). By de-legitimising the role of watchdog 
journalism, liberal democracy and ideological contestation, AV plays a crucial 
role in assisting one-party regimes in ASEAN to evolve into ideological one- 
party -governments. 
8D. THE RESURGENCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
Not only does AV help one-party states to cope with pro-democracy demands, 
it also gives a new lease of life to authoritarianism. Already a region especially 
resilient to democracy (Emmerson 1995), the use of the AV discourse by 
ASEAN governments provides an additional defence against the "third wave of 
democratisation" (Huntington1991) and even brings about the resurgence of 
authoritarianism. By accepting Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam as new 
members in spite of Western pressure, ASEAN Is in effect, bestowing upon 
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these countries international recognition of their national sovereignties. t88 This 
can be seen in ASEAN's decision to admit Cambodia, its latest member. 
After the failure of UN's "quick-fix democracy" in Cambodia in 1993,169 
Cambodia needed a political form that would secure it international recognition 
as a sovereign state. Many options were no longer possible: UN-styled 
democracy had failed, old-style Soviet socialism had become obsolete, military 
dictatorship had become undesirable, while monarchy had become outdated. 
Lacking a definite political programme, Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen (CPP) 
both reverted from the rhetoric of democracy (employed during the phase of 
UN democracy) to a discourse of develop mentalism: 
Democracy means food for the people's stomach, shelter and education 
... This is democracy in the Cambodian sense... It is easy to preach or 
advocate democracy when one has a full stomach... but what about the 
poor rural people? ... To them... democracy is just a phrase to be talked 
about in idle gossip. (Prince Ranariddh, Phnom Penh Post 25/08/1995) 
Such discourses of developmentalism has strong similarities with the AV 
discourse (especially Mahathir's 1985 development model. 170) Indeed, "Asian 
Democracy" would be a most suitable political programme, given how Hun Sen 
models himself as a Cambodian version of LKY (Öjendal and Antlöv 1998, 
534) and prefers a political system build on consensus where "everyone co- 
operates with each other in the Malaysian way" (Phnom Penh Post 04/10/1995) 
and where foreigners (especially Westerners) are prevented from interfering. 
Before seizing power through a very violent coup against the Prince in 1997, 
Hun Sen had to anticipate international reactions. By 1997, the UN had 
become a marginal actor. Japan, the largest aid donor, was reluctant to tie aid 
to political outcomes, despite US pressures. China no longer supported the 
Khmer Rogue against CPP. Thus, ASEAN's reaction was of primary 
consideration. 
'6e Benjamin argues that nation-statehood is mutually conferred (Chapter 4). 
169 Many explain this culturally - democratisation was doomed because of Cambodia's deep-seated notions of hierarchy and lack of inclination towards pluralism 
cBoua et al In Ojendal and Antlöv 1998). 70 For differences between LKY and Mahathir's formulations of AV, Cf. 
www. apmforum. com/news/apmn88. htm. 
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Öjendal and Antlöv (1998,535) argued that the CPP expected a mixed reaction 
from ASEAN and considered it worth the risk to execute a coup. While ASEAN 
members may not condone Cambodia's violent authoritarianism given their 
attempts to dissociate themselves from hard authoritarianism, the CPP 
counted on ASEAN's "non-inference" policy since ASEAN could not criticise 
Cambodia without risking the credibility of the "ASEAN way. " 
Furthermore, it is possible that ASEAN's previous acceptance of serious 
human rights violation in Myanmar led Cambodia to believe ASEAN would 
similarly tolerate its violence. Nischalke (2000,102) noted that ASEAN had 
accepted Myanmar's military regime In a "perceived need to display unity In the 
face of Western pressure. " For Muzaffar (in Nischalke 2000,102), what most 
likely tilted the balance in favour of Myanmar were vociferous Western 
demands to deny Myanmar's entry to ASEAN. Perceived as undue external 
interference, all ASEAN members felt "somehow they had an obligation to re- 
assert their own sovereignty" and to show that "this is our region, our part of the 
world, and we know what to do 
ASEAN's reaction to Cambodia's violence was more vocal than their reaction 
to Myanmar's violence. ASEAN expressed deep regret, demanded a cease-fire 
and suspended Cambodia's admission into ASEAN. Even while reaffirming the 
principle of non-interference, ASEAN attempted to broker peace between Hun 
Sen and Prince Ranariddh. However, the integrity of ASEAN and the "ASEAN 
way" was severely damaged when Hun Sen accused ASEAN of interference 
(Ramacharan 2000,68-69) and successfully pressured ASEAN to admit 
Cambodia in 1998. . 
The admittance of Cambodia into ASEAN Is a good example of the diffusion of 
authoritarianism. AV is no longer mere rhetoric but the medium through which 
authoritarian regimes can "inspire and clear the way for each other" (Öjendal 
and Antlöv 1998,527). This is precisely the goal of the "Commission for a New 
Asia, " a semi-official forum organised in Malaysia in 1993 to outline Asia's role 
in international political development and especially "Winning the Struggle for 
Human Rights and Responsibilities" (Commission for a New Asian 1994,2). 
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"Asian Values" was to struggle against other political Ideologies In the world 
arena and especially against Western democracy, "a highly imperfect form of 
government. " The Commission proposes a "political democracy" where 
governments are "strong and stable, " the mass media "responsible" and 
decisions made through "harmonious exchanges and consensus" (Ibid, 32-34). 
AV is not the first wave of "Asianisation of Asia, " or the first "pro- 
authoritarianism" wave. In 1945, Sukarno claimed Pancasila (see appendix) as 
Indonesia's national values while Ho Chi Minh fought for Vietnam's 
independence based upon traditional peasant culture. What Is unique about the 
1990s AV wave Is that Asian countries now have the economic muscles to 
enforce their new political ideology. Öjendal and Antlöv (1998,530) argued that 
just as the spread of socialism and liberalism in Europe was closely linked to 
the interest of the working class and the bourgeoisie. In the same way, AV may 
become the new political ideology of a powerful Asian conservative middle- 
class. 
The contributions of AV to the perpetuation of authoritarianism can be best 
appreciated if we recall that the extreme heterogeneity of Southeast Asian 
societies "conspire[d] against the countries of ASEAN to make their task of 
nation-building and economic development more difficult" (Tilman 1987,154). 
In this sense, AV is alchemic, not only in legitimising authoritarianism as a 
cultural ideal, but also in transforming the most culturally impure and 
heterogeneous states into ideologically cohesive one-party nations. AV was 
rejected by culturally "purer" nations who could claim "Chinese, " "Japanese" or 
other organic ethnic values and employed only by culturally "impure" nations. 
Yet, it is precisely because AV lacked specificity and purity that it is able to rally 
regional solidarity and secure strong regional legitimacy against international 
criticism. With AV, "cultural poverty" Is turned into ideological strength. 
AV contributes significantly to the regional and domestic legitimisation of 
authoritarianism. Regionally, ASEAN's "non-interference" policy and 
legitimisation of Asian Democracy provide an environment where one-party 
governments can mutually reinforce their legitimacy. The cultural vagueness of 
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what can count as AV allows it to rally regional solidarity and enables Asian 
Democracy to develop beyond a convenient excuse for authoritarianism Into a 
pan-(Southeast) Asian phenomenon, into a genuinely Asian cultural 
phenomenon. "' 
Domestically, as an ideology, AV's emphasis on consensus over conflict de- 
legitimises ideological alternatives and prevents their circulation in public 
spheres and discourses. As a norm, AV sets up social expectations of good 
(Asian) citizen behaviour and successfully secures complicit co-operation to 
subordinate and privatise their dissent. In this sense, AV serves more as a 
doctrinal/rhetorical centre (cf. LKY's Vatican analogy) -a centre that Is publicly 
or inter-personally meaningfully but not necessarily meaningful privately. LKY 
clearly understands that rhetorical compliance Is a sufficient basis for the 
PAP's hegemony. 
The fact that government hegemony is based not upon consent but rhetorical 
conformity suggests that social and Ideological order is maintained through the 
creation of a particular governmentality. As Perlmutter (1981,176/179) 
observes, authoritarianism cannot be sustained merely by ideological consent, 
but through the "ideology becom[ing] an organisational weapon" - In the case 
of "Asian Democracies, " through AV becoming the social gaze of the moral 
majority. By encouraging citizens to police each other, state/government 
authoritarianism becomes softened Into societal or popular authoritarianism. 
The enormity of this feat cannot be understated. Many dictators (civilian and 
military) have tried to stamp out unofficial representations of nation but without 
success. In the former Sovtbt Union, unofficial versions of national history 
continued to circulate (Wertsch 1998) while among Malaysian peasants, 
"hidden transcripts" circulate healthily (Scott 1990). Worldwide, citizens protest 
authoritarian governments and do not accept state coercion against civil and 
political leaders. 
171 Could Asian Values spark off "Caribbean Values" in Singapore's latest admirer, 
Jamaica? 
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While there are many challenges to the hegemony of one-party states, they are 
not insurmountable, especially among ASEAN states where AV serves as a 
sophisticated anti-pluralist tool to ensure national consensus. Within a global 
pro-democratic hegemony, AV's justification of authoritarianism gives one-party 
governments cultural legitimacy and a new lease of life. If hegemony can be 
sufficiently maintained not by consent but by the perception that there are no 
viable alternatives, then AV's ability to de-legitimise Ideological alternatives and 
prevent social fragmentation makes it a very effective social technology for the 
sustaining of ideological dominance. AV does not require citizens' Identification, 
merely their deference. Indeed, the best proof of Ideological success Is not the 
absence of dissent, but rather citizens' willing subordination and privatisation of 
dissent. 
8E. CODA: "WINNING MINDS BUT NOT HEARTS" 
From the beginning, this research was partly motivated by a desire to explain a 
puzzling statement made by the local Chinese press, that "the government has 
won the people's minds but not their hearts. " This statement in turn implies two 
more puzzles: firstly, while coercion is clearly present in an authoritarian society 
such as Singapore, there is also consent. Secondly, while the PAP government 
has secured some form of consent, it is far from complete. 
In trying to find a theoretical paradigm to articulate these puzzles In a 
meaningful way, I found Gramsci's theory of hegemony useful. Instead of 
dichotomizing authoritarianism and popular sovereignty as distinct/polar types 
of political forms and marginalizing "soft authoritarianism" and "popular 
dictatorships" as oddities, I pought theories that would be useful In studying the 
particular balance of consent and coercion - something that Gramsci's theory 
of hegemony does centrally. I especially found Stuart Hall's Interpretation of 
Gramsci's theory and his elaboration of Poulantzas' idea of "authoritarian 
statism" useful. His description of how Thatcher created consent for her 
authoritarian rule ("authoritarian populism") led me to think about the similarities 
and differences in the PAP's hegemonic project. 
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Through the "Asian Values" project, the PAP sought to present themselves as 
Singapore's only alternative and as the representative of the wishes of the 
silent, moral Asian majority. By urging citizens to be good Asians who value 
consensus over conflict, and who place the community's Interests before their 
own, deviations from the middleground are de-legitimized, as merely the voice 
of the un-communitarian vocal minority. 
To investigate the success of the PAP's ideological project, I sought to 
investigate the extent and ways in which official discourses are 
reproduced/contested in popular discourses. Popular discourse was collected 
through in-depth interviews with 32 ordinary citizens (of different generation, 
ethnicity, class) and through collecting jokes and rumors. 
The interview material, upon analysis, reveals the many reasons why citizens 
accept the PAP. Without exception, citizens believed that the PAP has brought 
economic prosperity to Singapore. Their faith in the PAP Is not based only on 
past accomplishment, but also in hope for the future: many believe that the 
PAP will continue to bring prosperity and that the Singapore Dream is 
something that will be accessible to their children, if not to them. In these 
discourses, echoes of official/media discourses could be traced in the way 
citizens consistently compared Singapore's plight (during the economic 
recession) with those of worse-off countries, and in the ways citizens 
expressed their belief in the PAP's capabilities. 
Even for those who do not consider economic success as a sufficient basis for 
government legitimacy, they nonetheless feel compelled to comply with social 
expectations based upon an economic culture of competitiveness. The success 
of the PAP and the media, In normalizing official values as public morality, can 
be clearly seen in the ubiquitous presence of "hidden audiences" in 
interviewees' transcripts. Interviewees feel a strong pressure ("the burden of 
social expectations") to follow "the rigid path" and succeed by society's 
materialistic criteria (of the 5Cs), thereby, whether willingly or reluctantly, 
legitimizing/reproducing the dominant Ideology of competitiveness. 
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That official values have not been internalized as personal ethics but rather as 
inter-personal social expectations (of generalized others) and that official 
values are not perceived as reasonable, but as stifling, suggest that the PAP's 
hegemony is based less on strong beliefs than on tolerance and conformity. 
This means that authoritarianism is tolerated, on a weighted consideration that 
it is worthwhile to trade freedom for prosperity. Fuelled by personal desire for 
prosperity and pressurized by social expectations of material success, citizens 
privatize/subordinate their dissent, which produces an aura of public support for 
the government. This appearance of ideological unity crucially accords the one- 
party government the legitimacy to claim to represent the nation and to deny 
multi-party representation. 
The realization that the PAP's hegemony is based less on conviction or 
identification and more based on conformity and tolerance led me to posit the 
presence of an alternative mode of govern mentality -a "moral" one, based on 
conforming to other's expectations, rather than an "ethical" one based on 
personal identification. I further highlighted the fact that these two 
"govern mentalities" have strong links to social ideologies. A further possible 
avenue of research for the future would be a closer investigation of how 
communitarian and liberal ideologies may encourage the emergence of 
different governmentalities. The nature of governmentality In liberal societies 
has been well researched by Nikolas Rose (1988,1992) Barry, Osborne and 
Rose et al (1996) and Burchell, Gordon and Miller et at (1991). However, no 
such studies exist in studying governmentality in illiberal communitarian 
societies. 
Although the PAP's hegemony may be based on conformity rather than 
conviction, I have argued that this is not an 'inferior' form of hegemony. Indeed, 
with Asian Values, the PAP government seemed to have refined and 
crystallized an ideological tool par excellence to allow Ideological pluralism 
without fragmentation. Developed to deal with the challenges of an Internet age 
where informational borders could not longer be policed, the "Asian Values" 
strategy sought to manage dissent within the public sphere (through 
subordination) rather than through blocking its access to the public sphere 
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(through censorship and privatization). In this way, the "Asian Values" strategy 
calls into question beliefs about the potential of the un-censor-able media 
technologies (e. g., the Internet) to undermine one-party ideological dominance. 
However, just because the PAP has refined their Ideological strategy does not 
mean that it is immune to hegemonic crises, nor is the Internet the only or key 
source that has counter-hegemonic potential. It would be also Interesting to 
consider where other sites, where legitimate ideological alternatives can 
emerge to fragment national consensus, both within Singapore and in other 
one-party states. A particularly noteworthy site that is prevalent outside 
Singapore is "civil society. " Among (Southeast) Asian countries with strong civil 
society (e. g., Islamic or Buddhist societies) where Asian Democracy is 
advocated, how useful is the Asian Values discourse in de-legitimizing 
"organic" political alternatives that cannot be so easily de-legitimized? Outside 
Asia, how useful would a communitarian ideology be in helping one-party 
states sustain ideological dominance? 
While it is not clear how useful communitarianism could be in preventing 
ideological fragmentation in other one-party states, in Singapore, the "Asian 
Values" strategy of de-legitimizing dissent certainly goes a long way in helping 
the PAP perpetuate their one-party ideological dominance. 
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Appendix 1: Politically significant "ethnic" groups 
In Aug 1998, the Straits Times report of a national survey on citizen's preference between 
consultation and decisiveness, 4 categories were used: "English-educated, " "Chinese-educated, " 
"Malays" and "Indians. " 
Does the government consult the public enough when implementing policies? 
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How much do you want to get involved in your neighbourhood? 
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Appendix 2: The types of links I had with my interviewees 
(1) Special reasons: 2 out of 32 interviewees 
" LV: Friend of a friend, writes frequently to the Forum Page 
" SE: Friend, unique anti-competitive mentality. 
(2) Mediated by formal institutions: 22 out of 32 
(a) Advertisement 
" Thomas: advertised himself as a "Chinese-educated" 27 year old in a Friends column. 
" TL: college advertisement 
(b) Church networks 
" BC: Family's church-mate, immigrant Indian citizen 
" PT: An ENG pastor in a Chinese church 
" EH: A foreigner who has lived in Singapore for a long time 
" HC: An ENG pastor in a Chinese church 
" SEOW: A retiree in a Chinese bible college 
(c) Office networks 
" SLH: An Indian clerical officer in family friend's company 
" JIM: Worker in family friend's company 
" DEX: Family's colleague, graduated from a Chinese-university in the 1960s 
" RAS: Family's colleague, Malay professional 
" HO: mother of DEX, selected because she is an immigrant citizen (from China) 
" TEO: Family's colleague, Chinese and English educated 
(d) Schools and tuition agency 
" RM: A student of family, who teaches early school leavers, Indian and working class 
" AS: A student of family, who teaches early school leavers, Malay and working class 
" LYN: Family's schoolmate, represents "the bright future generation of Singaporeans. " 
" PRL: Family's schoolmate, celebrates hybridity and Singlish. 
" VH: Ex-student 
(e) Family counselling centre 
" XX: a teenager in Normal (inferior education) stream 
" EB: a 17-year-old Eurasian girl, selected because she was Eurasian. 
(f) Journalist friends' contact 
" TSK: A Chinese intellectual 
" LS: A middle-aged Eurasian man 
(3) Informal links, family and friendship: 8 out of 32 
(a) Translator's contacts 
" AZ: A retired Malay working class man 
" AR: A Malay schoolteacher and an active social worker in his mosque. 
(b) My extended family 
" WCM: An aunt, selected because of her involvement with grassroots organizations. 
" STC: Family, civil servant during the colonial and post-colonial administration. 
(c) Friends of family 
" BL: Perankan (Straits Chinese, i. e., a mix between Malay and Chinese). 
" CST: a Chinese businessman. 
" KPT: CST's father, an immigrant citizen from China. 
" YJT: CST's son 
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Appendix 3: Determination of class 
[Income, property and education] 
Upper Class: 2 out of 32 
" TL: A university student, his father has business and property is different countries. 
" LYN: A medicine student, her father is the director of an MNC 
Upper-Middle Class: 12 out of 32 
Small business proprietors 
" BL: Owns small business, forced to wind it up because of the economic crisis. 
" CST: Inherited father's business, forced to wind it up because of the economic crisis. 
Graduates (living in above average homes) 
" YJT: CST's son, a fresh graduate working as a civil servant 
" VG: Family of lawyers, lives in a private house in an expensive part of Singapore 
" HC: University graduate training to become a Chinese pastor 
" TEO: University educated, refused to declare his income, owns private property 
" DEX: University educated woman teaching in a tertiary institution 
" SEOW: University educated retiree attending a Chinese bible college 
" TSK: A Chinese intellectual 
" PT: English-educated pastor of a Chinese church 
" RAS: Professional, teaches in a tertiary institution 
" PRL: university medical student 
Middle Class: 7 out of 32 
" Low education but high income or position 
" JIM: '0' levels and has a high household income 
" LS: '0' levels but holds a very high post 
VH: rich but not well educated 
High-education but poor family 
" SE: University educated but poor family. 
" EH: University-educated but poor and unemployed. 
Old-generation elite 
" KPT: Started a small business and retired 
" AR: schoolteacher 
Lower-Middle Class: 3 out of 32 
" Brother C: '0' level educated retiree who lives in a small flat 
WCM: semi-educated housewife, depends on children for income. 
" STC: retiree living at an old-folks home 
Working Class: 8 out of 32 
" Thomas: factory worker 
" SLH: clerical officer 
" HO: uneducated housewife, dependent on her children for income. 
" RM: '0' levels, no private property 
" AS: '0' levels, no private property 
" XX: teenage dropout 
" EB: teenage dropout 
" AZ: A retired technician 
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Appendix 4: Interview questions (detailed) 
National identification 
What does Singapore mean to you? What do you think it means to be a Singaporean? 
[E. g., how would you introduce Singapore to other people? ] 
What issues are important in Singapore? 
What issues are important to you? 
Do you think they have been addressed? 
What do you think about the Singapore dream? Is it your dream? 
What do you expect or want from Singapore? 
Do you think Singapore meet these expectations? [Is the government doing a good job or is the 
government successful in persuading people that it is doing a good job? ] 
Do you think Singapore has a good economy and good society? [Encourage examples from 
personal life] 
What are some positive/negative things about Singapore? [Encourage examples from personal 
life] 
What are some positive/negative things about the economy? [Encourage examples from personal 
life] 
How can Singapore society be improved? [Encourage examples from personal life] 
What are some positive/negative things about the society? [Encourage examples from personal 
life] 
How can Singapore society be improved? [Encourage examples from personal life] 
Jokes 
What do you think other people, especially foreigners, think about Singapore? 
What are some positive comments you have heard from foreigners? 
What are some negative comments you have heard from foreigners? 
Have you heard any Singapore jokes? 
Where did you hear this joke? Have you told it to others? [Circulation of information] 
Do you find them interesting? Why? 
I heard these rumours, what do you of them? 
Sinclish 
What do you think of Singlish? Should it be encouraged? 
Do you watch the sitcom "Under one roof"? Do you think that it is "Singaporean? " Why or why 
not? 
Can you identify yourself with any of the characters in there? 
Do you think the issues that the character faces are similar to yours? 
Do you think the portrayal of everyday Singaporean life is accurate? 
Foreigners 
Do you know any foreigners personally? 
What do you think of there being foreigners in Singapore? 
Is it a good or bad thing? Why? 
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Migration 
Have you ever thought of migrating, or do you have friends who have done so? 
What are the reasons for migrating? 
Travel 
How is Singapore different from other countries? 
Media exposure 
Newspapers 
Do you read newspapers? Which? Why? [State-media relation] Why not others (especially ethnic 
newspapers)? 
Which sections of the newspapers do you read? Why? 
Why do you not read the other sections (give e. g. )? Why? 
Television/Radio 
Do you watch television? 
Which programmes do you usually watch? Why? 
Which channel do you usually watch? Why? Why do you not watch the other channels (give e. g. )? 
Relevance of media issues 
Do you think the media / newspapers report issues that are important to you? [E. g., what would 
you like to see more in the newspapers? ] 
Do you think the media / newspapers / radio report issues that are of concern to you? [See 
question on what are the things that you think you ought-want to have? ) 
What do you think the media ought to provide to their readers/listeners? What should people be 
able to expect from their media? 
Does the media / newspapers meet these expectations? 
(Prompt if necessary: Do you think this newspapers are accurate, balanced, current? ) 
What sort of changes would you like to see in the media? 
Have you ever tried to make yourself heard on the media (especially radio)? 
If yes, how, where, when and on what issue? / Do you have friends who have made themselves 
heard? 
How successful was it? [What (real) obstacles were there? ] 
If not, why not? [Perceived obstacles, how are people made to feel small] 
Why do you have this opinion? Why gives you this impression? 
Alternative public sphere and rumours 
Are there places where you can discuss social issues with your friends, or where you can be 
"heard"? 
When and where do you usually do it? With whom (strangers in coffeeshop or friends)? [How are 
these places created? ] 
What are some social issues that are of concern to you and your friends? What are some issues 
that you talk about? 
In these places, do you get extra information that you do not usually get from the papers, e. g., 
rumours? 
Have you heard any rumours lately? 
Where did you hear these rumours? Have you told it to others? [Circulation of information] 
Do you find them interesting? Why? 
Do you think they are true? Why? 
I heard these rumours; do you think they are likely to be true? 
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Appendix 5: Interview questions (general) 
1 a. National Identification 
What do you consider yourself? A Singaporean, Chinese, etc. Why? What ric>a,;; it rrw, rn toi ho) a 
Singaporean? Is there something called "Singapore culture? " Are Singaporeans special and 
different from others? How? The media and popular literature portrays Singapore in certain ways. 
What do you think are the positive and negative things about Singapore? Do you long for the 
Singaporean dream? Why or why not? [Follow up with: do you think it is attainable? ] 
b. Under One Roof 
Would you say that "Under One Roof" is a Singaporean sitcom? Why? Do you idontify with any of 
the characters? Which one and why? [Trigger off discussion on Singlish] 
2. Current Issues in Singapore society 
General: What are some issues that Singapore society faces? How can the situation be 
improved? 
[(1) Bypass criticism, appear constructive, (2) hypothetical dimension, non-accountability, (3) 
indirect question about personal issues. ] 
Specific issues (to be raised if interviewees do not bring them up spontaneously) 
(a) Economic crisis: (are people satisfied with Singapore's situation? ) 
How have you been affected by the crisis (shares, property values, etc. )? [Do the governments' 
policy have an impact on you? (E. g., POSB, Housing Loans, etc. )] What do you think can be done 
to improve the situation? [Do they compare it with Malaysia and Indonesia? ] 
(b) Race crisis: 
Do you it is likely that race politics will develop in Singapore? [Do you think there is a potential that 
race politics will develop in Singapore? ] If yes, in what situations? 
(c) Malaysia crisis: 
Do you follow this event? Have you been affected by this crisis? What do you think is the 
problem? What can it be solved? Do you support the call by some Singaporeans to boycott 
Malaysia? 
(d) Migrants and foreigners 
Do you follow this event? What do you think should be done about the migrant issue? (Not 
problem). 
Do you think it is a problem? Why? 
(e) JBJ (an opposition politician taken to court for defaming the PAP) 
Do you follow this event? Do you think the verdict of the JBJ case is important? (Will it affect your 
life? ) 
[Would you consider Job's case a political (government) issue or a social-national issue? 
Media and Communications 
How do you keep in touch with "Singapore"? How do you find information about Singapore? 
Does the media supply you with what you want to know? If not, how can it be improved? 
Do you know of any jokes or rumours? Why are they interesting? Where did you hear it from and 
have you told it to others? In what situations? 
Do you discuss social issues? With who? Where? 
Have you ever tried giving feedback before? Can you describe the process? Does it work? Which 
body? 
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Appendix 6: Socio-economic survey questionnaire 
Name: 
Contact: 
General 
Age (in 1998): 
Generation: 
Gender: 
Marital status: 
Nationality: 
Ethnicity 
Race: 
Language stream: 
Languages spoken: 
Language preferred: 
Class (the 5Cs) 
Education: 
Occupation: 
Disposable household income: 
Car ownership: 
Type and size of home: 
Cultural capital/family background 
Father's education/occupation: 
Mother's education/occupation: 
Media habits 
Newspapers read: 
Reasons for reading that newspapers: 
Sections interested in: 
TV channels watched: 
Types of programmes watched: 
Radio stations listened to: 
Other media habits: 
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Appendix 7: Media indicators in Asia 
Source: Shelton A. Gunaratne (2000) "Overiew" in Handbook of tho media in Asia. Edited 
by S. Gunaratne. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Media indicators per 1000 people 
Country Daily Radio TV recei- Main Tel. Internet hosts 
newspaper recei-vers vors (1997) lines (1998) per 10,000 
circulation (1996) (1999) 
(1996) 
South 
Asia 1.8 12.2 3.9 6.58 4.00 
Maldives 
Sri Lanka 2.9 21.0 9.2 2.84 0.29 
Pakistan 2.1 9.2 2.2 1.85 0.22 
Bhutan 1.9 1.9 1.04 0.58 
India 3.1 10.5 6.9 1.85 0.78 
Banglade 0.9 5.0 0.7 0.26 0.00 
sh 
Nepal 1.1 3.7 0.4 0.77 0.07 
Southeast Asia 
Singapore 32.4 73.9 29.2 54.29 259.84 
Brunei 6.9 30.0 41.7 24.68 38.98 
Malaysia 11.0 43.2 16.6 19.49 30.21 
Thailand 20.1 20.4 23.4 8.02 7.25 
Philippine 27.9 15.9 10.6 2.87 3.00 
s 
Indonesia 11.3 15.5 9.7 2.70 1.97 
Myanmar 5.7 8.9 0.7 0.48 0.00 
Laos 1.6 13.9 0.4 0.55 0.00 
Cambodia 1.6 12.7 12.3 0.18 0.06 
Vietnam 4.1 10.6 18.0 2.07 0.00 
East Asia 
Japan 58.0 p5.7 70.6 47.86 133.64 
Hong 80.0 9.5 41.2 56.08 356.67 
Kong 
Macau 44.8 35.2 28.9 40.91 3.41 
Taiwan 40.1 32.7 49.96 142.75 
Korea (S) 39.4 103.7 34.2 44.40 60.47 
Korea (N) 20.0 14.7 11.5 4.82 0.00 
China 4.2 19.5 27.0 5.62 0.84 
Mongolia 2.7 13.9 5.9 3.66 0.08 
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Appendix 8: Mr Brown's list 
Singapore National Education (Part 3) 
I have also learned lately: 
1. That we need to set up a Committee to discuss systematically how we can have 
Creativity. 
2. That our leaders say that we must be creative and independent of spirit, therefore we 
must do as they say and be creative and independent of sprit 
3. That we are given a "choice" on upgrading our flats but when we choose not to and 
convince others it's not desirable, we are selfish (ST Forum Page 27/5/97). 
4. That Unselfishness means choosing upgrading like everyone should. 
5. That we should be creative and mentally independent, as long as we choose 
upgrading, or else it would be selfish. 
6. That we have Freedom of Choice, even in upgrading, as long as we choose correctly 
and vote for upgrading. 
7. That Johor (Malaysia's border state with Singapore) is an evil place and Singapore is 
a crime-free haven, that Johor is an evil place and Singapore is a crime-free haven, 
that Johor is an evil place and Singapore is a crime-free haven, that Johor is an evil 
place and Singapore is a crime-free haven, that Johor is an evil place and Singapore 
is a crime-free haven. At least that is what the papers say. 
8. That they way to mend ties with an angry neighbour is to keep printing statistics of his 
higher crime rate. 
9. That Engineering and Science Graduates are better than Arts Students, but we want 
a creative society where the Arts flourish too. 
10. That Creativity is so important to our Economic Survival that we set up a Committee 
to look into developing the Arts, but we want our students to choose an Engineering 
or Science if they can. 
11. That making the University fees relatively higher for Arts Courses will make better 
students choose Engineering and Science Courses because they are better value for 
money. 
12. That losing your queue in the HDB (Housing Development Board) is not penalty 
enough for the 230 young couples out of 29,000 who changed partners but an 
additional fine is necessary. 
13. That we can solve the problem of young couples changing their partners in the HDB 
queue by penalising "everyone" in the Fiance Fiancee scheme with a $5000 deposit. 
14. That women will have children earlier given enough monetary incentives in the form 
of income tax rebates ("I had my 5th kid by the time I was 28 and look how much I 
saved!!! ") 
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15. That the Govt wants us to get married but when we rush to the ROM (Registrar of 
Marriage), we are not really ready for marriage (Cf. 8/6/97 Sunday Times front page). 
16. That according to a local MP, 24 year-olds and below should think carefully about 
getting married, but the ideal age for marriage is 26 and above. 
17. That HDB and ROM should consider merging to take advantage of economics of 
scale and unity of purpose. 
18. That Population control and Family Planning can be controlled with housing policies. 
19. That the Male Fertility problems can be cured with Guinness Stout (ad in ST6/6/97, 
p52). 
20. That plugging a housing loophole can also create a nice little profit. 
21. That marriage has nothing to do with love but whether we can find the $5000 to make 
a home we won't see till more than 4 years later. 
22. That we are told to look beyond material gains and materialism, but come Election 
Day, we are to look at the Rewards of Upgrading that come with voting correctly... 
23. That a 20-year-old sci-fi movie trilogy can be re-released after a little cleanup and still 
make tons of money. 
24. That despite HDB assurances, couple will still get registered to avoid the $5000 
deposit and the July 12 deadline because they are not sure when the HDB will 
change its collective mind again. 
25. That the way to increase the availability of cabs to be booked, even though many 
cabbies are turning off their satellite sets in protest, is to increase the booking 
charges to a point where less people want to use the booking service. 
26. That the way to encourage the use of public transportation and discourage the use of 
private cars is to increase the costs of transportation for ALL transportation. 
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